Bringing the Pieces Together to Build a Safer More Sustainable Community

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

An IED Attack in Monterrey

On Oct. 20, as a Mexican military patrol chased a vehicle carrying suspected cartel gunmen through the streets of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, an unidentified party remotely detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) placed in a parked car moments before the patrol passed by it. There were no reported deaths or injuries from the blast, but all of the gunmen in the vehicle escaped. Though this is the first IED attack Monterrey has witnessed, there have been other such attacks in Mexico within the past year or so. In July 2010, La Linea, the enforcement arm of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes cartel, set off an IED in a car in Ciudad Juarez, killing four people; between August and December 2010, the Gulf cartel deployed as many as six IEDs throughout Tamaulipas state; and in January 2011, a small IED detonated in Tula, Hidalgo state, injuring four people.
In the aftermath of such attacks, it is tempting for observers and the mainstream media to assume cartel violence in Mexico has reached an unprecedented level of escalation, and that an increased use of IEDs is all but certain. However, the Oct. 20 ambush, sophisticated though it was, actually showed some degree of restraint on the part of the planners, as did the IED attacks of the past year elsewhere in Mexico. Given the psychological impact and tactical effectiveness of IED use in a combat environment — and cartel personnel armed with the knowledge to construct sophisticated explosive devices — perhaps more astonishing than the occurrence of IED attacks is the fact that cartels do not conduct them with more regularity or on a greater magnitude than they have. That the cartels choose not to do so illustrates a calculated strategy aimed at staving off further American involvement and limiting negative domestic public opinion against them.

courtesy of El Universal

A Mexican soldier stands near the site of the Oct. 20 Monterrey blast

(click here to view interactive map)

Oct. 19

• The Mexican military seized a drug lab in Zapopan, Jalisco state. Approximately 27 metric tons of chemical precursors were discovered.
• Mexican authorities seized a heroin and cocaine processing lab in Xochitepec, Morelos state. Two individuals were detained in the operation.

Oct. 20

• An improvised explosive device in a vehicle exploded Oct. 20 as a Mexican military convoy passed by it in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, while pursuing gunmen. All the gunmen escaped.
• A police radio operator was killed by gunmen in a security hut in Veracruz city, Veracruz state. The operator was involved in an ongoing operation in Los Volcanes neighborhood. Police pursued the gunmen afterwards, killing one gunman and injuring another.
• The Mexican military detained five alleged Los Zetas members in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz state. Among the five was Rodrigo Herrera Valverde, a nephew of the former Veracruz state governor, Fidel Herrera Beltran.

Oct. 21

• A confrontation in Tancitaro, Michoacan state, between gunmen and the Mexican military left one soldier and three gunmen dead.
• Three individuals were executed in Apatzingan, Michoacan state. Their bodies were left with a narcomanta signed by the Knights Templar stating that the individuals died because of their behavior.

Oct. 22

• Police seized 42 kilograms of cocaine from a tractor-trailer near Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.
• Police arrested four suspected La Barredora members in Acapulco, Guerrero state.

Oct. 23

• A convoy of gunmen executed three individuals in Villa Ocampo, Durango state. The same convoy was reported driving through Las Nieves, Durango state, prior to the executions.
• Soria “El Hongo” Adrian Ramirez, leader of Cartel del Centro, was arrested in Ojo de Agua, Mexico state. Cartel del Centro is reportedly in territory disputes with the Knights Templar, La Familia Michoacan and La Mano Con Ojos.
• A confrontation between Mexican authorities and gunmen in Doctor Gonzalez, Nuevo Leon state resulted in the death of a Los Zetas plaza boss and the capture of three Los Zetas members. The plaza boss, Gabriel “El Cochiloco” Hernandez Hernandez, was responsible for the municipalities of La Laja and El Oregan in Nuevo Leon state.

STRATFOR

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Current Status of the Mexican Cartels

Sinaloa Federation

Over the past four months, the Sinaloa cartel, under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, has continued to control the bulk of its home state of Sinaloa, most of the border region in Sonora state and the majority of Chihuahua and Durango states. The cartel continues to pursue its strategic goals of expansion into or absorption of neighboring cartel territories and to import precursor chemicals, mostly from China, for its methamphetamine production in Sinaloa, Nayarit, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes and Jalisco states. These shipments typically are received in the Pacific coast port cities of Lazaro Cardenas and Manzanillo.
In addition to marijuana, Sinaloa is known to be smuggling high-value/low-volume methamphetamines, domestically produced heroin and Colombian cocaine into the United States via the plazas it directly controls at Tijuana, Mexicali, Nogales, Agua Prieta, Columbus and Santa Teresa (both in New Mexico), Rio Bravo, El Porvenir and Manuel Ojinaga as well as the Gulf-controlled plazas at Ciudad Mier, Miguel Aleman, Diaz Ordaz, Reynosa and Matamoros.
As we will further discuss in a separate section below, it appears that Sinaloa recently managed to co-opt the formerly independent Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), which until early September was believed to be strongly distrustful of El Chapo. It is clear that dynamic has changed. Regarding Sinaloa’s running battles to subdue the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes cartel (VCF, aka the Juarez Cartel) and take control of the Juarez plaza, the slow, long-term strangulation of the VCF remains in progress.
Sinaloa recently took two significant hits to its leadership when regional chief Jose Carlos Moreno Flores was captured by military forces in Mexico City in mid-September and Noel “El Flaco Salgueiro” Salgueiro Nevarez, leader of Sinaloa’s enforcer arm Gente Nueva, was captured in Culiacan, Michoacan state, in early October.
According to information released by Mexico’s Defense Secretariat, Moreno Flores ran Sinaloa’s Guerrero state operations in the cities of Chilpancingo, Jaleaca de Catalan, Izotepec, Pueblo Viejo, Buena Vista, Tlacotepec and Leonardo Bravo. He also controlled agricultural drug operations in Izotepec, Tlacotepec, Chichihualco and Chilpancingo.
Salgueiro Nevarez reportedly founded Gente Nueva and had led it since 2007. Also under his control were the Juarez street gangs Los Mexicles and Los Artistas Asesinos, which conduct operations against the Juarez cartel and its allies Los Aztecas. Salgueiro Nevarez also ran operational cells in Guerrero and Durango states. His removal may adversely affect Gente Nueva’s operational cohesion, though it is not yet clear whether he had a trusted lieutenant in the wings to replace him.

Gulf Cartel

In the last four months, it has become apparent that a schism within the CDG over divided loyalties may be evolving into a split with large and violent consequences. As discussed in the 2009 and 2010 annual cartel reports, CDG leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen continued to run the cartel from his federal prison cell in Mexico after his capture in March 2003. He was subsequently extradited to the United States, where he was convicted. Currently, he resides in the U.S. Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence, Colorado, where tight security measures make it difficult for him to maintain any control over his organization.
Following his removal from power-by-proxy, Osiel Cardenas Guillen was replaced as leader of the organization by a pair of co-leaders, his brother Antonio Ezequiel “Tony Tormenta” Cardenas Guillen and Jorge Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla Sanchez. This arrangement shifted when Antonio Cardenas Guillen was killed in a six-hour standoff with Mexican military forces in November 2010.
The split within the CDG that we are now watching began to a large extent with the death of Antonio Cardenas Guillen. At the time, it is believed that Rafael “El Junior” Cardenas, the nephew of Osiel and Antonio Cardenas Guillen, expected to replace his uncles as leader of the CDG. Instead, Costilla Sanchez assumed full control of the organization. The schism became wider as two factions formed, the Metros, which were loyal to Costilla Sanchez, and the Rojos, which were loyal to the Cardenas family.
While government operations against the CDG resulted in the capture of several plaza bosses over the last three months — Abiel “El R-2” Gonzalez Briones, Manuel “El Meme” Alquisires Garcia, Ricardo Salazar Pequeno and Jose Antonio “El Comandante” Martinez Silva — internal violence brought down one of the factional leaders. On Sept. 3, 2011, the body of Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego was found by authorities in Reynosa. Flores Borrego had been the trusted lieutenant of Costilla Sanchez and served as his second in command as well as Reynosa plaza boss. These two men were at the top of the Metros faction.
Then on Sept. 27, in a rather brazen hit on U.S. soil, gunmen in an SUV opened fire on another vehicle traveling along U.S. Route 83 east of McAllen, Texas. The driver, Jorge Zavala from Mission, Texas, who was connected to a branch of the Gulf Cartel, was killed. Though his role in the cartel is unclear, he is rumored to have been close to a senior Gulf plaza boss, Gregorio “El Metro 2” Sauceda Gamboa, who was arrested in April 2009. As indicated by his “Metro” nickname, Sauceda had been aligned with the faction of the Gulf cartel that supports Costilla Sanchez.
On Oct. 11, the Mexican navy reported that the body of Cesar “El Gama” Davila Garcia, the CDG’s head finance officer, was found in the city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas. According to a statement from the Ministry of the Navy, the body was found in a home, dead of a gunshot wound. El Gama had been Antonio Cardenas Guillen’s accountant, but after the 2009 death of Tony Tormenta, El Gama was made plaza boss of CDG’s port city of Tampico for a period of time, then placed back in Matamoros as the chief financial operator for the cartel. Many questions arise from this killing, but it could be another indication of internal CDG conflict.
Though the CDG split has been quietly widening for two years, the apparent eruption of internally focused violence during the past quarter indicates the division may be about to explode. The consequences of a violent rupture within the CDG likely include moves by Los Zetas and Sinaloa to take advantage of the situation and grab territory. This would further heighten violence beyond the already volatile conditions created by the three-way battle between Los Zetas, the CDG and government forces for control of Mexico’s northeast.

Arellano Felix Organization

Little has changed in the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) since July’s update on cartel activity in Tijuana, Baja California. The AFO (aka the Tijuana Cartel) is widely considered to be operating by permission of the Sinaloa cartel, an agreement suggested by a drop in the turf-war homicide rate in Tijuana. According to the Mexican federal government, deaths by homicide statewide in Baja California from January through August 2011 numbered 464, compared to 579 for the same period in 2010.
In mid-August, Mexican authorities arrested AFO member Juan Carlos Flores “El Argentino” in Tecate, Baja California. Carlos Flores indicated that he was subordinate to a man known only as “El Viejon,” who is second in command of the AFO, which is led by Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sanchez Arellano. On July 9, Mexican authorities arrested Armando “El Gordo” Villarreal Heredia, an AFO lieutenant who reported to Sanchez Arellano. Any significant gains or losses for the AFO have gone largely unnoticed since the cartel effectively operates as a Sinaloa vassal organization.
For the near term we do not expect significant changes within or related to the AFO, although given the cartel’s continued but discrete interaction with Los Zetas, we believe there will probably be a resurgence of open hostility by the AFO at some point to regain control of its plazas.

The Opposition

Los Zetas

Los Zetas continue to fight a large, multi-front war across Mexico. They are combatting the CDG, Sinaloa and Mexican government forces in the northeast while assisting the Juarez Cartel in holding Sinaloa forces back in Chihuahua state. Los Zetas are also taking control of additional territory in Zacatecas, pushing into Jalisco, Nayarit, Guerrero and Mexico states and battling Sinaloa in the southern states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. The organization is being hit hard by the Mexican military in its home territories in Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Coahuila and Veracruz states and fighting to hold the crucial plazas at Monterrey and the port of Veracruz against incursions by Sinaloa, CDG and CJNG.
Certainly, Los Zetas are being pressed on every side. What we find telling is that despite significant challenges to their ownership of Monterrey and Veracruz, Los Zetas do not appear to have been displaced, though we do expect violence to increase significantly in the near term as rival groups openly push into both cities. While Los Zetas have withdrawn from territory before — Reynosa in the spring of 2010 being a prime example — the loss of that plaza was not detrimental overall to the cartel’s operations, given its control of other plazas in the region and in Nuevo Laredo. However, we expect to see Los Zetas ramp up defensive efforts in Monterrey and Veracruz, two cities that have great strategic value for the cartel.
From July to mid-October, federal operations against Los Zetas in Veracruz, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosi and Quintana Roo states netted 17 cell leaders and plaza bosses, including Angel Manuel “Comandante Diablo” Mora Caberta in Veracruz, Jose Guadalupe “El Dos” Yanez Martinez in Saltillo and Carlos “La Rana” Oliva Castillo, reported to be the third in command of Los Zetas, in Saltillo. During a two-month operation in Coahuila, government forces also reportedly seized caches of weapons, ammunition, tactical gear and 27 tons of marijuana and freed approximately 97 kidnapped migrants.
Over the past four months, questions have emerged in the U.S. and Mexican security communities about the strength, cohesion and capabilities of Los Zetas. At times, information from open sources, government reports and confidential STRATFOR sources on both sides of the border has been contradictory — which tends to be the norm given the exceptionally fluid nature of the drug war. The question of whether Los Zetas are weakening has many factors, including leadership losses, gains or losses in territorial control, increases or decreases in apparent smuggling activities (which directly tie to revenue) and the quality and quantity of human resources.
As we discussed in July, the estimated 30 deserters from the Mexican army’s Special Forces Airmobile Group (GAFE) who originally formed the core cadre of Los Zetas have been shrinking in number. On July 3, one of the remaining 11 “Zeta Viejos” at large, Jesus Enrique “El Mamito” Rejon, was apprehended by Mexican Federal Police in Atizapan de Zaragoza, Mexico state. In the past decade, 15 members of the original core group have been reported captured and imprisoned and nine have been reported killed. It is not realistic to assume, however, that the organization has lost the specialized skillsets, training and knowledge that those particular individuals possessed.
When evaluating reports of captured or killed Zeta leaders and the effects those losses might have on the organization, it is important to consider what leaders remain, the size of the manpower pool (both in terms of trained foot soldiers and potential recruits) and the existence of training programs and infrastructure for the rank and file.
First, unlike the more traditional Mexican drug cartels, which tend to be family-centric, the Los Zetas organization is more of a meritocracy, and a number of later recruits have risen to leadership positions. Prime examples are Miguel “Z-40” Trevino Morales, who was recruited roughly two years after the group’s 1998 founding and has risen to No. 2 in the organization, and Carlos “La Rana” Oliva Castillo, reported to be the regional boss over the states of Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Coahuila, who joined Los Zetas in 2005 and was captured the first week of October 2011. In recent media reports of his capture, Oliva Castillo is described as the No. 3 leader in the organization behind Trevino Morales. While STRATFOR has yet to corroborate Oliva Castillo’s position in the cartel, if he did in fact replace captured third-in-command Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon, neither part of the founding group.
Second, it is known that Mexico’s Defense Secretariat “lost track” of as many as 1,700 special operations soldiers over the past 10 years, according to documents obtained from the Federal Institute for Access to Information by the Mexican newspaper Milenio. A March 8 Milenio article indicated that at least 1,680 Special Forces Airmobile Group (GAFE) soldiers had deserted in the past decade, including trained snipers, infantrymen and paratroopers with advanced survival and counternarcotics training.
It is not reasonable to assume that all of the GAFE deserters over the last decade went to work for Los Zetas or any of the other drug-trafficking organizations. However, it is reasonable to expect that, in an environment where cartels have had a wide presence and a demonstrated willingness to pay handsomely for highly skilled soldiers, a significant proportion of the GAFE deserters would sell their skills to the highest bidder and many would gravitate toward Los Zetas. If even one-third of the GAFE deserters chose to join any of Mexico’s cartels, there are likely dozens of highly skilled soldiers already in positions of authority or working their way up the Zeta organizational ladder (along with recruits from other Mexican military branches and law enforcement agencies).
While the organization long has recruited predominantly from military and law enforcement pools, which means most new recruits are already able to use basic firearms and understand fundamental tactics, the strength of Los Zetas comes from structured training in small-unit combat tactics at facilities modeled after GAFE training camps. According to STRATFOR sources with access to seized training materials, Zeta training includes basic marksmanship, fire-team drills and room-clearing techniques.
The thoroughness of Zeta training depends on the tempo of the drug war. Prior to about May 2010, Zeta camps in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and elsewhere operated with sufficient space and freedom for recruit training to last as long as six months. When the Mexican government and the CDG, Sinaloa and La Familia Michoacana (LFM) cartels began to press them on every side, Zeta recruit training was reduced. According to a captured Zeta foot soldier, basic training in early 2011 involved two weeks of boot camp in which rudimentary firearms skills were taught. The recruits were then mobilized to gain additional training on the battlefield. The net effect has been seen in such “loose cannon” events as the Falcon Lake shooting in September 2010 and the botched carjacking attack on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents travelling through San Luis Potosi in February 2011. Nevertheless, we expect that Los Zetas will ramp up training whenever possible since their continued success depends upon it.
What we find important in these dynamics is that Los Zetas have taken several big hits in the past several months but have managed to absorb the losses without any overall diminution of the organization’s size or reach, even though the persistent pressure has reduced the capabilities of rank-and-file Zeta operatives. The net effect has been the organization’s fairly static condition. Peripheral Zeta losses on the outskirts of Monterrey and Veracruz have been offset by recent gains in Zacatecas state and elsewhere. It certainly is possible, however, that the last months of 2011 may see an overall degradation of Los Zetas if CJNG and Sinaloa are successful in making inroads into Monterrey and Veracruz, and we expect the military to continue its operations against Los Zetas as well.

Cartel Pacifico Sur

Since the last cartel update, we have seen little activity by Cartel del Pacifico Sur (CPS). The cartel has suffered no significant arrests, and any violence associated with group has gone unnoticed in contested areas. This lack of reported losses and gains for CPS may be due to its alliance with Los Zetas, which attracts most of the media attention. There also is the possibility that, while Sinaloa and the Mexican government focus their efforts on Los Zetas, CPS is taking advantage of a lull in territorial battles to concentrate on smuggling activities and rejuvenate its revenue streams. We do not consider CPS to be marginalized at this point and will be watching for signs of activity during the last quarter of this year.

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization

Although constriction of the VCF continues, the cartel retains the loyalty of the approximately 8,000-member Azteca street gang, which has helped it hold on to Juarez and maintain control of the three primary ports of entry into the United States, all of which feed directly into El Paso, Texas. STRATFOR sources recently indicated that the VCF also retains supply lines for its marijuana and cocaine shipments and continues to push large quantities of narcotics across the border.
On July 29, Mexican authorities captured Jose Antonio “El Diego” Acosta Hernandez, the top leader of La Linea, the VCF’s enforcement arm. His position in the VCF hierarchy makes him difficult to replace. For the cartels, there is never a good time to lose an important figure, but the loss is felt even more acutely when the figure is the leader of a cartel’s armed wing and he is removed from the mix during a heated and prolonged battle for survival.
The whereabouts of Vicente Carrillo Fuentes and his closest lieutenants are unknown. At the beginning of 2011 there was an expectation that the level of violence associated with Sinaloa operations against the VCF would continue to escalate, given the indicators seen at the time. However, over the last eight to nine months we have seen cartel-related homicides drop significantly. It appears now, though, that violence again is on the rise in Juarez. Gun battles and targeted killings are increasing in the city, and STRATFOR sources in the region expect the current trend to continue through the end of 2011.

La Resistencia

La Resistencia was originally a confederation between enforcers from Guadalajara-based affiliates of the Sinaloa Federation, the Milenio Cartel and Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel’s faction, along with enforcers from the Gulf Cartel and LFM. The organization was intended to fight against Zeta incursions into Jalisco and Michoacan. Following the July 2010 death of Coronel, the alliance splintered as the LFM made a push to take over Guadalajara and Coronel’s followers blamed Sinaloa leader El Chapo Guzman for Nacho Coronel’s demise.
In the melee that followed, the Milenio Cartel was badly damaged by the arrests of high-profile leaders and by battles with the strongest of the splinter groups from Coronel’s organization, CJNG. Remnants of the Milenio Cartel have continued to use the La Resistencia name. Although La Resistencia was originally formed to combat Los Zetas, it recently announced an alliance with the group. If there is an alliance forming, it could help explain why CJNG, the enemy of La Resistencia, recently traveled across Mexico to target Zeta operatives in the port city of Veracruz.
La Resistencia has been hit hard by CJNG and the Mexican government, but an apparent alliance with Los Zetas raises questions regarding the transfer of skills and the potential for a significantly increased Zeta presence in La Resistencia’s area of operations. We will be watching this situation closely, since the dual dynamic of a Zeta-La Resistencia alliance and CJNG’s cross-country operation lead us to expect elevated violence over a substantial part of Mexico’s bi-coastal midsection.

Independent Operators

La Familia Michoacana

LFM continues to suffer losses at the hands of the Knights Templar and the Mexican government. On Oct. 5, LFM leader Martin Rosales Magana “El Terry” was captured in Mexico state, the most significant hit to the cartel’s leadership since Jesus “El Chango” Mendez’s fall in July. The Mexican Federal Police claims that the La Familia structure is disintegrating and the cartel no longer has much access to essential precursors in the production of methamphetamines. The continued losses indicate that LFM as an organization is nearing its end. However though LFM’s losses have hurt the organization, the cartel continues to show activity. In a raid in July, U.S. law enforcement agencies arrested 44 individuals in Austin, Texas, who allegedly were LFM members, though it remains unclear whether the cell in Austin worked for LFM or the Knights Templar.
There have been indications that remnants of LFM are continuing to seek an alliance with Los Zetas. Narcomantas signed by the Knights Templar were intended to send a message to El Terry, blaming him for aligning with Los Zetas. Following his arrest in early October, Mario Buenrostro Quiroz, the alleged leader of a Mexico City drug gang known as “Los Aboytes,” claimed in an on-camera interview that El Terry had sought an alliance with Los Zetas prior to his arrest. This claim followed reports that Jesus “El Chango” Mendez was also seeking an alliance with Los Zetas before being arrested. While the Mexican government denies LFM has achieved an alliance with Los Zetas, LFM will likely continue pressing for any advantage to stay alive as the Knights Templar continue trying to eradicate it.

The Knights Templar

One question that emerged over the last quarter is whether the Federal Police will increase its focus on Knights Templar operations. With LFM’s organizational decline, Federal Police will have more resources to target the Knights Templar in Michoacan and Mexico states. Federal Police Commissioner Facundo Rosas has suggested an imminent end to LFM and a shift in operations against the Knights Templar.
The Knights Templar have taken hits from Mexican federal forces, but there have been no indications that the group’s organizational structure has been seriously impacted. Arrested in September was one of the group’s principal members, Saul “El Lince” Solis Solis, the highest-level Knights Templar leader to fall in the third quarter. A number of other Knights Templar leaders were arrested in the third quarter, including Bulmaro “El Men” Salinas Munoz and Neri “El Yupo” Salgado Harrison. The effect of these arrests on the group’s operations remains unclear.
The Knights Templar continue to display narcomantas in Michoacan and Mexico states. In September, the cartel offered monetary rewards for information leading to the capture of certain individuals named on the banners (known LFM members who the Knights Templar claimed were aligned with Los Zetas).
The early October arrest of Los Aboytes gang leader Buenrostro Quiroz has raised questions about Knights Templar leadership. In the video of Buenrostro Quiroz being questioned by authorities, he said he met with Knights Templar leaders approximately a month before he was captured. He further claimed that Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez is still alive and heading the Knights Templar with Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez, former LFM plaza boss, as second in command. There has been no evidence supporting Buenrostro Quiroz’s claims, although Moreno Gonzalez’s body was never found when he was reported dead in December 2010. The prospect of Moreno Gonzales, the ideological founder of LFM, still being alive would explain to a large extent LFM’s immediate decline following the emergence of the Knights Templar in March.
The Knights Templar will continue to target LFM members in Michoacan and Mexico states, and as it takes over La Familia’s turf it will likely increase its methamphetamine production operations. Regardless of whether an alliance exists between LFM and Los Zetas, we anticipate increasing conflict between the Knights Templar and Los Zetas in the coming months due to both groups’ territorial aspirations.

Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion

When we began discussing Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion in the last quarterly update, we included it in the “Independent Operators” section. We took the cartel at its word, which had been made clear its publically released videos, that CJNG had declared war on all other cartels. The organization, based in Guadalajara, consists primarily of former Sinaloa members who had worked for Nacho Coronel and who believe that Nacho was betrayed by Sinaloa leader El Chapo Guzman Loera. However, recent activities by CJNG have greatly muddied our take on the group.
Between Sept. 20 and the first week in October, at least 67 bodies labeled as Zetas were dumped in Boca del Rio, a wealthy southern suburb of Veracruz. The first batch of 35 bodies was dumped in a busy traffic circle in broad daylight during afternoon rush hour. All of the killings were claimed by CJNG. We find this odd for two reasons: While it is not surprising that CJNG would go after Los Zetas, Veracruz is very much outside of CJNG’s home territory in Guadalajara, and CJNG appears to have conducted these operations in cooperation with the Sinaloa Federation. Therefore, it seems as though CJNG may have been co-opted by Sinaloa (though Sinaloa has not confirmed this).
However, as discussed in the Sinaloa and La Resistencia sections above, such a restructuring of affiliations makes sense, and we anticipate that CJNG’s links to other cartels will become increasingly clear over the next quarter.

On Oct. 12, Mexican authorities arrested Carlos “La Rana” Oliva Castillo, purported to be the No. 3 overall leader of Los Zetas, in Saltillo, Coahuila state. Allegedly in charge of the cartel’s operations in Tamaulipas, Coahuila and Nuevo Leon states, Oliva is believed to have authorized the mass killing of Guatemalan immigrants in May and the attack on Monterrey’s Casino Royale in August that killed 52 people. Oliva surrendered quietly without firing a single shot, though many of his subordinates reportedly engaged in firefights with authorities throughout the city to divert the soldiers’ attention away from Oliva’s safe-house so that he could escape. This is a tactic we have seen Mexican cartels and Los Zetas in particular frequently employ when a high-value target is in jeopardy.
Two days later, the Mexican military and federal police arrested Marco “El Chabelo” Garza de Leon Quiroga, also known as Jose Andres Mireles Quiroz, a Zetas member reportedly in charge of several municipalities, such as Sabinas Hidalgo and Vallecillos Agualeguas, Nuevo Leon state, as well as part of Coahuila state. At least nine people were killed in the shootout leading to his arrest, and 10 other cartel members, including Jorge “El Exterminador” Gamiz Vega, were arrested with Garza.
The arrests are part of a continuing trend in the Mexican government’s assault against what most observers perceive to be the most violent cartels operating in the country, Los Zetas in particular. While the government has conducted successful operations against Zetas territory in the Yucatan and Veracruz of late, it has been more active over the past three months in the cartel’s strongholds in the northeast.
In June, military operations in Coahuila state led to the seizure of a large amount of narcotics and weaponry belonging to the Zetas. According to a Mexican military spokesman, a law enforcement offensive that began in August in the three northern states has resulted in 724 arrests, the freeing of 36 kidnapping victims and the seizure of 1,629 guns, 165 grenades and more than 27.5 tons of marijuana. As recently as Oct. 16, the Mexican military freed 61 men outside Piedras Negras, Coahuila state, who were being held captive by the Zetas for forced labor. That operation also uncovered 6 tons of marijuana.
In addition to these setbacks in inventory, Zetas’ leadership has also been facing heavy losses, as has the group’s general membership. The arrest of Zetas founding member Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon hurts the cartel, as does the arrest of Oliva, who is behind only Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano and Miguel Trevino in the cartel’s power structure. As the government continues to damage the Zetas operationally and kill or arrest many of their senior leaders, the cartel increasingly will need to replenish its ranks. This raises the question of how and with whom the Zetas will replace their losses in personnel.
Such losses, compounded by the fact the Zetas are fighting a war on multiple fronts against the military and cartel rivals, are difficult for any group to overcome. At present, the Zetas are not in any real danger of dissolving, but there are rumors of fracturing within the organization. How long the group can endure the pressure it is under will be contingent upon its ability to replace its personnel.

Limitations in Finding Replacements

On Oct. 13, Colombian police arrested four Colombian citizens suspected of having ties to Los Zetas. The individuals reportedly were part of a cocaine trafficking ring that smuggled its product by sea to Central America, North America and Europe. According to reports, the Colombians were former military personnel used to train Zetas recruits.
Formed by defectors from the Mexican army’s Special Forces Airmobile Group, Los Zetas have enjoyed strong, capable and organized leadership, especially at the senior level. But in light of the Mexican military’s operational successes over the past year, Los Zetas’ leadership is becoming depleted — only six of the founding members remain at large. In the past, attempts to repopulate the group’s ranks have led the Zetas to turn to the Mexican military as well as outside military entities for recruitment and training. Replacing soldiers with members of these groups is a logical move, given that defections from the military are commonplace. But it is very difficult to replace top-tier leaders with members of foreign militaries due to several limitations.
That is not to say recruiting outside personnel, such as Colombian military personnel or the oft-used Guatemalan Kaibiles, is without utility. Such groups or individuals are indeed useful for training purposes, protective detail or assassination squads, and they make for good operatives in locations where a cartel wants to expand. Kaibiles, for example, are effective proxies for Zetas operations in Guatemala because they are native to the area, have pre-existing support networks and blend in with the population. Colombians have long been smuggling cocaine into Mexico and are thus more practiced in that process (Mexico is not a producer of coca). Zetas from Mexico possess none of these advantages when operating in Guatemala or Colombia.
However, foreign military personnel have limited value in other capacities when used in Mexico. As assassins operating inside Mexico, their utility is mitigated by virtue that they are foreign; in other words, they stand out among the local population, making them easy for Mexican authorities and rival cartels to identify. Moreover, they lack the understanding of the areas in which they operate, whereas natives are more attuned to the culture and geography of the city or region — a critical advantage when smuggling narcotics or plotting cartel-related attacks. This makes it extremely difficult for a foreigner to operate freely or become a plaza boss in Mexico, at least overtly.
As key members of the Zetas leadership continue to fall, finding suitable replacements is all the more critical if the group wants to continue to enjoy its successes of the past. Ideally, replacements would come from the same source of talent the original members came from — Mexican special operations forces. Forces from foreign militaries may be an attractive option, but it is an option beset by limitations.

(click here to view interactive map)

Oct. 11

• Mexican authorities arrested 35 individuals with alleged links to Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal during a raid at a nightclub in Mexico City.
• Four decapitated bodies were found in the cities of Acapulco and Atoyac de Alvarez, Guerrero state, with narcomantas at the scenes. Signed “El Chapo,” the nickname of Sinaloa Federation leader Joaquin Guzman Loera, the narcomantas denounced extortionists.
• A video released on the Internet by the hacker group Anonymous threatened Mexican criminal cartels by releasing the identities of police officers, journalists and taxi drivers who collude with cartels. The video mentions that Los Zetas had kidnapped a member of their group and demanded his return. The video also mentions possible consequences for the cartels on Nov. 5.

Oct. 12

• Cesar “El Gama” Davila Garcia, Gulf cartel plaza boss for Tampico, Tamaulipas state, was found dead by Mexican authorities in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.
• Mexican authorities in Saltillo, Coahuila state, arrested Los Zetas No. 3 Carlos “La Rana” Oliva Castillo.
• A group of gunmen with assault rifles killed the municipal police commander in Navolato, Sinaloa state.
• Gunmen killed three state prosecutors in front of a school in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.

Oct. 13

• A three-hour confrontation between police and gunmen left five gunmen dead and several injured in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.

Oct. 14

• Mexican authorities arrested 11 municipal police officers during a shift change in Sabinas Hidalgo, Nuevo Leon state.
• A police officer was killed when a group of gunmen in multiple vehicles attacked three police officers on a street in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon state.

Oct. 15

• A prison riot in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, left 20 dead and 12 injured.
• Mexican authorities announced the arrest of Jose Andres Mireles Quiroz, alias Marco “El Chabelo” Garza de Leon Quiroga, a Zetas plaza boss for multiple cities within Nuevo Leon and Coahuila states.

Oct. 16

• Mexican authorities announced the recovery of 61 kidnapped victims in Piedras Negras, Coahuila state. The victims were being held in a safe-house by Los Zetas for use in forced labor.

Oct. 17

• Addressed to Mexican President Felipe Calderon, a narcomanta was hung from a bridge in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, asking which group was responsible for the massacre in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

La Familia Michoacana’s Presence in Austin

On Oct. 8, the Austin American-Statesman published a report on the presence of a Mexican drug cartel operating within the city. According to the report, the La Familia Michoacana (LFM) cartel has strong ties to Austin, Texas, because of a sizable contingency of expatriates from Luvianos, a city located in Mexico’s Michoacan state from which the cartel originated and took its name.
The presence of Mexican cartels in the United States understandably represents a serious concern for U.S. citizens, and is an issue STRATFOR and the U.S. mainstream media follow closely. A grasp on cartel origins and relationships is vital to understanding the Mexican cartel landscape, and we believe we can provide some clarity to help address the issue posited by the report: Does LFM actually operate in Austin? Essential to addressing that question is a cursory explanation of how LFM has evolved and how it currently exists.
LFM began as a vigilante group that sought to protect the citizens of Michoacan state from encroaching cartels. At some point in the mid-2000s, they began engaging in their own drug trafficking operations, adopting a quasi-religious, cult-like ideology. In 2009, then-Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora labeled LFM the most violent organized criminal group in Mexico, a statement that was made amid an offensive against Los Zetas, LFM’s archrival at the time.
The organization began to experience serious setbacks in December 2010, when the Mexican government announced the death of LFM leader Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez. Then in March 2011, banners appearing in the Michoacan cities of Morelia, Zitacuaro and Apatzingan said an LFM offshoot calling itself the Knights Templar would replace its predecessor as the dominant cartel in the area. Notably, the Knights Templar also adopted a quasi-religious ideology, even issuing a comprehensive code of conduct for its members. The splintering of LFM and the Knights Templar resulted in all-out war between the two, with LFM on the losing side. The LFM lost multiple leaders, including Jose “El Chango” Mendez Vargas, who led the LFM faction after the original group broke apart. Between the Knights Templar and the Mexican government, the LFM faction has been decimated. The government has gone so far as to say the original LFM has effectively ceased to exist.
At present, the Knights Templar are faring much better than LFM in the struggle. They are demonstrably the stronger and more capable of the two. But the distinction between the two often goes unnoticed in or is otherwise not clearly delineated by the mainstream media. Therefore, if a cartel from Michoacan state is operating in Austin, it is likely the Knights Templar, as LFM is in disarray and probably lacks the resources to traffic large quantities of narcotics on its own.
That is not to say it is impossible for LFM to be operating in the Texas capital, as the Austin American-Statesman article suggests. The fact that LFM is losing the battle against the Knights Templar has given rise to rumors that the former has sought an alliance with the Zetas. (Mexican government officials have said any alliance between the two has fallen through.) If the smaller LFM faction of the original group is operating in Austin and if the rumors of the alliance are true, then the Zetas are likely working closely with the faction to move narcotics in and through the Texas capital.

Continued Threat of Paramilitary Groups

The recent killings in Veracruz, including the dumping of some 35 alleged members of Los Zetas on a main road in the city, has garnered a great deal of attention from the media, which subsequently have labeled the group that claimed responsibility for the killings — the Matazetas, or Zetas killers — a “paramilitary group.” Indeed, many in the media have characterized such paramilitary groups as an emerging threat in Mexico.
The existence of paramilitary groups in Mexico is nothing new, and there appears to be a misconception as to what qualifies as a paramilitary group. STRATFOR has long considered several groups in Mexico to be paramilitary groups, which, broadly speaking, can be defined as groups that utilize military-grade weaponry and maintain a military-style hierarchy but are not part of the country’s formal military.
In this context, Los Zetas, the Matazetas (the enforcement arm of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion), Los Pelones and La Gente Nueva (both enforcers for the Sinaloa Federation) all are paramilitary organizations. The Sinaloa Federation recruited from the Mexican military to create La Gente Nueva. When the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels were avowed enemies from 1998 to 2010, the Gulf cartel leadership sought to build a similar organization and began specifically recruiting from the Mexican army’s Special Forces Airborne Group, which became Los Zetas.
By the broadest definition of paramilitary, all armed, organized and hierarchically structured cartels and crime groups in Mexico can be referred to as paramilitary groups. They all possess and use a wide variety of weaponry, the bulk of which is considered military-grade, and they all have been conducting armed operations against a ruling power — the Mexican military and federal police — and/or against an occupying power — rival cartels.
Mexico has seen multiple paramilitary groups for over a decade. The acts of the Metazetas, while sensational in their violence, do not represent a growing trend; they represent a continuing trend.

(click here to view interactive map)

Oct. 4

• Mexican special operations forces captured Noel “El Flaco” Salgueiro Nevarez, founder and leader of La Gente Nueva, in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. La Gente Nueva is an armed branch of the Sinaloa Federation operating primarily in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.
• Mexican authorities captured six members of Los Zetas in Jalisco state.

Oct. 5

• Mexican authorities announced the arrest of Martin “El Terry” Rosales Magana, a founder of La Familia Michoacana. Rosales was arrested in Las Juntas, Mexico state.
• Mexican soldiers and customs agents seized about $915,000 from a vehicle at a checkpoint near the U.S. border in Tijuana, Baja California state.
• Gunmen attacked a family in their home in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, leaving four dead and three injured. Among the dead was a two-year-old child.

Oct. 7

• A decapitated body was found with a narcobanner in Ciudad Altamirano, Guerrero state. The banner was addressed to political leaders, including President Felipe Calderon. The message threatened the families of political leaders who support La Barredora, a criminal organization aligned with the Sinaloa Federation. The message also blames La Barredora for extorting teachers in Guerrero state.
• Mexican authorities seized a camp in Vallecillo, Nuevo Leon state, used by drug traffickers. Approximately 40 individuals fled the camp as the authorities entered. At the camp, authorities discovered camouflage military uniforms and Mexican marine insignias, along with communication equipment.
• Mexican marines arrested 20 individuals thought to be members of criminal organizations in Veracruz. Eight of the individuals belonged to Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, and twelve belonged to Los Zetas.

Oct. 8

• A firefight between the Mexican military and gunmen erupted in Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas state. It was reported that Juan Reyes “R1” Mejia Gonzalez, a Gulf cartel leader, was among those killed.
• Ten bodies were discovered in two locations in Veracruz state. Seven bodies were discovered in a truck in Laguna Real, while three bodies were discovered on a road in Colinas de Sante Fe.

Oct. 10

• Gunmen shot and killed six police officers as they rode in a vehicle to Valparaiso, Zacatecas state. The police officers were returning from a party.

Alleged Gulf Cartel Member Killed

Around 2 a.m. Sept. 27, gunmen in an SUV opened fire on another vehicle traveling along U.S. Route 83 east of McAllen, Texas. The driver was hit multiple times, lost control and crashed his vehicle. The driver died, while law-enforcement sources say a passenger accompanying him was wounded and remains in serious condition.
The driver of the vehicle, identified as Jorge Zavala from Mission, Texas, was reported by Mexican and U.S. media outlets to be connected to a branch of the Gulf cartel, which is currently experiencing an internal power struggle between rival claimants for leadership. Zavala’s role in the cartel is unclear, but he is rumored to have been close to a senior plaza boss who was arrested in 2009 by Mexican authorities. U.S. investigators have said the shooting was not a random act. Given Zavala’s apparent connection to the cartel, it is possible that the gunmen responsible were acting on behalf of a rival faction.
The shooting reportedly took place minutes after Zavala was seen leaving a strip club in Edinburg, Texas. According to witnesses at the club quoted by local media, the suspected perpetrators were also at the club and may have followed him out. After attacking Zavala’s vehicle, the gunmen are believed to have crossed into Mexico.
Zavala is believed to have been associated with Gregorio “El Metro 2” Sauceda Gamboa, a Gulf plaza boss arrested in April 2009. Before his arrest Sauceda was aligned with the faction of the Gulf cartel that supports Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla Sanchez, the current leader of the group, against Rafael “Junior” Cardenas, the nephew of former Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen. After Osiel was captured in 2003, his brother Antonio Cardenas Guillen took over co-leadership of the group with Costilla. Following Antonio’s death in November 2010, Costilla became the Gulf cartel’s sole leader. The recent killing of Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego, the cartel’s second in command and a Costilla ally, on Sept. 3 was likely part of the same internal fight and further evidence of a split between the two factions.
Rafael Cardenas felt that as a blood relative of Osiel he was the rightful leader of the group. Tensions between those loyal to him and those loyal to Costilla have caused a growing rift within the cartel. Whoever shot Zavala may have known of his association with Sauceda and extrapolated from this that he was also part of the cartel faction loyal to Costilla. This would point to gunmen loyal to Cardenas’ faction as the parties likely responsible for Zavala’s shooting.

What Constitutes Cross-Border Violence?

The killing of Zavala, a suspected cartel operative, on the U.S. side of the border provides a good opportunity to examine how cross-border violence is defined — a question with different answers, depending on who one asks.
Technically speaking, the incident would appear to match most definitions. While in the United States, suspected Mexican cartel gunmen, acting at the direction of their leaders or autonomously, targeted an individual believed to be connected to a rival group, attacked him and then reportedly returned to Mexico. Those in the law enforcement community define as cross-border violence any incident of violence perpetrated by the cartels or by independent smuggling organizations operating in the trans-border region — whether the targets are civilians, authorities or rival cartel members.
These authorities use this definition for two main reasons. The first is to raise awareness about the threat posed by cartels and to educate the public on how to take precautions and instill proactive behavior in areas where cartels are known to be active. The second, more pragmatic, reason is to draw attention to the heavy security burden placed on law enforcement authorities on the border. By defining activity as cross-border violence, law enforcement authorities can solicit more funding from local, state and federal governments to redress the problem. Some politicians, especially at the state level and in the U.S. Congress, also tend to categorize cross-border violence in this manner, as seen in the recently released report by retired U.S. generals Barry McCaffrey and Robert Scales — a report commissioned by the Texas state government.
However, other politicians — especially at the county and municipal government levels — and businesses are often more reluctant to describe incidents like the one detailed above as cross-border violence. As with law enforcement authorities, money is also a central concern for these actors, albeit for a different reason. Local governments and businesses have an interest in downplaying the threat posed by cartels because it can scare off tourists or commercial opportunities. In addition, outspoken citizens and business owners may fear to discuss these issues because of the threat of retaliation. When attacks involve only cartel members, politicians and businesses can make the case that only those involved somehow in the drug trade are being subjected to violence and that uninvolved civilians have little reason to be concerned. Some of these authorities can and do pressure law enforcement officers to downplay any reference of cross-border violence.
There are exceptions to these general stances on the definition of cross-border violence — tourist destinations do advise visitors on taking safety precautions, and law enforcement authorities have downplayed the threat when appropriate to avoid causing an inordinate amount of worry on the part of the public — but each side typically does define cross-border violence in a way that safeguards its own interests.
The reality of the situation is that the border is an artificial line. Any place where drugs are shipped across borders is likely to experience a higher level of this kind of violence than somewhere more distant from drug-trafficking routes. For the most part, the cartels appear to avoid targeting U.S. citizens and law enforcement for fears of drawing a harsh response from the United States. However it is defined, cross-border violence has not reached the level where it is prompting the U.S. federal government to use more drastic measures to thwart it.

(click here to view interactive map)

Sept. 27

• Matazetas, the armed wing of Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, released a video statement recorded Sept. 24, denouncing Los Zetas and stating that the Matazetas sole purpose was to eradicate the group.
• Gunmen launched a grenade at a state police building in San Bernabe, Nuevo Leon state, leaving two bystanders injured.

Sept. 28

• Mexican authorities in San Luis Potosi detained eight Los Zetas members, including three women.

Sept. 29

• Banners left in undisclosed locations in Santiago, Nuevo Leon state, threatened to attack schools in the area with grenades.
• Narcomantas signed by the Knights Templar were posted in Zihuatanejo, Guerrero state, announcing their presence in the area. The banners stated the Knights Templar would not allow extortion or kidnapping in the area.

Sept. 30

• Mexican marines arrested approximately 50 police officers in various municipalities. The municipalities include Acultzingo, Ciudad Mendoza, Nogales and Rio Blanco.
• Mexican authorities in Zapopan, Jalisco state, arrested a member of Los Zetas allegedly involved in the Casino Royale attack in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

Oct. 1

• A battle between armed groups occurred in the evening in Boca del Rio, Veracruz state. Witnesses in the area claimed the armed groups used machine guns in the fight.
• Two men in Boca del Rio, Veracruz state, disappeared after refusing to pay extortion fees demanded by state and municipal police officers.
• Federal police seized 882 kilograms (about 1,900 pounds) of marijuana from a vehicle with Texas license plates in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.

Oct. 2

• Armed men in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, attacked a family of four traveling in a truck with Texas license plates. Three of the family members were killed.
• A mother, two children, and an unidentified woman were gunned down at an intersection in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.

Oct. 3

• Three unidentified men in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, were executed behind a grocery store. The victims were pulled out of their vehicles and lined up along the wall of the store before being executed.
• Three decapitated bodies were discovered in Torreon, Coahuila state. The victims’ heads were located approximately 100 meters (330 feet) away from the bodies.
• Two human heads were discovered along a road in Mexico City.

STRATFOR

The Games

Guadalajara is actually set to host two major international sporting events: the Pan American Games from Oct. 14 to Oct. 30 and the Parapan American Games from Nov. 12 to Nov. 20. We will focus on the higher-profile Pan American Games. Though the overall visitor presence in the region will be smaller for the Parapan American Games, the same venues will be used and the same dynamics will be in play.
Athletes from 42 countries will compete in 46 sporting events in Guadalajara and several outlying venues. The opening and closing ceremonies will be held Oct. 14 and Oct. 30, respectively, in Omnilife Stadium, adjacent to the athletes’ village in northeast Guadalajara.

Athletes’ village with Omnilife Stadium in background

click here to enlarge

The Cartel Wars

As laid out in our 2010 Cartel Annual Report, and in the first quarter and second quarter updates for 2011, the cartel wars have been escalating across the length and breadth of Mexico, increasing in complexity over the last year and a half. Guadalajara and Jalisco state play a key role in that struggle, as they occupy a strategic location offering control of both north-south and east-west smuggling routes, proximity to huge opium poppy and marijuana growing regions (and thereby control of access to those regions) and access to the huge domestic drug market of Guadalajara itself.
Smuggling has long been a lucrative source of income along the U.S.-Mexican border, whether it was alcohol during the Prohibition era in the 1920s or guns, narcotics or illegal immigrants today. The flow of South American cocaine that shifted to Mexico after interdiction efforts in the Caribbean were ramped up in the 1980s dramatically increased this profitability. The Mexican smugglers who benefited most from this shift included Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and Rafael Caro Quintero, who would go on to form a Guadalajara-based organization known as the Guadalajara cartel. This group became the most powerful narcotics-smuggling organization in the country and perhaps the world, controlling virtually all of the narcotics being smuggled into the United States from Mexico.
The Guadalajara cartel was dismantled after the United States and Mexico reacted to the group’s 1985 kidnapping, torture and murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration special agent Enrique Camarena. From the remnants of the Guadalajara cartel, however, emerged smaller organizations that would become the Arellano Felix Organization (aka Tijuana cartel), the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (aka the Juarez cartel), the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa cartel. The large number of major cartel organizations that grew out of the Guadalajara cartel demonstrates the immense power and geographic reach the group once wielded.
Even after the demise of the Guadalajara cartel, the city of Guadalajara remained important for drug smuggling operations due to its location in relation to Mexico’s highway and railroad systems and its proximity to Mexico’s largest port in Manzanillo. The port plays an important role in cocaine smuggling and has become a very important point of entry for precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. For many years, the Sinaloa cartel faction headed by Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal was in charge of the Guadalajara plaza. Although Guadalajara and the state of Jalisco continued to be an important component of the cocaine trade, El Nacho became known as “the king of crystal” due to his organization’s heavy involvement in the methamphetamine trade.
Until July 2010, Guadalajara was relatively stable and prosperous under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and El Nacho, who directly ran that region of western Mexico. Violence began to escalate sharply as factions within the Sinaloa organization fought to take control when El Nacho’s killing that month left a power vacuum. Along with the opium and marijuana farm assets in the region, large methamphetamine production, operations and distribution networks have been based in many portions of Jalisco state, including within the city of Guadalajara. El Nacho’s nephew Martin Beltran Coronel took over operations in the region on behalf of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, the leader of the Sinaloa cartel.
Transitions in the narcotics world rarely go smoothly, and indeed at least five other cartels and organizations are fighting to wrest control from Sinaloa (and everyone else). They are La Resistencia and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, both based in Guadalajara; Los Zetas; the Knights Templar; and Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS).

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Crime

As always, when traveling in Mexico, it is important for visitors to maintain good situational awareness and to take precautions in order to reduce the threat of becoming a victim of a crime. In most cases, visitors will be more vulnerable to criminals out to make a quick buck than to cartel violence. Pickpockets, muggers, counterfeit ticket scalpers and express kidnappers will all be looking for easy targets during the games, so security precautions need to be taken.
Guadalajara, as all of Mexico, has a declining security environment. According to the OSAC’s 2011 Guadalajara crime and security report, crimes of all types have increased in Guadalajara over the past year, including both violent and petty crime. Mexico has a problem with corruption, especially at lower levels of their police forces, something that must be taken into account when dealing with police officers.
Criminals will consider the Pan American Games a target-rich environment. They will assume security at the venues will be high, although pickpockets and other petty criminals will be working the crowds. Most security measures at the venue will be for major crimes, and professional thieves will have little trouble blending in. Criminals will be even more active on public transportation, around tourist hot spots and restaurants and bars.
Criminals in Mexico are usually looking for the easiest way to make money. They will therefore look for signs that a potential target is wealthy and displays low situational awareness. In Mexico, foreigners are perceived as being wealthy — if they were not, they would not be traveling. Some indicators of a person of means include expensive clothing or accessories, especially watches and shoes. Cellphones, nice wallets and large amounts of cash also catch the attention of criminals, and purses or bags left on the ground or hanging off chairs are easy targets. Criminals also look for backpacks or other bags not strapped across the chest. A common technique is to use a razor blade to slice open the bag and remove its contents when the victim is distracted. The easiest place for this type of criminal to operate is on public transportation or in crowds because of the compact nature of the setting and the inability of victims to identify who stole their items.
Some criminals will loiter around money exchange operations. To exchange money, one must of course bring the money into sight, and thieves can see how much a victim has and where he or she keeps it. Such criminals will sometimes use weapons, although it is typically unnecessary in such a target-rich environment as the Pan American Games. As evidenced through Mexico’s drug war, it should be assumed that a criminal who draws a weapon intends to use it.
Thieves and kidnappers also target ATMs that are not inside a bank, hotel lobby or other secure location. They can set up “dummy” ATMs, typically putting a false front on top of the actual ATM, or a smaller external card reader devices on top of the existing card slot, that will read and store the card’s data as it passes through to the ATM’s functioning card reader. They then use either a camera hidden behind the ATM or a scanner to capture the PIN number of the credit or debit card. This procedure is known as “skimming.”
Some taxi drivers are criminals or are working with criminals involved in kidnappings, theft or worse. At minimum, a driver could take a visitor to a dangerous part of town and blackmail him to return home. At worst, the driver could become violent or assist in a kidnapping.
Kidnappers also conduct surveillance near ATMs, watching for potential targets of express kidnappings. Criminals will typically seize and hold the victim until bank accounts are emptied, which can sometimes take several days. The kidnappers may also want a ransom to be paid, which of course makes the situation more complicated. The victim is in many cases released, but not always. There will be many executives in attendance at the games who are directly involved as representatives of the large multinational corporate sponsors of the Pan American Games. While these individuals will have protective details with them, some of the kidnapping-for-ransom organizations in Mexico may be watching for opportunities to snatch high-value targets — and not just at the public venues.
Criminals find inebriated victims easy prey. It is very common for Mexican thieves to target local nightspots known for attracting tourists. Date rape drugs can be used not only for rape but for robbery as well. In such scenarios, criminals typically watch for someone to stop paying attention to his or her drink, at which point they slip the pill in the bottle or cup and wait. Criminals also seek people who are alone or who display poor awareness, especially at night. If a potential target is listening to headphones or otherwise not paying attention to their surroundings, they are more inviting for criminals. Criminals also will look for targets who are isolated, away from public view or in a location where there is little or no chance of escape.

The Terrorist Threat

STRATFOR does not expect any large-scale terrorist attacks from Islamist or jihadi groups for several reasons. First, the games are not being held in the United States or another Western country where jihadist terrorist groups tend to seek targets. Second, because there is an existing cartel war, security for the Pan American Games will be as tight as the host and guest countries can make it. Also, the jihadist threat today in the Western Hemisphere predominantly emanates from grassroots cells and lone actors. Such operatives are unlikely to attack a highly secured target. Third, while press from across the world will be covering the events, there will be few viable targets within the demonstrated preferences for Islamist groups. As for other special-interest terrorist groups, we see a low likelihood for the appearance of anti-technology, animal rights, earth-rights or Marxist groups — however, they cannot be ruled out. In August, an anti-nanotechnology group sent two parcel bombs to two universities in Mexico City. One of the explosive devices seriously injured two professors. The same group claimed responsibility for a third parcel that was not ever found or reported as having detonated. The bottom line is that while there is the potential for one or more small-scale attacks, terrorist attacks as a whole are rather unlikely.

Miscellaneous Security Issues and Disaster Response

One element of the overall security environment facing the competitors, spectators and officials attending the Pan American Games is not of human making or intent. Guadalajara sits just east of a significant and rather active tectonic subduction zone. The western coastal region within 320 kilometers of Guadalajara has been hit four times by earthquakes over magnitude 7.5 in the last 80 years — two in June 1932, one in September 1985 and most recently in January 2003.
Because of that potential, and the desire to entice future tourism with demonstrated security and precautions, the government of Mexico probably will have a relatively decent earthquake response program in place. It is likely that visitors will see many well-placed placards in the venues, in multiple languages, offering earthquake safety information. Following the instructions found there would be wise in the event of a significant earthquake during the games.
Fire is also a serious concern in the developing world, and visitors to Guadalajara staying in hotels need to ensure that they know where the fire exits are located — and that those fire exits are not blocked or locked.
First-time visitors to Mexico will find that the traffic in Mexico’s cities is terrible — and Guadalajara is no exception. More often than not, there is little regard given to traffic lanes, traffic signals, stop signs or other standard traffic laws that are commonly conformed to in the West. Traffic congestion and traffic accidents are quite common.
Visitors to Mexico also need to be mindful of the poor quality of the country’s water and the possibility of contracting a waterborne illness from drinking water or from eating improperly prepared food. Privately operated medical facilities in Mexico are well-equipped for all levels of medical care, and foreign visitors should choose private over public (government-operated) health care facilities. Private medical services can also stabilize a patient and facilitate a medical transfer to another country (such as the United States), should the need arise.

Security Preparation

According to media and U.S. State Department sources, Mexican authorities are coordinating security for the Pan American Games with federal police forces, Jalisco state police, municipal police and elements of both the naval and army branches of the Mexican military. Mexico will provide some 10,000 security personnel (5,000 of whom will be federal police) and will be responsible for securing the competition venues as well as increasing the presence of law enforcement in tourist areas and around hotels and the airport. Military assets will be patrolling the roads and probably providing supplemental forces in the largest venues as well as those in the outlying municipalities where there may be less of a police presence.
According to STRATFOR sources in the Mexican media, the Jalisco state government allocated 100 million pesos ($7.26 million) to augment security in the metropolitan area. The funding covered the additional manpower needed and the acquisition of security equipment such as metal detector portals, drug and explosives detection equipment, and vehicles and special uniforms for the security forces. Sources also indicated that canine units will be on patrol, along with airborne assets providing coverage with Blackhawk and Colibri helicopters. All ground and air security assets will be networked, and federal elements will have a real-time connection with the Federal Command Center in Mexico City. The overall security program is reported to cover all pertinent areas: sports venues, hotels, airports, highways, training facilities and host cities. Additionally, as some of the sports delegations were expected to ship their equipment by sea, security will be augmented at the ports of Manzanillo and Veracruz.
The construction of the Pan Am athletes’ village, recently completed, includes perimeter security walls and a controlled entry, as seen in the architect’s rendering.

Bird’s eye view of Pan Am athletes’ village

Body Dumps of Zetas Members in Veracruz

The bodies of nearly 50 people with suspected ties to Los Zetas, including 35 dumped in one location along a main road, have been found since Sept. 20 throughout Veracruz, Veracruz state. The discovery of the bodies comes only a few weeks after the Mexican navy dismantled a large Zetas communications network Sept. 8 in Veracruz state.
Though it is not clear at this point who was responsible for the body dumps, these incidents indicate that the cartel war is intensifying in Veracruz and that the Zetas are taking the brunt of the action from both other cartels and Mexican authorities.
On Sept. 20 around 5 p.m., two flatbed trucks with 35 bodies (23 men and 12 women) were left on a roundabout near Manuel Avila Camacho Boulevard in Boca del Rio, a southern suburb of Veracruz. Most of the bodies were piled in the trucks, with a few surrounding the vehicles. Photos of the incident indicated the victims had been dead for some time. It is believed almost all of the victims were killed by suffocation.

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Sept. 20

• During the celebration of the 415th anniversary of the founding of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, gunmen scattered the remains of Topo Chico prison guards in Monterrey. A narcomanta was left with one of the bodies, but authorities have not released the contents of the message.
• Mexican authorities arrested 10 federal police officers for extortion in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The arrest came after a tip by a junkyard owner who stated the police officers threatened to force him to transport drugs if he did not pay them $3,000 within a year.
• Mexican authorities announced the arrest of a high-level leader of the Knights Templar, Saul “El Lince” Solis Solis. The leader was arrested a day prior in Nueva Italia, Michoacan state.
• The bodies of at least 40 alleged Los Zetas members were dumped near a major road in Veracruz. Some of the bodies were suspended from a post along the road while the rest were either in two flatbed trucks or nearby on the road. A narcomanta displayed between the two trucks denounced extortion and the killing of innocent people.
• The Mexican military arrested 19 Los Zetas members in Anahuac, Nuevo Leon state. All were shown to the public wearing camouflage uniforms.

Sept. 21

• In four separate attacks, gunmen attacked three police stations, injuring six police officers, in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. After one of the attacks, gunmen launched another attack against federal police sent to reinforce one of the attacked police stations.
• Approximately 30 gunmen in five to seven vehicles assisted in the escape of two people who had been detained in a juvenile detention facility on the Zacatecas-Guadalajara highway in Zacatecas state.
• Gunmen attempted to kidnap the Benito Juarez municipal police chief in Paseos Kabah, Quintana Roo state.

Sept. 22

• Fifteen executed bodies were placed in various locations in Pedro I Mata, Zaragoza and Vista Hermosa, Veracruz state. The bodies were semi-nude and showed signs of torture.

Sept. 24

• An enforcer wing of the CJNG, the Matazetas, released a video wherein they stated their intent to eradicate Los Zetas. The video states they do not intend to harm innocent individuals or interfere with the Mexican government. The video statement explained security concerns for several areas within Veracruz state.
• An execution video was released of two individuals who claimed to be halcones for the Sinaloa Federation. In the video, the individuals were interviewed by the executioners and then beheaded with a chainsaw and a butcher knife.
• Three narcomantas signed by the New Juarez Cartel were placed in various areas of Chihuahua City, Chihuahua state. The message was directed threats towards Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada Garcia, leaders of the Sinaloa Federation.
• A woman was found decapitated in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, along with a narcomanta apparently written by Los Zetas. The message blames the woman’s death on negative statements she posted on social networking website Nuevo Laredo en Vivo.

Sept. 26

• Four individuals were wounded when a grenade was thrown at a bar in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.
• At least five narcomantas were displayed in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz state, denouncing Mexican senators and the Mexican military for the lack of help in the disappearance of innocent people. The banners were signed “Desperate Society.”

Possible Cartel Hit on a Federal Lawmaker

On Sept. 17, the bodies of Mexican federal legislator Moises Villanueva de la Luz and his driver were found along a riverbank below a bridge in Huamuxtitlan, Guerrero state. The men had been missing since Sept. 4, when they disappeared following an Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) political event Villanueva de la Luz attended in his congressional district.
Shortly before his disappearance, Villanueva de la Luz had submitted a proposal to Mexican President Felipe Calderon and Attorney General Marisela Morales asking them to establish a special commission to investigate crimes against migrants, probably triggered by the discovery of several mass graves of migrants across Mexico and neighboring Guatemala over the past year. Though Mexican law enforcement authorities have not speculated on suspects in the case, and though his death may have been the result of some sort of personal or political dispute unrelated to the proposed migrant crimes commission, the cartels have been known to traffic and forcibly recruit (or sometimes kill) migrants, and may have been involved in Villanueva de la Luz’s killing in response to his attempt to investigate those crimes.
A report from the coroner’s office indicated that the men were executed by gunshots to the temple, and the bodies were found with no signs of torture. From the severe level of decomposition, the two men were likely killed shortly after they were kidnapped — they were also found wearing the same clothes they wore the day they disappeared. The location where they were discovered, on a riverbank below a bridge, could indicate that they were killed somewhere else and their bodies were quickly dumped from a vehicle off the bridge. According to the Guerrero state attorney general’s office, investigators have ruled out a kidnapping for ransom as the motive because Villanueva de la Luz’s family was never contacted about ransom demands.
Establishing a commission to investigate the abuse of migrants, a known cartel activity, may have been cause enough for Villanueva de la Luz to be targeted, but cartels have been known to attack lawmakers for a variety of reasons. In some instances, the cartels have tried to kill lawmakers known to be on the payroll of a rival drug cartel, or who have refused to cooperate with a cartel after being approached.
One other theory on Villanueva de la Luz’s death bears mentioning — though at this point it seems very unlikely. The PRI chapter in Guerrero state sent an official letter to local authorities suggesting the murder may have been politically motivated and demanded rural development secretary Socorro Sofio Ramirez Hernandez of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (who previously had held Villanueva de la Luz’s congressional seat) be detained for questioning. The PRI party chief said Ramirez had unsuccessfully pressured Villanueva de la Luz in the past to “subordinate him to his personal interests,” but provided no specifics. Given the ambiguity of the accusation from a single source, the relatively rare political violence between parties in Mexico and the fact that the state attorney general has said there is no evidence indicating Ramirez was involved, this seems an unlikely explanation for the congressman’s death.
If the killing was orchestrated by the cartels, there are a number of potential suspects. Los Zetas, due to their well-known role in trafficking migrants and sometimes forcibly recruiting them into their ranks, would be among the most hostile to an investigative body examining and publicizing their activities. Besides the large drug cartels, other, smaller criminal groups have been known to target migrants and would not have welcomed Villanueva de la Luz’s proposed commission. A STRATFOR source in U.S. federal law enforcement said that remnants of the defunct Beltran Leyva Organization are believed to be connected to the killing. One of those remnant groups, La Barredora, has been very active in nearby Acapulco, making statements threatening state-level political leaders in Guerrero state. It is also known to have connections to the Sinaloa Federation, currently Mexico’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization. The ties to Sinaloa mean La Barredora may act at the behest of the larger group and can easily take actions outside of the typical activities of the small-time gangs, like kidnappings for ransom, though Mexican authorities have already eliminated that as a possibility in this case.
Regardless of which cartel or criminal organization was responsible, the congressman’s death could have a chilling effect on other Mexican lawmakers with intentions to investigate anti-migrant crimes.

Teachers Killed in Guerrero State

Reports emerged Sept. 18 that a vehicle carrying four teachers was stopped and fired upon by gunmen in the town of Puerto Rico del Sur, Guerrero state. Three of the people in the car were killed, and the fourth was wounded. (A separate, conflicting story described the victims as three people, only one a teacher, who were attacked driving in a pickup truck in a nearby municipality.) The attack coincides with the closure of elementary and high schools across the state since the beginning of September after extortion letters were sent to school administrators.
The letters demanded the names, addresses, phone numbers, voter registration information and district payroll records for all teachers being paid more than 20,000 pesos (about $1,400) per month. It said that by Oct. 1, all teachers making more than that amount would be required to forfeit half of their monthly salary to the extortioner as well as half of their annual bonus, and threatened unspecified but “severe” consequences for noncompliance. According to a Mexican media report, the teachers’ union has said the teachers in the closed schools will not return to work until the government guarantees their safety.
While the extortion letter’s deadline has not arrived, it is possible that teachers refused to allow their information to be passed to the extortion group (the extortion letter demanded administrators provide the names of any teachers who refused and that they would address the matter). If all the occupants in the car were teachers, it seems unlikely that they were the victims of a random act of violence, and if the gunmen were connected to the extortion letter, they may have attacked the teachers before the deadline to reinforce fear and ensure compliance by the appointed time.
The Guerrero state prosecutor’s office reportedly denied any connection between the attack on the teachers and the known extortion threat, though it would obviously be reluctant to confirm a connection, given the potential for an attack against teachers to cause a panic and exacerbate the situation. Most cartels, and many of the smaller criminal organizations, have proven well to the Mexican population that threats rarely are hollow; intimidation related to the extortion threat appears to be the motive for the attack.

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Sept. 12

• Three “narcomantas,” or banners posted by drug cartels, were posted in Chihuahua, Chihuahua state, and signed by the Carrillo Leyva brothers. The banners criticized the Mexican government and invited citizens to join the Juarez cartel.
• Mexican authorities arrested an individual for smuggling 102 pellets of cocaine weighing a total of about 1.14 kilograms (2.5 pounds), in his stomach at the Mexico City International Airport. The individual had flown to Mexico City from Cancun, Quintana Roo state, and was destined for Spain.
• Mexican authorities arrested seven members of the Gulf cartel in San Cristobal de la Barranca, Jalisco state.

Sept. 13

• Narcomantas signed by Los Zetas were left with two bodies hanging from a bridge in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state. The messages threatened anyone who uses social media networks to report on Mexican cartel activity.

Sept. 14

• Gunmen attacked the State Investigation Agency office in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The gunmen used high-powered rifles and at least one grenade.
• About 70 Gulf cartel members entered Juchipila, Zacatecas state, in 22 trucks and stopped at the municipality’s headquarters. The members stayed in the area for approximately five hours, carrying rifles, grenades and grenade launchers. The Gulf members stated to observers they were in the area to “do a good cleaning.”

Sept. 15

• Gunmen in two separate incidents in Apodaca, Nuevo Leon state, attacked five transit officers. The attacks resulted in the deaths of three police officers and the kidnapping of another.
• A bomb in a vehicle was detonated on a street in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas state. No deaths were reported from the explosion.
• Members of Knights Templar handed out flyers to citizens in Apatzingan, Michoacan state, warning of upcoming attacks by Los Zetas.

Sept. 16

• At least thirty narcomantas were posted in at least 10 municipalities of Michoacan state signed by the Knights Templar. The banners denounced Los Zetas and claim that the Knights Templar are protecting the citizens of Michoacan. Some of the cities with banners include Apatzingan, Morelia and Quiroga.
• The Mexican military dismantled a drug lab in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. The military seized approximately 60 kilograms of methamphetamine, 2 liters (about half a gallon) of liquid methamphetamine, and chemical precursors.

Sept. 17

• Gunmen kidnapped a PRI party member in front of his home in Jose Azueta, Veracruz state. The individual was a leader of a municipal committee.
• The body of PRI federal legislator Moises Villanueva de la Luz, was discovered in Huamuxtitlan, Guerrero state. The congressman and his driver had been missing since Sept. 4.

Sept. 18

• Mexican authorities captured six Los Zetas members in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon state. One of the members was allegedly a lookout for the Casino Royale attack in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon.
• Three men were arrested in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, while attempting to post narcomantas. The contents of the banners were not released.
• A member of the Sinaloa Federation, Jesus Hernandez Valenzuela, was arrested at a safe house in Tijuana, Baja California state.

Sept. 19

• A confrontation between rival criminal groups left at least eight dead in Nocupetaro, Michoacan state.
• Mexican authorities discovered the bodies of five executed individuals in Ixtapaluca, Mexico state. Left with the body was a narcomanta signed by La Familia Michoacana, which claimed ownership of the area.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Zetas Communications Network Disrupted in Veracruz

The Mexican navy on Sept. 8 dismantled a communications network used by Los Zetas throughout Veracruz state. Among the equipment seized were mobile radio transmitters, computers, radio scanners, encryption devices, solar power cells and as many as seven trailers that served as base stations, according to media reports. A spokesman for the Mexican navy said some 80 individuals have been arrested over the past month in connection with the operation, itself the result of months of work by naval intelligence officers.
Los Zetas have been known to utilize more sophisticated communications networks than other cartels, due in large part to the organization’s origins in military special operations. The Zetas needed to augment sparse communications in some areas they control, and the Veracruz network likely was for the purpose of “off the grid” communications. Since cellphones are relatively easy for authorities to monitor, Los Zetas have sought to diversify their telecommunications capabilities, a fact of which Mexican authorities are aware.
It is possible that the seizure of this communications equipment means the navy is preparing to launch operations to push the Zetas out of the Veracruz port region. Indeed, a navy spokesman said the immediate result of the operation was the disruption of the Zetas’ “chain of command and tactical coordination.” If the navy is about to engage the Zetas in Veracruz, dismantling the Zetas’ communications network would be one of the first moves it would make.
There is not yet enough evidence to conclude with certainty that an operation is in the works, but STRATFOR will continue to watch for signs of increased military operations against the Zetas in Veracruz.

Hand Grenade Attacks in Rio Bravo

On Sept. 10, armed men in an SUV and an accompanying car reportedly threw five hand grenades at two businesses in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas state, killing two people. Beginning at 2:30 p.m., the assailants lobbed three grenades at a bar on the city’s east side, an unnamed police official said; one of the grenades failed to detonate. A few minutes later, unidentified men threw two grenades at a strip club in downtown Rio Bravo, causing the building to catch fire and injuring three people.
It is unclear who conducted the attacks, but they are believed to be the work of Los Zetas, who are engaged in a turf war with the Gulf cartel in the wider region. At present the Gulf cartel controls the Rio Bravo plaza, but Los Zetas have been known to “heat up” a plaza — increase attacks to soften their target — prior to an offensive, as was the case in Matamoros in mid-June.
The targets are significant in that they are “legitimate” businesses. Businesses can serve as money-laundering hubs for cartels and thus are not immune to attack. Also significant is that the attacks occurred during daylight hours. While violence in Mexico is unpredictable and by no means limited to nighttime hours, there is a general sense that the goings-on of a normal day are spared from targeted violence. Incidents such as the Sept. 10 grenade attacks show that this is not always the case.
If the Zetas did not conduct the attacks, they could be a symptom of infighting within the Gulf cartel. The recent death of Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego, the Gulf cartel’s Reynosa plaza boss and overall No. 2, suggests rifts are forming within the cartel. Rio Bravo can expect to see reprisal attacks regardless of who is responsible.

U.S. Citizens as Couriers for Money, Guns

Mexican authorities arrested seven individuals Sept. 7 in Piedras Negras, Coahuila state, and confiscated firearms, ammunition, radio communication equipment, two vehicles and the equivalent of $600,000. The Ministry of National Defense has not disclosed the identities or nationalities of those arrested, but local and state media have reported that they are all U.S. citizens.
It is not uncommon for a cartel to use individuals with U.S. citizenship as couriers. These individuals have unfettered access to the United States and, while highly visible due to their frequent border crossings, they may receive less scrutiny from border security. Therefore, U.S. citizens are useful in moving guns and money south into Mexico (but they are less useful coming north, as security checks are more robust when coming from Mexico to the United States). This is particularly true in an area such as Coahuila state, where authorities have recently uncovered several large weapons caches.
The corridor of Piedras Negras and its sister city in the United States, Eagle Pass, thus is valuable not as a route to smuggle drugs north but as a route to move guns and money south. (A lack of drug-smuggling routes makes the area desirable territory, so the Zetas are the only ones operating there.) As recently as Sept. 7, in a separate incident from the seven arrests, Texas law enforcement stopped a van with Texas license plates that was carrying 14 assault rifles, a sniper rifle and more than 500 assault rifle magazines.
But the incident in which seven U.S. citizens were arrested, if true, is interesting because those arrested reportedly only had enough weaponry to protect the money they were transporting. This means they were not moving guns but cash, most likely proceeds from drug sales in the United States, the beneficiaries of which are Los Zetas.

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Sept. 5

• The Mexican military dismantled a drug lab in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, containing 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of methamphetamines and chemical precursors.
• Mexican authorities attempted to stop a stolen vehicle traveling on a road in Cadereyta municipality, Nuevo Leon state. The vehicle, along with two accompanying vehicles, refused to stop, leading authorities on a chase that turned into a gunfight in which four gunmen were killed.

Sept. 6

• Gunmen in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, shot and killed two women traveling in a vehicle with Texas license plates. The four-year-old daughter of one of the women survived the attack.
• Federal police arrested four members of Los Aztecas in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, including a leader of the group.
• A criminal group sent a message to the Department of Education in Acapulco, Guerrero state, demanding a percentage of the salaries of teachers who matched certain criteria. The message also demanded identification information on teachers in the city.
• Gunmen attacked a deputy traveling in his vehicle in Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco state. During the attack, the deputy left his vehicle and was subsequently hit by a semitrailer.
• Mexican authorities arrested a U.S. citizen in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. The individual was charged with trafficking weapons from the United States for the Sinaloa cartel.

Sept. 7

• Three members of Los Zetas were arrested in a neighborhood of Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state, while attempting to kidnap an individual. One of the members arrested was in charge of the “halcones” (Zetas lookouts) in Nuevo Leon.
• The Mexican Attorney General’s Office identified 18 Los Zetas operators who were involved in the attack on the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, that killed 52 people. The Mexican government is offering a reward of 15 million pesos ($1.2 million) for information leading to the arrest of each individual.
• Mexican soldiers seized approximately 2.5 tons of marijuana after receiving a tip on the existence of a drug camp in Cerro del Borbollon, Durango state. Soldiers also found a vehicle with Baja California license plates.

Sept. 8

• Federal police killed seven gunmen during a firefight in Villanueva, Zacatecas state. A conflict with the gunmen had erupted earlier when two federal police officers were kidnapped in the area.
• Authorities announced that an operation conducted throughout Veracruz state resulted in the dismantling of a Los Zetas telecommunications network. More than 80 members of the cartel were arrested, and a variety of communications equipment was seized, including solar power cells, high-powered transmitters, encryption devices and secure radio communication systems.

Sept. 9

• A drug courier transporting 1 kilogram of cocaine was arrested at Mexico City International Airport after authorities discovered the drugs. The individual’s itinerary indicated he was flying to Rome via Madrid.
• The Knights Templar posted a narcomanta over a bridge in Zamora, Michoacan state, offering a 500,000-peso reward for information leading to the location of the Los Zetas members listed on the banner.
• The Mexican military seized approximately 9 tons of marijuana, 51 firearms and 8,000 rounds of ammunition hidden in a cave near Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.

Sept. 10

• Unidentified men threw five hand grenades in two separate locations in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas state. The first incident involved gunmen traveling in a vehicle who threw three grenades at bar, and the second attack involved an individual who tossed two grenades at a strip club. The attacks killed two people.

Sept. 11

• The Mexican military captured Veronica Mireya “La Vero” Moreno Carreon, Los Zetas’ plaza boss for San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon state. Also know as “La Flaca,” she was discovered to be the plaza boss after she was arrested while traveling in a stolen vehicle.

‘El Metro 3’ Killed

Mexican authorities found the body of senior Gulf cartel member Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego on Sept. 3 in a pickup truck along a highway between Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, and Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. According to media reports, the Reynosa plaza boss and No. 2 leader was shot and killed, and his body was discovered with that of Eloy Lerma Garcia, a high-ranking police official from Diaz Ordaz, Tamaulipas state, who was also reportedly shot and killed.
The Gulf cartel has been engaged in a bloody turf war with Los Zetas, its former enforcement arm, since violence broke out between the two groups in February 2010. As such, each group routinely inflicts casualties on the other. At this point, however, Flores’ death appears to be the result of developments within his own organization rather than the result of a targeted assassination by Los Zetas.
Los Zetas certainly had cause to kill Flores. In fact, he was widely regarded as the primary reason behind the two groups’ extremely violent split; some Mexican authorities and elements within Zetas leadership believe Flores gave the order to kill senior Zetas member Sergio “Concord 3” Pena Mendoza in January 2010. Los Zetas demanded that Flores be killed, but Gulf cartel head Osiel Cardenas Guillen refused, and open warfare between the two groups erupted shortly thereafter.
It is possible that the Gulf cartel sacrificed one if its own as a means to placate the Zetas and end or ease the ongoing feud between the two groups. But available evidence suggests otherwise. Since Flores’ death, the dismembered bodies of two unidentified men were found on Morelos street in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas state; a message at the scene signed by the Zetas claimed the victims were members of the Gulf cartel. If Flores’ death was intended to be an appeasement, the Zetas either did not receive or did not accept the gesture. In all likelihood, too much time has passed and too many people have been murdered for the rift to be mended with a belated, symbolic killing.
According to media reports, the conditions in which Flores was found suggest he was executed, but, aside from the gunshot wounds, his body was more or less intact. This would be atypical of the Zetas, who, as a means of intimidation, mutilate or torture their victims. It is likely that they would have done so with a high-ranking cartel member such as Flores — particularly given the accepted perception of his involvement in Pena’s death. So far, they have not even claimed responsibility for his death.
In addition, it is rumored that Flores’ body was found with its pants down around the ankles — in Mexico, the bodies of those believed to be informants are often found with their pants down. If this rumor is true, it raises the possibility that Flores was providing information to Mexican authorities. That Lerma was found with Flores gives some degree of credibility to this theory. Prior to joining the Gulf cartel, Flores worked as a law enforcement official with Lerma in Tamaulipas state, and if Flores was providing information to the authorities, his relationship with Lerma is the logical connection — though this may or may not be the case. Notably, Flores’ brother allegedly is in custody and is rumored to be in talks with government officials. Flores’ death, and the manner in which he was left, could be a retaliatory move for his brother’s perceived cooperation.
Other rumors suggest Flores was killed over internal disagreements within his organization, but so far STRATFOR has yet to verify those rumors. While Zetas involvement in Flores’ death cannot be completely ruled out, given their propensity for violence, and while an internal disagreement could have prompted his death, a more likely explanation is that elements within the Gulf cartel executed Flores in the belief he was cooperating with the government.

Flores’ Replacement

On Sept. 2, only hours after Mexican authorities confirmed the death of Flores, the Gulf cartel installed Mario Armando “Pelon” Ramirez Trevino as the new Reynosa plaza boss. Ramirez previously served under Flores as his second in command, and the U.S. State Department has an outstanding reward of $5 million for Ramirez’s capture.
The speed with which Flores was replaced following his death is unsurprising, given that there was already a second in command in place to succeed him. This also underscores the belief that Flores’ death was an inside job and that a succession plan was in place. What is unclear is whether Ramirez will serve purely on an operational level as the Reynosa plaza boss, or if he, like Flores, will simultaneously serve as the cartel’s overall No. 2.
Gulf cartel enforcer units have been hard hit in the past year. Antonio Ezequiel “Tony Tormenta” Cardenas Guillen was killed in November 2010, and now with Flores’ death the Gulf cartel has sustained another major blow. Ramirez is rumored to a tough leader, a trait he will need to fully utilize as he fends off Los Zetas in Reynosa.

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Aug. 29

• Five members of Los Zetas were arrested in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, in connection with the Casino Royale fire in the city.
• Mexican authorities arrested Abiel “R-2” Gonzalez Briones, a leader of the Gulf cartel, was arrested in Camargo, Chihuahua state, along with other Gulf cartel members after their vehicles were spotted by aerial reconnaissance.

Aug. 30

• A seafood restaurant in Chihuahua City, Chihuahua state, was set on fire by a group of gunmen early in the morning. Approximately two hours later, another group of gunmen set fire to a moving truck in the city.
• Mexican authorities announced a reward of 500,000 Mexican pesos (about $40,000) for information leading to the arrest of a 14-year-old assassin in Chihuahua City, Chihuahua state. The teenager is allegedly responsible for the Aug. 26 murder of a Municipal police officer.
• Three decapitated bodies were discovered in a parked minivan in Emiliano Zapata, Morelos state. Two narcomantas were left with the bodies signed by “Comando Del Diablo,” a gang affiliated with ongoing violence in Acapulco, Guerrero state.
• A grave was discovered in Norogachi, Chihuahua state, containing seven bodies. Six of the victims appeared to have been asphyxiated.

Aug. 31

• Two decapitated bodies were found in Tizapan el Alto, Jalisco state. The bodies were left with a message stating a bomb had been placed in the nearby area, but reports said no bomb was found.
• An explosive device on a street in Veracruz City, Veracruz state, left two individuals dead.
• The bodies of two kidnapped female journalists were found in Iztapalapa, Distrito Federal.

Sept. 1

• A group of armed men shot and killed Mario Martin Favela Portillo, a police captain in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. Narcomantas issued prior to Portillo’s killing had directed death threats against him.

Sept. 2

• Samuel “El Metro 3” Flores Borrego, the second in command of the Gulf cartel, was found dead Sept. 2 outside Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. A police official was also found dead at the scene.

Sept. 3

• Multiple banners displayed throughout Acapulco, Guerrero state, signed by “United Families of Acapulco,” asked Mexican President Felipe Calderon for support in ending the violence in the city. The banners single out La Barredora and Comando Del Diablo as the gangs responsible for the violence. They also detail where the two gangs operate and its members.

Sept. 4

• Six individuals, including three police officers, were killed in two shootings outside the Territorio Santos Modelo sports complex in Torreon, Coahuila state, and a highway near the city. Both shootings began when gunmen engaged in a firefight with police patrols.

Extortion in Acapulco School District

Reports surfaced Aug. 23 that an unnamed cartel sent an extortion letter to a financial administrator of the Acapulco public education system. In the letter, the sender demands the names, locations and telephone numbers for teachers earning between 20,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos per month (about $1,000-$4,000) as well as voter registration cards and a copy of the district’s payroll. Effective Oct. 1, those within the designated salary range will forfeit to the cartel 50 percent of their monthly salary and annual bonus, the letter said. The letter threatened those who might refuse to pay the “derecho de piso,” or tax, prompting more than 600 teachers in more than 140 elementary and middle schools to close their classrooms.
Extortion is a common occurrence in Mexico — even extortion of this type is not unprecedented, occurring most recently in San Luis Potosi. But while no one has claimed responsibility, the threats contained in the Acapulco extortion letter are considered more credible than those of San Luis Potosi, as Acapulco is a particularly violent city, and the threats in San Luis Potosi went largely unenforced. The timing of this instance of extortion suggests that cartels operating in the area are in need of cash and will resort to alternative means to replenish lost funds.
Acapulco is home to a number of cartels, but it is believed that the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA) and La Barredora, a CIDA offshoot, are responsible for much of the extortion in the city. Media reports suggest that the teacher extortion is the work of Comando del Diablo and Los Calentanos, both of which work for La Barredora.
The incident is likely the result of the proliferation of independent, low-level cartel members feeling the financial effects of inter-cartel warfare and government interdiction. Indeed, all cartels are seeing a disruption in their cash flows due to cartel wars, but the smaller organizations lack the financial wealth of the larger rivals. Bloody turf wars and battles with the government have left some groups, who cannot or do not pay their low-ranking members as well as they did during times of relative prosperity, looking for alternative sources of revenue to finance their drug-trafficking operations; extortion is one such source.
The Mexican government’s increased operations against the country’s cartels have given rise to increased instances of extortion. In Acapulco, the extortion is clearly affecting the lives of the city’s children, seen by many as a significant affront. In the wake of the deadly Aug. 25 fire in Juarez, public opinion has been rising against the cartels, and if these criminal groups continue to threaten the safety of children in Mexico, that public opinion could reach a critical mass.

Knights Templar Diversifying Tactics?

The Knights Templar, an offshoot of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), distributed “narcomantas” — banners inscribed with messages from drug cartels — throughout Michoacan state from Aug. 26 to Aug. 28. The messages offered a 500,000-peso reward for information leading to the location of Martin “El Terry” Rosales, a presumed plaza boss for Los Zetas, as well as a number of other alleged Zetas members.
Cartels tend to use whatever means available to achieve their goals — some overemphasize the use of violence, while others employ a combination of methods, such as bribery and extortion, to retain power. Violence is rarely, if ever, abandoned, but cartels may use it in concert with these other tools as the situation demands.
It is through this context that the situation in Michoacan must be viewed. The distribution of narcomantas offering monetary reward is atypical of the Knights Templar. The group, since their inception, has been notoriously violent, usually opting to achieve its goals through murder or intimidation. But the banners show a different tactic: In this instance, the group is trying to co-opt the citizenry of Michoacan through financial incentives.
It is unclear whether this is an isolated incident or a philosophical shift in the group’s tactics. One instance does not constitute a trend, but the possibility that the Knights Templar are using this tactic as a means of gaining ground on the Zetas cannot be ruled out. LFM, the group from which the Knights Templar split, began as a vigilante, albeit violent, group whose intent was to protect the people of Michoacan from cartel gunmen. As such, they enjoyed strong support from many elements within Michoacan society.
The Knights Templar’s distributing of narcomantas could indicate that the group has exhausted other means of combating the Zetas or that it is refocusing efforts on widening their support base in the population to gain better cooperation from the people — something that seemed to benefit LFM. STRATFOR will continue to look for indications that the group will continue to diversify its tactics to gain public support or resume its violent behavior.

(click here to view interactive map)

Aug. 22

• Guerrero state Attorney General Alberto Lopez Rosas asked that the criminal groups in Acapulco call a truce.
• A confrontation between armed men and the Mexican army left two gunmen and one soldier dead in Jalpa, Zacatecas state.

Aug. 23

• A narcomanta, signed by La Linea and directed against the Drug Enforcement Administration, said that an individual named “El Gato” was the new leader of La Linea.

Aug. 24

• El Comando del Diablo, a criminal group operating under La Barredora, sent a message to Mexican media accepting a truce proposed by the state’s attorney general on the condition that the state governor publicly confirms or denies his alleged family links to the Independent Cartel of Acapulco.
• A group of armed men opened fire on parents outside an elementary school in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. One individual was killed and five were wounded.
• The Knights Templar distributed narcomantas in the cities of Patzcuaro, Santa Clara del Cobre, Quiroga and Zirahuen, Michoacan state, offering a reward for information on two members of Los Zetas.
• Mexican authorities seized approximately 18 tons of chemical precursors used for manufacturing illicit drugs in the port of Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state. The chemical precursors were found in 80 barrels, and the shipment originated in India and were en route to Guatemala.

Aug. 25

• The Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, was set on fire by a unidentified group of attackers. As many as 61 individuals inside the building were killed.
• The body of missing journalist Humberto Millan Salazar was found with gunshot wounds in Culiacan, Sinaloa state.
• A narcomanta signed by La Linea on Aug. 25 denied reports that it had made threats against the Drug Enforcement Administration in previous narcomantas found in Ciudad Juarez.
• Three gunmen were killed in a confrontation with the Mexican army in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state. Mexican authorities reported after the confrontation that Los Zetas leader “El Loko” was among those killed.
• Mexican authorities seized more than 2.1 million psychotropic pills at an airport in Tijuana, Baja California state. The pills were found on an Aeromexico flight that originated in India.

Aug. 26

• Mexican authorities discovered the remains of five bodies in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas state. A message signed by Los Zetas was left at the scene, identifying the victims as Gulf cartel members.

Aug. 27

• The Knights Templar continued distributing more narcomantas throughout Michoacan state requesting information on Los Zetas figures Martin “El Terry” Rosales and Silvestre Cano “El Chomino” Guzman.

Aug. 29

• Nuevo Leon state Gov. Rodrigo Medina announced the arrest of five Los Zetas members allegedly involved in the attack on the Casino Royale in Monterrey.

Alleged Cartel Leader Arrested

On Aug. 11, Mexican federal authorities arrested a man they claim is the leader of La Mano con Ojos, a drug cartel operating in Mexico City and Mexico state. Much is still unknown about Oscar Osvaldo “El Compayito” Garcia Montoya and his organization. In fact, authorities are unsure how many members the group comprises, but it is widely believed that it controls retail drugs sales in parts of Mexico City and Mexico state. Garcia was arrested in Tlalpan, a neighborhood in southern Mexico City.
It is not yet clear that Garcia is the cartel’s leader, but his apprehension and subsequent video-recorded interrogation suggest that he is no mere foot soldier. His success in evading arrest — and in remaining relatively unknown — makes his apprehension more significant, especially if factors other than good police work were at play. Whatever led to his arrest, authorities will now have the opportunity to investigate an alleged criminal about whom they previously knew little.
Garcia reportedly is a former Mexican marine. During his stint in the armed forces, he allegedly received counterinsurgency training from the Guatemalan military. He worked as an enforcer for Edgar ” La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal, who was the head of the Beltran Leyva Organization enforcer unit Los Negros. Garcia joined Valdez after the latter split with Hector Beltran Leyva following the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in December 2009. When La Barbie was captured in August 2010, Garcia formed his own organization based on his nickname (El Compayito refers to a Mexican puppet character that is a hand with eyes, and Garcia’s group’s name, La Mano con Ojos, means “the hand with eyes”).
What distinguishes La Mano con Ojos from other groups operating in the capital region is its ruthlessness. It is not uncommon for newly formed drug cartels that began as enforcement arms to be especially cutthroat because they lack the business savvy and decision-making experience of their former parent group. (Look no further than Los Zetas as evidence.) According to media reports, Garcia has been involved in as many as 900 homicides. In April 2010, the dismembered bodies of alleged Los Zetas members were found near a chapel, an incident that many thought was the handiwork of Garcia’s group. Though La Mano con Ojos’ involvement in the incident was never proven, such stories add to the lore of the group’s perceived barbarity.
Now that Garcia has been captured and interrogated, Mexican authorities will be better able to investigate the group under his purported command. And as intelligence comes to light — if it comes to light — the government will be able to know whom they are dealing with and engage the group accordingly. Indeed, four additional members of the gang were arrested Aug. 15.
Garcia’s alleged counterinsurgency training gives added significance to his arrest. Such training would render Garcia a formidable adversary because he would be equipped with knowledge common street thugs do not possess. Garcia has been able to evade arrest for at least the better part of a decade. It is certainly possible that good police work led to his arrest, but it is equally possible that a rival cartel, threatened by the growing notoriety of a relatively new and violent faction, provided information about his whereabouts. Regardless of how he was arrested, any intelligence authorities are able to obtain from the alleged leader may help bring clarity about the group and its operations.

Massive Cocaine Seizure in Yucatan State

On Aug. 12, the Mexican navy seized 500-560 kilograms (about 1,100-1,200 pounds) of cocaine from a Liberian-flagged commercial vessel at a port in Progreso, Yucatan state. Sailing from Lima, Peru, the ship took a somewhat circuitous route on its way to its destination city of Cancun. (Progreso is further east along the coast of the peninsula, meaning the ship had to double back to Cancun.)
The Yucatan Peninsula is under almost undisputed Zetas control, and it is a significant entry point for cocaine into Mexico. The seizure marks a huge blow to the Zetas, especially at a time when they face threats on many fronts and by many actors, including the government and rival cartels.
That the Zetas were comfortable bringing in a shipment of that size — more than half a ton — in one haul indicates that they were likely very confident in their security on the peninsula. Until the navy interdicted, the Zetas’ confidence was justified: Operations against the cartel usually occur on the east coast of the country in territory disputed by Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel. The military is assigned where the violence is, and since violence along the east coast is more common than it is on the Yucatan Peninsula, interdictions on the peninsula are rare. However, the seizure could change this trend.
The seizure is a significant loss for the Zetas. Fighting rival cartels is adding to the already steep price the group pays in its war against the government. They need large shipments such as the one confiscated in Progreso to help finance that war. It is significant that this blow was dealt on the supply side of their operations — rather than on the military side — because it cuts into the funds that the Zetas need for gunmen and supplies.

Tourists as Collateral Damage

One man was killed and three people — a woman and two children — were wounded Aug. 14 when unidentified gunmen threw a grenade out of their escape vehicle while fleeing from police in Veracruz, AP reported, citing a statement from the office of the Veracruz governor. The report did not say whether the victims were local citizens or tourists, but the area in which the grenade was thrown — near the city’s aquarium — suggests they may have been tourists. Neither did it indicate who the gunmen were, but given the area and the type of weaponry used, it is safe to assume that the gunmen were members of Los Zetas.
The incident serves as a reminder for those who choose to spend time in Mexico that although tourists are not often specifically targeted by drug cartels, they can fall victim to collateral violence caused by those cartels. Violence between rival cartels and government forces is indiscriminate and can occur in almost any part of the country. While the cartels have not consciously targeted tourists or other innocent bystanders, they have also not gone out of their way to avoid hurting them. Cartel gunmen will shoot or throw grenades whenever they deem necessary without thought for the welfare of others, and this fire can and does hit bystanders.

(click here to view interactive map)

Aug. 9

• An improvised incendiary device was thrown at a plaza in Tuxpan, Veracruz state, injuring one woman.
• Authorities arrested Dolly Cifuentes “La Meno” Villa, a money launderer for the Sinaloa Federation, in Medellin, Colombia. Cifuentes was responsible for 32 businesses in Colombia and 17 businesses outside Colombia.
• Raul “El Sureno” Garcia Rodriguez, Los Zetas’ plaza boss for San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon state, was detained by the Mexican army in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

Aug. 10

• Mexican federal police arrested Victor Chavez “El Ruso” Gomez, a leader for the Knights Templar drug cartel, in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state. Chavez had participated in a July 7 attack on the federal police in Apatzingan, Michoacan state.

Aug. 11

• Oscar Osvaldo “El Compayito” Garcia Montoya, the alleged leader of La Mano con Ojos, was detained in Tlalpan, a neighborhood in Mexico City. Garcia reportedly is a former Mexican marine who also received training from the Guatemalan military.
• Jose Ruvalcaba Plascencia, a former police chief in Ciudad Juarez, was shot and killed in Chihuahua, Chihuahua state.

Aug. 12

• Mexican police discovered an incomplete tunnel used for smuggling drugs in Tijuana, Baja California state, and arrested 10 individuals they found excavating the tunnel.
• The Mexican navy seized approximately half a ton of cocaine on board a Liberian-flagged commercial shipping vessel in Progreso, Yucatan state. The ship reportedly had come from Lima, Peru.

Aug. 14

• Cristina Guadalupe “La Cris” Iniestra Medina, a financial operator for the Knights Templar, was detained in Zitacuaro, Michoacan state.

Operation Northern Lynx

On Aug. 5, the Mexican government concluded Operation Northern Lynx, a military action targeting the leadership, operations and logistics structures of cartels and criminal gangs in the northeastern states of San Luis Potosi, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. The operation began July 16 and involved 4,000 Mexican military personnel, 722 vehicles and 23 aircraft across the four states. According to the Mexican military, the operation resulted in the release of 12 kidnapping victims, the arrest of 196 people with suspected cartel ties and the seizure of 1,217 weapons, 3.3 tons of marijuana, 260 vehicles and 188 communications devices. The three-week-long operation also resulted in a notable number of important Los Zetas leaders killed or captured.
Northern Lynx is consistent with the Mexican government’s recent focus on specifically targeting the most violent criminal groups and drug cartels — the Los Zetas in the northeast but also La Familia Michoacana and the Knights Templar elsewhere in the country. An increase in cooperation, especially on intelligence gathering, between the United States and Mexico may have enhanced the effectiveness of this operation. This cooperation garnered a great deal of attention after an Aug. 6 report by The New York Times, citing the Mexican ambassador to the United States and a number of unnamed U.S. officials, characterized the collaboration as a relatively new development, having only coalesced for a few weeks. In fact, the collaboration has a much longer history. It has included intelligence gathering by U.S. security personnel posted at an undisclosed Mexican military base (among other places), and the training of Mexican military and law enforcement personnel at facilities in the United States and in Mexico. Although Operation Northern Lynx did not force Los Zetas to surrender territory, the losses sustained by their leadership and their logistics infrastructure will not be easily replaced. If U.S. cooperation on intelligence gathering with the Mexican military continues, Los Zetas may be forced to pull back from certain areas.
At least 30 Zetas were killed during the course of the operation, the most prominent being Jorge Luis “El Pompin” de la Pena Brizuela, the purported leader of Los Zetas in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, just across the border from Laredo, Texas. De la Pena Brizuela was killed Aug. 2. On the same day, the army detained Valdemar “El Adal” Quintanilla Soriano, the suspected No. 2 financial operator for Los Zetas, and his assistant Jose Guadalupe “El Dos” Yanez Martinez, in Saltillo, Coahuila state. Yanez Martinez was in possession of more than 6 million pesos ($512,800) at the time of his capture. In the capital city of San Luis Potosi, two more leading Zetas were captured — Rafael “El Iguano” Salmeron Rodriguez, the reported leader of San Luis Potosi plaza, and Jose Angel “El Cheche” Zapata Pantoja, the reported head of administrative activities in the state.
The number of ordinary foot soldiers killed during this operation was not particularly high. However, the elimination of so many leaders, especially as Los Zetas are fighting on multiple fronts against other cartels and the military, will be difficult for the group to replace (particularly in light of their other losses over the past two years). Most of the original Zetas — founded by former Mexican special operations forces — have already been captured or killed. While Los Zetas still actively recruit soldiers from the Mexican and Guatemalan military, they have not been able to do so at the rate they are losing them. According to information drawn from the interrogation of Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon after the senior Zeta member’s July 3 arrest, Los Zetas are also having a difficult time acquiring weapons, which, if true, could be extremely damaging to the group’s long-term survival.
Los Zetas are under pressure, but this has not prevented the group from attempting to expand its reach. They continue to push into areas not under their control such as in Pedro Escobedo, Queretaro state, where they are believed to have left a narcomanta stating “We have arrived” signed “Z” on July 31. However, this outreach may actually have been an attempt to take some of the pressure off of their home base by diverting the resources and attention of rival cartels and the government. If the group continues sustaining losses as they did during Operation Northern Lynx and if they continue to have problems recruiting and training new gunmen, they will likely be forced to start making decisions on which areas to drawdown their thinly-stretched forces.

U.S. Involvement in the Cartel War

The United States has long assisted the Mexican government by sharing the intelligence it acquires on the cartels, but more recently it has expanded this role to include intelligence gathering and helping plan countercartel operations with Mexican authorities. Although U.S. officials declined to provide specifics on their activities, the unit stationed on the Mexican base (it is unclear which one) reportedly consists of U.S. military personnel, CIA operatives and Drug Enforcement Administration agents. This unit has been compared to “intelligence fusion centers” that the United States operates in Afghanistan and Iraq which monitor militant groups and support the host country’s security forces. Past reports have identified similar bi-national fusion centers in Mexico City and Juarez. However, this physical presence is only one part of the assistance provided by the United States. It has also been providing tactical and intelligence training to Mexican security forces at facilities both in the United States and in Mexico for some time.
U.S. assistance will certainly enhance Mexico’s intelligence gathering capabilities against the cartels while also providing the United States with valuable on-the-ground intelligence from its Mexican partners. Nonetheless, trust remains an area of concern for both parties. Although the Mexican members of the particular units working closely with the Americans were likely thoroughly vetted to ensure they have not been corrupted (or as well vetted as can be done in Mexico), it is unlikely that the personnel of the entire base where the unit is stationed has been subjected to the same level of scrutiny. Out of concerns that U.S. intelligence sources, tactics or technology could make its way back to the cartels, the United States is probably exercising extreme caution in what it provides Mexican authorities. As for Mexico, U.S. assistance — however desperately needed — is always eyed warily due to historic sensitivities about U.S. military activity.
Involvement in intelligence gathering is still a far cry from deploying U.S. ground forces in Mexico, which is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. Only a major attack on U.S. soil by a cartel or significant spillover violence along the border would be likely to prompt such a move. Still, increased intelligence cooperation and training is an escalation of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s cartel war. Mexican cartels have been mindful of the example of the Guadalajara cartel which drew the ire of the United States with the 1985 torture and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. The United States took unilateral action that resulted in the decapitation and destruction of the Guadalajara cartel. However, retaliation by the cartels cannot be ruled out — particularly if they continue taking hits as Los Zetas did in Operation Northern Lynx.

(click here to view interactive map)

Aug. 1

• The Mexican military rescued five kidnapped individuals from a safe house in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. Three individuals were arrested during the rescue.
• Moises “El Coreano” Montero Alvarez was detained by federal agents in Acapulco, Guerrero state. Police suspect Alvarez was responsible for the killing of 20 tourists from Michoacan in Acapulco on Sept. 30, 2010.
• Hector “El Huicho” Guajardo Hernandez, a senior leader in the Sinaloa Federation, escaped from a hospital in Mexico City. Hernandez was injured during his arrest last May and was at the hospital for a check-up on his recovery. Two Federal Police who were watching Hernandez in the hospital are reported missing.

Aug. 2

• A confrontation between the Mexican army and gunmen in Tiquicheo, Michoacan state, left one gunman dead. The Mexican army seized the gunmen’s arsenal after the confrontation.
• Federal Police captured Valdemar Quintanilla Soriano, a finance operator for Los Zetas in Saltillo, Coahuila state. Soriano was the No. 2 finance operator for the cartel, possessing close ties to Los Zetas leader, Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano.
• Jorge Luis “El Pompin” de la Pena Brizuela, the Los Zetas’ plaza boss in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, was killed in a confrontation between Los Zetas and the Mexican military.

Aug. 3

• Eleven Knights Templar members were detained in two separate operations in Mexico state. Among the arrests include Andres “El Mecanico” Garcia, the Knights Templar boss for Mexico state.

Aug. 4

• The entire police force of Ascension, Chihuahua state, resigned over the casualties they have sustained over the last few months, including the death of their police chief. The resignations leave Ascension without any local police service.
• The Mexican federal government released $4.8 million for security assistance in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The funds were frozen by the federal government in July due to lack of improvement in the city’s police force.
• The Mexican army discovered a training camp for the La Resistencia cartel in Tapalpa, Jalisco state. The camp included obstacle courses and a firing range.
• The Mexican military concluded Operation Northern Lynx. The operation began July 16, and targeted Los Zetas in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosi, and Nuevo Leon states.

Aug. 5

• Two police officers were killed in an ambush by armed men traveling in a vehicle in Torreon, Coahuila state.

Aug. 6

• Five individuals were gunned down in San Ignacio, Sinaloa state, while eating dinner at a hamburger stand.
• Three Los Zetas members, including a 13-year-old girl, were arrested in Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco state. The members were detained after a firefight between Mexican authorities and cartel members.

The Capture of ‘El Diego’

Mexican authorities captured Jose Antonio “El Diego” Acosta Hernandez, the top leader of La Linea, on July 29 in Chihuahua state. La Linea is the enforcement arm of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF), aka the Juarez cartel. Several media reports say Acosta was captured after a gunbattle in an upscale neighborhood of Chihuahua city, while others specified that he was caught at his house in Juarez following a gunbattle. Police seized several items from the house, including two handguns, one assault rifle and various communications and computer equipment.
Acosta, a former Juarez police officer, had previously been linked to the murder of two U.S. Consulate employees in Juarez and improvised explosive device attacks directed against Juarez police, as well as a Jan. 30, 2010, attack on teens at a party which killed 15. Mexican police say that since his capture, Acosta has confessed to ordering the killings of 1,500 people in the VCF’s ongoing struggle against the Sinaloa Federation for control of Juarez.
Acosta’s capture will deal a significant blow to La Linea’s operations, as well as those of the VCF. It also provides Mexican authorities a large volume of information to analyze that could lead to possible follow-up actions.
Acosta is believed to control all La Linea operations in Juarez and Chihuahua. His position in the VCF hierarchy as head of the cartel’s enforcement arm will make him difficult to replace. For the cartels, it is never a good time to lose an important figure, but the loss is felt even more acutely when the figure is the leader of the cartel’s armed wing and he is removed from the mix in the midst of a heated and prolonged battle for survival. Moreover, Sinaloa has been pressing its advantage in Juarez, making steady headway into VCF territory, and Acosta’s arrest likely will further weaken the VCF’s ability to combat Sinaloa encroachment. Acosta also reportedly was the pivotal link between the VCF and a key Juarez street gang, Los Aztecas. Acosta’s arrest thus could provide an opportunity for the Aztecas to switch allegiance to Sinaloa, which would further weaken the VCF.
Acosta’s capture may assist Mexican authorities in a number of ways. Admissions he makes during interrogations could be used in follow-on raids against his key lieutenants and contacts and other high-level La Linea and VCF leaders. Acosta was indicted in the Western District of Texas on March 9 for his alleged involvement in the killings of the U.S. Consulate employees, and Mexican authorities may use the possibility of extradition to the United States as an incentive to encourage his cooperation. His statements also could corroborate those of his reputed lieutenant, Marco Antonio “El Brad Pitt” Guzman Zuniga, who was captured in June. The computer equipment seized from Acosta’s house also will be heavily mined for information (though the amount of actionable intelligence it contains is unknown).
Authorities also benefit from the timing of Acosta’s capture. On July 27, just two days prior, “narcomantas” — banners containing messages from drug-trafficking organizations — appeared in Juarez and Chihuahua signed with the name “El Diego” making explicit threats against the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Consulate in Juarez and border crossings. The arrest is likely to mitigate any potential follow-through on those threats, as well as send a message to cartel leaders that authorities will not take such threats lightly.
Acosta’s capture likely will lead to the continued erosion of the VCF’s control over the important smuggling corridor of Juarez, especially if statements from Acosta produce actionable intelligence that leads to the arrest of other high-ranking cartel members. Also, because La Linea is largely made up of former Juarez police and corrupt active-duty officers, the arrest could lead to the identification and removal of corrupt police who have been supporting the VCF. This could be a pivotal point in the battle for control of Juarez, and developments there must be watched very carefully in the coming days and weeks.

(click here to view interactive map)

July 25

• Mexican authorities in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, rescued 12 kidnapped migrants, including eight Central Americans, three Brazilians and one Iranian.
• Police in Zacacoyuca, Guerrero state, engaged armed men in a firefight, leaving nine gunmen dead. The police pursued the armed men after spotting them traveling in suspicious vehicles.
• Unidentified gunmen killed two police officers in Acapulco, Guerrero state.

July 26

• Fighting between rival prison gangs the Mexicles, affiliated with the Sinaloa Federation, and the Aztecas, affiliated with the Juarez cartel, erupted into a riot at a Juarez prison July 26, leaving 17 dead. Federal Police and the Mexican military were called to the prison to quell the violence. No prisoners were reported escaped due to the riot.
• Yolanda Ordaz de la Cruz, a journalist with the newspaper Notiver, was found dead behind the offices of Imagen de Veracruz periodical in Boca del Rio, Veracruz state. The journalist was reported missing 48 hours prior to her body being discovered.
• Hector Murguia, mayor of Juarez, Chihuahua state, announced that thousands of Federal Police will withdraw from the city in September. The Federal Police, initially deployed to Juarez in April 2010, will turn over security responsibility to the local police.

July 27

• The remains of 12 individuals were discovered in Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. Two decomposing bodies were discovered in a trench along a dirt road. Bones belonging to 10 individuals were discovered nearby.
• Five individuals were killed when the truck they were traveling in was ambushed by armed men in San Lucas Camotlan, Oaxaca state.
• Los Zetas leader Oscar Tiul was arrested in Guatemala City, Guatemala.
• Narcomantas left in Juarez and Chihuahua, Chihuahua state, made threats against the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Consulate in Juarez and border crossings. The messages were signed “El Diego.”

July 28

• The body of Fortino Cortes, the kidnapped mayor of Florencia de Benito Juarez, Zacatecas state, was discovered.
• The Mexican military engaged in a firefight with armed men in Ixtlan del Rio, Nayarit state. The armed men used roadblocks during the confrontation.

July 29

• The Mexican military arrested 15 armed men traveling in three separate vehicles in San Miguel Totolapan, Guerrero state. The arrested individuals were discovered by ground reconnaissance and were found in possession of high-powered weapons, including eight grenades.
• A shipment of approximately 22 tons of chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs from Shekou, China, was seized in Manzanillo, Colima state.
• Mexican authorities arrested Jose Antonio “El Diego” Acosta Hernandez, leader of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization enforcement arm La Linea in his home after a gunbattle.

July 31

• Five individuals were killed in a gunfight between Federal Police and armed men along the Uruapan-Los Reyes highway in Michoacan state.

A screenshot of Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon from an interrogation video

The Interrogation Process

These videos portray a typical interrogation: a subject, held for questioning against his will, being asked questions on topics of information that have intelligence value. Interrogations of a prisoner of war or a criminal are not always conducted in a hostile manner. Most interrogations consist of more than one round of questioning, so it is highly unlikely the video was the only interaction between Rejon and the authorities. The interview is but one step in a larger interrogation process that Rejon and other captured leaders must undergo.
For any captured criminal or prisoner of war, an interrogation is a delicate process of negotiation. For the prisoner, self-preservation is of paramount importance. Interrogation resistance strategy — whether guided by ideology or by fear of reprisal — is the process by which the detainee minimizes his or her answers to the authorities. At the same time, the detainee must find ways to work with the interrogating authorities to incentivize leniency. In doing so, the detainee has three options. He or she can provide a detailed-enough response to barely answer a given question, lie to distract the interrogator from the truth, or provide harmless nuggets of truth in hopes of persuading the interrogators that he or she is fully cooperating. Without further insight into Rejon’s overall investigation, the disclosure of an interrogation designed specifically for public consumption does not tell us much about which option Rejon chose during the interrogation and deal-making process.
Notably, the video indicates that Mexican authorities did more than capture a high-profile criminal; they acquired his cooperation. Rejon very clearly admits his own guilt and association with criminal activities in the video, and for every direct question the interrogator asks, Rejon immediately responds with an answer satisfying the query. Indeed, it is clear that some sort of deal was made prior to the recording in which both sides received concessions from the other. The concessions have not been made public, so STRATFOR can only speculate as to what they were, but he was likely offered anything from lighter sentencing to immunities and guarantees of protection from criminal reprisal in exchange for his testimony to the Mexican Federal Police.
While it is unknown what Rejon may have offered to the police in return for his cooperation, we do know that Rejon’s statements in the video did not offer actionable intelligence to his interrogators (such intelligence would likely be withheld from the public by Mexican authorities). Because the video of Rejon’s interrogation is a propaganda tool for Mexican authorities, it was likely rehearsed to some extent. It also showed clear signs of editing. The video did, however, provide insight into the leadership of one of the country’s most notorious criminal organizations and insight into cartel dynamics.

The Government’s Public Relations Strategy

In releasing the video of Rejon’s post-capture interrogation, the Mexican authorities are not so much disclosing intelligence on the operations of the cartels as they are using the opportunity provided by capturing a high-value target to bolster the government’s public relations campaign in support of the war on drug cartels. Though the public release of an interrogation is an unusual method for states to prove their successes in a campaign against criminal organizations, such a move is in keeping with Mexico’s general strategy of publishing photographs and videos after successful busts. Typically after high-profile arrests, Mexican authorities will line up the arrestees in front of the media in a controlled environment.
The interrogation videos serve the same purpose, but give a more intimate perspective on the detainees. They show the government in complete control of the criminal and give the government a chance to have cartel members confirm information that has been published in the media. With a responsive interrogation subject, the video also demonstrates that the authorities can further capitalize on their arrest. Past videos have included statements from cartel leaders praising the government and the federal police. The obvious edits in the interview may have excluded omissions of information that the government does not deem fit for public consumption. This would include actionable intelligence, which the government would need to retain for its own uses, as well as for the protection of the prisoner.
Presenting captured high-ranking cartel operatives to the public is important for the Mexican government. With elections approaching in 2012, and the ruling National Action Party having lost the lead in public opinion to the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon is struggling to justify a war that has left thousands dead, with little in the way of tangible results. Accordingly, Calderon’s government has been experimenting with a number of strategies to tackle the issue of public opinion. In addition to the real life examples provided by captured cartel members, the government has sponsored the launch of a television show called “El Equipo” (The Team), which glorifies the activities of the federal police and shows drug cartels as having an increasingly difficult time doing business because of police activity.
However, despite significant successes and an increasingly sophisticated propaganda machine, the Mexican government still struggles against endemic corruption and the ingenuity and wealth of the drug cartels. This is a fight that will continue beyond the Calderon administration, and it will last until some sort of credible detente with the cartels can be found.

Stumbling Upon a Second Lab?

On July 20, Mexican soldiers found a large methamphetamine lab built 3.5 meters (11 feet) below ground in La Cruz de Elota, Sinaloa state. According to Mexico’s Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), the underground space was 20 meters by 10 meters (about 2,153 square feet), with a tunnel that was 1.5 meters wide and 35 meters long leading to the lab from the surface. The entrance to the tunnel was concealed under a large pile of shredded wood, the kind that might be used for garden mulch.
Beneath the ground, the walls and ceiling appear to be made of cinderblock (the ceiling probably is rebar-reinforced), and two of the rooms were reportedly still under construction. A generator provided electricity and powered three complete production lines. SEDENA reports indicate that the structure contained two forklifts, probably for moving large quantities of precursors and finished product into and out of the lab via the tunnel. The lab reportedly was found during a land survey, though there are no further details regarding the type of survey or who was conducting it. It is not clear whether a surveyor stumbled across the lab or it was detected from the air with high-tech tools like ground-penetrating radar.
The second subterranean meth lab is the second found in Sinaloa; the first was discovered June 28 in San Antonio, 235 kilometers (146 miles) northwest of this latest find. The La Cruz de Elota lab appears to be more professionally constructed, though the lab in San Antonio had two levels, including living space and a bathroom, and was equipped with electricity, a ventilation system and air conditioning. Both labs were found in the home territory of the Sinaloa cartel, which specializes in methamphetamine production and smuggling, and both were found in inland towns that are near seaports and were apparently capable of producing large volumes of meth.
The Sinaloa cartel appears to be taking great pains to increase its methamphetamine production while improving the security and concealment of its production facilities. Following the discovery of these labs the cartel’s security efforts will only intensify. It is worth noting that the ownership of the land on which the two labs were found is unknown, but it seems unlikely that facilities of such strategic value would be built on land not owned by the cartel running the operation. Underground labs constructed in the future will likely be even more carefully concealed in remote areas still accessible by vehicle where third-party encounters can be minimized.

Luxury Prison Cells in Sonora

The state penitentiary in Hermosillo, Sonora state, evidently has accommodations for wealthy cartel members willing to pay for them. On July 20, Mexican media reported that an inmate was raffling three “luxury” cells for 200 pesos ($17) per ticket. It is not clear how long the winners would be able to spend in the cells, but photos of the upgraded spaces show cabinetry, tile floors, colorful sheets and bedspreads, and small framed pictures and crucifixes on the walls. Upon discovering the raffle and the three upgraded cells, prison authorities dismantled them.
Then on July 21, Mexican media reported that the same prison in Hermosillo had 130 “luxury suites” for housing high-value or VIP inmates. These suites reportedly include comfortable furniture, air-conditioning, televisions and kitchens. According to several reports, inmates in Mexican prisons will often pay guards to allow them to keep certain amenities in their cells, but the amenities are removed when the inmates are released. And cartel bosses have long been known to enjoy better accommodations in Mexican prisons. What makes this development interesting is the sheer scale of the upgraded accommodations. That there are such “luxuries” in a Mexican penitentiary does not necessarily equate to direct cartel involvement. But the quantity of these amenities at Hermosillo and the apparent fact that they remain in place point to some level of organizational influence, not just individual sway.
We do not yet know the cartel affiliations of the inmates occupying these cells, but the number of cells and the extent of the renovations — not to mention the cost involved — point to the Sinaloa cartel as the likely benefactor. Sonora state, and Hermosillo in particular, is nominally controlled by the Sinaloa cartel, but that control is regularly contested by the Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS). The latter cartel is an offshoot of the Beltran Leyva Organization, which was once a part of the Sinaloa cartel. This suggests possible CPS involvement in the Hermosillo prison upgrades.
Many of the guards certainly knew about the luxury cells, but higher-level prison authorities may not have been in the loop. As the investigation continues, it may lead to higher levels of Sonora state government, and we will continue to monitor media reports and seek additional information from STRATFOR sources about the Hermosillo facility.

(click here to view interactive map)

July 18

• A lieutenant of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa cartel, was arrested in the Dominican Republic. The interrogation of Luis Fernando Bertulucci Castillo by Dominican authorities confirmed the Sinaloa cartel’s attempt to use the Dominican Republic as a drug trafficking route.
• Gunmen attacked a municipal police officer and his family in Rosales, Chihuahua state, while the family was traveling in a truck. The police officer and his wife were killed in the attack while one of the children was seriously injured.
• An alleged boss of the Knights Templar, Faustino “El Pariente” Pacheco Torres, was arrested in Apatzingan, Michoacan state. Pacheco Torres is thought to have participated in the Dec. 9, 2010, confrontation in which Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, former leader of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), was killed.
• The Mexican army seized approximately 840 tons of chemical precursors in Benito Juarez, Queretaro state.

July 19

• Two decapitated bodies were found in a car parked along a street in Torreon, Coahuila state.
• The warden in charge of the prison in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, where 61 inmates escaped July 15, has been arrested along with six other prison officials, Mexican media reported.
• An investigation by Mexican authorities revealed Pablo Magana Serrato (aka La Morsa) as another leader of the Knights Templar.

July 20

• The Tamaulipas state government called for the transfer of 700 state prisoners to federal penitentiaries. The announcement came after the prison escape of 61 prisoners in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state.
• Federal police arrested 25 individuals thought to have been responsible for an attack April 28 on the police headquarters in Tula de Allende, Hidalgo state. The individuals were detained in the Hidalgo municipalities of Zempoala, Tepeapulco and Apan.
• Thirteen members of La Familia Michoacana were detained in Valle de Chalco, Mexico state. The group included a military deserter and two police officers.
• A soldier and a police officer were killed when Mexican security forces engaged in a firefight with armed men in Petatlan, Guerrero state. The security forces were in charge of safeguarding the family of slain environmentalist Javier Torres.

July 21

• The Mexican army shut down an underground drug lab in La Cruz de Elota, Sinaloa state, that reportedly was found during a land survey.
• The son of the news director of El Debate was found dead in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. The body of Fermin Rosas Quezada was discovered in a car with a bullet wound in his head.
• One hundred thirty prison cells described as luxury suites were found in a prison in Hermosillo, Sonora state. The prisoners occupying the suites were able to bribe officials for amenities such as refrigerators, televisions and air-conditioning.
• U.S. authorities arrested 35 LFM members in Austin, Texas. Police said the cartel uses Austin as a drug trafficking hub connected to 11 other states.

July 22

• Six gunmen were killed in a firefight between an armed group and a military unit in Teul de Gonzalez Ortega, Zacatecas state.
• Mexican authorities discovered three drug labs in Izucar de Matamoro, Puebla state. Chemical precursors and manufactured drugs were seized along with five individuals.

July 23

• Mexican authorities arrested 1,030 people in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, for links to human trafficking. About half of the individuals were male. Twenty female minors were released.
• Two Mexican police officers assigned to a security detail for the U.S. Consulate were killed in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

STRATFOR

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Current Status of the Mexican Cartels

To assist in navigating the fractured cartel landscape — as much as conditions in Mexico currently allow — we have arranged the discussion below into three camps: the Sinaloa Federation and other cartels aligned with it, Los Zetas and their associated groups, and the independent cartels that have declared war on all other cartels and are determined to go it alone.

The Sinaloa Federation and Associates

The Sinaloa Federation continues to be the largest and most cohesive of the Mexican cartels. Run by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, Sinaloa continued its expansion into Durango state, Mexico D.F. and Guerrero and Michoacan states over the last three months as well as its fight to take over the plazas in Juarez and Chihuahua City. The cartel has also clashed occasionally with CPS in the city of Hermosillo in Sonora state and in parts of Durango state; with Los Zetas in Torreon, Coahuila state; and with both CPS and Los Zetas in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. On May 27 in Nayarit state, Sinaloa conducted a major ambush of Zeta forces in which Sinaloa fighters apparently utilized Zeta defensive positions close to a Zeta camp.
During the second quarter of 2011, three significant Sinaloa leaders were captured. In early April federal forces arrested Jesus Raul Ochoa Zazueta, a former Baja California ministerial police officer who, at the time of his arrest, was Sinaloa’s operations boss for the Mexicali plaza. Then in mid-April, Bruno “El Gato” Garcia Arreola was captured in Tepic, Nayarit state. The following month, Martin “The Eagle” Beltran Coronel, nephew of Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal (a top Sinaloa leader killed in a gun battle in July 2010), was arrested in the Zapopan neighborhood of Guadalajara, Jalisco state. With Guzman Loera’s approval, Beltran Coronel had taken over Coronel Villarreal’s operations, overseeing cocaine importation from South America through the Pacific ports in Jalisco and Colima states. Coronel Villarreal’s operations included very substantial methamphetamine production facilities and distribution networks, so much so that one of his nicknames was the “king of crystal.” That being the case, it is likely that Martin Beltran Coronel also took over his uncle’s methamphetamine operations, though that portion of his inherited operations has not been delineated.
These Sinaloa leadership losses could be significant, though Guzman Loera is believed to have removed high-level threats within his organization before via anonymous tips to federal authorities. That so many Sinaloa leaders were apprehended by federal authorities in the last quarter was just as likely the result of betrayal as it was of legitimate government investigations. Given Guzman Loera’s solid hold on the organization, we expect to see replacements elevated to the vacant positions, with the duration of their lives or their freedom predicated on their loyalty and service to Guzman Loera. STRATFOR does not anticipate any significant changes or instability within the Sinaloa Federation as a whole over the next quarter.

Gulf Cartel

The Gulf cartel has managed to hold Matamoros despite several large offensives by Los Zetas in May and June. We have also seen a string of retaliatory attacks by the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas against each other’s support networks. As we discussed in the last quarterly update, Matamoros is vital to the Gulf cartel’s survival, but control of Matamoros plaza alone is not enough. The organization may well survive over the long term, but it will likely do so as a minority partner with Sinaloa. In the last three months, Gulf’s cocaine supply chain was hit hard by Los Zetas in Guatemala’s Peten department, and the organization lost several plaza bosses when they were captured by Mexican troops. In May, federal forces captured Jose Angel “El Choche” Garcia Trujillo approximately 80 kilometers south of Monterrey. Garcia Trujillo led the Gulf cell tasked with hunting down and killing Zeta operatives in Montemorelos, Allende, and General Teran, Nuevo Leon state. Also captured in May was Gilberto “El Tocayo” Barragan Balderas, the Gulf plaza boss in Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas state, a vital point of entry across the border from Roma, Texas.
With federal forces occasionally entering the fray and Los Zetas seeking any weaknesses to exploit, the Gulf cartel remains stretched as it seeks to hold onto its territories and maintain its supply and revenue streams. The Gulf cartel has displayed increasing desperation regarding revenues and has ordered its smuggling groups on the U.S. border to protect the drug loads at all costs, as opposed to the previous practice of the groups’ abandoning their loads if pressed too closely by U.S. law enforcement. Hence there has been a significant upswing in aggression toward U.S. border protection and law enforcement officers. Rock throwing, attempts to run over or crash into U.S. personnel and their vehicles and gunfire from the Mexico side of the Rio Grande while drug loads are retrieved have increased in intensity and frequency in Gulf operational areas on the border. These are clear indicators that the Gulf cartel is under great pressure, and STRATFOR expects these conditions to continue through the third quarter.

Arellano Felix Organization

Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sanchez Arellano, nephew of the founding Arellano Felix brothers, continues to run the remaining operational cells of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO, aka the Tijuana cartel). In effect, the AFO has become a minority partner with Sinaloa. While the AFO occupies Tijuana, STRATFOR sources indicate that it pays Sinaloa a piso (a tribute or fee) for the right to use the plaza. In the first six months of 2011 little changed in the AFO’s condition from what we reported in our 2010 annual cartel report.
While Sanchez Arellano has apparently worked out some sort of arrangement with Sinaloa to stay in place and in business, several STRATFOR sources report that he has been quietly aligned with Los Zetas for the last six to 12 months to train and strengthen his forces. To conduct this training, according to our sources, Zetas are known to travel to and from Tijuana on the IH-10 corridor north of the border in order to bypass Sinaloa-held territory. Sinaloa likely is aware of the Zeta association, and if this is the case we anticipate a restoration of open hostilities at some point between Sinaloa and the AFO, though we have seen no indication that it will occur in the next three months.

La Resistencia

There appear to be at least two different groups in Mexico using the moniker La Resistencia. In March we discussed one group, which is not a drug trafficking organization but rather an organized crime “brotherhood” based in the Tepito neighborhood of Mexico City. The other group calling itself La Resistencia is based in Guadalajara and appears to consist of followers of killed Sinaloa lieutenant “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal who have remained loyal to the Sinaloa Federation. This group is currently fighting for control of Guadalajara against Los Zetas/CPS, the Knights Templar and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG).

The Opposition

Los Zetas

Los Zetas continue to operate in the north-central, northeast, eastern coast, Yucatan and southern portions of Mexico, and on all of those fronts they have been waging a war against the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels. As far as we’ve been able to determine, none of the cartels successfully wrested any territory away from an opponent in the second quarter, though it is clear that Los Zetas (as we describe above) did put a dent in Gulf operations. In May and June it also became apparent that the Zetas had found it useful to manufacture their own steel-plated “troop transports.” While these vehicles are large, somewhat slow and very visible, they likely give Los Zetas a psychological advantage over municipal and state police and strengthen their ability to intimidate the civilian population.
Also during the last quarter several high-ranking Zeta leaders were captured. In April, federal forces arrested Martin Omar “Comandante Kilo” Estrada Luna, the leader of the Zeta cell in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state. He is believed to have been directly responsible for the mass killing of Central American migrants and the deaths of the San Fernando police chief and the state investigator last year and the killing of at least 217 people found in mass graves in the same city in April. In May, Jose Manuel “Comandante 7” Diaz Guardado, plaza boss for Hidalgo, Coahuila state, also was captured, and in early June Victor Manuel “El Siete Latas” Perez Izquierdo, the Zeta leader for Quintana Roo state, was arrested, only to have his replacement, Rodulfo “El Calabaza” Bautista Javier, captured later that same month.
Several of these captured leaders were former members of the Mexican army’s Special Forces Airmobile Group (GAFE). Such men are hard to replace and while Los Zetas are known to have continued to recruit from the Mexican military and police, as well as foreign military elements such as the Guatemalan and Salvadoran special operations forces, it does not appear that the organization has been able to recruit quickly enough to replace their losses — a fact underscored by Los Zetas’ desperate efforts to recruit illegal immigrants passing through their territory as well as gang members. This means that the trend we have been seeing for the past few years of Los Zetas becoming less disciplined and more dangerous to the general public will continue.
Los Zetas have been engaged by the military on both the east side (Tamaulipas) and west side (Coahuila) of their core territory. They have also been attacked by their cartel opponents in critical locations like Monterrey. While they have damaged the Gulf cartel, at the same time Los Zetas have taken heavy losses in terms of leaders, fighters, weapons and other materiel. They have been forced to increase their other criminal activities to offset their losses in the cartel war. These losses will take their toll over time and we will need to watch carefully over the next quarter to see if the government’s push to eradicate Los Zetas, along with the efforts of the Sinaloa Federation and its allies, will combine to further weaken the group — or if Los Zetas are able to regroup and re-fit.

Cartel Pacifico Sur

This Zeta ally centers on leader Hector Beltran Leyva, who succeeded his brother Arturo as head of the Beltran Leyva Organization when Arturo was killed by Mexican marines in December 2009. The BLO then split into two primary groups and several splinter groups that went on to form other cartels or rejoin Sinaloa. Following that split, the larger faction under Hector re-established itself as CPS. The second quarter of 2011 found CPS continuing to fight for supremacy in the central and western coastal regions of Mexico, including areas northward into Sonora and Baja California states.
Regarding the capture of supposed CPS leaders, there is conflicting information about their actual cartel affiliation. Several Mexican media sources reported that Miguel Angel “El Pica” Cedillo Gonzalez, the CPS leader in Morelos state, was captured in April and that his replacement, Jose Efrain “El Villa” Zarco Cardenas, was captured in May. However, there also are references made to Cedillo Gonzalez being associated with Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal, who led the other faction that emerged from the BLO and that opposes CPS. The succession of Cedillo Gonzalez by Zarco Cardenas is the only thing that appears to be consistent. Nevertheless, whether CPS has lost leadership or not, it does not appear to be foundering. Its alliance with Los Zetas likely has helped it remain viable.
Overall the cartel dynamics on the Pacific coast continue to favor Guzman Loera and Sinaloa. As noted in our last cartel update, the Mexican government seems to be trying to defeat the most violent cartels rather than end the narcotics trade and, at present, seems to be focused on Los Zetas and the Knights Templar. We anticipate these two groups will remain firmly fixed in the government’s sights in the coming quarter.

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization

The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel) is holding on. Though STRATFOR previously reported that the VCF was hemmed in on all sides by the Sinaloa Federation and essentially confined to downtown Ciudad Juarez, STRATFOR sources have recently indicated that this is no longer quite the case. The VCF continues to control the border crossings in Juarez, from the Paso del Norte port of entry on the northwest side of town to the Ysleta port of entry on the west side. While the VCF’s territory has diminished, there has been a strong VCF resurgence since April in the city of Chihuahua in an effort to wrest it away from Sinaloa, with La Linea, the VCF’s enforcer arm, openly aligned with Los Zetas to remove Sinaloa from Chihuahua state. La Linea’s alliance with Los Zetas has been evident for at least a year, verified by STRATFOR’s sources within the law enforcement and federal government communities, but the two groups went public with the alliance only on June 2, probably with the aim of creating a psychological edge.
Theoretically, an operation by Los Zetas and La Linea/VCF forces, augmented by allied gangs in Juarez (recent reports indicate there could be as many as 8,000 fighters in such an amalgamated force), could be able to rout Sinaloa, but this will not happen anytime soon. Too many battles are being fought across too many fronts spread across vast areas. However, if Los Zetas manage to overcome the Gulf cartel in the northeastern states of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, there will be more Zeta assets to deploy in Chihuahua state.

Independent Operators

The Knights Templar

Since April we have gained a much clearer understanding of the Knights Templar cartel. On May 31, Mexican security forces captured 36 members of the cartel La Familia Michoacana (LFM). Statements by several of the detained LFM operatives revealed that LFM had split into two separate elements, one headed by Jose “El Chango” Mendez Vargas and retaining the LFM name and the other coalesced around co-leaders Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez and Enrique “La Chiva” Plancarte Solis and calling itself the Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios in Spanish). The split resulted from a disagreement following the December 2010 death of charismatic LFM leader Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez. Just before he was killed, Moreno reportedly sent word to Mendez Vargas that he and several others were surrounded by federal forces and asked Mendez Vargas to help them escape. Mendez Vargas supposedly refused to come to Moreno Gonzalez’s aid, resulting in the LFM leader’s death.
Emerging as a separate rival group, the Knights Templar has gone head to head with the much smaller LFM in a fierce fight for supremacy, which the Knights Templar appears to be winning. The group also can be expected to continue a war against the Sinaloa Federation that has been ongoing since the latter half of 2010, when the pre-fracture LFM tried to take over the territory of deceased Sinaloa lieutenant Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal.
Meanwhile, government operations against LFM and its remnants continue, though they are now focused primarily on the Knights Templar, which has responded with massive outbreaks of violence in Michoacan. We expect to see the Mexican military continue to press the group in the coming quarter and to continue its efforts to decapitate the group by killing or capturing Gomez Martinez and Plancarte Solis.

La Familia Michoacana

During the second quarter of 2011, LFM struggled to remain viable and relevant in the world of Mexican drug trafficking organizations while being a primary target of the Mexican military. Firefights, killings and narcomantas messages between LFM and the Knights Templar have been commonplace in Michoacan and Jalisco states over the last three months. In several instances, banners signed by the Knights Templar have accused LFM leader Mendez Vargas of being a traitor, most likely because of his alleged efforts to seek help from Los Zetas. That Mendez Vargas would turn to Los Zetas, an organization demonized in previous LFM propaganda, indicates his desperation and points to the successful attrition of LFM by Knights Templar and federal forces.
Following his capture by federal troops June 21 in Aguascalientes state, Mendez Vargas is now in a federal detention facility and the next phase of LFM’s evolution is unclear. Another as yet unknown LFM member could step up in the near future and assume leadership. Another possibility is the incorporation of some of the drifting LFM cells into the Knights Templar structure, a distinct possibility given their common histories and the apparent alienation of some of Mendez Vargas’s followers after he turned to Los Zetas for aid. A third potential outcome could be that Mendez Vargas’s LFM eventually disbands and fades away. A fourth is that the remnants of LFM could try to organize a smaller independent organization as some of their former LFM colleagues did when they helped form the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA).

The Independent Cartel of Acapulco

The CIDA consists of one small faction of the former BLO that was loyal to Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal and that joined with some local Acapulco criminals and LFM members to form their own independent cartel. Due to its heritage as a group, the CIDA is quite hostile to Los Zetas, a group Valdez Villarreal and his enforcers were at war with for many years, and the Sinaloa Federation, which they believe betrayed Alfredo and Arturo Beltran Leyva. In our last update we discussed the potential for the CIDA to fade from the scene within the year, but we saw no indication of that happening over the past three months, and the group appears to remain viable. But we are still receiving conflicting information about the group’s composition and alliances.
Currently, the CIDA is at war with Sinaloa, due to Sinaloa’s efforts to take control of the port of Acapulco. We anticipate that Sinaloa will continue its efforts to weaken the remnants of the CIDA, and Sinaloa will likely do this, as it has done in the past, by conducting armed operations and providing actionable intelligence on the CIDA to Mexican authorities.

Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion

Members of CJNG, which also is based in Guadalajara, are former Sinaloa members from Coronel Villarreal’s group who believe that he was betrayed by Sinaloa leader Guzman Loera. For that reason they are at war with the Sinaloa Federation. CJNG members also hate the Zetas because Coronel Villarreal’s son was killed by Los Zetas operatives. Indeed, the CJNG has basically declared war on everyone except the authorities, whom it has gone out of its way not to offend, and it remains at the center of the battle for the Guadalajara plaza.
Guadalajara is a large city, encompassing crossroads of transportation arteries running parallel to the Pacific coast and connecting that corridor with the port at Manzanillo, Colima state. Hence the Guadalajara plaza is immensely valuable to whoever can control it. Due to the proximity of the CJNG and La Resistencia factions, as well as the presence of Los Zetas, CPS and Sinaloa — all attempting to gain control of the plaza — we expect the violence in Guadalajara to continue and perhaps increase over the next three months.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Videos are a very powerful intelligence tool for us at STRATFOR as well as for the intelligence community. In this week’s Above the Tearline, we’re going to break down four recent Mexican cartel interrogation statements with an eye towards their nonverbal cues and body language.
The first cartel individual we’re going to look at is El Mamito. Your first impression when you look at this videotape is the very high quality of the Mexican backdrop. As you can see, there’s a psychological ramification here that the Mexican government is trying to convey with the high value targets standing in front of the SSP (Secretariat of Public Security) logos and insignias. As you run the tape a little bit, you will notice that El Mamito appears to be in pretty decent shape, although it appears that he hasn’t slept. He’s making very good eye contact with the interviewer.
The next cartel high value target we’re going to look at is El Chango, same backdrop. As you’re looking at his eye movements, he’s showing signs of deception with the shifty eyes towards the left. One of the most interesting parts here is you will notice that the Mexican authorities are utilizing a female interrogator in this case. There’s probably a method to their madness with that course of action. It’s not unusual for the debriefing team ahead of time to think about the best person to ask questions. This very well may be on the part of the Mexican authorities in an effort to disarm the suspect to some degree or to throw him off balance.
The third suspect is El Huache, and he’s an individual that is linked towards human trafficking killings, and your first impressions as you compare and contrast him with the others is that he has the body language and demeanor, in my assessment, of a stone cold killer. As you look at him, you notice his eyes. As you take a look at his body language, he has that attitude you can see that’s conveying across the videotape. Notice the furrow on his brow. He’s making really good eye contact with the interviewer. It appears to me that in all probability, he’s handcuffed. You also notice the swallowing motion there before he asked certain questions, and as you can see, he is conveying, even in the videotape, this air of cockiness, in my assessment.
Lastly, we’re going to take a look at La Barbie. He’s an interesting individual. This is an American that went over to the cartel sides from Laredo. We have discussed him in the past in many of the major news networks as well as on our website, for those of you who would like more information about La Barbie. As we transition into this, keep in mind the previous suspect interviews. Take into account the general nervousness of La Barbie right from the beginning as we transition in. And then you will also notice that the Mexicans are utilizing a female interrogator. La Barbie was known as a ladies’ man, so there might be some degree of psychological reason for the use of the female. As you look at La Barbie, notice that he makes no attempt to establish or maintain good eye contact. He’s looking around. He’s giving off tremendous behavioral signals that indicate a high degree of nervousness. And notice him looking down and to the left. This is a survivor. This is an individual that traveled in the highest levels of the narco world. At one point in this you’ll see that he lifts his handcuffed hands up and actually wipes the sweat off his brow.
From an investigator’s perspective, as you compare and contrast these four videos, what you will notice are some similarities as well as some behavioral indications that indicate that perhaps the suspect is not being as truthful as he could be. The U.S. doesn’t like to release these kinds of videotapes before prosecution. In fact, the Department of Justice and the FBI do not typically videotape suspect debriefings. The Mexicans are clearly utilizing this videotape for a couple different reasons. The first is the psychological aspect of getting this out into the media, hoping that other cartel bosses will see this. Second, remember they are disseminating these videos for domestic consumption inside of Mexico, as well as to show the U.S. that there is a return on their investment based upon all the counter-narcotics aid that we have given the country.
The Above the Tearline aspect in this video is the extraordinary value of videotape as it pertains to intelligence assessments. Videotape is a tremendous value in your ability to go back to evaluate statements and to develop your follow-up questions. The other aspect from the suspect’s perspective is they’re going to be thinking about the ramifications of this videotape. For example, if they rat off one of their bosses, they’re thinking about “What happens to me when I get inside a Mexican prison?” You have the ability to closely examine videotape with an eye towards truthful statements versus signs of deception, as well as nervous behavior. It’s important to realize that in these kinds of custodial situations, the government in many ways holds all the cards, so the suspect that you’re watching is thinking of a thousand different things at the time, primarily geared toward survival.

Knights Templar-Orchestrated March in Michoacan

In Apatzingan, Michoacan state, a large protest materialized July 13 in which the drug-trafficking organization Los Caballeros Templarios (aka the Knights Templar or KT) figured prominently. Demonstrators carried signs supporting the cartel and protesting the presence of federal security forces in Michoacan. This was not the first time that a cartel has orchestrated a “popular protest” in Mexico. Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation and the Juarez cartel are known to have contrived public demonstrations to enhance their public image. What makes the KT-engineered protest in Apatzingan interesting is that the cartel leadership seemed so adamant about the turnout and timing.
In three recorded telephone conversations believed to have been released to the media a day after the march, a mid-level KT leader insisted that all residents and business owners in Apatzingan participate and warned that those who did not would be “fined.” The KT organizers arranged for food and drink to be served to the marchers and ensured that the Mexican press would cover the event. We find the recorded conversations interesting not so much for their content — which was revealing — but because of their sourcing. Who recorded them and put the tapes in the hands of the Mexican media outlet Milenio Television? What was the purpose?
However the recordings were obtained and whatever their intent, they do suggest two possible motives for the KT to organize the July 13 protest. First, there is a good possibility that the prearranged presence of the Mexican press made the march the kick-off event of a propaganda campaign in Michoacan to pressure the federal forces to leave. Another possible motive is misdirection. The federal forces have been targeting the Knights Templar as well as La Familia Michoacana, and the increased federal presence may be hampering KT smuggling activities; the group is reportedly having difficulties receiving shipments of methamphetamine precursors and moving the finished product north to the border to generate revenue.
In one of the recorded discussions, an apparent boss ordered an underling to mobilize all of the people in Apatzingan and march immediately. When the underling said arrangements had already been made for the protest to begin, the boss relented. Timing was obviously an issue, so the question arises: Why stage the protest now? It could be that the KT needed to create a diversion — make a lot of noise, protest the federal presence, require that every resident participate, ensure that the country’s national press would be present with cameras.
We may not end up developing all the facts, but a well-publicized public protest could be an effective way to ensure that the bulk of the federal forces in the state are focused on — or removed from — one particular area of Michoacan.

Prison Break in Nuevo Laredo

On July 15, 59 prisoners believed to be members of Los Zetas escaped from the federal prison in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state. Immediately before their escape, a large fight broke out that resulted in the deaths of seven inmates, all believed to be members of the Gulf cartel. Following the escape, it was determined that the prison’s warden was missing.
This was not the first time that a large group of inmates had broken out of the federal prison in Nuevo Laredo; the last major escape occurred in December 2010 and involved 151 escapees, all believed linked to Los Zetas. Nor is this particular prison an anomaly: A year ago in Gomez Palacio, Durango state, Zeta assassins left the prison in street clothes, driving official prison vehicles and armed with prison guards’ weapons. After killing 17 people attending a birthday party, the gunmen returned to the prison, gave the weapons back to the guards and re-entered their cells. It was later determined that they had conducted such operations from the prison on two previous occasions in 2010.
Mexican authorities have tried rotating prison staff and spending more money on training, but so far it has had little long-term effect. Many incarcerated cartel operatives, especially those who have leadership positions, seem to be able to get out of prison almost any time they wish. Until these problems are corrected, the federal effort in the cartel war can only be a qualified success.

Ambush in Sinaloa

On July 16, a convoy carrying members of Grupo Elite, a special operations unit of the Sinaloa state police, was ambushed on a highway near Guasave, Sinaloa state, in an area that has been hotly contested by cartels this year. The personnel were travelling in officially marked but unarmored trucks when they were attacked, and 10 members of the unit as well as one civilian were killed.
According to media reports, the convoy had just finished providing security for the chief of the Ministry of Public Security in Sinaloa state, Francisco Cordova Celaya, at an appearance in Los Mochis. (Cordova Celaya was not with the convoy, having departed Los Mochis by helicopter.) Though there is not yet any evidence to indicate this, the intent of the ambush may have been to kill Cordova Celaya.
Most notable about the ambush are the topographic features of the site. In other cartel ambushes seen over the past two years, geography has offered obvious tactical advantages for the ambush team such as high ground, roadblock-created kill zones, existing fighting positions, protective cover and limited visibility. In this case, the highway is in flat, level terrain, with two lanes in each direction separated by a “k-rail,” a low concrete partition common to many highways around the world. Other than the k-rail, which is high enough to prevent vehicles from crossing it and heading in the opposition direction, photographs and video of the scene show no other cover from which to conduct an effective ambush.
How, then, were cartel gunmen able to surprise a group of highly trained, well-armed law enforcement personnel traveling in multiple trucks and having excellent visibility and fields of fire? If a stationary roadblock were used, the Grupo Elite officers would have seen it well in advance and been able to take adequate measures to avoid or deal with the attackers. Similarly, a rolling roadblock, in which attacking vehicles box in the target vehicle while moving and force it to slow down, stop or crash, would have been easy to detect, and with multiple vehicles in the convoy such a tactic would have been difficult to pull off.
We suspect that a ruse was used to get the convoy to slow or stop voluntarily, such as a staged accident scene. Whatever it was that stopped the police convoy, it appears that security protocols were not followed and situational awareness was minimal at best. Even for well-trained security forces travelling in numbers, complacency can kill.

(click here to view interactive map)

July 11

• Thirteen individuals were charged in a July 8 shooting at a bar in Valle de Chalco, Mexico state, that left 11 people dead. The shooting was a result of fighting between the Knights Templar and La Familia Michoacana.
• Five members of Los Zetas were arrested in Ixcan, Peten, Guatemala, including a Mexican national. The arrests were the result of an ongoing investigation of a massacre that killed 27 people in Peten.
• A lieutenant of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, Luis Fernando Bertolucci Castillo, was arrested in the Dominican Republic. During the lieutenant’s interrogation he revealed the Sinaloa Cartel’s attempt to use the Dominican Republic as a base for drug-smuggling operations.

July 12

• Two police officers were killed by residents of San Crisobalito in the municipality of San Andres, Chiapas. The police were following a man who was accused of stealing a vehicle. When the police entered San Cristobalito they were detained by residents then thrown into a ravine that was more than 200 meters deep.
• A grenade thrown from a moving vehicle exploded at an Institutional Revolutionary Party office in Saltillo, Coahuila.
• The public security director in Tuzantla, Michoacan state, was reported missing. His vehicle was found empty in Benito Juarez.

July 13

• Five police officers were arrested in Mexico state for the June 26 execution of eight individuals in Valle de Chalco, Mexico state.
• Five minors were killed after playing a soccer game in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. The bodies of the youth were found inside a truck.
• Javier Beltran Arco, an alleged leader of Knights Templar also known as “El Chivo,” was arrested in Apatzigan, Michoacan.
• A protest march organized by the Knight Templar was held in Apatzigan, Michoacan. A man identified as “Pantera” organized the march in response to federal troop deployments in the area.

July 14

• Five vehicles that were replicas of typical police vehicles in the area were seized in San Luis Potosí.
• Mexican authorities discovered a 300-acre marijuana plantation in Baja California, thought to be the largest cultivated marijuana operation ever found in Mexico.
• Roadblocks and firefights involving the Mexican navy were reported in Matamoros, Tamaulipas.

July 15

• A firefight between armed groups in Torreon, Coahuila, left four people dead and two injured.
• Fifty-nine prisoners, many of whom were thought to be Los Zetas, escaped from a federal prison in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. Seven inmates thought to be members of the Gulf cartel were killed before the escape.
• A convoy made up of members of the state police unit Grupo Elite was ambushed while traveling along a highway in Guasave, Sinaloa. At least 10 police officers were killed.

July 16

• Mexican soldiers discovered 114 kilograms of cocaine in a truck in Sonora.

July 17

• A firefight between two groups in south Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, lasted for 45 minutes and included the use of high-powered rifles and grenades.
• The Mexican army captured a Los Zetas leader, Cristobal “El Golon” Flores Lopez, in Anahuac, Nuevo Leon. El Golon is thought to have trafficked drugs from northern Mexico into the United States for the last eight years.

Economies of Scale

On July 6, 30.6 tons of monomethylamine, a liquid chemical compound used as an alternative to ephedrine in methamphetamine production, was seized at the Lazaro Cardenas container-ship terminal in southern Michoacan. STRATFOR has discussed large precursor shipments seized in Mexico over the last several months, and this latest seizure gives us an opportunity to describe how lucrative the synthetic-drug business can be for the Mexican cartels.
While marijuana continues to be the mainstay product of the Mexican cartels, methamphetamine is especially profitable for the three cartels that have large-scale production capabilities — the Sinaloa Federation, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los Zetas. Upswings in high-value drug-smuggling activities (mainly meth and cocaine) tend to correspond with lulls in cartel battles and the need for large injections of revenue. But regardless of the tempo of fighting, meth production can continue in areas that are relatively secured, such as the large swath of territory controlled by the Sinaloa Federation. There is the added benefit of being able to keep meth production going and product stockpiled, as opposed to having to deal with the vicissitudes of weather and the marijuana growing cycle.
According to a January U.S. Department of Justice report on illicit drug prices, wholesale methamphetamine prices in the southern United States averaged approximately $22,000 per kilogram, while the wholesale price for marijuana in the same region is approximately $440 to $660 per kilogram. Marijuana is very low in value by weight and remains bulky even when highly compressed, making it a high-volume/low-value commodity. Methamphetamine’s much higher price and low-volume properties as a powder give it much higher value as a smuggled commodity. Given the space restrictions when concealing any contraband, either in stockpiles or during smuggling operations, methamphetamine provides a much higher return on investment for the cartels that specialize in that commodity.
At this point, the volume of LFM’s meth production is unclear, but both Sinaloa and Los Zetas do have the wherewithal to produce meth in large quantities — and the continued need for the revenue that it brings.

Developments in Monterrey

Late in the evening of July 8, approximately 15 gunman entered the Sabino Gordo bar on Villagran Street in the bar district of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, shooting and killing 20 people and wounding at least six. Two days later, narcomantas banners, reportedly hung by Los Zetas, appeared in a number of Mexican cities in addition to Monterrey, including San Luis Potosi, Juarez and Mexico City, claiming the Gulf cartel was behind the shooting at the Sabino Gordo bar.
Some of the narcomantas also stated the violence directed at civilians was meant to “heat up” the plaza in Monterrey, and the one hung in Juarez said the Gulf cartel was desperate and could not fight with Los Zetas. It said Gulf was simply trying to divert attention away from Reynosa and Diaz Ordaz in Tamaulipas state. Just as Los Zetas have engaged in random grenade attacks over the last month or two in Matamoros to destabilize the Gulf cartel’s footing in that city, it may be that Gulf intends to create problems for the Zetas in Monterrey. It is odd that Los Zetas would hang such narcomantas in distant cities and not just in the northeastern region, and these developments should be monitored to determine whether the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas are headed for a major confrontation in Monterrey.

Anomaly in Torreon

Over the past week in Torreon, Coahuila state, 10 decapitated bodies were found piled in an SUV. According to the Mexican attorney general’s office, the heads were not with the bodies but were scattered around the city. At least one message was found, reportedly with the bodies, but authorities have not released its contents. Mexican media say the message addressed “a rival gang,” but this has not been verified.
STRATFOR finds the event somewhat anomalous in terms of location, severity and timing. There may be a link to the recent captures of top cartel leaders Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon (Los Zetas) and Jose de Jesus “El Chango” Mendez Vargas (LFM). Also, the Mexican military is making a concerted effort to track down and capture or kill Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez, the leader of the Knights Templar, the former LFM faction that split from its parent cartel in early 2011 and has been attacking LFM relentlessly ever since.

(click here to view interactive map)

July 5

• Thirteen unidentified gunmen died in a firefight with the Mexican military in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas state.
• Nicolas Mora “El Nico” Ovando, the leader of the criminal group La Oficina, was killed during a shootout with the Mexican navy and police at his residence in Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes state.
• Mexican police discovered 200 kilograms (about 440 pounds) of marijuana along with a cache of rifles, ammunition, camouflage uniforms and berets with symbols associated with Los Zetas in Vallecillo, Nuevo Leon state.

July 6

• Mexican authorities seized approximately 30 tons of chemical precursors for synthetic-drug production in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state.
• Police discovered a Los Zetas workshop in Fresnillo, Zacatecas state, used to manufacture armored vehicles.

July 7

• The police chief of Sabinas Hidalgo, Nuevo Leon state, and eight other police officers were arrested for having ties to Los Zetas.
• Seven people, including two minors, were killed by a group of armed men in San Dimas, Durango state.
• Six dismembered bodies were discovered in the towns of Taxco, Guerrero and Tlacotepec in Guerrero state.

July 8

• Four gunmen were killed in a confrontation with federal forces in Apatzingan, Michoacan state.
• Eleven members of the Knights Templar were arrested in Mexico state, including the leader of the small group, Julio Cesar Garcia “El Chito” Hernandez.
• Unknown attackers detonated a grenade in Coquimatlan, Colima state, but no one was injured.

July 9

• Ten headless bodies were discovered in an SUV parked in Torreon, Coahuila state. Soon after the discovery, their heads were found in various locations throughout the city.
• Gunmen opened fire on a rival gang at a bar in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, killing 20 people. The gunmen are thought to have targeted a rival gang but most of the victims were employees of the bar.

Zeta Leader Nabbed

On July 3 in Atizapan de Zaragoza, Mexico state, another founding member of Los Zetas was captured by Mexican Federal Police. Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon, a former member of the Mexican army’s Special Forces Airmobile Group (GAFE), deserted the army in 1999 and joined the core group that later became known as Los Zetas. He is known to have been third in the Zeta leadership hierarchy after Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano and Miguel “Z-40” Trevino Morales, both of whom are still at large.
According to statements from the Federal Police, Rejon became responsible for Los Zetas operations in northeastern Mexico shortly after violence erupted in 2010 between the group and the Gulf cartel, its parent organization. Rejon reportedly was in San Luis Potosi when Zeta gunmen ambushed two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in February 2011 and killed agent Jaime Zapata. It is not clear whether Rejon ordered that attack or was aware at the time that it was being conducted, but his role in the Zeta organization in the region does link him to it. Rejon also is being investigated in connection with mass graves found in San Fernando in April and the execution of 72 Guatemalan migrants in August 2010 in the same area.
Los Zetas have taken hits to their leadership over the years, as cartel battles and Mexican military or law enforcement actions have resulted in the killing or capture of nearly three-fourths of the original group of 31 “Zetas Viejos.” But it is important to note that those losses have not diminished the organization’s reach or its operational principles, which are based on the original group’s military and special operations training. Certainly there has been evidence at the foot-soldier level of a reduced level of training, discipline and command and control, such as the Falcon Lake shooting in September 2010. Overall, however, the Los Zetas organization remains large, powerful, self-regenerating and self-correcting.
In other words, it would be a mistake to view El Mamito’s take-down as a significant weakening of Los Zetas, although if he chooses to be cooperative he would be quite a treasure-trove of actionable intelligence for the Mexican government. STRATFOR will follow this situation closely for signs that Mexico is indeed exploiting this resource.

Threats Against U.S. Citizens

Over the last week in northern Mexico, several threats that specifically target U.S. citizens came to light. After five banners appeared June 30 around the city of Juarez in Chihuahua state threatening Gov. Cesar Duarte and accusing his administration of protecting the Sinaloa Federation, graffiti was found in Chihuahua City, the capital of Chihuahua state, threatening to decapitate agents with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Other threats surfaced that prompted the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Webb County Sheriff’s Office in Laredo, Texas, to issue warnings against travel to Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, over the July 4 holiday weekend.
The narco-messages in Chihuahua state were explicitly worded threats, and while no evidence of written threats was reported in relation to the Nuevo Laredo travel warning, the security conditions in Tamaulipas indicate that extreme caution is warranted. Sources associated with U.S. law enforcement agencies have indicated that the threats are considered credible and specific enough to be taken very seriously. What STRATFOR finds significant about these threats is that a certain point may have been reached, particularly in Tamaulipas, in which the cost-benefit ratio of attacking U.S. citizens may have tipped in the cartels’ favor. When threats of this sort have been made in the past, the cartels have not followed through for fear of generating too much U.S. attention. But current conditions in Tamaulipas are such that targeting Americans could prove beneficial to the cartels — or at least they may perceive it to be so.
For one thing, the threat could force the Mexican government to reverse the recent military takeover of all law enforcement functions in 22 of the cities in Tamaulipas (including Nuevo Laredo). There are likely large numbers of local police officers who were on cartel payrolls and have been relieved of their official duties. While most of these cartel assets remain at large, they no longer are privy to government information or possess government-issued firearms. Regional news organizations, both north and south of the border, have indicated that the likely intent behind the threat in Tamaulipas is to create an overwhelming security condition that would force the government to reinstate the local police officers in the 22 cities in order to have the manpower to deal with the cartels. This would result in many of the police officers who had been co-opted by the cartels being brought back to their posts, which the cartels would obviously want.
Regarding the threats against U.S. DEA agents operating in Chihuahua state, two points should be made. First, while the narcomantas that threatened that state’s governor were signed by La Linea, the enforcer element of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes cartel (aka the Juarez cartel), the spray-painted graffiti aimed squarely at DEA “Gringos” was not signed. That message, translated, read: “[expletive deleted] Gringos (D.E.A.), we know where you are and we know who you are and where you go. We are going to chop off your [expletive deleted] heads.” Second, because the graffiti was not signed, it raises the question of who wrote it and why.
Our working theory is that the message threatening the DEA was left by La Linea. La Linea has been hit hard over the past few years by both aggression from the Sinaloa Federation and government pressure. However, while they are down they are not yet out and like a wounded animal, could still prove to be quite dangerous.
For these reasons, STRATFOR is taking these latest threats seriously and will continue to try to determine their veracity. We recommend that Americans living in or traveling to these areas err on the side of caution.

(click here to view interactive map)

June 27

• Eighty undocumented migrants from Central American countries were kidnapped in southern Mexico. On board a train heading from Oaxaca to Veracruz, the migrants were abducted by armed men wearing ski masks.
• Approximately 700 municipal police officers protested the presence of the Mexican army in Nuevo Laredo.
• Gunmen shot and killed two people after entering bar in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. The gunmen escaped while engaging in a firefight with municipal police near the bar.
• The alleged Los Zetas boss in Quintana Roo state, Javier Altamirano Terrones aka El Pelon, was detained in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, in a joint operation by the Mexican navy, army and Federal Police.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed Santa Catarina police chief German Perez at his office in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon state. Seven police officers near the scene at the time of the shooting were arrested June 28 in connection with the killing.

June 28

• The Mexican military discovered an underground drug lab in San Antonio, Sinaloa state. The lab occupied two floors and was equipped with an elevator and a ventilation system. Military officials discovered 260 kilograms (about 573 pounds) of methamphetamine as well as chemicals and equipment for manufacturing the drug.
• A federal court issued a 40-day curfew through the Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime to be imposed against 24 police officers in Tarimbaro, Michoacan state. The officers are suspected of having links to La Familia Michoacana.

June 29

• The Mexican military clashed with gunmen linked to organize crime in Villarin, Veracruz state. At least three gunmen were killed and five more were detained during the confrontation.

June 30

• An elite police unit was ambushed by armed men along Highway 15 in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. One police officer was killed and six were wounded in the ensuing firefight.
• Five dead bodies were discovered by police on a street in Juarez, Chihuahua state. More than 20 spent shell casings were also found on the street.
• The director of municipal police in Turicato, Michoacan state, was arrested by the Mexican army for extortion of the local population. The director was in possession of marijuana and firearms when he was detained.
• The Mexican military killed a Los Zetas boss in Garcia, Nuevo Leon state, about 30 kilometers (18 miles) from Monterrey. Hernando Rodriguez Hernandez, aka El Fabuloso, was in charge of Zeta operations in several municipalities in Nuevo Leon.

July 1

• A firefight erupted between the Mexican navy and as many as 250 gunmen likely linked to Los Zetas in Fresnillo, Zacatecas state, leaving at least 13 gunmen killed. The gunmen had used vehicles to establish roadblocks throughout the city.

July 2

• At least 40 gunmen attacked a police headquarters in Morelia, Michoacan state, arriving in more than 10 vehicles and using grenades and small arms. Three of the gunmen were killed and two were detained while three policemen were wounded.

July 3

• A founding member and third in command of Los Zetas, Jesus “El Mamito” Rejon, was detained by Mexican police in Mexico City. Rejon is linked to the killing of two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers in February.

STRATFOR

full-blown insurgency

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Strengths

The first known example of the Mexican monstruo, the modified Mack dump truck found in Miguel Aleman last summer, is a tandem-axle dump truck with a 10-cubic-yard dump box. The primary prerequisite of any armored vehicle is that it must be capable of handling the extra weight of the armor, and a dump-truck chassis is very well suited to this. Elements added to the manufactured design include closeable firing ports with hinged or sliding steel plates and plates welded in place inside the engine compartment and surrounding the external fuel tanks. On the two Camargo dump trucks, fabricators took the extra step of placing the tanks in the interior compartment. All three of the dump-truck variants have steel slats or louvers shielding the radiators, providing a level of protection from most small-caliber bullets while allowing air to flow through the radiators. Drivers are protected by windows made of ballistic glass rather than simple openings in the steel plate.
Efforts to protect the wheels and tires are also well thought-out. The entire undercarriage of the Miguel Aleman prototype is shielded with one-half-inch steel plate extending almost to the ground, with sliding plates hung at the bottom of the fixed plates on the outside of the tires, allowing the tires to be covered to the ground. This protects the lowest portions of the tires from smaller-caliber bullets while effectively “floating” over rough terrain. This solution was a good answer to a common tactical problem, though it was not repeated in any of the other monstruos found to date.
The two Camargo dump trucks seized in June 2011 have a new and very useful addition to the front bumper that was not found on the Miguel Aleman prototype. Rather than a stout but flat bumper for pushing or ramming, each of the two Camargo trucks has a heavy reinforced wedge added to the bumper, which provides more efficient breaching capabilities. We would expect this tool to be employed in breaking through barricades, checkpoints or building or perimeter walls and would come in handy during a prison break or the storming of a rival cartel compound.
The need for reliable communications was also a consideration in the monstruo modifications. As anyone with a cell phone knows, a weak cellular signal makes calls intermittent. The Miguel Aleman monstruo, in particular, displayed significant foresight in addressing the tactical need for effective communications among Los Zetas operatives. Four boxes are attached to the truck’s mirror brackets, two on each side, with an antenna on the passenger side. A STRATFOR source determined that the boxes are cell-signal booster/repeaters. Why four? Our research indicated that there are four main cellular-service providers in Mexico, which likely would correspond with the number of booster/repeaters on that truck. (It is not likely that all of the cartel foot soldiers and leaders would subscribe to the same service, if for no other reason than operational security.) The booster/repeaters amplify the cellular signal, giving occupants of the truck and anyone within line-of-sight more reliable communications for coordinating activities in remote areas where the cellular signal is spotty.

Weaknesses

Now we turn to the monstruos’ weaknesses, which so far seem to outweigh their strengths. With the exception of the original El Monstruo prototype, there was no other effort to protect the vehicles’ tires, nor is there evidence that any of the monstruos were fielded with tactical-grade “run-flat” tires. As manufactured, such tires have an internal structure that prevents them from being completely deformed if they are punctured, allowing the vehicle to retain mobility (in effect, the release of the tire’s air pressure does not result in a flat tire). There are several cost-effective ways to make standard tires more resistant to punctures by bullets or spikes, but these do-it-yourself retrofits will not retain their shape if the rubber is burned and melted. As indicated by the two F-550-type vehicles discovered in May in Ciudad Mier and Santa Maria de Los Angeles, flat conventional tires stopped both vehicles squarely in the kill zone, making them easy targets.
Even a steel plate well-positioned outside of the wheel wells only mitigates this vulnerability, for a .50-caliber round will efficiently perforate the steel plate and probably the tire as well. Furthermore, a true run-flat tire, even one shielded by a 2-inch-thick steel plate, will not remain in place, intact and functional, if it is hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), a 40 mm grenade or an improvised explosive device (IED) — all of which exist in cartel arsenals. And, of course, it does not take military-grade munitions to deflate conventional tires. U.S. law enforcement agencies report that drug smugglers known to work for the Gulf cartel often throw out dozens of small four-pointed spikes (called “caltrops”) on the U.S. side of the border when they are being pursued by the authorities, and these spikes are very effective at stopping vehicles. Caltrops are simple to make, light in weight and easy to deploy. Perhaps anticipating the caltrop potential, makers of the Progreso monstruo came up with an odd-looking solution: dual wheels on the front axle.
Even some of the monstruos’ strengths have weaknesses. The use of ballistic glass definitely offers more protection than ordinary glass. Because details on these specific vehicles remain spotty, we have technical information on the grade of ballistic glass for only the monstruo seized in Progreso. According to Mexican media reports, that vehicle has level 5 ballistic glass in a grade range from 1 to 7 (the higher the number, the greater the protection). While guarding against gunshots, however, ballistic glass is rendered opaque when it is hit by bullets, and an RPG will penetrate it without any difficulty at all. Regardless of the type of glass found in the Zeta armored trucks, it is apparent that there are significant blind spots in all of the vehicles found so far. Due to the small viewing/shooting ports on the sides and backs of the vehicles, occupants have severely degraded fields of view and therefore limited situational awareness, which can be a fatal flaw.
Regarding vehicle mobility, this is dictated by original vehicle type, transmission (how easily and quickly the gears can be shifted) and the weight of the armor. The three smaller F-550-type monstruos will have a higher acceleration rate, tighter turning radius and lower profile than the larger dump trucks. None of them, though, can be viewed as fast or particularly capable of navigating rough off-road terrain. The lower center of gravity and lighter weights of the smaller monstruos give them more maneuverability on steep or loose terrain (all three of the smaller monstruos are four-wheel drive), but this advantage is offset to some degree by their lower ground clearance. And while the wheel diameters and chassis configurations of the three dump trucks give them much higher ground clearance, they lack four-wheel drive and have a very high center of gravity, which makes them vulnerable to rollovers. With the weight of truck, armor and cargo, the dump truck monstruos would likely sink into sand or mud if forced off of pavement or compacted ground.
Another vulnerability of these vehicles is found in their undercarriages. Because the original vehicles were not designed or manufactured to be armor-shielded, the various components of the undercarriages — drive shaft, axles, tie rods, suspension — are not arranged closely enough together or tucked snugly enough within the trucks’ frames for the undercarriages to be armored and still provide sufficient ground clearance. For that reason, effective shielding beneath the vehicles is not possible — at least not without significantly more modifications than the Zeta fabrication shops apparently have been able to provide so far.
It is also important to note that the steel plate used to shield the monstruos is not military-grade armor but commercial-grade steel plate. The vehicular armor being installed in Zeta fabrication shops is not like that found on military armored vehicles such as tanks and personnel carriers, which are protected by sophisticated alloys with high-density ballistic resistance. The commercial-grade steel on the modified Zeta dump trucks appears to range from the 2-inch-thick steel plate reportedly used on some areas of the Miguel Aleman vehicle to the reported 1-inch plate on both Camargo vehicles. A rough estimate of the square footage of steel plate used to armor the more boxy Camargo dump truck comes to about 626 square feet, which includes the floor, the steel plate surrounding the engine compartment and the bumper and wedge. One-inch steel plate weighs 18 kilograms (about 40 pounds) per square foot, which means the armor cladding that particular dump truck would weigh about 11,350 kilograms.
As for the other Camargo vehicle, the dump box appears armored on the inside, and there is similar armor shielding within the engine compartment and interior of the cab, where it appears that somewhat less steel plate was used. A rough estimate on the weight of the armor for that truck, based upon approximately 553 square feet of steel used, came to 10,230 kilograms. That much weight is supported easily by the trucks’ originally engineered infrastructure, but the costs are high — painfully slow acceleration, minimal speed or maneuverability (relative to unarmored vehicles) and extremely limited utility off-road.
Industrial “heavy lift” chasses, such as those of the tandem-axle dump trucks retrofitted in Miguel Aleman and Camargo, are engineered to have a “working payload capacity” (meaning the quantity of cargo a dump truck can carry above the vehicle’s own weight and that of its fuel supply) of 13,600 to 19,000 kilograms. The wide range is accounted for by the manufacturers’ size and model variations. That means that the manufactured axles, suspensions and chasses of these trucks are perfectly capable of handling the estimated 11,350 kilograms of armor plus the added weight of up to 20 gunmen with weapons, ammunition and gear (another 1,800 to 2,200 kilograms).
Unlike the modified dump trucks, the three smaller monstruos are not capable of carrying the weight of 1-inch or thicker armor. Putting that much weight on an F-550-type chassis would negate its maneuverability and likely result in broken axles or suspension after traveling the first stretch of rough road. So the three armored F-550s, as the photographs suggest, are likely clad in half-inch plate, which weighs 9.2 kilograms per square foot. Half-inch steel is fairly effective in stopping 7.62x39 mm and 5.56x45 mm rounds, which is the common assault-rifle ammunition used by the Mexican cartels and military, and though that thickness will not stop those same calibers if they are armor-piercing rounds, the design of the smaller monstruos could deflect such rounds because the steel is angled rather than perpendicular. It is not known to what extent armor-piercing ammunition is issued to the Mexican military or available to the cartels, though cartel accessibility to that type of ammunition cannot be ruled out.
But the half-inch plate on the three smaller monstruos (with perhaps some 1-inch armor in certain critical places) is still good enough. These retrofitted armored trucks are not intended to be impervious or invincible. They are meant to move fairly quickly over roads and fairly smooth terrain and to protect their occupants against the small-arms fire commonly encountered in a typical firefight. A conservative estimate of the amount of steel used for each of these vehicles might be 350 to 375 square feet. If these vehicles were armored only with half-inch plate, that would put the weight of the armor alone in the range of 3,238 to 3,470 kilograms per vehicle. A full complement of shooters in one vehicle — 10 to 12 gunmen, say, plus a driver and maybe a navigator riding shotgun — as well as weapons and ammunition would add another 1,100 to 1,350 kilograms, which means that one of the smaller monstruos likely would be carrying a total payload of at least 4,350 to 4,800 kilograms. Certainly, the heavy-duty F-550 chasses can handle that much weight, since the manufacturer’s specifications indicate a maximum working payload of 5,400 pounds.

Conclusions

So is the advent of the monstruo a significant event in Mexico’s drug war? The short answer is yes. In Mexico, the vast majority of confrontations between these vehicles and security personnel would involve local cops with handguns. Even the smaller monstruos with thinner armor would offer more than sufficient protection in most cases. It is not clear whether any of the six highly modified steel-clad trucks were retrofitted for specific tasks or general-purpose use, but even in a clash with heavily armed military or cartel forces, all would offer distinct advantages over regular “street vehicles” (with certain trade-offs in speed and maneuverability, particularly for the larger dump trucks). Because all of the trucks offer both high passenger capacity and increased ballistic protection, it is possible that their most likely purpose was to insert gunmen as far into a target area as possible.
Given the design differences among the six monstruos, there are probably more fabrication shops in Zeta territory producing such vehicles than the one raided June 4 in Camargo. Based on the examples under discussion and three distinct types of configurations reflected by these examples, we believe there are at least two more fabrication shops producing armored vehicles for Los Zetas. However, while there seem to be some “lessons learned” evident from vehicle to vehicle, there are no signs of design or technology transfer from shop to shop.
The two Camargo trucks appear to have the ability to breach most walls with ease, due to the design of the wedge on their front bumpers and the massive weight and power behind that wedge. These trucks would be very useful in springing Zeta leaders from prison or pushing through Gulf cartel barricades, and they would offer effective protection in convoys (though not if subtlety is desired when traveling through enemy territory). Of course, as a tool for intimidating municipal police and civilian populations, the monstruos have a great deal of psychological value. But both the Mexican military and other cartels possess the weaponry and ability to stop them. There is also a negative psychological factor in play with these vehicles for their operators: If Los Zetas believe these armored trucks make them invincible, they could become overconfident and prone to tactical miscalculations that the Mexican military can exploit.
We fully expect to see more Zeta monstruos in Mexico, and evolving designs that mitigate initial weaknesses. We also expect to see other cartels develop monstruos of their own. When the first truck was found last year, it seemed to us to be an anomaly. The discovery of the second, last month, made it a trend. That trend became a pattern this month, with the existence now of six heavily modified armored vehicles. We believe there will be more. And as Los Zetas become better armed and more heavily armored, they will become an even more difficult to rein in by local — or even federal — law enforcement.
Another important aspect of the monstruo introduction is what it says about Mexico’s deteriorating security environment. It was already getting worse, and Los Zetas apparently made a strategic decision to raise the violence to even greater heights. Should more monstruos emerge, we anticipate that the Mexican government will try to acquire anti-armor weapons from the United States or any other government that will supply them. More monstruos will beget more powerful military-grade munitions to take them out, and the overall effect — whether it is part of the Zeta calculus or not — will be an intensifying arms race that will not be good for anyone.

El Chango’s Arrest

The leader of a faction of La Familia Michoacana (LFM) — the faction that continues to use the LFM name — was arrested June 21 without incident in Aguascalientes state in central Mexico. At the time of his arrest, Jose de Jesus “El Chango” Mendez Vargas and his branch of the LFM were under heavy pressure from the other LFM faction, known as the Knights Templar (KT) and led by Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez, as well as from Mexican authorities and the Sinaloa Federation.
Mendez Vargas’ arrest clearly is a short-term blow to his faction of LFM, but it is too early to tell if it will result in the end of the group. More important, it is unclear what effect it will have on the battle for control of the drug flow through Michoacan state.
Mendez Vargas’ faction of the LFM is the weaker of the two currently fighting for control of the LFM territory and business. In fact, STRATFOR sources and media reports indicate that Mendez Vargas’ faction was losing the battle against the Knights Templar. Mendez Vargas’ forces had experienced some significant losses in the weeks prior to his arrest, and banners posted by the Knights Templar alleged that Mendez Vargas was so desperate that he had even reached out to his former enemies in Los Zetas for assistance.
Presently, it appears that the Knights Templar has placed itself in a position to assume control of the LFM empire. The Knights Templar is a local organization with local support, and many of its members have a long history of close ties to the community. However, after being weakened by the fight with Mendez Vargas’ faction, it is not altogether clear if the Knights Templar will have the strength to fend off a renewed push by its enemies in the Sinaloa Federation. It is also possible that the remnants of Mendez Vargas’ organization will become even more closely aligned with Los Zetas, which will allow the Zetas to expand their presence in Michoacan by working through locals. All this means that the capture of Mendez Vargas may have removed one cartel leader, but it will likely do little to quell the violence in the state.

Troops in Tamaulipas

Around 2,800 Mexican soldiers deployed during the week of June 19 to 22 cities in Tamaulipas state along the U.S.-Mexico border. The objective of the deployment is to put the military in charge of security operations in the state while stamping out corruption in local police forces. After relieving all officers of duty, the military will conduct interviews and drug tests on new officers to determine who will receive further training and continue in law enforcement. Many of the officers who are not rehired likely will begin working for the cartels.
The military has taken control in Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and San Fernando, border towns that saw violence increase just last week, along with the state capital of Victoria. An audacious raid in Matamoros by Los Zetas on June 17 looked to be an indication that the violence was only going to get worse in Tamaulipas. In this context it is not surprising that the Tamaulipas state government felt the need to ask the federal government for help.
The government position is that the presence of the military in Tamaulipas will lead to a decrease in violence. However, statistics on murders in Juarez, Chihuahua state, where the military took control in early March 2009, are evidence that military deployments do not necessarily correlate with a reduction in violence. In 2008, prior to the deployment, there were 1,600 murders in Juarez attributed to organized crime, according to Spanish newspaper Diario Universal. In 2009, the number went up to 2,650. The attorney general’s office in the state’s northern zone reported 3,200 murders in 2010, and as of June 15 there were already 1,500 murders on record for 2011.
The military cannot be everywhere at once, and it would take far more than 2,800 soldiers to secure the entire state of Tamaulipas. Cartels know the military presence will not last forever, so while there occasionally can be direct conflicts, more often the cartels will hunker down and wait for the military to leave or simply strike where the military has no presence.
Also, the Mexican military cannot risk being in a location too long because it faces the same corruptive forces that continually destroy the police departments. The longer the military comes in contact with those forces, the harder it is to guarantee soldiers are not being corrupted. The value of the military is that it has long been kept separate from the drug war and therefore has not been the focus of the cartels’ corruption efforts. This is already changing, and authorities must be careful with using the military to fight the war.
Another issue is that populations tend to tire of the presence of soldiers, who lack the police skills and training necessary to manage a civilian population. An extended deployment increases the chances of an incident that could upset the locals, and at the very least it is a hindrance to civilians’ daily lives.
The arrival of the military in Tamaulipas state is not a guarantee of security and tranquility. Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel are currently locked in a brutal battle for control of the northeast. The way they fight their battle may be altered a bit due to the presence of the military, but we believe that based on the experience of past military deployments in places such as Juarez, the violence between the two groups will continue despite the deployment.

(click here to view interactive map)

June 20

• A journalist, his wife and son were found murdered in their house in Veracruz, Veracruz state. The journalist, the second murdered in the state this month, wrote about crime and politics for the newspaper Notiver.
• Five bodies were found throughout Michoacan state with a narcomanta on each claiming responsibility on behalf of the Knights Templar.
• The police chief in Morelia, Michoacan state, was detained for possession of drugs and weapons for military use only.
• More than three tons of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals were found in an industrial area of El Marques, Queretaro state.

June 21

• A cache of weapons and military tactical gear, including camouflage uniforms, were found in Coneto de Comonfort, Durango state.
• The burned bodies of three traffic cops were found on the street in Guadalupe, Chihuahua state.
• Eight suspected members of the Knights Templar were detained in Piedras de Lumbre, Michoacan state. Among the detained were the group’s leaders in Tuxpan and Zitacuaro, Michoacan state.

June 22

• A man’s body was found in Jesus Maria, Aguascalientes state, with a narcomanta alluding to the detention of Mendez Vargas, the LFM head who was detained by police the previous day.
• A group of marines was ambushed by unknown gunmen in Panuco, Zacatecas state, leaving one marine dead.
• The police chief in Praxedis G. Guerrero, Chihuahua state, and her family were attacked and held at knifepoint during a robbery in the state of Chihuahua.
• The municipal police chief of Ciudad Isla, Veracruz state, Ricardo Reyes Alvarez, was attacked by gunmen. The police chief was killed and three others were injured in the attack.
• Three individuals working for the criminal organization led by Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal were detained in Tlaltizapan, Morelos state. The suspects were arrested with two kilograms (more than four pounds) of marijuana, one kilogram of cocaine and firearms.

June 23

• A group of suspected extortionists opened fire on an escort vehicle in the convoy of Julian Leyzaola Perez, the municipal security chief in Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. One attacker was injured in the ensuing firefight.
• Seven individuals suspected of belonging to a gang of kidnappers operating in Pachuca and Mineral de la Reforma were detained in Hidalgo state. The individuals are responsible for at least two kidnappings and one murder.
• Seventy-eight Central American migrants were detained at a railway station in Irolo, Hidalgo state. Among the migrants were Hondurans, Salvadoreans, and Guatemalans.

June 24

• Ninety-one police officers were arrested in Tlaxcala, Tlaxcala state, on charges of robbery and collusion among public officials.
• Four Salvadorans were arrested in San Salvador, El Salvador, in connection to the August 2010 massacre in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state, that left 72 immigrants dead. The Salvadorans were responsible for transferring undocumented migrants to Mexico.
• Approximately 60 undocumented migrants were kidnapped by armed men in Veracruz. The migrants were on a freight train headed from Oaxaca to Veracruz when the train was stopped by three vehicles parked in its path.
• Eleven graves containing human remains were found in Nuevo Leon by the Mexican army.
• The Mexican government announced the deployment of around 2,800 Mexican troops to Tamaulipas to take charge of public safety and counter corruption within the police force.

June 25

• Mexican Federal Police captured alleged Los Zetas leader Albert Gonzalez Pena, aka “El Tigre,” in Xalapa, Veracruz state. He was responsible for moving drugs farther into northern and central Mexico and was also linked to various other criminal activities in Veracruz state.
• Nine women from the Institutional Revolutionary Party were assaulted and received death threats allegedly due to political affiliations in Pachuca, Hidalgo state. The attackers are allegedly working for the campaign of a rival candidate.
• Seven bodies were found in the municipalities of Ixtapaluca and Valle de Chalco, Mexico state. A message from LFM was left with them.

Zeta Raid or Rescue?

Around 5 a.m. on June 17, simultaneous firefights reportedly broke out between elements of the Gulf and Los Zetas cartels in several locations in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, a Gulf stronghold. The Mexican military has confirmed that a gunbattle did indeed take place in the Colonia Pedro Moreno area but has not confirmed media reports of additional firefights in the Mariano Matamoros, Valle Alto, Puerto Rico and Seccion 16 neighborhoods. The military also has not confirmed a reported gunbattle in the rural area of Cabras Pintas, where six Mexican soldiers are said to have been killed.
Details of the confirmed firefight remain unclear, but from all indications, a large movement of Zeta forces into a Gulf stronghold did occur, and it suggests a heightened operational tempo in the war between these two cartels. In the coming months, this increasing violence is likely to continue in Gulf-held Reynosa and Zeta-held Monterrey as well as Matamoros.
The Mexican military said the June 17 gunbattle in Matamoros’ Colonia Pedro Moreno neighborhood resulted in three deaths and nine arrests, while an unnamed U.S. law enforcement official said four Gulf cartel gunmen died in the exchange of fire. According to a Mexican army officer quoted in border media, a Mexican army “mechanized regiment” was patrolling in trucks in downtown Matamoros when the fighting erupted but did not participate. The media also quoted a U.S. law enforcement official confirming the presence of another mechanized regiment and claiming that this other regiment of soldiers traveling in trucks supported Los Zetas in an attempt to rescue 11 Zeta operatives, both male and female, who had been captured by the Gulf cartel June 16.
For its part, the Mexican military said a motorized army unit rescued 17 civilians who had been kidnapped, although it is uncertain how an army unit could have achieved this without being a part of the operation or participating in the firefight. At some point during the gunbattle, the leader of Los Zetas, Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano, was reportedly killed, although STRATFOR doubts that he was present.
While reports of the Matamoros battle are conflicting, it is very likely that a large firefight did occur in the city between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas and that it was initiated by the latter. Due to the conflicting information, we have been unable to determine the motive behind the Zeta assault, which reportedly involved a force of armed Zetas in 130 SUVs. However, we have seen several large Zeta raids into Gulf territory in recent months intended to undercut Gulf’s support network, and this raid into Matamoros would have been the largest one yet (at least that we are aware of).
Zeta leader El Lazca, a former member of the army’s Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES), an elite special operations unit, is an “old Zeta.” He has good tactical and operational awareness and has proved himself to be a very rational decision-maker. Moving a convoy of 130 SUV’s nearly a half mile long (if they were bumper to bumper) into the heart of Gulf territory could not have achieved any element of surprise, which means Lazcano probably thought his force was large enough to accomplish the mission even if it was detected well in advance.
If the objective of this raid was to recover the 11 Zetas reportedly captured by Gulf forces, those prisoners must have been extremely valuable to the Zetas and possibly to Lazcano personally. Low-ranking members of an organization are typically not worth potential losses incurred in such an operation.
The reports that a motorized Mexican army regiment took part in the firefight alongside Zeta gunmen are likely untrue. While there is a corrupt element within the military, the chance of an entire regiment operating with cartel gunmen is quite remote. It is not uncommon for individual soldiers and smaller military units to be found in the employ of cartels, and perhaps a small element was working with Los Zetas, but it could not have been a Mexican army regiment, which would number some 1,000 to 3,000 troops.
Whether the Zeta Matamoros raid was a deliberate strike against the Gulf cartel’s power base or an attempt to rescue a group of Zeta prisoners, we have been expecting to see this type of Zeta offensive action for several months now. People and businesses should be aware of the probability of increasing violence in the coming months in Matamoros, Reynosa and Monterrey.

(click here to view interactive map)

June 15

• Gunmen killed two bodyguards of Nuevo Leon state Gov. Rodrigo Medina. Police found the bodies near a market in Monterrey with a written warning to the governor. At least 33 people with links to organized crime were murdered June 15, the bloodiest day in recent history in Monterrey.
• The chief of police in Guantajuato, Guantajuato state, was arrested for the murder of three individuals at an inn. Four unidentified gunmen killed the three individuals the morning of June 15. Three hours later, Martin Rodriguez Olvera was arrested for a link to the killings.
• The attorney general’s office in Colima state announced La Familia Michoacan had ordered the murder of the former Gov. Jesus Silverio Cavazos in November 2010.
• Marco Antonio “El Brad Pitt” or “El Dos” Guzman Zuniga, the second in command of La Linea, was arrested, along with two other La Linea members in Chihuahua City, Chihuahua state, on June 15 by Mexican police. The Juarez cartel created La Linea as an enforcer group, led by Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez. Guzman Zuniga operated as a right-hand man for Acosta Hernandez and is responsible for coordinating drug trafficking and executing individuals who do not cooperate with the Juarez cartel. Another La Linea boss, Jose Guadalupe “El Zucaritas” Rivas Gonzalez, was detained in Chihuahua on June 17.

June 16

• The State Investigation Agency of Nuevo Leon and the Mexican army arrested 26 police in Zuazua, Nuevo Leon state.
• The director of tourism in Cosala, Sinaloa state, was shot and killed at his home in Cosala.

June 17

• The Knights Templar posted narcomantas in cities throughout Michoacan state professing their commitment to serving the community and calling La Familia Michoacana and Los Zetas traitors to Mexico.
• Gunbattles reportedly erupted between elements of the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas in several areas of Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, leaving at least 10 individuals dead. Some reports indicate that Los Zetas leader Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano was killed in the fighting.
• Jose Guadalupe Rivas Gonzalez aka “El Zucaritas” was arrested by Mexican authorities in Chihuahua City, Chihuahua state. Gonzales is a close associate of Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez, a La Linea leader.
• Edgar Huerta Montiel, a member of Los Zetas, was arrested in Zacatecas state. He allegedly participated in a killing of at least 72 migrants in Tamaulipas.

June 18

• Eight bodies were found in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state, believed to have been individuals kidnapped by the Knights Templar. A message was attached to one of the bodies saying anyone associated with Chango Mendez, leader of La Familia Michoacan, will meet a similar fate.
• Seven police officers were arrested for the murder of a Mexican marine in Tuxpan, Veracruz state. The marine was killed on June 10, one of three marines found dead whose bodies showed signs of torture.

Military Operations in Coahuila

Over the past week, military operations in Los Zetas-controlled areas of Coahuila state netted large caches of narcotics, firearms — even an armored “monstruo” truck. The first such vehicle found in Coahuila, the monstruo was discovered June 6 near Progreso, between Monclova and the border town of Piedras Negras. An army unit found it concealed in a wooden structure built into a hillside and partially buried. Two days later, a detachment of Mexican marines conducting a raid in Villa Union, just south of the Texas border town of Eagle Pass, reportedly seized 201 assault rifles, some 600 camouflage or black uniforms with boots, several grenade launchers, three sniper rifles (one of which was scoped) and 30,000 rounds of ammunition.
Also on June 8, soldiers seized 16 AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles in Zaragoza. Then on June 10, an army unit patrolling near Castanos, just south of Monclova, came upon an area of ground that had recently been churned up. Further investigation revealed four underground cisterns in which soldiers found 11 kilograms (24 pounds) of heroin and almost 1,000 kilograms of methamphetamine.
Combined with a munitions cache found June 1 in Nadadores and a ton of cocaine seized May 24 near Monclova, last week’s trove represents a sizable chunk of Zetas inventory. As we discussed in the last Mexico Security Memo, Coahuila has been a relatively quiet front in the cartel wars, except for occasional battles in Torreon and the capital city of Saltillo. But a buildup of military forces is continuing in the state, and large-scale operations over the past two weeks appear to be making an impact.
This is probably due to the confluence of a significantly larger military force in the state and newly acquired actionable intelligence, which enabled the military to conduct more effective operations. And what these military actions are revealing is that Los Zetas apparently have been using the rural areas of the sparsely populated state for years as a secure caching zone. With few people and no major transportation arteries leading to the U.S. border, Coahuila is not a landscape hotly contested by competing cartels. This has no doubt led to some complacency on the part of Los Zetas, and it now appears that their security has been compromised by the Mexican military presence.
According to STRATFOR sources in the region, clashes between federal troops and Zetas operatives may flare up in the near term as direct military actions against Zetas forces and support networks increase. Should Zetas operatives find themselves cornered, their reaction may be full-scale combat, but we anticipate that Los Zetas will use hit-and-run tactics, such as ambushes, sniping attacks and explosive devices, at every opportunity to try to seize the advantage. It also is likely that Los Zetas will use some of those tactics to pull military patrols away from vital caches, so that the narcotics or munitions can be retrieved and relocated — possibly out of the state and perhaps to the Nuevo Laredo area, which also is Zetas territory.
For the most part, however, we believe Los Zetas will try to avoid direct confrontation with the Mexican military whenever possible. Zetas tactics elsewhere have shown that they may fade back when the military has the advantage of numbers or terrain. What is certain, given the organization’s known behavior, is that Zetas surveillance of the military will be vigilant. While we do not yet know the military’s ultimate objective in Coahuila state, we expect its intermediate goals include developing intelligence on Zetas weapons caches and seizing them to undermine Los Zetas’ ability to supply arms to their forces across northern Mexico.

Declaring War on All Rivals

The dismembered remains of three men were found June 7 in Lagunillas, Guanajuato state, with a message indicating they were killed because they were associated with Los Zetas, La Resistencia, the Sinaloa cartel and La Familia Michoacana (LFM). The following day, two more dismembered bodies were found in the same location accompanied by an identical message. In both cases, the messages were signed by Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG).
Then on June 9, outside of a bar in Apaseo el Grande, Guanajuato, a group of gunmen shot and killed one woman and two men, a shooting the state attorney general’s office initially attributed to LFM. It also has been reported that the shooting may have been tied to the CJNG, though it is not yet clear whether the gunmen or the victims were members of the cartel.
STRATFOR believes that CJNG consists of former followers of Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal, a high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Federation. In April 2010, Los Zetas executed Coronel’s son, Alejandro Coronel. Several months later, the Mexican army killed Ignacio Coronel himself — but the perception within his group was that Sinaloa leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera betrayed him. Five days after Coronel’s death, a video was released announcing that the CJNG was an independent organization operating in Jalisco state. CJNG surfaced again on Jan. 28, 2011, targeted by the Milenio cartel in narcomantas hung throughout Jalisco. A few days later, the cartel released a video in which a spokesman said the organization did not intend to attack municipal, state, federal or military authorities.
The video did, however, go on to list the names of specific law enforcement personnel who the spokesman claimed were known to be involved with La Resistencia and LFM. According to the video, the named individuals had until Feb. 10 to resign or CJNG would begin hunting them down. Little appeared in the media concerning CJNG from the time the video was released until this month, and we have seen no reports that CJNG has followed up on its ultimatum.
What STRATFOR finds significant in these events is the scope of CJNG’s hit list. The cartel appears to have declared war on virtually all of the other cartels operating in Mexico rather than align itself with either Los Zetas or Sinaloa, as most of the other cartels have done purely for survival’s sake. Another smaller regional cartel that appears to have taken the same step is the Cartel Independiente de Acapulco (CIDA). As for CJNG, its primary motive for going it alone (which may also be the case with CIDA) is probably its institutional distrust of both Sinaloa and Los Zetas.

(click here to view interactive map)

June 6

• Police in the municipality of Pabellon de Arteaga, Aguascalientes state, found the decapitated body of a man near the La Huerta ranch. The victim’s severed head was found near the body, along with an undisclosed message from an unidentified drug cartel.
• Unidentified gunmen in the San Jeronimo neighborhood of Cuernavaca, Morelos state, shot and killed Ulises Martinez Gonzalez, a suspected associate of arrested cartel member Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal. It appears that Martinez Gonzalez was killed while trying to take over a house belonging to a rival cartel.
• Soldiers in the municipality of Veracruz, Veracruz state, shot and killed eight suspected cartel gunmen during at least four separate firefights.

June 7

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed 13 people at a drug-addiction treatment center in Torreon, Coahuila state. Gunfire was reported at the scene for at least 30 minutes.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a federal police officer and a civilian male in the La Mancha neighborhood of Naucalpan, Mexico state.
• Military authorities announced that soldiers on patrol in the municipality of Tancitaro, Michoacan state, discovered approximately 450 kilograms of methamphetamines at a suspected drug lab.
• Unidentified gunmen reportedly kidnapped Marco Antonio Ortiz Lopez, news editor of the newspaper Novedades, in Acapulco, Guerrero state.

June 8

• The bodies of 21 people were found in separate parts of Morelia, Michoacan state. The victims all bore signs of torture and had been shot to death.
• Security personnel discovered the bodies of eight men and two women in a grave in El Veladero National Park near Acapulco, Guerrero state.
• Federal police officers arrested two suspected members of the Sinaloa cartel in Acapulco, Guerrero state. The suspects are believed to have participated in an attack on the Tabares II nightclub on May 28.
• An unidentified drug cartel reportedly paid citizens of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, 500 pesos (about $40) each to block two international bridges.

June 9

• Nayarit state police officers arrested two suspected members of Los Zetas after a firefight in the Ojo de Agua neighborhood of Tepic.
• Soldiers in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, arrested Kineret Orozco Gonzalez, the suspected successor to Jesus Radilla Hernandez, a Cartel Pacifico Sur chief believed to be responsible for the murder of poet Javier Sicilia’s son.

June 10

• Soldiers arrested 20 police officers from Pesqueria, Nuevo Leon state, for their alleged cooperation with criminal groups.
• Unidentified attackers threw a grenade at the State Investigative Agency headquarters in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported.

June 11

• The Mexican Prosecutor General’s office announced the seizure of 32 tons of ethyl phenyl acetate at the port of Manzanillo, Colima state. The seizure brought the total amount of chemical precursors seized at the port since June 1 to 145 tons.

June 12

• Municipal police officers in El Cuchillo in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state, discovered the body of a soldier who had been stabbed to death.
• Authorities discovered the severed heads of three suspected members of the Gulf cartel near a memorial at the entrance to the municipality of General Teran, Nuevo Leon state.

Money-Laundering Targets

Another significant facet of Monterrey’s strategic value to the cartels made the news May 25 when four casinos were robbed. Heavily armed gunmen reportedly emptied out the cashier cages at Casino Hollywood, Casino Royale, Casino Red and Casino Miravalle Palace, all in the same general area between Monterrey proper and the westside city of San Pedro Garza Garcia.
Los Zetas are currently fighting with the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels for Monterrey. The Zetas hold the city, but the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels want to take it because it sits astride intersecting smuggling corridors for drug and human trafficking. But that is only part of the story. The greater Monterrey area has about three dozen casinos, most of the more than 40 casinos in northeast Mexico. To an extent that no other business sector can be, large casino operations are essential to laundering the billions of dollars generated by Mexico’s cartels. Clearly, the tit-for-tat operations in which Gulf and Zetas elements target each other’s vital support networks appear to have been elevated to a higher level with bigger stakes.
Mexican media have indicated that “millions” were taken in the heists, but no source has quantified how much money was taken or whether the currency was in pesos or U.S. dollars. Furthermore, the reports have offered confusing or conflicting information about the order in which the heists occurred, so much so that a sequence may not be easily determined. In this situation, however, such tactical details are less important than the larger implications of the apparently well-coordinated heists.
Last January, the Casino Royale was the scene of an apparent effort to eliminate two high-profile members of the Juarez cartel who were gambling in the casino. Gunmen entered the establishment and started firing hundreds of rounds, but the reported targets got away — and later were apprehended by authorities. Almost as an afterthought, one online report mentioned in its last sentence that “in the confusion” the casino’s cashier cage was robbed and all of the casino’s security-camera tapes disappeared. STRATFOR has found no direct link in the media between the January shooting-robbery and the May robbery at Casino Royale. But we find the events more than coincidental. In all likelihood, the first heist in January was a test run for the coordinated multi-casino robberies conducted May 25.
Certainly, U.S. interdiction efforts have put a financial strain on all of the Mexican cartels, making casino robberies a tempting proposition, but the successful theft of millions of dollars or pesos may only have been a bonus on top of the larger reward of hitting a rival cartel at a vulnerable spot: its money-laundering operations.
Two years ago, Monterrey was something of a neutral zone where all top cartel families made use of the affluent stability and superior schools and medical care. In late January 2010, however, Los Zetas started consolidating their hold on the city after declaring open war on their former parent organization, the Gulf cartel. Last summer, after taking losses on the border at Reynosa and Matamoros, Los Zetas retreated to Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey. In Monterrey, the Zetas forces were entrenched for about two weeks when Hurricane Alex roared into the Rio Grande Valley and catastrophic flooding demolished huge sections of the city’s transportation arteries — effectively pulling up the drawbridge behind the Zetas.
Despite the heavy Zetas presence, Monterrey’s longer history as relatively neutral ground means that the casinos robbed May 25 were likely laundering funds for any number of drug trafficking organizations. The Zetas’ control of the Monterrey metropolitan area does not equate to exclusive use of its black market infrastructure, and dozens of large casinos have far more strategic worth as money-laundering operations than they do as extortion targets.

On the Quiet Coahuila Front

With the exception of Torreon and Saltillo, Coahuila state has been fairly quiet in Mexico’s cartel wars. The state is sparsely populated, lacks high-volume interstate highway arteries and remains largely undisputed Los Zetas territory. But several recent events along with an increasing Mexican military presence could point to a coming change in Coahuila’s security conditions.
According to official government news releases and confirmed by STRATFOR sources in the region, there has been a gradual increase in the deployment of military assets to Coahuila and in military activities in 2011. Mexican marines seized just over a ton of cocaine at a ranch northwest of Monclova on May 24. Then on June 1, Mexican army personnel found 38 narcofosas, or hidden graves, in the village of Guerrero, 50 kilometers (30 miles) southeast of Piedras Negras. It is not yet clear how many victims were disposed of at the Guerrero site — the meter-deep pits contained thousands of bits of charred human bones, metal buckles, buttons, and other personal items, and three 55-gallon drums also were found in which human bodies had been cremated. Also on June 1, the Mexican military uncovered a large cache of firearms and munitions on a farm in Nadadores, including 161 weapons and 92,039 rounds of ammunition of various calibers.
By no means are these recent events in Coahuila unique for Mexico, but the increase in military personnel and operations in the sparsely populated state is notable. As that military presence grows, STRATFOR expects significant clashes between Los Zetas and Mexican troops over the next few months. In Mexico, cartels have demonstrated that they will absorb a low level of losses as “the cost of doing business.” However, losses can reach a point where they are no longer acceptable to an organization, and violent countermeasures tend to result. In the quieter areas of Coahuila, particularly in the western and northern parts of the state where the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels have not bothered to contest Zetas control, Los Zetas may soon respond to the Mexican government’s inroads with direct and violent action against the military.

(click here to view interactive map)

May 31

• Unidentified people asphyxiated a man and abandoned his body in a vacant lot near the Francisco Madero avenue in Cancun, Quintana Roo state. The victim was tortured and beaten before being killed.
• Soldiers arrested four men in Acapulco, Guerrero state, for transporting a dismembered body in the trunk of a car. A fifth suspect managed to escape. The men had been stopped at a military roadblock but attempted to flee and crashed into another car.

June 1

• Unidentified gunmen in the Dale neighborhood of Chihuahua, Chihuahua state, shot and killed Fernando Oropeza, the former deputy director of a low-risk prison. Oropeza had resigned from his post after a clandestine bar was discovered at the prison.
• Two people were killed and one was injured in a firefight between suspected members of drug trafficking gangs in the Region 233 neighborhood of Cancun, Quintana Roo state. The incident reportedly began when six members of a criminal gang arrived at a food vendor’s stall and opened fire on several members of a rival group identified only as “LGD.”
• Relatives of journalist Noel Lopez identified his body among those found in a mass grave in Chinameca, Veracruz state. Lopez had last been seen headed to Soteapan on March 8.

June 2

• Unidentified gunmen in the Jardines de Oriente neighborhood of Chihuahua, Chihuahua state, opened fire on a municipal police vehicle, killing a police officer.
• Federal police officers arrested Candido Ramos Perez, the suspected head for Cartel Pacifico Sur of the Cuernavaca “plaza” in Morelos state, during vehicle inspections on the Cuernavaca-Mexico City highway near the southern boundary of the Federal District. A suspected cartel lookout riding in Ramos Perez’s vehicle also was arrested.

June 3

• Military authorities announced the seizure of 161 firearms and 92,039 rounds of ammunition reportedly belonging to Los Zetas in the municipality of Nadadores, Coahuila state.
• Security guards at the Sinaloa state government palace in Culiacan discovered a severed head and hands on the building’s exterior stairs. A preliminary report stated that the victim could be a state police officer.
• The Mexican prosecutor general’s office announced the seizure of two large containers holding 80 barrels of monomethylamine, a precursor used to manufacture chemical drugs, at container-ship facilities in Manzanillo, Colima state. Another 80 barrels were seized from a separate ship, bringing the total amount of precursors seized to 34,848 kilograms.

June 4

• Soldiers arrested Jorge Hank Rhon, a former mayor of Tijuana, Baja California state, during a raid in response to a citizen complaint. Approximately 50 firearms were seized from Rhon’s house.
• Federal police announced the arrest of Victor Manuel Perez Izquierdo, the head of Los Zetas in Quintana Roo state, during an operation in Cancun. Ten other members of Los Zetas were arrested along with Perez Izquierdo. Authorities said the operation resulted from the arrests of 10 Zetas in Cancun on May 28.

June 5

• Military authorities announced the seizure of four armored vehicles and 23 tractor-trailers during raids on vehicle workshops in Reynosa and Camargo, Tamaulipas state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed the municipal police commander of Mazatlan, Sinaloa state, in the San Angel neighborhood as he headed to his house.
• Police in the Mitras Norte neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, discovered the bodies of two men hanging from a pedestrian bridge. Signs bearing undisclosed messages to members of a criminal group were found near the bodies.
• Unidentified people abandoned a taxi with a dismembered body outside a police station in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state. A message found in the vehicle included a threat to the mayor of Guadalupe, warning that she would be next.

Escalating Violence in Acapulco

Cartel violence and law enforcement operations spiked in Acapulco, Guerrero state, during the last week of May. On May 23, the severed head and decapitated body of a man were found in an abandoned vehicle next to the Malibu Hotel in the heart of Acapulco’s tourism district. Several body parts, including ears, were reportedly missing from the scene. The next day, federal police raided a condominium in the city’s Joyas Del Marquez neighborhood and arrested eight members of a cell of Sinaloa hit men operating in Acapulco.
On May 29, a firefight broke out when gunmen in a convoy opened fire on an Acapulco municipal police car, reportedly killing two officers and two bystanders. Federal police responded to the scene and then tracked down the convoy, resulting in a second shootout in which three gunmen were killed. On the same day the body of a gunshot victim was found in one of Acapulco’s residential areas. Verifiable information is scant, but it appears that at least 30 killings were attributed to cartel activities in the greater Acapulco area between May 26 and May 30.
The battle for Acapulco and its vital seaport is escalating. As we have discussed, the seaport is the primary asset being fought over in Acapulco and would translate into control of methamphetamine production in Mexico — bulk shipments of the necessary ingredients originate in China, India and Bangladesh. The Sinaloa cartel has been in the business of large-scale methamphetamine production and distribution and already controls the ports at Colima and Mazatlan. It is therefore likely that, with La Familia Michoacana (LFM) busy battling the Knights Templar, Sinaloa expects at some point to be able to corner the methamphetamine market — a market in which LFM has been the dominant supplier.

LFM and the Knights Templar

Information came to light over the weekend that alters STRATFOR’s take on the Knights Templar. Initially discussed in our first quarterly update this year, the emergence of the Knights Templar was seen as a reinvention or rebranding effort by LFM following the death of charismatic leader Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez and the organization’s apparently swift disintegration. When we wrote the quarterly update, however, the Knights Templar were new on the scene, hanging narcomantas banners of the same style and tone as those previously hung LFM. In light of new information, we have been able to gain a more accurate understanding of the Knights Templar and the remnants of LFM.
According to reported statements by an LFM operative captured May 24 in Las Lomas, Jalisco state, along with 35 other LFM members, there was a significant split in the organization when Moreno died and Enrique “La Chiva” Pancarte Solis and Jose Jesus “El Chango” Mendez Vargas could not agree either on a succession plan or an evolution strategy. To some extent, Mendez had been a “co-leader” with Moreno, but following the Moreno’s demise Pancarte and several other senior leaders collaborated with Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez to create the Knights Templar.
Thus, the leadership struggle between Pancarte and Gomez thus was not strictly successional, contrary to STRATFOR’s initial take. Rather, the two parted ways and formed separate factions — one retaining the LFM name and the other calling itself the Knights Templar. We now understand that these two main factions are opponents in the battle for control of Michoacan state and their respective territories in neighboring states. This alters our perception of the two groups’ dynamics in the region, which will be decidedly more contentious and violent than we originally thought, and we will be following this evolution closely.

(click here to view interactive graphic)

May 23

• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on police vehicles responding to a reported car accident near La Ferreria, Durango state. One police officer was killed in the ambush and five others were injured.
• Police discovered the body of a woman inside an abandoned vehicle with Texas license plates in the municipality of Salinas Victoria, Nuevo Leon state. The victim had been shot once in the head.
• Several firefights between members of unidentified criminal groups were reported in the municipality of Buenavista Tomatlan, Michoacan state. The incidents caused as many as 1,000 people to flee to temporary shelters in Buenavista Tomatlan and Apatzingan.
• The Mexico state prosecutor general’s office announced that 21 people, including 16 police officers, were arrested in the city of Huixquilucan for allegedly aiding the criminal group La Mano con Ojos.

May 24

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a prison guard from Apodaca prison, Nuevo Leon state, as he was driving from the prison on the way to Laredo after his work shift.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a group of ministerial police officers in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state, as they checked a vehicle that had been reported stolen. One police officer was killed in the attack.
• Soldiers arrested five men during a patrol near Colombia, Nuevo Leon state, including Jose Manuel Diaz Guardado, the chief of Los Zetas in Hidalgo, Coahuila state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured an agent from the Directorate of Criminal Investigation in Durango, Durango state.
• A federal police helicopter landed in the municipality of Apatzingan, Michoacan state, after being fired upon by suspected cartel gunmen. Two officers aboard the helicopter were injured.
• Seventeen inmates escaped from a prison in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, through a hidden tunnel.

May 25

• Groups of unidentified gunmen stole cash from the registers at the Royale and Red casinos in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported during the robberies.
• Police discovered the severed head of a woman inside an abandoned taxi near a police headquarters in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state.
• Soldiers in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz state, arrested Julio de Jesus Radilla Hernandez, a suspected member of the Cartel Pacifico Sur who is believed to be responsible for the March 27 murder of the son of poet Javier Sicilia.
• Twenty-nine people were killed and two were injured in a firefight between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel in the municipality of Ruiz, Nayarit state.

May 26

• Soldiers in the municipality of Florencia de Benito Juarez, Zacatecas state, shot and killed three gunmen after being attacked.
• Security forces discovered the bodies of two men and two women inside an abandoned car near a night club in the Zona Diamante area of Acapulco, Guerrero state.
• Military authorities announced the arrest of Romeo Ramses Cota Lopez in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. Cota allegedly was associated with the Sinaloa cartel and had links to several businesses acting as cartel fronts in Honduras.
• A group of unidentified gunmen shot and killed six people and injured five others in at least four separate attacks in northern Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

May 27

• Federal police officers in the municipality of Mineral de la Reforma, Hidalgo state, arrested Esteban Javier Reyes Hernandez, a former police commander who allegedly provided protection for Los Zetas. Reyes attempted to flee in a vehicle but was apparently drunk at the time of his arrest.
• Unidentified gunmen in Tlalchapa, Guerrero state, shot and killed three people, including a local municipal commissioner and his son.

May 28

• Federal police officers arrested 36 members of La Familia Michoacana after a firefight at a meeting of cartel members in the municipality of Jilotlan de los Dolores, Jalisco state. Eleven suspected gunmen were killed and two police officers were injured during the incident.
• The bodies of two people who appeared to have been strangled were found at separate locations in the 20 de Noviembre and San Luis neighborhoods of Durango, Durango state.
• The dismembered bodies of a man and a woman were found inside an abandoned taxi near a police headquarters in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state.
• Security forces found the body of a man bearing signs of torture and wrapped in a blanket in China, Nuevo Leon state. The victim’s hands and feet were bound and a message (the contents of which was undisclosed) was found near the body.

May 29

• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a bus belonging to Grupo Senda in Hidalgo, Tamaulipas state. No injuries were reported in the attack.
• Around 20 gunmen traveling in several vehicles opened fire on a group of vehicles in Cojumatlan de Regules, Michoacan state, killing one person — the cousin of a state lawmaker’s wife — and injuring another.
• State police officers in Atotonilco El Alto, Jalisco state, arrested five suspected members of the Millenium cartel.
• Unidentified attackers threw a grenade at the offices of the La Vanguardia newspaper in Saltillo, Coahuila state, but no one was injured.

May 30

• Unidentified attackers threw an improvised explosive device at the Institutional Revolutionary Party offices in Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state, damaging the building. No injuries were reported in the attack.

JOHAN ORDONEZ/AFP/Getty Images

Guatemalan soldiers patrol the streets of Flores, Peten department, May 17

What We Know Now

On May 15, a group of Guatemalan laborers were found murdered in Peten department on the Los Cocos farm, which is owned by a man named Otto Salguero. The location initially was reported incorrectly as being “near the village of San Benito,” in central Peten. Salguero’s Los Cocos property is in the southwestern corner of Peten, near the Mexican border state of Chiapas and situated on a main transnational roadway. STRATFOR’s sources in the region have indicated that the reports of 27 victims of the massacre may not be entirely accurate. According to our sources, 27 bodies were recovered, 26 of whom were beheaded, but elsewhere on the property the decapitated bodies of two children were found. That discovery was not broadly reported, but it may account for the discrepancy in the totals mentioned in several Latin American media outlets immediately following the event. Another detail that emerged recently is that three of the decapitated heads were missing from scene. Though the Zetas often place heads and other body parts some distance away from the rest of the body, we have not seen them carry away heads or other parts as trophies or for other purposes. It has also recently been reported that Los Cocos landowner Salguero, the apparent focal point of the massacre, is in hiding.
There were several survivors of the massacre, and though we were under the initial impression there were four, the correct number appears to be three: one man who was stabbed but managed to slip away before the attackers returned to remove his head, and a pregnant woman with her daughter. The woman’s statement included her observation that when the attackers spoke they had Mexican accents — whether she was instructed to say that is not known. As of May 25, 16 individuals reportedly had been arrested in Guatemala who are suspected of involvement in the killings, seven of whom have been identified as Mexican nationals.

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Making Sense of it All

It is important to remember that the only things really clear on the ground in northern Guatemala are that facts are limited, rumors abound and mistrust and fear are endemic — and there is a very real possibility that the full truth about the mass killing may never be known. Given that caveat, it is appropriate to discuss implications that can be drawn from the Peten massacre by examining how they fit into the larger picture.

A Two-Front War

It is clear that the killing of the farm workers was intended to spread fear and send a distinct message: If you cross the Zetas you will pay. From past events and reliable sources, we know that the Zetas — both Mexican and Guatemalan nationals — essentially have free rein over as much as 75 percent of Guatemalan territory. This is not to say that the cartel controls the Guatemalan government, only that, at ground level, Zeta human- and drug-smuggling operations are conducted without interference from the government along the country’s interior and eastern transportation corridors. (Guatemala’s highways that run the length of its Pacific coastline are controlled by the Sinaloa Federation.) We also know that the initial rumor relayed by the press that Salguero was targeted due to theft of 2,000 kilograms of Zeta cocaine is false and that there may be a much more strategic goal for Los Zetas.
STRATFOR has learned that Salguero has been associated with a regional Guatemalan drug-trafficking organization, the Leon family (Los Leones), which is associated with the Gulf cartel. If Salguero is connected to the Gulf cartel via Los Leones, it is likely that the association predates the initial 2008 split between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas, Gulf’s former enforcement arm, and the war that erupted between them in February 2010. And these pre-existing relationships could explain the dynamics behind the May 15 Peten massacre. A bloody message to Salguero was left at the scene promising that he would be next, and numerous narcomantas (banners) were hung in the city of Quetzaltenango in Quetzaltenango department on May 21 tying Salguero to the Gulf cartel as one of its main cocaine conduits. This makes sense given his drug-trafficking association with Los Leones.
Viewed from the perspective of the Zeta war against the Gulf cartel in northeastern Mexico — in which strength or vulnerability is directly linked to revenue, and revenue is directly linked to supply flow — there is a very good possibility that the Zeta strategy is to sever the Gulf cartel’s high-value supply lines. A collateral point here is that the trusted conveyors of cartel inventory also serve as procurers of cartel weapons. It is not yet known whether Salguero funneled munitions to the Gulf cartel, but there is that distinct possibility, and by taking him out Los Zetas could land a double blow on the Gulf’s forces in northeastern Mexico, impacting the flow of both money and munitions.
As STRATFOR has reported over the last year, Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel are engaged in a protracted war for northeastern Mexico. In that region, the Gulf cartel is weaker than it has been in past years and a fraction of its size and power in 2006, in large part because of the war with the Zetas. But Gulf is not entirely alone in the fight. The alliance of former opponents Sinaloa and Gulf in the newer construct called the New Federation has bolstered Gulf’s forces and firepower (not in huge amounts, perhaps, and sporadically when convenient for Sinaloa, but it has been assistance nonetheless). On the other hand, Los Zetas, with apparent superiority in firepower, battle tactics and strategic planning, have been going it alone in the northeast, though they have partnered with the Cartel Pacifico del Sur and other groups to fight against the Sinaloa cartel in other parts of Mexico. Presently feeling the pinch in the northeast, it appears that Los Zetas have opted for an alternative plan — open warfare on the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels on a vulnerable front: Guatemala.
Los Zetas possess a number of potential assets — the ability to attack the Gulf cartel on another front, large numbers of foot soldiers already in place in the south and access to large allied organizations. Given the heavy Zeta presence in Guatemala and on Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula (it is necessary to hold this territory in order to conduct smuggling operations in the region), Los Zetas have both internal manpower and the ability to request significant backup from their Guatemalan allies, such as groups of former Kaibiles and members of Mara Salvatrucha. The latter group has a substantial presence in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and with both of these Zeta allies already in the region, Los Zetas could raise their numbers quickly, easily and significantly if they indeed are opening a second front in Guatemala.
If that is the idea, Gulf may be forced to pull resources away from the battle in northeastern Mexico and/or request significant assistance from Sinaloa in order to protect both its flank and its drug-supply lines. Gulf does have its Guatemalan allies in Los Leones, and that group may be pulled into the fight as well, but their priorities more likely will center on protecting their own operations in a war between the Mexican cartels. Whether Gulf pulls some or all of its enforcement arm Nueva Gente away from its current operations or asks for (and receives) assistance from Sinaloa, the net effect would likely be a reduction in the pressure on Zeta forces in Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Coahuila states. If this is the Zeta goal, and it would be a logical strategy, the opening salvo may have been a surprise attack May 15 against the Gulf supply train, coupled with a clear message to the population that getting in the way will be fatal.

Government Reaction

Peten always has been an uncontrollable department for the Guatemalan government. During the civil war that raged from 1960 to 1996, the jungles and swamps of Peten sheltered rebels, training camps and refugees. One stated element of President Alvaro Colom’s plan to restore control over the Peten is to increase the army’s presence in the region and on the Franja Transversal del Norte (FTN), a major trucking route through northwestern Guatemala. Statements by Colom late in 2010 indicated that armed forces had control of the FTN area and it was expected that by the end of 2010 the military “should have gained complete control of northeast Peten and the Laguna del Tigre area…” Obviously, this prediction has not come true.
That lack of government control likely is due to resistance and distrust of the military by the people of Peten department, an area that suffered greatly when the military committed many atrocities during the 36-year civil war. Now, despite the intentions of the Colom administration, Peten and neighboring regions remain uncontrolled. The wholesale killing of the laborers on Salguero’s farm, regardless of the perpetrators’ identities, created a condition in which the military may be asked to come in and protect the people. There are some who hold to conspiracy theories that the massacre was an event engineered by the military in order to justify its declaration of a state of siege in Peten. These theories are understandable given Guatemala’s history, but given the course of events, the Zetas’ previous activities in the region and the target of the attack — an alleged Gulf ally — these rumors appear to be ill-founded. Nevertheless, according to STRATFOR sources, the Guatemalan army will seek to use the situation to increase its presence in the area by declaring a state of siege.
There could also be an expansion of the state of siege beyond Peten. Although the department has long been a haven for smugglers, drug traffickers and other violent elements, the Guatemalan government will have little success in subduing the region if it does not include Quiche and Alta Verapaz departments in any operations associated with a declared siege. As it stands, the conditions exist in which the people are thankful to have the military there in force and want them to stay. In all likelihood, the end state will more closely resemble the regular running battles seen in Mexico’s Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon states, where the fight between cartels is further complicated by a third force: the military.
There are still some outstanding questions related to these events, but STRATFOR believes the most rational explanation is that the Peten massacre was indeed part of an intentional Zeta offensive to damage their Gulf rivals. This theory could be confirmed if there are more Zeta attacks against Gulf smuggling networks in Guatemala and a Gulf counteroffensive.

Smuggling People

Just after midnight on May 16, two semi-trailer rigs were stopped at a checkpoint outside the city of Tuxtla Gutierrez in Chiapas state. State police conducted X-ray scans of the trailers and discovered human cargo inside: a total of 513 migrants, including 32 women and four children — 273 people crammed in one trailer and 240 in the other. Images from the X-ray scans show many people standing and holding onto ropes above their heads. According to a statement released by Mexico’s National Immigration Institute, 410 of the migrants were from Guatemala, 47 from El Salvador, 32 from Ecuador, 12 from India, six from Nepal, three from China and one each from Japan, the Dominican Republic and Honduras.
The mountainous region of Chiapas where the trucks were stopped is known to be controlled by Los Zetas, for whom human smuggling is a primary revenue stream. It is also a booming business. Other cartels are known to guide migrants across the U.S. border — typically for a fee of $2,000 or more per person — while requiring their clients to carry marijuana bundles on their trek (human smuggling is not regularly conducted by the larger cartels).
Los Zetas, on the other hand, tend to specialize in a form of human smuggling that is both high volume and high value. Statements made by several of the detained Guatemalan migrants indicate that they paid their smugglers $7,000 each to be transported to the U.S. border and smuggled into the United States. The fee for the Asian migrants may have been as high as $10,000 each, and it is likely that all of the migrants packed into the two trucks had already paid their smugglers.
The discovery of the Guatemalans heightened diplomatic criticism of the Mexican government by the government of Guatemala, which took issue with the Mexican authorities for not having immediately notified their consulate after the migrants were identified. Such an official complaint is not unusual, since relations between the two countries are known to be testy on occasion, but following closely on the heels of the May 14-15 mass killing of Guatemalan farm workers in Guatemala’s Peten department, reportedly by Mexican Zetas, the event may contribute to the larger geopolitical picture shaping up in Guatemala surrounding the upcoming presidential election.

Weapons and Cocaine in Chiapas

Later in the day on May 16 in Chiapas, federal troops intercepted an all-terrain vehicle operating along the Suchiate River near Frontera Hidalgo. The river in that area delineates the border between Mexico and Guatemala. The soldiers arrested four male Guatemalan nationals and seized eight magazines of various calibers, four handguns, five hand grenades (three fragmentation, two smoke), three AK-47 variants, a grenade launcher and one AR-15 outfitted with a scope and bipod. Then on May 17, three other seizures were conducted by federal authorities in different locations in Chiapas, including Comitan, where soldiers arrested five people for transporting weapons (the quantity and types were not reported).
The Comitan arrests did lead soldiers to a safe-house in the city, where they discovered 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of cocaine, an unreported amount of currency, more weapons and equipment and materials presumed to be for packaging cocaine. All five people arrested reportedly were from Sinaloa state. Also on May 17, at a checkpoint between the Chiapas coastline and the city of Huixtla, Federal Police discovered 80 kilograms of cocaine in packages mingled with a shipment of mangoes. Police arrested the truck’s driver, identified as being from Tamaulipas state, who indicated that the shipment was bound for Monterrey in Nuevo Leon state.
The locations and routes related to these arrests point to several potential connections. The weapons and cocaine discovered in Comitan are interesting because that particular region of Chiapas state is heavily controlled by Los Zetas and the five operatives arrested are reportedly from Sinaloa state. This does not prove an absolute connection to the Sinaloa Federation, but the likelihood that five Zetas all came from Sinaloa state is rather remote. Because of the area’s proximity to the coast, the cocaine mingled with a mango shipment probably means the shipment was destined either for the Sinaloa or Gulf cartels’ smuggling operations on the U.S. border. If the reported statement of the driver is correct, a connection to the Gulf cartel is likely. Finally, the presence of a weapons shipment barely across the river — and the Guatemalan border — and only about 32 kilometers (20 miles) upriver from the coast points to the Sinaloa Federation due to that group’s control of the Mexican and Guatemalan coastal regions.
The likely sourcing of Gulf cartel cocaine and weapons shipments via Guatemala, combined with the known presence of Zetas operating in the region, raises the possibility that Los Zetas may be using the military in an effort to choke off Gulf cartel supply lines. Taken together, all of these seizures may indicate a coordinated Zeta effort to dry up the weapons and revenue that have been supplying the Gulf/New Federation side of the fight for control of northeastern Mexico.

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May 16

• Banners signed by the Beltran Leyva Organization were hung in the cities of Cuernavaca, Tetecala, Jojutla and Jiutepec, all in Morelos state. The banners blamed Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS) and the Mexican government for the death in March of Mexican poet and journalist Javier Sicilia.
• A group of unidentified gunmen opened fire on a vehicle carrying the police commander of Altar neighborhood in the municipality of Caborca, Sonora state. The commander was injured in the attack and was transferred to a hospital in Hermosillo.
• Authorities discovered the burned body of an unidentified man among rubble and discarded tires in Tlalnepantla, Mexico state.
• A group of gunmen traveling in at least two vehicles shot and killed seven suspected drug dealers and addicts near a vacant lot in the Riberas de la Silla neighborhood in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state.
• A group of armed gunmen opened fire near the walls of the state prison in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. No injuries were reported in the attack.
• Chiapas state police operating a checkpoint outside of Tuxtla Gutierrez discovered 513 migrants crowded into two semi-trailers when they conducted X-ray scans of the trailers. The migrants were detained and four suspects were arrested.
• Federal troops intercepted an all-terrain vehicle operating along the Suchiate River near Frontera Hidalgo, Chiapas state. The soldiers arrested four male Guatemalan nationals and seized eight magazines of various calibers, four handguns, five hand grenades, three AK-47 variants, a grenade launcher and one scoped rifle with a bipod.

May 17

• Police officers discovered the bodies of four people abandoned in a garbage dump in the Prolongacion Primo de Verdad neighborhood in Durango, Durango state. The victims were blindfolded with packing tape.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed the brother of the Michoacan state police academy director in Tanhuato. The gunmen chased the victim as he drove through Tanhuato and killed him after forcing him out of his car. His wife was also in the vehicle but was not injured.
• A group of gunmen shot and killed eight people and injured two others at a sheet metal workshop in the Melchor Ocampo neighborhood of Cardenas, Tabasco state.
• Mexican marines chased an unidentified car and were involved in a firefight with unidentified gunmen along Harold Pape Boulevard in Monclova, Coahuila state. No injuries or deaths were reported in the incident, which lasted approximately 30 minutes.
• Federal troops arrested five people, including one woman, for transporting weapons in Comitan, Chiapas state. The arrest led to the search of a safe-house in the city, where troops seized 200 kilograms of cocaine.
• Inspecting a truck load of mangoes, Federal Police operating a checkpoint between the Pacific coast and the city of Huixtla, Chiapas state, discovered and seized 80 kilograms of cocaine mingled with the cargo.

May 18

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed four youths and injured three others in the Unidad Pedreras neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
• Military authorities announced the seizure of a methamphetamines lab capable of producing approximately 10 kilograms of methamphetamines per day in Etchojoa, Sonora state. No arrests were made during the raid.
• Ministerial police officers arrested the police commanders of Uriangato and Moroleon in Guanajuato state and four other police officers for alleged links to organized criminal groups. Three suspected members of La Familia Michoacana were also arrested during the same operation. The suspects are allegedly linked to 23 kidnappings and 12 murders.
• Nine inmates were killed during a riot at the Durango state prison. Hundreds of police officers were brought in to subdue the rioters.

May 19

• Soldiers in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, arrested Victor Manuel Valdez, the suspected second-in-command of CPS. During an interrogation, Valdez claimed that Cuernavaca ministerial police chief Juan Bosco Castaneda Matias provided protection for CPS for 15,000 pesos per month. Soldiers arrested Castaneda Matias later in the day.
• One person was killed and two others were injured when unidentified gunmen opened fire on attendees at the Mazatlan Cattle Fair in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a Renault car dealership in the Villas de Lux neighborhood in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported at the dealership, which was closed at the time of the attack.

May 20

• The decapitated body of a woman was found near the municipal government headquarters in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state. Four police officers assigned to the headquarters were arrested in connection with the abandoned body.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured the police commander of Cihuatlan, Jalisco state, as he drove to police headquarters. The commander was transferred to a hospital at an undisclosed location.
• Federal police officers in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, arrested Gilberto Barragan Balderas, the suspected Gulf cartel chief in the city of Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas state. Suspected cartel member Romeo Eduardo Mejia, who is the brother of Gulf cartel member Juan Reyes “R1” Mejia , was also arrested.

May 21

• Soldiers killed five suspected Los Zetas gunmen during a firefight in Boca del Rio, Veracruz state. Rolando Veytia Bravo, the suspected leader of Los Zetas in Boca del Rio, was killed in the firefight, which reportedly began when a group of Zetas traveling in a car refused to stop after being ordered by soldiers to do so.
• Soldiers in the municipality of Temascaltepec, Mexico state, seized a suspected methamphetamine lab reportedly belonging to La Familia Michoacana. No arrests were made during the seizure.
• State authorities released 26 police officers from Jerecuaro and Coroneo, Guanajuato state, who had been arrested for alleged links to La Familia Michoacana.
• Unidentified gunmen in the Satelite neighborhood of Tlalnepantla, Mexico state, shot and killed retired army Gen. Jorge Juarez Loera as he was driving his vehicle.

May 22

• Soldiers in the Paseo Santa Fe neighborhood of Juarez, Nuevo Leon state, shot and killed five suspected cartel gunmen after a vehicle chase. The gunmen tried to escape after the soldiers spotted them as part of a cartel convoy, but their vehicle crashed into a wall and caught fire.
• Military authorities announced the seizure of six aircraft at the El Crucero airport in Ciudad Obregon, Sonora state. The aircraft were reportedly used by the Beltran Leyva Organization to smuggle drugs.
• Soldiers discovered a 70-meter tunnel thought to be used for smuggling drugs from San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora state, to San Luis in the U.S. state of Arizona. The tunnel began in the kitchen of a house on the Mexican side of the border and ended on the U.S. side of the border in a San Luis residence.

Attack and Vehicle Theft in Reynosa

Methamphetamine on the Gulf Coast

(click here to view interactive graphic)

May 9

• Authorities discovered the severed heads of six people outside a high school in the Azcapotzalco neighborhood of Durango, Durango state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed three people at a bar in the Altamira neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. A person driving past the scene of the attack was injured.
• State police officers arrested suspected Sinaloa cartel drug trafficker Hector Eduardo Guajardo Hernandez in Mexicali, Baja California state. Guajardo Hernandez and an associate identified only as “El Lupis” were injured in a firefight with police officers.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a prison guard in the Hector Mayagoitia neighborhood of Durango, Durango state. The guard was the sixth prison official killed by gunmen in Durango in 2011.
• Local residents discovered the severed head of a man in the Libertadores neighborhood of Acapulco, Guerrero state. A message addressed to “Melon, Victor Aguirre, El Eden, El Coreano and Betito” was found near the head, as was another signed by “C.S.”

May 10

• Unidentified gunmen traveling in eight vehicles entered Taxco de Alarcon, Guerrero state, and shot and killed five people. Five other people were injured in the attack, which occurred near the city bus terminal.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a convoy of vehicles transporting the police director of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state. The attack, which occurred in the Rincon de Guadalupe neighborhood, left at least one gunman dead and four police officers injured.
• A local resident discovered the bodies of three men in Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. The three victims had their hands bound and might have been beaten to death.

May 11

• Police officers in Zacatepec, Morelos state, rescued a kidnapped businessman and arrested five suspected kidnappers as they attempted to flee with the victim bound inside a vehicle.
• A ministerial police officer from the Michoacan state anti-kidnapping directorate was found dead in the Villas del Pedregal neighborhood of Morelia. The victim died from a single gunshot to the head.
• One prisoner was shot to death and four others were injured during a riot at a prison in Cancun, Quintana Roo state. The riot was reportedly due to a power struggle at the prison between members of Los Zetas and criminal group Los Pelones.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed an off-duty agent from the Sinaloa state ministerial police Elite Group during an ambush in Los Mochis. Two other officers were injured in the attack.

May 12

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed five members of the same family as they drove in a vehicle near Choix, Sinaloa state. One of the victims was reportedly a nine-month-old child.
• Soldiers arrested 12 suspected members of the Gulf Cartel during a raid on a ranch in Montemorelos, Nuevo Leon state. A Salvadoran and a Guatemalan citizen were among those arrested. The group reportedly operated near General Teran.
• Police officers in the San Rafael neighborhood of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state, arrested eight men suspected of acting as lookouts for an unidentified drug cartel.
• Authorities discovered the decapitated bodies of six men, including Durango prison guard chief Gerardo Galindo Meza, in Durango, Durango state. Two other decapitated bodies were found in Pueblo Nuevo, Durango state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured Ricardo de Jesus Larralde Ramos, the head of the Criminal Investigation Directorate, as he drove through the Juan Lira neighborhood in Durango, Durango state. A group of gunmen later entered the hospital where Larralde Ramos was being treated and killed him.

May 13

• Military authorities announced the arrest of Martin Beltran Coronel, the nephew of deceased Sinaloa cartel member Ignacio Coronel Villarreal. Beltran Coronel was arrested in Zapopan, Jalisco state, with four other people.
• Two federal police officers were killed and four others were injured in a firefight with unidentified gunmen traveling in three vehicles in Acapulco, Guerrero state.
• A group of gunmen attacked the convoy of the director of roads police on the Cuauhtemoc Avenue in Acapulco, Guerrero state, killing a taxi driver. Police officers at the scene repelled the attackers.

May 14

• Authorities in Janos, Chihuahua state, discovered the bodies of the police chief and two officers of Ascencion. The three men had been kidnapped on May 13 as they returned to Ascencion from Casas Grandes.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on the municipal headquarters of Gran Morelos, Chihuahua state. No injuries were reported in the attack, which damaged parts of the building and some computers inside.
• Twelve people were killed and three police officers were injured during a firefight between three groups of federal police special forces and unidentified gunmen near the Barra de Potosi tourism project in Zihuatanejo, Guerrero state.

May 15

• The bodies of three dismembered men were discovered in the municipality of Montemorelos, Nuevo Leon state. A sign, the contents of which were not revealed, was discovered nearby.
• The bodies of nine men were discovered at the bullfighting arena in the San Ignacio neighborhood of Durango, Durango state. The victims were found naked and piled up near the ticket booths and had apparently been strangled.
• Authorities from the state prosecutor general’s office announced the seizure of approximately 1.24 tons of methamphetamines in the municipality of Ursulo Galvan, Veracruz state.

Gunbattles in Matamoros

A series of gunbattles flared up May 5 in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, resulting in the emplacement of several cartel roadblocks in and around the city. This is a tactic not typically employed by the Gulf cartel, which controls that territory. One of the battles started in the street in front of the Tamaulipas state police building just before 7:30 a.m. and continued for almost an hour.
According to the state attorney general’s office, the firefights involved federal troops and unidentified cartel gunmen, but there is conflicting information and evidence of a third significant element: Los Zetas. Posts on Internet forums and Twitter describe gunfire and explosions that morning in several areas of Matamoros and along the 50 kilometers (30 miles) of highway between Matamoros and Valle Hermoso. The series of roadblocks included one blockade very near the Matamoros side of the Veterans International Bridge point of entry, which caused a temporary closure of the southbound lanes of the point of entry by U.S. authorities.
What is significant about these events is the use of trailers and vehicles to block roads after the gunbattles, which is a tactic regularly employed by Los Zetas. Matamoros is home turf for the Gulf cartel, and the presence of roadblocks indicates the possibility that the fighting was a significant probe by Los Zetas. Information posted on the Internet by possible witnesses indicated that the battles involved two cartel groups — gunmen connected to Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen (incarcerated in a U.S. federal penitentiary but known to still be running many Gulf operations via proxies) and a contingent of Zetas gunmen. The placement of the roadblocks after the main battle and the running gunbattle from southern Matamoros to Valle Hermoso make it likely that Zetas gunmen were involved.
Judging from the reported events, and what is known of Zetas tactics, it appears they successfully penetrated the Gulf’s outlying surveillance posts surrounding the city and pushed into central Matamoros, nearly to the U.S. border. Last February, in the last major round of Zetas incursions into Matamoros, the violence remained at a sustained level for a couple of weeks. It is likely that this latest probing action will be followed by a series of battles in the next week or two, and extreme caution should be exercised by anyone conducting business in the region.

Arrests in Mexico City

Federal authorities arrested Jose Efrain Zarco Cardenas and another suspect May 7 in Mexico City. Zarco Cardenas was the latest leader of the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA), and according to Mexican media reports he was restructuring CIDA and working to forge alliances with the Gulf cartel and the hybrid group La Familia Michoacana/Knights Templar. Media reports also suggest that Zarco Cardenas may have been headed to Reynosa, Tamaulipas, to acquire weapons, drugs and/or money from the Gulf cartel.
Despite its name, CIDA’s area of influence stretches beyond the local Acapulco area. STRATFOR sources recently indicated that CIDA has as many as 180 gunmen in Morelos state distributed in three groups and covering a triangular region about 65 kilometers south of Mexico City, with the triangle’s corners centered on the cities of Cuernavaca, Cuautla and Amacuzac.
The arrest and possible incarceration of CIDA’s leader could further destabilize the cartel, but not enough is known about its membership to rule out the possibility that it can withstand the loss. Given the group’s shaky footing in the Pacific coast areas of Guerrero and southern Michoacan states, where it has been marginalized, CIDA’s apparently strong presence in the triangular area south of Mexico City may be the result of an effort to rebuild its membership and strength. This could mean a CIDA resurgence over the next three to six months, and if that occurs we will expect to see the group try to re-establish itself in strength in the Acapulco seaport area.

Firefight on Falcon Lake

A firefight reportedly occurred the afternoon of May 9 on Falcon Lake, which straddles the U.S.-Mexico border between Laredo and McAllen, Texas. Although few details have emerged about the incident, a Mexican navy patrol on the lake apparently encountered a group of Zetas gunmen on an island about 3.5 kilometers from Nueva Ciudad Guerrero. A gunbattle began, and marines reportedly were called in to reinforce the navy patrol. It is unclear whether any gunmen were captured, though 12 gunmen and one marine reportedly were killed. Mexican forces seized 19 firearms, including a Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle and a 5.56 mm light machine gun.
STRATFOR’s initial take on the significance of this event is that Los Zetas appear once again to have ramped up their marijuana-smuggling operations across Falcon Lake. Following the shooting of David Hartley in September 2010, there was an increase in law enforcement and military patrolling of the lake on both sides of the border, and it was apparent that Zetas operations had withdrawn while the organization lay low. Now Los Zetas appear to be using the islands again, in the same area of the lake where they were last summer when they encountered the Hartleys (who reportedly were sightseeing at the Old Guerrero church ruins). The area is remote, with few residents, and Los Zetas need more smuggling routes to increase revenue in order to buy more weapons and train more gunmen. With hot weather setting in, the increasing number of U.S. citizens plying the lake in watercraft should heed the warnings and stay well away from border buoys and not venture anywhere near the Mexican side.

(click here to view interactive map)

May 2

• Soldiers in the La Hacienda neighborhood of Apodaca, Nuevo Leon state, chased and killed two suspected cartel gunmen in a car. A third gunman reportedly escaped, leaving behind a suitcase full of ammunition.
• Security forces arrested nine suspected members of the Cartel Nueva Generacion in the municipality of Tequila, Jalisco state. The men were arrested with 17 firearms, four bulletproof vests, 14 radios and approximately 4,140 rounds of ammunition.
• Local residents found the body of a man wrapped in a blanket in the Jardines de la Silla neighborhood of Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. The victim had been shot in the head.
• A group of unidentified gunmen shot and killed a police officer, injured two others and stole seven firearms from municipal police officers during three separate incidents in the municipality of Acapulco, Guerrero state.

May 3

• Police found four decapitated bodies in an abandoned car in the San Antonio neighborhood of Cuautitlan Izcalli, Mexico state. A message was left near the victims’ severed heads saying they were murdered for “working with the H and the CC.” In the place of a signature on the message were three question marks. Reports indicated that the message came from Cartel del Centro.
• Police found the bodies of four men who had been shot to death in the town of Tablillas San Dimas, Durango state.

May 4

• Unidentified gunmen kidnapped three highway patrol officers in Linares, Nuevo Leon state. Three gunmen were reportedly killed in the incident.
• Workers at a department store in Chilpancingo, Guerrero state, discovered a dismembered body in the store parking lot. A message attributing the crime to “El Sapo Guapo,” an alleged local leader of La Familia Michoacana, was found near plastic bags containing the body parts.
• The Public Security Secretariat announced that federal police officers freed 16 migrants being held hostage in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.
• Unidentified gunmen in Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state, shot and killed two police officers in a drive-by shooting. The content of a message found near the officers’ bodies was not reported.

May 5

• Unidentified gunmen in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, used stolen vehicles to block several roads, including Pedro Cardenas, Sendero Nacional, Canales, Sexta, Portes Gil and the Ignacio Zaragoza International Bridge.
• The decapitated body of a man wrapped in plastic bags was found in the Ciudad Cuauhtemoc neighborhood of Ecatepec, Mexico state. The victim’s head was found a short distance from the body.
• Unidentified gunmen wearing uniforms similar to those worn by federal police officers shot and killed two men and two women travelling in a car in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The victims were shot after a brief chase.
• Police in Pachuca, Hidalgo state, arrested 20 people, including five police officers, for alleged links to Los Zetas.
• Soldiers arrested 23 police officers in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state, for alleged links to organized crime.

May 6

• Unidentified gunmen travelling in two vehicles shot and killed six people outside a taco stand in the municipality of Ebano, San Luis Potosi state.
• Soldiers in the Nuevo Leon Estado de Progreso and Agropecuario neighborhoods of Escobedo, Nuevo Leon state, freed nine people held hostage and killed one suspected cartel gunman. Two other suspects were arrested during the raid. The soldiers had been searching for gunmen believed to be responsible for a firefight in Escobedo earlier in the day.
• Authorities found the decapitated body of a man wrapped in a blanket in the El Refugio neighborhood of Durango, Durango state. The victim’s head was found in a different location.
• Federal police arrested Jose Efrain Zarco Cardenas, the leader of the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, in Mexico City along with another suspect.

May 7

• Soldiers in the municipality of Poncitlan, Jalisco state, seized approximately 720 kilograms (1,600 pounds) of methamphetamine and more than 3,000 liters (800 gallons) of chemicals at a drug lab.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire in a seafood restaurant in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state, killing a man and injuring a woman.
• Federal police officers in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, stopped a pickup truck for speeding and discovered that two Guatemalans traveling in the vehicle had no identity documents. The people in the vehicle led police to a house from which 16 migrants were seized.

May 8

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed the former deputy director of prevention and social re-adaptation in Acapulco, Guerrero state.
• Unidentified gunmen traveling in two vehicles shot and killed a prison guard in the San Ignacio neighborhood of Durango, Durango state.

Possible VCF Weapons Seizure in Juarez

While acting on an anonymous tip April 30 on kidnapping victims being held in a house in Juarez, Chihuahua state, Mexican Federal Police instead found a large cache of weapons and ordnance inside a secret room. The house was located in an affluent neighborhood just south of the Instituto de Ingenieria y Tecnologia in northeast Juarez, and, given the location, the cache was most likely owned by a upper-level member of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (VCF), aka the Juarez cartel, as the house is in an area known to be controlled by that cartel.
The secret room was found in the basement gym, but, according to STRATFOR sources, the room was well concealed, with the mirrored wall in the gym designed to open when a button near the floor was pressed. Because the room was discovered despite being well hidden, it is likely that either the Federal Police may have already known what they would find and how to access it (they may otherwise be protecting a source), or someone may have informed on the owner of the house and given the authorities specific information as to where to look for the “kidnapping victims.” The latter scenario may involve a disenfranchised or compromised VCF insider.
The arsenal is a significant find; it included over 26,000 rounds of ammunition, two dozen AK-47 rifles, a belt-fed .30-caliber Browning machine gun, two .50-caliber Barrett sniper rifles, several miscellaneous rifles and handguns, 39 fragmentation grenades and 9 smoke grenades, 294 rifle and pistol magazines (including 10 high-capacity drum magazines), 19 bayonets for AK-47s, 13 ballistic vests, 53 military uniforms, three gas masks, as well as three currency-counters, a scale, and vacuum packaging machines. This is not the first time that .50-caliber sniper rifles have been seized in large weapons caches. However, also found in the cache, (if the inventory provided by Mexican authorities is accurate) were three “ghillie” suits, a heavier type of camouflage used by scout/sniper teams taking up positions for lengthy periods — and these paired with the two Barrett sniper rifles and a third .30-caliber sniper rifle are a significant combination. At present it is unclear whether the weapons and ghillie suits would have found their way into hands capable of utilizing them effectively, though it is notable that the .50-caliber sniper rifles did not have optics mounted on them, indicating they were being held in the cache but not being actively used.
The VCF has been steadily losing ground in Juarez to their rivals in the Sinaloa Federation over the past two years. Losing a long-established safe-house and a significant weapons cache will contribute to the erosion of the VCF’s control of Juarez. We can anticipate seeing more VCF safe-houses and weapons caches being seized and key figures from the VCF or its enforcement arm, La Linea, arrested or killed as Sinaloa continues to encroach on their home territory.

Migrants Rescued in Reynosa

Mexican authorities on April 25 freed 51 migrants being held hostage in a house in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. Information obtained during a raid on a group of kidnappers the previous week led to their release. In a separate incident April 29, Mexican army troops turned over to immigration authorities 52 Central American migrants held at a house in Reynosa, after receiving an anonymous tip.
Despite the Mexican government’s pledge to prevent the kidnapping of migrants, these events indicate that the practice continues unabated. The Gulf cartel was likely responsible in these particular cases, given its control over Reynosa. The possibility of another cartel’s involvement cannot be ruled out, however.
It is not yet clear whether the migrants were being held for ransom, or to coerce their labor or cartel membership, though the forced gang membership of migrants is not typical behavior for the Gulf or Sinaloa cartels. (Over the last year this has been employed extensively by Los Zetas.) The 51 hostages released by authorities during the first event were from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala but also included 27 Mexican citizens and six Chinese citizens. The 52 captives in the second event on April 29 were from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador — 34 of them from Honduras.

(click here to view interactive map)

April 25

• Visiting tourists discovered a severed head in the municipality of Poncitlan, Jalisco state.
• Soldiers shot and killed four suspected cartel gunmen during a firefight in Zihuatanejo, Guerrero state.
• Mexican police freed 51 migrants held hostage at a house in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. There were 14 Guatemalans, two Hondurans, two Salvadorians, six Chinese and 27 Mexicans in the group. The individuals were freed based on intelligence gained from a raid on a group of migrant kidnappers the previous week.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed three police officers in the Minerva residential neighborhood in the municipality of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state.

April 26

• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed an employee of the Nuevo Leon state Public Security Secretariat at a gas station in northern Monterrey.
• Five dismembered bodies were found in an abandoned lot in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state.
• The Federal Investigative Agency announced the seizure of approximately 7.7 tons of marijuana in Tijuana, Baja California state. The drugs were seized during a raid on a warehouse in the Las Mesas neighborhood.
• Soldiers in the municipality of Durango, Durango state, seized 8.1 tons of marijuana from a warehouse.

April 27

• Four suspected gunmen were killed by soldiers in Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. The victims were all traveling in the same car, which reportedly failed to stop when ordered to do so by soldiers.
• Authorities discovered four decapitated bodies in Zihuatanejo, Guerrero state. The victims bore signs of torture and had their hands and feet bound.
• The National Defense Secretariat announced that soldiers freed three hostages and arrested six suspected kidnappers during a raid in Allende, Nuevo Leon state.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on people inside a house in the Tierra Nueva neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Leon state. Two people were killed and three others were injured in the attack.
• Unidentified gunmen used two buses and a taxi to block roads near the Monterrey municipal palace. No injuries or firefights were reported during the incident.

April 28

• Soldiers shot and killed six suspected cartel gunmen during a six-hour firefight in Arcabuz, Tamaulipas state. The soldiers were responding to reports of a firefight involving up to 50 trucks carrying unidentified gunmen.
• Authorities found the decapitated bodies of three men and the body of a woman shot to death inside an abandoned vehicle in the Sauceda neighborhood of Zamora, Michoacan state.
• Municipal police officers found three bodies — one of them dismembered — in a grave in San Miguel el Alto, Jalisco state. The discovery was made in response to an anonymous tip to police about grave.
• Three people were killed when unidentified gunmen opened fire on the prosecutor general’s headquarters in Tula de Allende, Hidalgo state.
• Soldiers freed 52 immigrants held hostage in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. There were 34 Hondurans, 12 Guatemalans, five Salvadorians and one Nicaraguan in the group.

April 29

• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured two police officers during a routine patrol in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon state.
• Two police officers reportedly kidnapped by Los Zetas in Mezquitic, Jalisco state, were found alive in Monte Escobedo, Zacatecas state. The victims had been kidnapped April 27 during a firefight
• The bodies of three men were found in a condominium in Acapulco, Guerrero state. The victims’ throats had been slit.

April 30

• Police found the body of a man in Playa del Carmen, Quintana Roo state, and arrested a suspected member of Los Zetas who was transporting containers of diesel to allegedly burn the body.
• The National Defense Secretariat announced that soldiers freed four hostages and arrested four suspected kidnappers in the municipality of Pesqueria, Nuevo Leon state.

May 1

• Soldiers in the municipality of Santiago Papasquiaro, Durango state, found nine plastic bags containing human bones.
• Security forces arrested 26 members of the police force in Tarandacuao, Guanajuato state, for allegedly cooperating with La Familia Michoacana.

(click here to view interactive slideshow)

• December 2006: Mexican President Felipe Calderon takes office, promising to fight back against drug cartels. His first two years in office show strong successes against the cartels, with large drug seizures and the capture of several organizations’ leaders. The government’s chief target is the Gulf cartel, the most powerful in Mexico.
  
  
• December 2008: A two-year-long campaign by the Calderon government against the Gulf cartel has left it crippled. The cartel’s enforcement arm, Los Zetas, splintered off in spring 2008 and now controls much of what used to be Gulf territory. The government’s success is a double-edged sword, however: The decline of the Gulf cartel has left a large power vacuum, encouraging other organizations — and factions within those organizations — to fight to increase their influence.
  
  
• December 2009: As the government pressures powerful cartels, the situation in Mexico becomes more volatile and two distinct but interconnected wars begin to emerge: the government’s fight against the cartels, and the cartels’ fights between and among themselves. The geography of cartel influence does not change significantly, though one notable exception to this is the rise of the infamous La Familia Michoacana (LFM), which has captured media attention by marrying drug-trafficking activities to a pseudo-religious ideology.
  
  
• May 2010: A major rift emerges in the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) after the death of leader Arturo “El Jefe de Jefes” Beltran Leyva. Two factions emerge, one under Arturo’s brother, Hector, and the other made up of elements of the BLO’s brutal enforcement wing and run by Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal.
  
  
• December 2010: Tensions between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas also have boiled over into open war in the country’s east, with the Gulf cartel reaching out to its former rivals in Sinaloa as well as LFM to align under the name “New Federation” and pushing Los Zetas from one of their traditional strongholds, Reynosa, though not out of Nuevo Laredo or Monterrey. In its weakened state, Los Zetas began increasing operations outside the normal scope of drug trafficking, such as kidnapping for ransom, and giving rise to a trend that STRATFOR eventually would dub Mexico’s third war: that of the cartels on the Mexican public. Cartel-related violence in the country reaches new heights, with more than 11,000 deaths on record.
  
  
• April 2011: Violence continues to rise in all parts of the country. The Sinaloa Federation continues to expand its territory north and east, taking over areas formerly under the influence of the Carrillo Fuentes Organization and the Arellano Felix Organization. With the help of Sinaloa, the Gulf cartel has been able to repel offenses from Los Zetas in Reynosa and Matamoros, though the Zetas are proving resilient. LFM appeared to implode in January, but now a large subset of the former LFM seems to have simply rebranded itself as the “Knights Templar.” Its size and capabilities remain unclear.

A Change in Cartel Dynamics

Various drugs are smuggled more intensely in different regions along the U.S.-Mexico border, and some cartels are known to specialize in the production and distribution of certain drugs. Drug seizures can thus indicate much about the degree of influence and control the cartels have in a given area.
For example, most Mexican cartels have produced methamphetamine to an extent, but the Sinaloa Federation and La Familia Michoacana both have histories of large-scale methamphetamine production in the western states of Sinaloa, Durango, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan and Guerrero. Most of the methamphetamine produced by these cartels is smuggled north across the border into California and Arizona, the logical route for the cartels most heavily involved in the drug’s production, given the geographic areas and highways the they control.
Along the Texas border, long-term trends for methamphetamine seizures indicate the drug is moved less frequently and in smaller amounts than other drugs moved through the area, with occasional spikes being reported. STRATFOR sources have said spikes in seizures do not necessarily indicate a meaningful trend. Recently, however, there has been a consistent upswing in the size and frequency of methamphetamine shipments seized along the Texas border, specifically in the section of the border from Laredo to Brownsville, a section controlled mainly by the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas.
Projections of the amount of drugs smuggled across the border, based on collected drug-seizure statistics, are approximations at best. Too many unknowns make precise projections impossible, but STRATFOR sources have estimated that between 8 and 10 percent of drugs smuggled into the United States in the border region is seized by law enforcement.
Since mid-February, 661 kilograms (1,457 pounds) of methamphetamine have been reportedly seized by U.S. law enforcement between Laredo and Brownsville, while the reported total seized in the same area for the final three months of 2010 was 137 kilograms, indicating nearly a five-fold increase. With this area controlled mainly by two cartels not typically linked to methamphetamine distribution, STRATFOR believes that such a significant increase may indicate a change in cartel dynamics in the area. The Sinaloa cartel has a presence in the region in support of the Gulf cartel. We are inclined to believe that Sinaloa has benefited substantially from the association and has routed much larger quantities of their high-value commodity to the lower Rio Grande Valley. Whether this is the result of an agreement with the Gulf cartel or an overt takeover remains to be seen.
It should be noted that the Nuevo Laredo “plaza” has been a Zetas stronghold for several years (a plaza is a cartel’s territory that comprises parts the city itself, its adjacent highways and ports of entry), and with about 256 kilograms of methamphetamine seized since mid-February, we begin to wonder whether Sinaloa has co-opted some Zetas assets in the area — or if the Zetas have ramped up one or more superlabs to boost revenues for the area. The upswing also may be an indication that the Gulf and Zetas cartels are having difficulty getting cocaine from South America, and have had to diversify their product lines in order to keep cash flowing. In the case of Nuevo Laredo, there is also the possibility that the Zetas’ allies from the Pacific Coast, such as the Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS), are now moving product through Zetas territory.
In any case, the increase in methamphetamine traffic is indisputable, and it indicates a change in cartel dynamics in the region that merits continued observation.

A Mass Grave in Durango

A mass grave was found April 21 in Durango, Durango state. While a great deal of attention has been focused on mass graves discovered in San Fernando attributed to the Zetas, we believe the Durango discovery is important, too, because it is a reminder that the Zetas are not the only Mexican drug-trafficking organization that engages in mass murder.
As of April 26, 58 decomposed bodies had been found in Durango. The state of decomposition indicates that the grave sites had been occupied for many months, longer than the mass graves in San Fernando. There are no reports attributing responsibility, but given the location in Durango state, we believe Sinaloa or the CPS are the most likely candidates.
It is unlikely a Zetas dumpsite. Their ruthlessness and violence notwithstanding, the Zetas are not the only cartel to dispose of bodies en masse. One method pioneered by the “El Teo” faction of the Arellano Felix Organization (aka the Tijuana cartel) involved the use of lye or acid to dissolve the bodies of their victims. In Mexico, people have been dying in the drug war in ever-increasing numbers, and the body count tabulated by the Mexican government and by Mexican and U.S. news agencies will never be accurate or complete. The mass graves found over the past few weeks are likely indications of things to come; as the violence in Mexico spreads, many of the dead will likely never be found.

(click here to view interactive map)

April 18

• Unidentified gunmen attacked two fuel stations in the municipality of Canatlan, Durango state. The attackers used small arms and grenades to damage the two stations, but no injuries were reported.
• Unidentified attackers shot and injured the deputy director for the State Security Agency for Tejupilco, Mexico state, as he drove with a bodyguard in Temascaltepec, Mexico state.
• Unidentified people left two decapitated bodies near a gas station in the Valle del Sur neighborhood of Durango, Durango state. The victims’ heads were found several blocks away.
• Soldiers arrested two suspected cartel lookouts in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state. The suspects were detained after their car crashed into a utility pole while they were attempting to escape.

April 19

• Soldiers in the Infonavit Rio Medio neighborhood of Veracruz, Veracruz state, killed 10 suspected cartel gunmen in a firefight. Ten other alleged gunmen were arrested.
• Unidentified attackers threw two improvised explosive devices at the Tultitlan Polytechnic University in Tultitlan, Mexico state. One device exploded, injuring one man. The other device failed to detonate and was deactivated by police.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a police station in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, killing two people. The attackers fired more than 700 rounds at the building.

April 20

• Police in the Los Olivos neighborhood of Leon, Guanajuato state, found the body of a man reportedly killed by the La Familia Michoacana cartel. The victim’s head had been wrapped in packing tape. A message was found near the body, but authorities did not disclose its contents.
• Unidentified gunmen attacked a prison transport convoy in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, killing one guard and injuring four others. Three prisoners were freed in the attack.
• Residents of the municipality of Tecamac, Mexico state, found the bodies of two unidentified men. The victims bore signs of torture but had apparently not been shot.
• Police found the burned bodies of two men in the municipality of Pueblo Nuevo, Durango state.

April 21

• Authorities freed 40 police officers arrested April 19 in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state, for alleged links to Los Zetas, Mexican media reported.
• Unidentified gunmen attacked several car dealerships and other businesses in Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas state, with grenades and small arms. No injuries were reported in the attacks, which were unofficially attributed to the Gulf cartel.
• Unidentified gunmen in the Santa Teresa, Jalisco and Colinas del Saltito neighborhoods of Durango, Durango state, set three houses on fire. No injuries were reported in the attacks.
• One soldier and one suspected cartel gunman were killed during a firefight in Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas state. Eleven other people were arrested after the incident. According to a military news release, gunmen from Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel were involved in the firefight.

April 22

• Unidentified attackers damaged a car dealership in southern Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, with two grenades. No injuries were reported.
• Soldiers in the municipality of General Bravo, Nuevo Leon state, freed two people reportedly kidnapped April 9. One person was arrested in connection with the kidnappings. The raid occurred at a ranch on the highway to Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.

April 23

• Police found the bodies of five women at separate locations in Acapulco, Guerrero state. The victims’ throats had been slit, and a message was found near one of the bodies.
• The decapitated body of a man was found near a gas station in Durango, Durango state.
• Unidentified gunmen traveling in two vehicles shot and killed five men in the Riberas del Sacramento neighborhood of Chihuahua, Chihuahua state.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on three buses in separate incidents in the municipality of Hidalgo, Tamaulipas state. Three people were injured in the attacks.
• Residents of the Chapultepec neighborhood of Mexico City discovered the dismembered body of a woman inside a cardboard box and two suitcases.

April 24

• One police officer was reported injured and three people were arrested after a firefight between police and unidentified criminals in Ecuandureo, Michoacan state. Five police officers had previously been injured in an ambush by unidentified gunmen in Ecuandureo.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on police stations in Hualahuises and Linares, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported in either attack.

STRATFOR

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Current Status of the Mexican Cartels

Los Zetas

Los Zetas have had setbacks over the last three months — reduced territory, captured or killed regional leaders, internal control issues — but the organization appears to be able to absorb such losses. Los Zetas have maintained control of their strongholds in Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo as well as the key Gulf of Mexico port of Veracruz, despite the best efforts of the Gulf cartel and elements of the New Federation. STRATFOR sources indicate that the Gulf cartel maintains constant surveillance of all roads leading to Matamoros, making a Zeta move in that direction difficult at best and at this point unlikely. It is more likely that Los Zetas will make a concerted effort to retake Reynosa in the coming months.
Since the beginning of 2011, actions by the Mexican military and federal police have resulted in the loss of at least 11 mid- to upper-level Los Zetas leaders, including Flavio “El Amarillo” Mendez Santiago, one of the original founding members, captured by federal police in Oaxaca on Jan. 18. One of seven Zeta gunmen killed Jan. 25 by Mexican soldiers during a running gunbattle through the Monterrey metropolitan area was identified only as “Comandante Lino,” who is believed to have been the top Zeta leader in Nuevo Leon state.
STRATFOR has heard rumors of a split between Los Zetas leader Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano and No. 3 leader Miguel “Z-40” Trevino Morales. However, we have not been able to confirm this or determine if the attrition of secondary leaders was affected — or caused — by such a division.
One of the most significant events involving Los Zetas since December 2010 was the Feb. 15 attack against two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. The motivation for the attack remains unclear, but viewed against documented Zeta operational behaviors and priorities, it clearly was not consistent with the top leadership’s doctrine and past practices. There has been much speculation regarding the attackers’ motives, but a planned and sanctioned attack against U.S. officials would be certain to bring the full weight of the U.S. government onto the perpetrators, and that is not something the top Zeta leadership would want to invite. This suggests the possibility that lower-level regional leaders either lost control of their operational cells or actually condoned and/or ordered the attack.
Regarding the possibility of neglected control, the erosion of Zeta forces through battle, targeted assassination and capture has been high over the past year. There have been numerous indications that recent Zeta recruits have tended to be younger and less experienced than those who joined prior to 2010. The attrition in leadership has also resulted in leaders who are themselves younger and less experienced. Such a mix may be creating conditions in which young men equipped with vehicles and weapons but with little discipline or oversight are left to their own devices.
A number of mid-level Zeta leaders came from military and law enforcement backgrounds and had received some level of institutional training and education. But many of them likely do not grasp the gravity — or even know about — an incident 26 years ago, when the Guadalajara cartel kidnapped, tortured and killed Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a special agent with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. In response, the U.S. government orchestrated the annihilation of the Guadalajara cartel in a massive offensive called Operation Leyenda. It is possible that certain midlevel Zetas, lacking knowledge or appreciation of that operation, may not be aware of the potential repercussions of an attack on known U.S. government personnel.
If that is the case, there may be a few sporadic attacks on U.S. government agents in the coming months. But unless such events go unanswered by U.S. agencies, thereby lending the cartels a sense of impunity, it is doubtful that more than a handful of such attacks will occur.
To some extent, out-of-control gunmen within Los Zetas are a self-solving problem. Rash actions by low-level Zetas can and do trigger the occasional harsh “house cleaning,” in which the transgressors, on the orders of top-level leaders, are either killed or betrayed to authorities to send a message to the rest of the organization. Either way, the internal problem weakens the cartel and reduces both its numbers and its organizational efficacy, and it is unlikely that the internal punishment of wayward Zetas protects the organization as a whole from the consequences of their actions.
Los Zetas’ current organizational dynamics suggest that we are likely to see more unsanctioned operations such as the ICE and Falcon Lake shootings. This obviously has implications for U.S. law enforcement personnel and innocent bystanders. Such operations also will continue to induce internal culling of the elements responsible for such attacks. In all likelihood, this internal pressure, when combined with external pressures brought against Los Zetas by their cartel rivals, the Mexican government and American authorities, will continue to take a heavy toll on the cartel. And as losses are replaced with younger and less-experienced operatives, ongoing violence and destabilization will likely erode Los Zetas’ power.

Gulf Cartel

Since late January, the Gulf cartel has been solidifying its hold on Matamoros. As both a northbound smuggling route into the United States and an inbound supply port for receiving waterborne shipments, Matamoros is vital to the Gulf cartel’s survival. The organization is not down for the count, but it continues to be weakened and dependent on its allies in the Sinaloa Federation to protect it from Los Zetas. With Los Zetas in control of the port of Veracruz, Matamoros serves as the cartel’s primary resupply point for Colombian cocaine, Central American arms shipments and other logistical operations. Certainly, Gulf cartel logistics are not constricted solely to that corner of Mexico, but seaport access enables large-volume resupply that minimizes the losses inherent in land routes through hostile areas.
Though Gulf cartel control encompasses Matamoros and Reynosa, both smuggling plazas with vital ports of entry on the border, the ownership of that territory has been contested. On Jan. 29, Los Zetas launched a sizable offensive that they had prepared in advance by placing resupply caches in and around Matamoros shortly after Antonio “Tony Tormenta” Cardenas Guillen was killed last November. Several weeks of heavy fighting flared up in Matamoros and to the south and west, as Zeta fighters hit Gulf cartel groups and Mexican military units took on both cartels. Smaller fights broke out along the border northwest to Nuevo Laredo as well as southward between Matamoros and Monterrey.
The fighting died down toward the end of February, and the Gulf cartel took the opportunity to ramp up revenue streams and restock. According to STRATFOR sources, cocaine seizures by U.S. law enforcement agencies rose steadily from mid-February to late March in the Rio Grande Valley portion of the south Texas border zone — a significant increase of high-value/low-volume contraband. To offset losses from the early February Zeta offensive, the Gulf cartel tried to bring in substantial revenue very quickly.
The upswing in cocaine smuggling corresponded with the lull in cartel battles and the need for quick cash. According to a Jan. 11 U.S. Department of Justice report on illicit drug prices, wholesale cocaine prices in the area were approximately $25,000 per kilogram (more than $11,000 per pound) versus $440 to $660 per kilogram for marijuana. There is no way to calculate the ratio of contraband seized to the total contraband smuggled in any given area at any given time, but various STRATFOR sources have made conservative estimates of 1:10 to 1:12 (seized to total smuggled). Since approximately 348 kilograms (767 pounds) of cocaine were seized between the last week of February and April 1, a reasonable extrapolation of the expected revenues — after the loss of the seized cocaine — would be $87 million.
The Gulf cartel leadership does not appear to have taken as big a loss as the Los Zetas leadership did in the first quarter. On March 4, however, authorities arrested Gustavo “El 85” Arteaga Zaleta and Pablo Jesus “El Enano” Arteaga Zaleta in Tampico, Tamaulipas. The brothers were wanted on charges of kidnapping, extortion, and arms and drug trafficking for the Gulf cartel in the states of Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosi. Secretariat of Public Security intelligence reports indicate that Gustavo Arteaga Zaleta is a former municipal policeman from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas, and was the “jefe de plaza” (plaza boss) in El Ebano, San Luis Potosi.
The loss of two Gulf cartel leaders over the past few months does not appear to have adversely affected the organization, though as a whole the cartel continues to be stretched thin. With federal forces occasionally entering the fray and Los Zetas seeking any weaknesses to exploit, the Gulf cartel is engaged in a large, bloody game of “whack-a-mole” in which its dual opponents further stretch its resources — augmented though it may be by Sinaloa elements.
While the Gulf cartel has held its territory and successfully repelled a Zeta offensive this past quarter, it has not been able to wrest Monterrey, Veracruz or Nuevo Laredo away from Zeta control. In northeast Mexico, the battle lines have not shifted, there are no clear winners and the violence will continue for the foreseeable future.

Sinaloa Federation

The Sinaloa Federation remains the largest and most cohesive of the Mexican cartels. Under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, Sinaloa has been steadily making inroads into the territories of other cartels, friend and foe alike. This expansion has been seen in Durango, Guerrero (specifically Acapulco and its vital seaport) and Michoacan states as well as Mexico City. Because it has remained a cohesive organization and maintained widely diversified revenue streams — from narcotics to avocados — the Sinaloa Federation stands to benefit most from the chaos across Mexico.
Only two significant members of the Sinaloa leadership were captured during the first quarter of 2011. The first was Cesar “El Placas” Villagran Salazar, arrested by army troops on Feb. 12. Villagran Salazar is alleged to be a key operator for Guzman in northern Sonora and coordinator of Sinaloa drug shipments for distribution across the border into Arizona. The second, on March 18, was Victor Manuel “El Senor” Felix, who is presumed to be a relative and confidante of Guzman and runs one of the cartel’s financial networks.
According to a STRATFOR source, the Mexican government’s current priority is getting the violence under control, not eliminating the cartels. It is a pragmatic approach. While some of the cartels may be breaking up or in the process of being absorbed, it is not possible at this point to eliminate them all — or to stop the trafficking of narcotics. Systemic corruption at all levels of government, well-entrenched for many years, turns a blind eye to cartel activities at best and enables them at worst. Apparently, the Mexican government has decided that the best course of action in this environment is to wage a war of attrition, taking out the low-hanging fruit and letting Sinaloa do the rest.
Extreme levels of violence are not in the best interests of cartels, whose primary goal is to make money. When violence goes up, revenue goes down. As the largest and most widespread Mexican cartel — incapable of being eliminated in the current environment — the Sinaloa Federation likely will continue to be relatively impervious to government efforts. It also is the organization most likely to assume the dominant position in the cartel landscape, which would enable it ultimately to impose a forced reduction in the cartel violence. Sinaloa could use its dominance to keep weaker groups in line, which would suit the government’s purposes.
As Sinaloa has steadily gained influence and territory over the past several years, its competition has been fragmenting. The destabilization that began in 2006 with Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s anti-cartel campaign thoroughly upset the cartel equilibrium and created power vacuums. With the possible exception of Los Zetas, the fragmentation and power vacuums have weakened or destroyed cartels while Sinaloa has either been unaffected or strengthened as the primary beneficiary. Even those elements within the Sinaloa Federation that were neutralized — the Beltran Leyva brothers and Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal — were elements that posed a potential challenge to the leadership of Sinaloa head Guzman.
In the case of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), once a part of the Sinaloa Federation, the remaining Beltran Leyva brother Hector (see section on Cartel Pacifico Sur below) believes that Guzman betrayed his brothers and used the government to remove a potential challenger — the BLO. This was borne out by events in the first quarter of 2011, when Sinaloa expanded into the territories of cartels that were fragmented or floundering such as its New Federation allies La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA). “Divide and conquer” works, even when a third party causes the fragmentation, and Guzman knows this well.

Knights Templar

As was discussed in STRATFOR’s 2010 annual cartel report, the death of Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez in a shootout with federal authorities on Dec. 9, 2010, was a blow to LFM. Moreno was a charismatic and compelling leader, around whom grew a curious blend of religious cult, merciless killing machine and highly specialized drug-trafficking organization. Without Moreno’s centrally focused leadership, the bands of LFM killers fractured and seemed to engage in directionless violence in late December and into January.
LFM continued to devolve with the loss of its methamphetamine labs to government takedowns (and probably efforts by other cartels as well). As with the territorial grabs in other parts of Mexico, LFM’s leaderless cells did not hold onto the bulk of the cartel’s smuggling routes but likely lost them to regional hegemon Sinaloa. At this point in the degeneration of the organization, it is likely that the faithful core of Moreno’s followers saw the need to reorganize or rebrand the group in order to reunify its scattered elements. Such an effort at organizational self-preservation would require a particular sort of leader to fill the void left by Moreno’s death.
As with most charismatic pseudo-religious organizations and their inherent strongman leadership, there was a fiercely loyal cadre of lieutenants who surrounded Moreno. From that group alone will be found a successor who will be followed, since most of the LFM rank and file will align themselves only with someone who has complete faith in Moreno’s teachings. In the chaos of last December, following Moreno’s death, the two top members of his inner circle were rumored to have fled the country. STRATFOR has been unable to confirm the rumor (or, if it is true, whether they have returned), but the two — Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez and Jose Jesus “El Chango” Mendez Vargas — are the prime candidates to replace Moreno and bring the elements of LFM back together. They fit the mold for being the most likely to succeed in the reconstitution and rebranding of the group.
LFM announced its dissolution in January. Authorities and analysts dismissed the announcement and waited to see what evolved. The wait was not very long. On March 17, banners appeared in multiple cities and villages in Michoacan that proclaimed the presence of a previously unknown group — Los Caballeros Templar, aka the Knights Templar.
The new name may have triggered a few chuckles in some agencies — and objections from members of the Sovereign Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem, which traces its origins to the original Knights Templar, an order of Christian knights formed to protect pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land during the First Crusade. There is some parallel to the religion-centric LFM, with its stated goals of protecting the people of Michoacan from criminal elements, including corrupt government officials.
Banners announcing the emergence of the Knights Templar in Michoacan read: “To the people of Michoacan, we inform you that starting today we will be carrying out here the altruistic activities previously realized by La Familia Michoacana. We will be at the service of the people of Michoacan to attend to any situation that threatens the safety of Michoacanos. Our commitment is to: keep order; avoid robberies, kidnappings, extortion; and protect the state from possible (interventions) by rival organizations. — The Knights Templar.”
The Knights Templar banners bore the same type of message and tone as previous LFM banners, which suggests that the activities of the Knights Templar in the next few months will likely be consistent with documented LFM activities. This development is recent, and information regarding the composition of the group, its leadership and its relations with remnant LFM cells and the Sinaloa Federation is very sparse. STRATFOR will continue to monitor events in Michoacan over the next quarter, paying particular attention to the emergence of the Knights Templar leadership and the reconstitution of LFM alliances and business, enforcement and smuggling operations. It is too soon to know whether the former LFM partnership with the Sinaloa Federation will be reinstituted.

Cartel Pacifico Sur

The groups that evolved from the factions of the BLO no longer are recognizable as such. The BLO split into two separate groups, with an unknown number of BLO operatives electing to return to the Sinaloa Federation rather than join either of the two new drug-trafficking organizations.
The first of these two independent groups, Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS), centers around Hector Beltran Leyva and is allied with Los Zetas. During the first quarter of 2011, CPS demonstrated an addition to its skill set: the use of an improvised explosive device (IED) placed in a car in Tula, Hidalgo state, with an anonymous call to local law enforcement to lure victims to the booby trap. The small device detonated on Jan. 22 when one of the vehicle’s doors was opened, injuring four police officers.
Though no one claimed responsibility for the IED, a connection can be made that suggests CPS involvement. Last summer, STRATFOR discussed the use of an IED in a car in Juarez in which the first responders were targeted and killed following an anonymous call regarding a wounded police officer. That IED is believed to have been detonated by members of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes cartel (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel). In both the Juarez and Tula bombings, the devices used were small, composed of industrial hydrogel explosives and placed in vehicles to which local police were lured by some ruse.
The common denominator is likely Los Zetas. Though the cities of Juarez and Tula are about 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) apart, and the Juarez cartel and CPS do not share assets, both organizations are allied with Los Zetas — and Los Zetas have members with military demolitions training. In the coming months, STRATFOR will be watching for any other indicators that this connection has led to other permutations in CPS tactics previously not associated with the BLO.

Independent Cartel of Acapulco

The second group that broke off from the BLO is the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (Cartel Independiente de Acapulco, or CIDA). This group is still evolving and information about it remains rather muddled. At this point, STRATFOR has identified CIDA as a large part of the BLO faction loyal to Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal. Since Valdez Villarreal was arrested in September 2010, his faction has apparently become somewhat marginalized. Some CIDA members came from La Barbie’s faction, some did not. There are also some former LFM elements in the CIDA as well as a handful of miscellaneous Acapulco street thugs and miscreants. There continues to be sporadic violence attributable to, or claimed by, the CIDA, but there is mounting evidence that the organization is fading from the picture in some areas.
That said, the CIDA is not giving up without a fight. STRATFOR sources recently indicated that the group is locked in a battle with CPS for control of the city of Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Sources say CPS gunmen currently control the east side of Cuernavaca and CIDA operatives control the city’s west side. Particularly dangerous areas are the Jiutepec sector on the city’s southeast side and the Carolina neighborhood on the west side.
According to Mexican media reports, federal police arrested Benjamin “El Padrino” Flores Reyes, one of the suspected top CIDA leaders, on March 6 in Acapulco, Guerrero state. Flores Reyes reportedly controlled the distribution of drugs, managed the cartel’s lookout groups and is said to have reported directly to cartel chief Moises “El Koreano” Montero Alvarez.
The CIDA was aligned with LFM and the Sinaloa Federation, and until late last year it was most likely in control of the Acapulco plaza and seaport. The disbanded LFM, reincarnated into the Knights Templar, probably has not provided any help to the weakened CIDA, and Sinaloa has likely taken full advantage of the chaos and helped itself to the Acapulco plaza. STRATFOR has asked its sources which cartel controls the Acapulco seaport itself, and while conditions are sufficiently murky to prevent any definitive answers, the working hypothesis is that the port is also in the hands of Sinaloa.
Currently, the CIDA is at war with former ally Sinaloa, likely triggered by Guzman’s move to take CIDA territory after the arrest of Valdez Villarreal. The CIDA appears to be taking a beating on that front. During President Calderon’s visit to Acapulco last month, five dismembered bodies were found in front of a department store on Farallon Avenue in Acapulco. The discovery was made about an hour after Calderon opened the 36th Tourist Marketplace trade fair in the International Center of Acapulco. Pieces of two of the bodies were scattered on the ground near an abandoned SUV, and body parts from the other three were found in plastic bags inside the vehicle. Messages left at the scene said the victims were police officers killed by the Sinaloa Federation because they worked with the CIDA.
The outlook for the CIDA over the next three to six months is not promising. Unless something occurs to revitalize the group, such as a successful escape from prison by Valdez Villarreal, the CIDA may fade into obscurity within the year. Certainly the next three months will be telling.

Arellano Felix Organization

Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sanchez Arellano, nephew of the founding Arellano Felix brothers, is still in control of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO, aka the Tijuana cartel), though the group is only a shadow of its former self. Little changed in the cartel’s condition in the first quarter of 2011 from how it was described in the 2010 annual cartel report. Sinaloa’s “partnership agreement” with the AFO has relegated the once-mighty Tijuana cartel to vassal status, with the bulk of its former territory and all of its smuggling avenues across the border now controlled by the Sinaloa Federation. The AFO now pays Sinaloa for access to its former territory.

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization

The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel) is holding on. Though STRATFOR has previously reported that the VCF was hemmed in on all sides by the Sinaloa cartel, and essentially confined to the downtown area of Ciudad Juarez, recent reports from STRATFOR sources indicate that this is not quite the case. The VCF retains control of the plaza and the border crossings in Juarez, from the Paso Del Norte port of entry on the northwest side to the Ysleta port of entry on the west side of town. However, the VCF’s territory is significantly diminished to the extent that it no longer controls the city of Chihuahua, which is now held by Sinaloa, as is the rest of Chihuahua state and the border zone on both sides of Juarez/El Paso.
As we have discussed in previous cartel reports, VCF second-in-command Vicente Carrillo Leyva has been in Mexican federal custody since his arrest in Mexico City in 2009. He is the son of Amado Carrillo Fuentes, founder of the cartel, and nephew of the current leader (and cartel namesake) Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. On March 15, Carrillo Leyva was formally charged with money laundering, which diminishes the possibility of his eventual release. Given how long he has been detained and the foibles of the Mexican legal system, Carrillo Leyva may yet be released, but it seems doubtful at present.
In the absence of Carrillo Leyva, his right-hand man, Juan “El JL” Luis Ledezma, has been acting as the No. 2 in the organization, running the cartel’s operations and those of its enforcement arm, La Linea. But one of the other high-ranking VCF leaders has been taken out of the mix. On Feb. 22, Luis Humberto “El Condor” Peralta Hernandez was killed during a gunbattle with federal police in Chihuahua City, which removed the leader of the network holding open the cartel’s supply lines. As it stands now, STRATFOR sources indicate that most of the contraband seized by law enforcement on the U.S. side of the border with Chihuahua state is owned by Sinaloa, not the VCF, though the percentage remains unclear.
The VCF is surrounded by Sinaloa-held territory. Barring an unlikely reversal of Sinaloa’s fortunes, such as a massive operation by Los Zetas/VCF with all their allied gangs that successfully routs Sinaloa, the VCF is facing slow strangulation as its supply lines close and its revenue streams dry up. This will not happen overnight or even within the next three months, but as the noose tightens we can expect violence in Juarez to skyrocket beyond its current record-breaking level because the VCF will not go quietly.
In the short term, the inability to move narcotics will cause the VCF to continue to seek operational funding through other means, such as kidnapping, extortion, alien smuggling and cargo theft. We have seen indications of that with a couple of recent nightclub shootings that are thought to have been associated with VCF extortion rackets. As hard as it might be to imagine, the violence in Juarez may actually get worse.

Mass Graves in Tamaulipas

At least 173 bodies have been found in mass graves in Sinaloa, Durango and Tamaulipas states over the past week, though there is little information available on the graves discovered in Sinaloa and Durango. The last official body count available to STRATFOR for the mass graves in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, stands at 145, but that tally may increase as recovery efforts continue.
On April 13, the Mexican government announced a reward of up to 15 million pesos ($1.28 million) for information leading to the capture of Omar Martin “El Kilo” Estrada Luna, an offer that apparently was effective — three days later, Mexican marines arrested the Los Zetas plaza boss and 11 other Zeta operatives. Estrada Luna is believed to be responsible for at least 217 murders in the vicinity of San Fernando, including the 145 people whose bodies were recovered from mass graves over the past week and the 72 migrants killed Aug. 24, 2010, on a ranch outside of San Fernando.
According to the Mexican marines, Estrada Luna has also been implicated in the murders of Juan Carlos Sanchez Suarez, the secretary of public security for San Fernando, and Public Ministry agent Roberto Jaime Suarez Vazquez, the lead investigator of the Aug. 24 mass murder.
In both mass-murder events, migrants headed to northeast Mexico — either to relocate to Tamaulipas state or to cross the border into the United States — were taken at gunpoint by Los Zetas operatives. According to an Ecuadorian survivor of the massacre last summer, the migrants were being press-ganged into working for the cartel and, when they refused, the migrants were killed. The same appears to have been the case with those in the mass graves found last week. Fifty-seven Mexican migrants recently were reported missing by their families after the migrants left Guanajuato state. Their destination was not released, but reportedly the office of the Guanajuato state prosecutor expressed concern that the missing migrants were killed by Los Zetas in San Fernando.
It has been reported that many of the Mexicans forced from cross-country buses at gunpoint on the highways of Tamaulipas since the end of January have been found in graves in San Fernando. A STRATFOR source indicated that all but one of the bodies recovered to date at the San Fernando grave sites were Mexican citizens. Further confirmation has not been made available.
The current conditions in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon states are tied to the Mexican government’s deployment of troops there last November. The influx of 3,000 troops led to the attrition of cartel assets and a new reality for Los Zetas, which has had to rebuild its foot-soldier ranks in northeastern Mexico. Still, even though Los Zetas is wounded it remains a formidable force, and the violence between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel — with its Sinaloa partners — will continue in Mexico’s northeast for the foreseeable future.

Methamphetamine Lab in Baja California

On April 13, a large methamphetamine lab was found 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) south of Ensenada, Baja California state, and dismantled by military forces. Included in the reported inventory were 11.1 kilograms (24.5 pounds) of crystal methamphetamine, 214 kilograms of an unidentified white liquid in nine plastic bags, 2,880 liters (761 U.S. gallons) of precursor chemicals and 51 kilograms of caustic soda.
Given its location, the lab was likely run by elements of the Sinaloa cartel, which controls that part of Mexico. The presence of a sophisticated “super lab” that close to the border is somewhat unusual; such valuable facilities typically are placed farther south to avoid military operations in the border zone. At the same time, the location of the lab so close to the border may explain the large quantities of the synthetic drug seized in the area over the last two months: 928 kilograms of methamphetamine discovered just south of Tijuana the first week of March and 658 kilograms of methamphetamine seized between Mexicali and Tijuana the first week of April.
As we have noted before, cartels typically do not risk such huge losses so close to the border zone, where they tend to ship methamphetamine and cocaine in much smaller quantities. Cartels also tend to protect their labs by isolating them in out-of-the-way places. But the expanding Mexican military and federal police operations on the south side, combined with successful interdiction by U.S. law enforcement north of the border and increased cartel violence in the interior, may have influenced the decision to set up super labs close to the border for expediency, security and logistical simplicity.
Of particular interest in the inventory seized from the lab is the large quantity of white liquid. It is possible that it was liquid methamphetamine, though reports have not yet identified it as such. Though seen less often than the powder or crystallized form of the drug, liquid methamphetamine allows smugglers to conceal and transport the product in different ways. It has been smuggled, for example, in the windshield washer reservoirs or radiators of vehicles and in juice or water bottles. The possibility that such a large quantity of the drug may have been found in liquid form at the Ensenada lab suggests that the lab operators may have been responding to the recent bulk-drug seizures by choosing an alternate method of transport.

(click here to view interactive map)

April 11

• Soldiers seized a suspected methamphetamine lab in Zapotitlan, Jalisco state. No arrests were made during the raid.
• Unidentified gunmen opened fire on several members of a family traveling in a car in the Base Tranquilidad neighborhood of Cuernavaca, Morelos state. The attackers shot the victims as they pulled over, killing one and injuring another.
• Security forces in Jaltenco, Mexico state, found the bodies of two men in a vacant lot. The victims had been shot in the head and bore signs of torture. A sign containing unspecified threats was found near the bodies.
• Soldiers and federal police in the Las Fuentes neighborhood of Durango, Durango state, discovered a grave containing the bodies of four people. The bodies were found after an anonymous phone call made to a federal police station.
• Soldiers in the Los Lermas neighborhood of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state, shot and killed Juan Carlos Cordoba Ocana, the suspected leader of Los Zetas in that municipality. Eight kidnapping victims were freed during the operation, which led to roadblocks in Guadalupe and surrounding municipalities by suspected Los Zetas gunmen. Three people were arrested in connection with the roadblocks.

April 12

• Unidentified gunmen traveling in two vehicles shot and injured a female passenger in a vehicle in the Dos Rios neighborhood of Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a prison guard from the Topo Chico prison as he rode his motorcycle in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

April 13

• Soldiers arrested three suspected kidnappers and freed four kidnapping victims during a raid in the Cumbres neighborhood in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a lawyer in Minas Viejas, Guerrero state, as he was driving to Iguala de la Independencia. The victim was shot at least 15 times.
• Military authorities announced the arrest of Victor Hugo Martinez Morales, a suspected financier for Los Zetas, in Saltillo, Coahuila state. Martinez Morales was arrested with eight other suspected members of Los Zetas.
• The bodies of three men were discovered in Nopaltepec, Mexico state. Two of the victims had their throats slit, while the third had been shot in the head.
• Mexican Attorney General Marisela Morales said 16 policemen from the municipality of San Fernando, Tamaulipas state, have been arrested for allegedly protecting Los Zetas in San Fernando, including those responsible for the murders of people discovered in mass graves in the city.

April 14

• Eight bodies were discovered in Cojumatlan de Regules, Michoacan state. The victims had been bound and tortured and each was shot in the head.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured Leonarda Flores Estrada, the commander of the state investigative police operational base in Ciudad Obregon, Sonora state. Flores Estrada was shot as she left her house.
• Soldiers in Hermosillo, Sonora state, arrested Raul Sabori Cisneros, who is believed to be the second-in-command for the Sinaloa cartel in Sonora state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed three people and injured two others in the San Rafael Chamapa neighborhood of Naucalpan, Mexico state.

April 15

• Police in Cali, Colombia, arrested Hector Efren Meneses Yela, a suspected former head of the Norte del Valle cartel and associate of the Sinaloa cartel. He was considered the deputy of Colombian cartel leader Javier Antonio Calle Serna.
• Soldiers shot and killed three suspected cartel gunmen in Montemorelos, Nuevo Leon state, and freed one kidnapped person. The firefight began after the gunmen reportedly opened fire on the soldiers and took refuge in a house.
• Unidentified people abandoned three dismembered bodies near a church in Hualahuises, Nuevo Leon state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and injured a police officer in the Miravalle neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
• Soldiers in Tepic, Nayarit state, arrested Bruno Garcia Arreola, who is wanted in the United States for alleged money laundering, arms trafficking and narcotics distribution for the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels.

April 16

• The Mexican military announced the arrest of Omar Martin Estrada Luna, a suspected regional chief for Los Zetas who is believed to be responsible for 217 murders in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state. Estrada Luna was arrested along with 11 other suspects in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas state.
• Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a man and a woman outside a residence in the Progreso neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.

April 17

• A dozen human bones were found in an abandoned suitcase near a house being remodeled in the Americana neighborhood of Guadalajara, Jalisco state.
• Soldiers seized four camps and a clandestine runway reportedly belonging to a drug trafficking cartel in the municipalities of Panuco de Coronado, Oro and Rodeo, Durango state.
• Construction workers in Pesqueria, Nuevo Leon state, discovered a hidden grave containing the bones of several people.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Colin: More than 230 American cities have now been affected by the presence of Mexican drug cartels. This weekend, Australia’s Crime Commission reported that the cartels have taken ahold of organized crime syndicates in cities like Sydney and Melbourne. In Mexico, the seemingly unstoppable violence continues. A few days ago we had the gruesome discovery of at least 116 bodies in mass graves near the city of San Fernando, just 100 miles away from the Texan border. And, perhaps as evidence of more violence to come, we have the erection of concrete car-bomb barriers outside the busy United States consulate in Monterrey.
Welcome to Agenda. Joining me this week to discuss Mexican security is Scott Stewart. Scott, let’s start with this latest security measure. Has this building been targeted before, and is there intelligence that it’s about to be hit by a large car bomb?
Scott: Well first of all yes, the U.S. consulate general in Monterrey has been targeted before by attacks but these have been attacks using hand grenades and small arms, and that’s something different from a large car bomb attack. At this point we don’t believe there is any imminent car bomb threat to that facility, or any other U.S. facilities in Mexico for that matter.
Colin: Why would a cartel want to escalate the battle and invite the further wrath of the United States?
Scott: The Mexican cartels certainly don’t shy away from violence. We see them regularly beheading and dismembering people. However they tend to try to target most of their violence against opponents of the fellow cartels or against government employees, and a lot of times the government employees that they target are actually working for opposition cartels. So there’s really a relation there between the targeting. We have not seen the Mexican cartels really get into widespread attacks against the public at large. They have really tried to target their violence. And in times where we have seen them have incidents where there’s been indiscriminate violence, or violence that has impacted negatively on their public image - things like the Falcon Lake shooting - we have seen the cartels come down hard on operatives that made those mistakes and that brought the heat down upon the cartel.
One thing to remember is that these cartels are not terrorist groups. They are really businesses, and they’re organized crime organizations. So their end is making money. That is their objective. And anything that gets in the way of that objective, bringing down massive heat upon them, is bad for business, and they try to shy away from that sort of activity.
Colin: Are the authorities making any progress in their fight against the cartels?
Scott: Well, I think it depends on how one defines progress. Certainly, they have been arresting the heads of certain cartels and they have been disrupting the operations of some of these cartels. For example, over the last five or six years, organizations such as the Arellano-Felix organization, which is also known as the Tijuana cartel; another organization, the Juarez Cartel or the VCF, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization; they’ve both been decimated. Likewise, we’ve seen the Beltran Leyva organization decapitated and split up. So, they’re making headway against certain organizations, but at the same time, the largest cartel, Sinaloa cartel, that is headed up by a gentleman by the name of El Chapo, “the short one,” Sinaloa has been getting stronger and stronger. And they are really becoming more of a regional hegemon in the cartel landscape. And right now, they control the border from Tijuana all the way over to Juarez, for the most part. And they are acting to increase their control over that area. So while certain cartels have been weakened, other cartels, like Sinaloa, have become stronger.
Of course, one other measure of progress against the cartels would be violence. And indeed, we have not seen violence come down at all. This fracturing, this splintering of these cartel organizations, has really led to more fighting. What happens is, when a cartel organization has very good control of an area - or what we call a plaza, a smuggling corridor - there’s generally peace in that area. But when they become weakened and another organization comes in and tries to take over there territory, that’s when you see the violence, that’s when you see the fighting. And of course the death toll then will increase. So as some of these organizations have been weakened, others have tried to move in. And that has escalated the violence.
Colin: How safe is it for a businessperson to go to Mexico now, and where should they avoid?
Scott: There are certain hotspots right now. Indeed, in Acapulco at this present time we have a three-way struggle for control of that city between three factions of the former Beltran Leyva organization. One that now calls itself the Cartel del Pacifico Sur, the South Pacific Cartel; another faction has gone on to form this independent cartel of Acapulco; and still another little faction has gone and they’re working with Sinaloa. And so you have these three organizations fighting each other for control of Acapulco, which generally in the past had been a very popular tourist resort.
Likewise, in the Northeast we see a lot of violence right now in places like Monterrey. And one of the reasons that Monterrey is so concerning is because it is really the industrial heart of Mexico. You have not only large Mexican corporations that are headquartered there, but also U.S. companies have gone down into Monterrey in order to manufacture. The things that make Monterrey attractive to businesses, the fact that they have good lines of communication and roads, and then of course lines of communication to the U.S. border to ship stuff, also makes it an ideal place to control as a drug organization. If you can control Monterrey, you can control the flow of a lot of goods and a lot of contraband to the border. So we really expect to see a lot of continued violence in the Northeast in the coming months.
Colin: Scott, thank you. Scott Stewart there, ending Agenda for this week.