Mexico: Police Investigate Possible New Drug Gang
Mexico: Suspected Cartel Operatives Kill 17 At Party
Dispatch: Mexican Cartels' Money Movement
Mexican drug cartels notoriously transport money from the United States across the border into Mexico where it gets laundered. Security analyst Scott Stewart examines the cartels’ methods.
Mexico: Elected Officials Receive Death Threats
Mexico: La Familia Cartel Member Arrested
U.S.: Wells Fargo Admits Financing Mexican Drug Cartels
Mexico: Gubernatorial Candidate Assassinated
Mexico: Suspected Sinaloa Cartel Member Arrested
Venezuela: Drug Suspect Wanted By U.S. Captured
Mexico: Firefight, Roadblocks Reported In Nuevo Leon
Jamaica: Suspected Drug Lord Extradited To U.S.
Mexico: Camps Raided, Marijuana Seized
Mexico: 3 Dead, 1 Ton Of Marijuana Seized
Mexico: Suspected Drug Traffickers Arrested
Mexico Security Memo: June 21, 2010
Attempted Prison Break in Sinaloa
Around 9:50 a.m. on June 14, during the daily guard shift change, 18 inmates at the Center for the Execution of Crime’s Legal Consequences in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state, allegedly tried to break out of the facility. The 18 men, whom some reports linked to Los Zetas, were housed in special security block 21 and were reportedly armed with three large-caliber handguns, an AK-47-type automatic assault rifle and a sledgehammer to force their way through the facility’s exits.
Details of the incident are murky, with the death toll ranging from 17 to 28, depending on the source. What is clear is that the breakout attempt was unsuccessful and that 17 of the 18 inmates were killed and two Sinaloa State Preventive Police officers and a prison guard were injured. It is suspected that the other deaths and injuries reported were the result of stabbings by inmates in other areas of the prison who took advantage of the chaos in block 21.
Los Zetas have a fairly good track record when it comes to prison breaks in Mexico. In May 2009, members of Los Zetas arrived outside the Center of Social Rehabilitation of Cienguillas in Zacatecas state in several buses with an armed SUV escort. A total of 53 inmates filed out of the prison and onto the buses in an orderly manner without a shot being fired. Surveillance video footage showed guards simply standing by watching the inmates walk out of the prison and onto the buses. Several prison officials have since been arrested on corruption charges.
More recently, 41 inmates at the Matamoros municipal prison, known as CEDES Matamoros, were freed after an assault by armed men between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on March 26. It is not clear whether Los Zetas or the Gulf cartel were responsible for the assault, but this particular incident, unlike the Zacatecas breakout, required some force to free the prisoners.
One common feature in all three of these cases is corruption, which is endemic in the Mexican prison system. This is one reason federal officials in Mexico extradite some high-value cartel captives to the United States; otherwise they would be able to continue operating from inside the Mexican prison system. Without a comprehensive reform effort from the bottom up, similar to what is being implemented with the Federal Police, Mexican prisons will continue to be vulnerable to criminal influence and will remain porous containers for cartel captives.
Mayor Assassinated
Jesus Manuel Lara Rodriguez, the mayor of Guadalupe Distrito Bravos, Chihuahua state, was assassinated by a group of gunmen in Ciudad Juarez at about 1 p.m. on June 19, inside his home. Lara had reportedly received numerous death threats from unnamed organized-crime groups in the weeks leading up to his murder, and he had taken refuge at a second home in Juarez. Brazen midday attacks have become the norm in Juarez, and while the death of a person in Lara’s position is notable, it is not a new occurrence in Chihuahua. The mayors of Guadalupe y Calvo and Namiquipa also have been gunned down in the last 10 months.
Guadalupe Distrito Bravos is a small border town just south of the Fabens international border crossing. The region has seen increasingly heavy-handed cartel tactics in recent months, including a threat by the Sinaloa Federation to attack local schools in nearby El Provenir if parents and school officials refused to pay extortion fees. Being situated next to an established port of entry into the United States, Guadalupe Distrito Bravos is a strategic transshipment point for any group looking to smuggle narcotics and other illicit goods into the United States. Organized crime groups simply remove local officials if they stand in their way.
Lara’s death is also another indication that the conflict in Juarez extends well beyond the city itself and into surrounding areas, particularly the Juarez Valley, which stretches southeast from the city about 48 kilometers (30 miles) along the Texas-Chihuahua border. It has been three months since an FBI intelligence report was leaked saying that the Sinaloa cartel had “taken over” Juarez, although the level of violence has remained the same and it appears the Sinaloa Federation and its allies are still in the process of trying to solidify their hold on the region.
June 14
- The bodies of three people, including the son of a former police commander, were discovered in a field in Guasave, Sinaloa state.
- Three federal policemen were killed after a firefight between unidentified gunmen and police in Chihuahua, Chihuahua state.
- Soldiers seized eight tons of marijuana from a warehouse in the municipality of Vallecillo, Nuevo Leon state. One person was arrested in connection with the incident and two vehicles were seized by authorities.
June 15
- The bodies of an unidentified man and woman were discovered by residents of the municipality of Jaltenco, Mexico state. The victims had messages on their backs indicating they had been killed by a drug cartel.
- Fourteen suspected members of a drug-trafficking cartel were killed in Taxco, Guerrero state, in a firefight with soldiers.
- A decapitated body was discovered in a canal in a water treatment plant located in Atapaneo, Michoacan state.
June 16
- The bodies of three men and two women were discovered in Apodaca, Nuevo Leon state. One body was decapitated and three of the bodies had messages from suspected drug-trafficking cartels attached to them with ice picks.
- Unidentified gunmen killed six people at a rehabilitation clinic in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.
- Mexican authorities confirmed the seizure of 16,000 liters of phenyl acetate in Veracruz, Veracruz state.
June 17
- Two suspected La Familia Michoacana members were arrested in connection with a June 14 ambush against police in Zitacuaro, Michoacan state, that left 12 policemen dead.
- Unidentified attackers tortured and killed two members of the same family in their house in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. The suspects later set fire to the residence.
- Eight kidnappers were arrested and two kidnapping victims were freed by federal agents in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state.
June 18
- Soldiers seized more than $1 million and approximately 65 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana from a residence in Culiacan, Sinaloa state.
- One person was killed and eight were injured during a firefight in which several gunmen attacked a group of about 100 people in Veracruz, Veracruz state.
- Soldiers in Leon, Guanajuato state, destroyed a laboratory allegedly used to make methamphetamines.
June 19
- Unidentified gunmen killed a former police officer in Santiago, Nuevo Leon state, after breaking into his house as he slept.
- Unidentified gunmen killed the mayor of Guadalupe Distrito Bravos, Chihuahua state.
June 20
- An explosive device injured a university security guard in Atizapan, Mexico state. A taxi driver allegedly delivered the package containing the device to the university guardhouse.
- The decapitated bodies of a regional police commander and a police officer were discovered in the municipality of Villa Azueta, Veracruz state.
- Soldiers in the municipality of Tlajomulco de Zuniga, Jalisco state, destroyed a drug lab and arrested five men transporting drugs in a vehicle. The suspects allegedly tried to bribe the soldiers by offering them $20,000.
Dispatch: Expanding Reach of Mexico's Drug Cartels
Analyst Fred Burton looks at the security effects of more internationally assertive Mexican drug cartels.
Mexico, a “Failed State?”
April 6, 2010
By George Friedman (Editor of Stratfor Intelligence)
STRATFOR argued March 13, 2008, that Mexico was nearing the status of a failed state. A failed state is one in which the central government has lost control over significant areas of the country and the state is unable to function. In revisiting this issue, it seems to us that the Mexican government has lost control of the northern tier of Mexico to drug-smuggling organizations, which have significantly greater power in that region than government forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to assert its will against these organizations has weakened to the point that decisions made by the state against the cartels are not being implemented or are being implemented in a way that would guarantee failure.
Despite these facts, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Mexico is becoming a failed state. Instead, it appears the Mexican state has accommodated itself to the situation. Rather than failing, it has developed strategies designed both to ride out the storm and to maximize the benefits of that storm for Mexico.
First, while the Mexican government has lost control over matters having to do with drugs and with the borderlands of the United States, Mexico City's control over other regions - and over areas other than drug enforcement - has not collapsed (though its lack of control over drugs could well extend to other areas eventually). Second, while drugs reshape Mexican institutions dramatically, they also, paradoxically, stabilize Mexico. We need to examine these crosscurrents to understand the status of Mexico.
Mexico's Core Problem
Let's begin by understanding the core problem. The United States consumes vast amounts of narcotics, which, while illegal there, make their way in abundance. Narcotics derive from low-cost agricultural products that become consumable with minimal processing. With its long, shared border with the United States, Mexico has become a major grower, processor and exporter of narcotics. Because the drugs are illegal and thus outside normal market processes, their price is determined by their illegality rather than by the cost of production. This means extraordinary profits can be made by moving narcotics from the Mexican side of the border to markets on the other side.
Whoever controls the supply chain from the fields to the processing facilities and, above all, across the border, will make enormous amounts of money. Various Mexican organizations - labeled cartels, although they do not truly function as such, since real cartels involve at least a degree of cooperation among producers, not open warfare - vie for this business. These are competing businesses, each with its own competing supply chain.
Typically, competition among businesses involves lowering prices and increasing quality. This would produce small, incremental shifts in profits on the whole while dramatically reducing prices. An increased market share would compensate for lower prices. Similarly, lawsuits are the normal solution to unfair competition. But neither is the case with regard to illegal goods.
The surest way to increase smuggling profits is not through market mechanisms but by taking over competitors' supply chains. Given the profit margins involved, persons wanting to control drug supply chains would be irrational to buy, since the lower-cost solution would be to take control of these supply chains by force. Thus, each smuggling organization has an attached paramilitary organization designed to protect its own supply chain and to seize its competitors' supply chains.
The result is ongoing warfare between competing organizations. Given the amount of money being made in delivering their product to American cities, these paramilitary organizations are well-armed, well-led and well-motivated. Membership in such paramilitary groups offers impoverished young men extraordinary opportunities for making money, far greater than would be available to them in legitimate activities.
The raging war in Mexico derives logically from the existence of markets for narcotics in the United States; the low cost of the materials and processes required to produce these products; and the extraordinarily favorable economics of moving narcotics across the border. This warfare is concentrated on the Mexican side of the border. But from the Mexican point of view, this warfare does not fundamentally threaten Mexico's interests.
A Struggle Far From the Mexican Heartland
The heartland of Mexico is to the south, far from the country's northern tier. The north is largely a sparsely populated highland desert region seen from Mexico City as an alien borderland intertwined with the United States as much as it is part of Mexico. Accordingly, the war raging there doesn't represent a direct threat to the survival of the Mexican regime.
Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40 billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant. Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports. Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80 percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion.
In estimating the impact of drug money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any conventional export. The drug trade's tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted substantially.
On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion of such funds.
The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it out on the border; even their bosses couldn't manage funds of that magnitude. And while money can be - and often is - baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions - banks and other financial entities - and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no different from the American Mafia's practice during and after Prohibition.
The Drug War and Mexican National Interests
From Mexico's point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it generates wealth and jobs.
For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the difficulty of ending the traffic anyway - and that many in the state security and military apparatus benefit from it - an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade.
Mexico's policy is consistent: It makes every effort to appear to be stopping the drug trade so that it will not be accused of supporting it. The government does not object to disrupting one or more of the smuggling groups, so long as the aggregate inflow of cash does not materially decline. It demonstrates to the United States efforts (albeit inadequate) to tackle the trade, while pointing out very real problems with its military and security apparatus and with its officials in Mexico City. It simultaneously points to the United States as the cause of the problem, given Washington's failure to control demand or to reduce prices by legalization. And if massive amounts of money pour into Mexico as a result of this U.S. failure, Mexico is not going to refuse it.
The problem with the Mexican military or police is not lack of training or equipment. It is not a lack of leadership. These may be problems, but they are only problems if they interfere with implementing Mexican national policy. The problem is that these forces are personally unmotivated to take the risks needed to be effective because they benefit more from being ineffective. This isn't incompetence but a rational national policy.
Moreover, Mexico has deep historic grievances toward the United States dating back to the Mexican-American War. These have been exacerbated by U.S. immigration policy that the Mexicans see both as insulting and as a threat to their policy of exporting surplus labor north. There is thus no desire to solve the Americans' problem. Certainly, there are individuals in the Mexican government who wish to stop the smuggling and the inflow of billions of dollars. They will try. But they will not succeed, as too much is at stake. One must ignore public statements and earnest private assurances and instead observe the facts on the ground to understand what's really going on.
The U.S. Strategic Problem
And this leaves the United States with a strategic problem. There is some talk in Mexico City and Washington of the Americans becoming involved in suppression of the smuggling within Mexico (even though the cartels, to use that strange name, make certain not to engage in significant violence north of the border and mask it when they do to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexico). This is certainly something the Mexicans would be attracted to. But it is unclear that the Americans would be any more successful than the Mexicans. What is clear is that any U.S. intervention would turn Mexican drug traffickers into patriots fighting yet another Yankee incursion. Recall that Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, but he did help turn Villa into a national hero in Mexico.
The United States has a number of choices. It could accept the status quo. It could figure out how to reduce drug demand in the United States while keeping drugs illegal. It could legalize drugs, thereby driving their price down and ending the motivation for smuggling. And it could move into Mexico in a bid to impose its will against a government, banking system and police and military force that benefit from the drug trade.
The United States does not know how to reduce demand for drugs. The United States is not prepared to legalize drugs. This means the choice lies between the status quo and a complex and uncertain (to say the least) intervention. We suspect the United States will attempt some limited variety of the latter, while in effect following the current strategy and living with the problem.
Ultimately, Mexico is a failed state only if you accept the idea that its goal is to crush the smugglers. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea that all of Mexican society benefits from the inflow of billions of American dollars (even though it also pays a price), then the Mexican state has not failed - it is following a rational strategy to turn a national problem into a national benefit.
Mexico Security Memo: April 12, 2010
Nuevo Laredo Consulate Attack
On April 9, at approximately 11 p.m. local time, an explosive device detonated in the compound of the U.S. Consulate in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state. The device was thrown over the wall of the compound by unknown suspects who then fled the area. There were no injuries and only minor damage to windows in the compound. While authorities have yet to confirm the exact type or composition of the device, STRATFOR sources have indicated that it was a hand grenade.
The U.S. Consulate in Nuevo Laredo and the Consulate General and Consular Agency in Piedras Negras, Coahuila state, were closed April 12 and will reopen when U.S. authorities believe there is sufficient security at the facilities to keep visitors and staff safe. The Mexican government deployed 1,200 additional troops April 9 to the Nuevo Leon-Tamaulipas border region merely hours before the consulate attack to improve the general security situation in the region.
No suspects or criminal groups have been named in the investigation thus far, largely because of the widespread availability of hand grenades and the proliferation of this type of weapon among all manner of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico. The motives remain unclear for the consulate attack, which is the latest in a string of violent acts toward U.S. diplomatic missions and personnel in recent months.
In October 2008, the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, was attacked by two men who rammed their truck into the consulate's perimeter gates, fired several rounds at the main building and then threw a grenade over the fence that failed to detonate. More recently, the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey was the subject of a suspected Los Zetas probe of the consulate's physical security measures that resulted in a standoff between foreign national consulate guards and masked gunmen in two SUVs. However, the most publicized incident involving U.S. personnel was the March 13 killing - apparently targeted assassinations - of three people tied to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez, Chihuahua state.
The uptick in attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions and personnel in Mexico has been attributed to two main groups, Los Zetas and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF), also known as the Juarez cartel, and their associates. Additionally, a Barrio Azteca (BA) leader who works in conjunction with the Juarez cartel recently divulged in an interview with a local newspaper that the organization was targeting U.S. personnel specifically to force the U.S. government to intervene in Mexico because the Mexican government is demonstrating favoritism toward the Sinaloa Federation. Both Los Zetas and the VCF have been bearing the brunt of an offensive by both Mexican federal forces and elements of Sinaloa. There are also reports that the VCF and Los Zetas have developed a working relationship on the basis of common foes - namely, the Sinaloa Federation and the Mexican government. The statements made by the BA leader have yet to be verified by either Mexican or U.S. authorities, but the increased violence against the U.S. diplomatic community in Mexico and the developing relationship between the VCF and Los Zetas cannot be dismissed.
Sinaloa Takes Control of Juarez
An FBI intelligence report released April 9 indicated that the Sinaloa Federation, led by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, has taken control of the Juarez Valley drug trafficking corridor and appears to have the upper hand in the conflict with the VCF. The FBI cites information from confidential informants involved in the drug trade and located in and around Juarez, Chihuahua state, and El Paso, Texas. Additionally, drug seizures in the El Paso area show that upward of 60 to 80 percent of the drugs confiscated come from the Sinaloa Federation. This shift in power could mean changes for the long-term security environment in the Juarez Valley, but the violence will likely continue unabated in the short term.
STRATFOR sources have described the Juarez Valley landscape as largely under the control of Guzman and the Sinaloa Federation, with pockets of VCF control. Indeed, the Juarez Valley is the core turf of the VCF, and the organization has said on several occasions that it will fight to the death, along with its associates in La Linea, BA and Los Aztecas, in defense of the territory. This mindset could have inspired the BA leader's statement above that the organization was targeting U.S. personnel specifically to force the U.S. government to intervene in Mexico.
We have seen time and again throughout Mexico that DTOs can be remarkably innovative and resilient when they are backed into a corner. The VCF will fight to stay relevant on the drug-trafficking scene, and it will likely pursue this ambition violently - as will the Sinaloa Federation - in an attempt to dominate the Juarez Valley drug trade. Eventually, this could lead to the VCF's extermination. Or the current situation could result in a truce between Sinaloa and VCF, since both have had previous arrangements with each other. In any case, the VCF is down but not out, and violence in the greater Juarez area will not be ending any time soon.
April 5
- Two soldiers were injured in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, during a grenade attack on military barracks.
- Four people were killed during a firefight between police and suspected DTO gunmen in Torreon, Coahuila state.
April 6
- One man was killed and another was injured in Atizapan de Zaragoza, Mexico state, after being shot from a vehicle driven by unidentified gunmen.
- The decapitated body of a kidnapped businessman, identified as Roberto Martinez Frias, was discovered in El Chilillo, Sinaloa state.
- Eleven gunmen were killed during a firefight between unidentified criminal groups in the municipality of Xalisco, Nayarit state. Three of the victims were shot and the charred bodies of eight others were found in a burned vehicle.
April 7
- The body of an unidentified man was found in the Buenos Aires neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The man's body had its hands bound and bore a gunshot wound on the neck.
- Unidentified gunmen fired at a border control post near the Guatemalan border in Las Champas, Chiapas state. One bystander was killed and another was injured in the attack.
- Approximately 200 kilograms of marijuana and several weapons were seized by soldiers during a raid in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state.
- A Mexican customs and immigration official, identified as Alejandro Solis Vallarina, was killed in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, by unidentified gunmen.
April 8
- Two people under 18 years of age were reportedly kidnapped and subsequently released following a ransom payment in San Nicolas, Nuevo Leon state.
- Several gunmen stole almost 500,000 pesos from the offices of Compania Mexicana de Gas in the Cementos neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
- Naval troops arrested an unspecified number of policemen in Valle Hermoso, Tamaulipas state.
April 9
- The bodies of two unidentified men were found hanging from a bridge in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Both men had been shot to death.
- The dismembered bodies of two men were found in plastic bags in Ecatepec, Mexico state.
- Approximately 80 suspected members of the La Linea criminal group occupied the town of Maycoba, Sonora state, for an hour. Ten people were reportedly kidnapped during the incident.
- Arturo Lopez Maravilla, the regional police commander of Autlan de Navarro in Jalisco state, was killed by unidentified gunmen.
April 10
- One policeman was killed and another was injured by unknown gunmen in the municipality of Huitzilac, Morelos state.
- Two policemen were kidnapped by unidentified persons in Escobedo, Nuevo Leon state. The men abducted were not identified, but one was believed to be a police commander.
- The bodies of three men were found in a car after a shootout in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
April 11
- Soldiers seized a suspected drug laboratory in the municipality of Mocorito, Sinaloa state. Chemicals and weapons were found at the location.
- The mutilated and decapitated body of an unidentified man was found along the Mexico City-Acapulco highway in El Polvorin, Morelos state.
- A man was killed at a police roadblock in the municipality of Zinacantepec, Mexico state, after he refused to stop for an inspection and instead fired a gun at police. A passenger in the vehicle was reportedly injured.
Mexico: Army Will Patrol 5-10 More Years - Defense Secretary
Mexican National Defense Secretary Gen. Guillermo Galvan said the army will patrol against organized crime for five to 10 more years unless the federal government orders it to cease operations, Milenio reported April 8. Galvan's comments were reportedly made during a meeting with political leaders in which he asked for the national congress to establish a legal framework to clarify army operations against organized crime.
Mexico: Juarez Police Take Over From Army
Mexican army troops were pulled off Ciudad Juarez's streets and replaced by thousands of federal police officers who will take over the fight against drug-related violence, AP reported April 9. Mayor Jose Reyes stated that the city's 3,000-member municipal police force will be backed up by 5,000 federal police. Federal Police Commissioner Facundo Rosas said the change of strategy is intended to bring more community policing and intelligence work to the problem of gang and drug cartel violence. He said soldiers will remain at checkpoints at border crossings, entrances to the city and a few other strategic locations.
Mexico: The Struggle for Balance
By Scott Stewart
This week’s Geopolitical Intelligence Report provided a high-level assessment of the economic forces that affect how the Mexican people and the Mexican government view the flow of narcotics through that country. Certainly at that macro level, there is a lot of money flowing into Mexico and a lot of people, from bankers and businessmen to political parties and politicians, are benefiting from the massive influx of cash. The lure of this lucre shapes how many Mexicans (particularly many of the Mexican elite) view narcotics trafficking. It is, frankly, a good time to be a banker, a real estate developer or a Rolex dealer in Mexico.
However, at the tactical level, there are a number of issues also shaping the opinions of many Mexicans regarding narcotics trafficking, including violence, corruption and rapidly rising domestic narcotics consumption. At this level, people are being terrorized by running gunbattles, mass beheadings and rampant kidnappings — the types of events that STRATFOR covers in our Mexico Security Memos.
Mexican elites have the money to buy armored cars and hire private security guards. But rampant corruption in the security forces means the common people seemingly have nowhere to turn for help at the local level (not an uncommon occurrence in the developing world). The violence is also having a heavy impact on Mexico’s tourist sector and on the willingness of foreign companies to invest in Mexico’s manufacturing sector. Many smaller business owners are being hit from two sides — they receive extortion demands from criminals while facing a decrease in revenue due to a drop in tourism because of the crime and violence. These citizens and businessmen are demanding help from Mexico City.
These two opposing forces — the inexorable flow of huge quantities of cash and the pervasive violence, corruption and fear — are placing a tremendous amount of pressure on the Calderon administration. And this pressure will only increase as Mexico moves closer to the 2012 presidential elections (President Felipe Calderon was the law-and-order candidate and was elected in 2006 in large part due to his pledge to end cartel violence). Faced by these forces, Calderon needs to find a way to strike a delicate balance, one that will reassert Mexican government authority, quell the violence and mollify the public while also allowing the river of illicit cash to continue flowing into Mexico.
An examination of the historical dynamics of the narcotics trade in Mexico reveals that in order for the violence to stop, there needs to be a balance among the various drug-trafficking organizations involved in the trade. New dynamics have begun to shape the narcotics business in Mexico, and they are causing that balance to be very elusive. For the Calderon administration, desperate times may have called for desperate measures.
The Balance
The laws of economics dictate that narcotics will continue to flow into the United States. The mission of the Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and the larger cartels they form is to attempt to control as much of that flow as they can. The people who run the Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are businessmen. Historically, their primary objective is to move their product (narcotics) without being caught and to make a lot of money in the process. The Mexican drug lords have traditionally attempted to conduct this business quietly, efficiently and with the least amount of friction.
When there is a kind of competitive business balance among these various organizations, a sort of detente prevails and there is relative peace. We say relative, because there has always been a level of tension and some level of violence among these organizations, but during times of balance the violence is kept in check for business reasons.
During times of balance, the territorial boundaries are well-established, the smuggling corridors are secure, the drugs flow and the people make money. When that balance is lost and an organization is weakened — especially an organization that controls one or more valuable smuggling corridors — a vicious fight can develop as other organizations move in and try to exert control over the territory and as the incumbent organization attempts to fight them off and retain control of its turf. Smuggling corridors are geographically significant places along the narcotics supply chain where the product is channeled — places such as ports, airstrips, significant highways and border crossings. Control of these significant channels (often referred to as “plazas” by the drug-trafficking organizations) is very important to an organization’s ability to move contraband. If it doesn’t control a corridor it wants to use, it must pay the organization that does control it.
In past decades, this turbulence was normally short lived. When there was a fight between the organizations or cartels, there would be a period of intense violence and then the balance between them would either be restored to the status quo ante or a new balance between the organizations would be reached. For example, when the Guadalajara cartel dissolved following the 1989 arrest of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, and the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) and the Sinaloa cartel emerged from the Guadalajara cartel to fill the power vacuum, there was a brief period of tension, but once balance was achieved, the violence ebbed — and business returned to normal. However, the old model of cartel conflicts has changed. The current round of inter- and intra-cartel violence has raged for nearly a decade and has intensified rather than abated; there appears to be no end in sight. In fact, death tolls are far higher today than they were five years ago.
This inability of the cartels to reach a state of balance is due to several factors. First is the change of products. Mexican drug cartels have long moved marijuana into the United States, but the increase in the amount of cocaine being moved through Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s changed the dynamic — cocaine is far more compact and far more lucrative than marijuana. Cocaine is also a “strategic narcotic,” one that has a transnational supply chain far longer than drugs like marijuana or methamphetamine, and that long supply chain is difficult to guard. Because of this, organizations involved in the cocaine trade tend to be more aggressive and violent than those that smuggle drugs with a shorter supply chain like marijuana and Mexican opium.
At first, Mexican cartels like the Guadalajara cartel only smuggled cocaine through their smuggling routes into the United States on behalf of the more powerful Colombian cartels, which were seeking alternate routes to replace the Caribbean smuggling routes that had been largely shut down by American air and sea interdiction efforts. Over time, however, these Mexican cartels grew richer and more powerful from the proceeds of the cocaine trade, and they began to take on an expanded role in cocaine trafficking. The efforts of the Colombian government to dismantle the large (and violent) organizations like the Medellin and Cali cartels also allowed the Mexicans to assume more control over the cocaine supply line. Today, Mexican cartels control much of the cocaine supply chain, with their influence reaching down into South America and up into the United States. This expanded control of the supply chain brought with it a larger slice of the profits for the Mexican cartels, so they have become even more rich and powerful.
Of course, this large quantity of illicit income also brings risk with it. The massive profits that can be made by controlling a smuggling corridor into the United States are a tempting lure to competitors (internal and external). This means that the cartels require enforcers to protect their personnel and operations. These enforcers and the escalation of violence they brought with them are a second factor that has hampered the ability of the cartels to reach a balance.
Initially, some of the cartel bosses served as their own muscle, but as time went by and the business need for violence increased, the cartels brought in hired help to carry out the enforcement function. The first cartel to do this on a large scale was the AFO (a very aggressive organization), which used active and current police officers and youth gangs (some of them actually from the U.S. side of the border) as enforcers. To counter the AFO’s innovation and strength, rival cartels soon hired their own muscle. The Juarez cartel created its own band of police called La Linea and the Gulf cartel took things yet another step and hired Los Zetas, a group of elite anti-drug paratroopers who deserted their federal Special Air Mobile Force Group in the late 1990s.
The Gulf cartel’s private special operations unit raised the bar yet another notch, and the Sinaloa cartel formed its own paramilitary unit called Los Negros to counter the strength of Los Zetas. With paramilitary forces comes military armament, and cartel enforcers graduated from using pistols and submachine guns to regularly employing fully automatic assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades. As we have previously noted, thugs with such weapons do pose a threat, but when those weapons are in the hands of highly-trained gunmen with the ability to operate as an integrated unit, the threat is far greater.
The life of a cartel enforcer can be brutish and short. In order to find additional personnel to beef up their ranks, the various cartel enforcer units formed outside alliances. Los Zetas worked with former Guatemalan special forces commandos called Kaibiles and with the Mara Salvatrucha street gang (MS-13). La Linea formed a close alliance with the American Barrio Azteca street gang and with Los Aztecas, the gang’s Mexican branch. Cartels also recruit heavily, and it is now common to see them place “help wanted” signs in which they offer soldiers and police officers big money if they will quit their jobs and join a cartel enforcer unit.
In times of intense combat, the warriors in a criminal organization can begin to eclipse the group’s businessmen in terms of importance, and over the past decade the enforcers within groups like the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels have become very powerful. In fact, groups like Los Zetas and Los Negros have become powerful enough to split from their parent organizations and, essentially, form their own independent drug-trafficking organizations. This inter-cartel struggle has proved quite deadly as seen in the struggle between AFO factions in Tijuana over the past year and in the more recent eruption of violence between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas in northeastern Mexico.
This weakening of the traditional cartels was part of the Calderon administration’s publicized plan to reduce the power of the drug traffickers and to deny any one organization or cartel the ability to become more powerful than the state. The plan appears to have worked to some extent, and the powerful Gulf and Sinaloa cartels have splintered, as has the AFO. The fruit of this policy, however, has been incredible spikes in violence and the proliferation of aggressive new drug-trafficking organizations that have made it very difficult for any type of equilibrium to be reached. So the Mexican government’s policies have also been a factor in destabilizing the balance.
Finding a Fulcrum
The current round of cartel fighting began when the balance of cartel power was thrown off by the death of Amado Carrillo Fuentes in 1997, which resulted in the weakening of the once powerful Juarez cartel. Shortly after the head of the Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin Guzman Loera, aka El Chapo, escaped from prison in 2001, he began a push to move in on the weakened Juarez cartel. Guzman initially succeeded and the Juarez cartel became part of the Sinaloa Federation until the two cartels had a falling out in 2004.
Then when the chief enforcer of the AFO, Ramon Arellano Felix, was killed in 2002, both the Sinaloa and the Gulf cartels attempted to wrest control of Tijuana from the AFO. Finally, when Gulf cartel kingpin Osiel Cardenas Guillen was captured in March 2003, the Sinaloa cartel sent Los Negros to attempt to take control of the Gulf cartel’s territory, and this sparked a series of violent clashes in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. The top enforcer of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), Edgar Valdez Villarreal (aka La Barbie), led Los Negros into Nuevo Laredo.
These same basic turf wars are still active, meaning that there is still ongoing violence in Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, but as noted above, the actors are changing, with organizations like Los Zetas breaking out of the Gulf cartel and the BLO parting ways with the Sinaloa cartel. Indeed, the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels have joined forces with La Familia Michoacana (LFM) to form a new super cartel called the New Federation and are now allies in the struggle against Los Zetas and the BLO, which have teamed up with the Juarez cartel to fight against the New Federation. One constant in the violence of the past decade has been the aggressiveness of the Sinaloa cartel as it has sought to take territory from other cartels and organizations.
In the midst of the current cartel landscape, which has radically shifted over the past year, it is difficult for any type of balance to be found. There are also very few levers with which the Calderon government can apply pressure to help force the shifting pieces into alignment. In the near term, perhaps the only hope for striking a balance and reducing the violence is that the New Federation is strong enough to kill off organizations like Los Zetas, the BLO and the Juarez cartel and assert calm through sheer force. However, while the massed forces of the New Federation initially made some significant headway against Los Zetas, the former special operations personnel appear to have rallied, and Los Zetas’ tactical skills and arms make them unlikely to be defeated easily.
There have been many rumors that the New Federation, in its fight against Los Zetas, was being helped by the Mexican government. (Some of those rumors have come from the New Federation itself.) During the New Federation’s offensive against Los Zetas, federation enforcers have been seen driving around Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo in vehicles openly marked with signs indicating they belonged to the New Federation. While far from conclusive proof of government assistance, the well-marked vehicles certainly do seem to support the cartel’s assertion that, at the very least, the government did not want to interfere with the federation’s operation to destroy Los Zetas.
When pieced together with other observations gathered during the cartel wars, this also suggests that the Sinaloa cartel may have consistently benefited from the government’s actions. These actions would include taking out the BLO leadership after the Beltran Leyva brothers turned against Sinaloa and the government’s success against La Linea and Los Aztecas in Juarez. There are also occasional contraindications, such as the recent large-scale attacks against military bases in the northeast that appear to have been conducted by the New Federation.
Despite these contraindications, the cartels fighting the New Federation believe the government favors the group, and there have long been rumors that Calderon was somehow tied to El Chapo. The Juarez cartel may have recently taken some desperate steps to counter what it perceives to be a dire threat of government and New Federation cooperation. A local Juarez newspaper, El Diario, recently published an article discussing a Los Aztecas member who had been detained and interrogated by the Mexican military and federal police in connection with the murders of three U.S. Consulate employees in Juarez in March. During the interrogation, according to El Diario, the Los Aztecas member divulged that a decision was made by leaders in the Barrio Azteca gang and Juarez cartel to engage U.S. citizens in the Juarez area in an effort to force the U.S. government to intervene in Mexico and therefore act as a “neutral referee,” thereby helping to counter the Mexican government’s favoritism toward the New Federation.
Of course, it is highly possible that the Sinaloa cartel is just a superior cartel and is better at using the authorities as a weapon against its adversaries. On the other hand, perhaps the increasingly desperate government has decided to use Sinaloa and the New Federation as a fulcrum to restore balance to the narcotics trade and reduce the violence across Mexico.
In any case, we will be closely watching the activities of the New Federation and the Mexican government over the next several months to see if this hypothesis is correct. Much hangs in the balance for Calderon, the Mexican people and their American neighbors.
Mexico and the Failed State Revisited
By George Friedman
STRATFOR argued March 13, 2008, that Mexico was nearing the status of a failed state. A failed state is one in which the central government has lost control over significant areas of the country and the state is unable to function. In revisiting this issue, it seems to us that the Mexican government has lost control of the northern tier of Mexico to drug-smuggling organizations, which have significantly greater power in that region than government forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to assert its will against these organizations has weakened to the point that decisions made by the state against the cartels are not being implemented or are being implemented in a way that would guarantee failure.
Despite these facts, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Mexico is becoming a failed state. Instead, it appears the Mexican state has accommodated itself to the situation. Rather than failing, it has developed strategies designed both to ride out the storm and to maximize the benefits of that storm for Mexico.
First, while the Mexican government has lost control over matters having to do with drugs and with the borderlands of the United States, Mexico City's control over other regions - and over areas other than drug enforcement - has not collapsed (though its lack of control over drugs could well extend to other areas eventually). Second, while drugs reshape Mexican institutions dramatically, they also, paradoxically, stabilize Mexico. We need to examine these crosscurrents to understand the status of Mexico.
Mexico's Core Problem
Let's begin by understanding the core problem. The United States consumes vast amounts of narcotics, which, while illegal there, make their way in abundance. Narcotics derive from low-cost agricultural products that become consumable with minimal processing. With its long, shared border with the United States, Mexico has become a major grower, processor and exporter of narcotics. Because the drugs are illegal and thus outside normal market processes, their price is determined by their illegality rather than by the cost of production. This means extraordinary profits can be made by moving narcotics from the Mexican side of the border to markets on the other side.
Whoever controls the supply chain from the fields to the processing facilities and, above all, across the border, will make enormous amounts of money. Various Mexican organizations - labeled cartels, although they do not truly function as such, since real cartels involve at least a degree of cooperation among producers, not open warfare - vie for this business. These are competing businesses, each with its own competing supply chain.
Typically, competition among businesses involves lowering prices and increasing quality. This would produce small, incremental shifts in profits on the whole while dramatically reducing prices. An increased market share would compensate for lower prices. Similarly, lawsuits are the normal solution to unfair competition. But neither is the case with regard to illegal goods.
The surest way to increase smuggling profits is not through market mechanisms but by taking over competitors' supply chains. Given the profit margins involved, persons wanting to control drug supply chains would be irrational to buy, since the lower-cost solution would be to take control of these supply chains by force. Thus, each smuggling organization has an attached paramilitary organization designed to protect its own supply chain and to seize its competitors' supply chains.
The result is ongoing warfare between competing organizations. Given the amount of money being made in delivering their product to American cities, these paramilitary organizations are well-armed, well-led and well-motivated. Membership in such paramilitary groups offers impoverished young men extraordinary opportunities for making money, far greater than would be available to them in legitimate activities.
The raging war in Mexico derives logically from the existence of markets for narcotics in the United States; the low cost of the materials and processes required to produce these products; and the extraordinarily favorable economics of moving narcotics across the border. This warfare is concentrated on the Mexican side of the border. But from the Mexican point of view, this warfare does not fundamentally threaten Mexico's interests.
A Struggle Far From the Mexican Heartland
The heartland of Mexico is to the south, far from the country's northern tier. The north is largely a sparsely populated highland desert region seen from Mexico City as an alien borderland intertwined with the United States as much as it is part of Mexico. Accordingly, the war raging there doesn't represent a direct threat to the survival of the Mexican regime.
Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40 billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant. Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports. Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80 percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion.
In estimating the impact of drug money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any conventional export. The drug trade's tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted substantially.
On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion of such funds.
The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it out on the border; even their bosses couldn't manage funds of that magnitude. And while money can be - and often is - baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions - banks and other financial entities - and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no different from the American Mafia's practice during and after Prohibition.
The Drug War and Mexican National Interests
From Mexico's point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it generates wealth and jobs.
For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the difficulty of ending the traffic anyway - and that many in the state security and military apparatus benefit from it - an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade.
Mexico's policy is consistent: It makes every effort to appear to be stopping the drug trade so that it will not be accused of supporting it. The government does not object to disrupting one or more of the smuggling groups, so long as the aggregate inflow of cash does not materially decline. It demonstrates to the United States efforts (albeit inadequate) to tackle the trade, while pointing out very real problems with its military and security apparatus and with its officials in Mexico City. It simultaneously points to the United States as the cause of the problem, given Washington's failure to control demand or to reduce prices by legalization. And if massive amounts of money pour into Mexico as a result of this U.S. failure, Mexico is not going to refuse it.
The problem with the Mexican military or police is not lack of training or equipment. It is not a lack of leadership. These may be problems, but they are only problems if they interfere with implementing Mexican national policy. The problem is that these forces are personally unmotivated to take the risks needed to be effective because they benefit more from being ineffective. This isn't incompetence but a rational national policy.
Moreover, Mexico has deep historic grievances toward the United States dating back to the Mexican-American War. These have been exacerbated by U.S. immigration policy that the Mexicans see both as insulting and as a threat to their policy of exporting surplus labor north. There is thus no desire to solve the Americans' problem. Certainly, there are individuals in the Mexican government who wish to stop the smuggling and the inflow of billions of dollars. They will try. But they will not succeed, as too much is at stake. One must ignore public statements and earnest private assurances and instead observe the facts on the ground to understand what's really going on.
The U.S. Strategic Problem
And this leaves the United States with a strategic problem. There is some talk in Mexico City and Washington of the Americans becoming involved in suppression of the smuggling within Mexico (even though the cartels, to use that strange name, make certain not to engage in significant violence north of the border and mask it when they do to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexico). This is certainly something the Mexicans would be attracted to. But it is unclear that the Americans would be any more successful than the Mexicans. What is clear is that any U.S. intervention would turn Mexican drug traffickers into patriots fighting yet another Yankee incursion. Recall that Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, but he did help turn Villa into a national hero in Mexico.
The United States has a number of choices. It could accept the status quo. It could figure out how to reduce drug demand in the United States while keeping drugs illegal. It could legalize drugs, thereby driving their price down and ending the motivation for smuggling. And it could move into Mexico in a bid to impose its will against a government, banking system and police and military force that benefit from the drug trade.
The United States does not know how to reduce demand for drugs. The United States is not prepared to legalize drugs. This means the choice lies between the status quo and a complex and uncertain (to say the least) intervention. We suspect the United States will attempt some limited variety of the latter, while in effect following the current strategy and living with the problem.
Ultimately, Mexico is a failed state only if you accept the idea that its goal is to crush the smugglers. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea that all of Mexican society benefits from the inflow of billions of American dollars (even though it also pays a price), then the Mexican state has not failed - it is following a rational strategy to turn a national problem into a national benefit.
Mexico Security Memo: April 5, 2010
Cartel Assault on Mexican Military Garrisons
In an uncharacteristic move, cartel members launched an offensive against the Mexican military in the northeastern border states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon on March 30. The cartel gunmen conducted a series of attacks using tactics from ambushes to blockades in the cities of Matamoros and Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, and against a military patrol along Federal Highway 40 in Nuevo Leon state. Media reports indicate that upward of 50 cartel members commandeered trucks and tractor-trailers to blockade elements of the Mexican military, preventing government forces from leaving garrisons in Reynosa and Matamoros. Cartel forces then attacked the garrisons with small-arms fire, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and crude improvised explosive devices (IEDs) outside these military facilities. The cartels implemented other blockades around the city of Reynosa, most notably around Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) facilities.
Despite this large show of force, the cartels sustained heavy losses, with 18 men killed compared to just one injury for the military. Mexican authorities also seized 54 rifles, 61 hand grenades and RPGs, eight IEDs and six lightly armored vehicles after the fighting ended. Mexican authorities have yet to identify the group responsible for these attacks, but STRATFOR sources have indicated that the New Federation is the prime suspect.
Though it is not uncommon for the military and the cartels to clash, the scale and offensive nature of these attacks stand out. The Mexican military and cartel members often engage in brief skirmishes during military patrols or other operations aimed at capturing cartel members, but the military is typically the aggressor in these conflicts. While the cartels often have carried out brief assaults on relatively vulnerable military patrols before fading back into the surroundings or attacked a given government facility with grenades, sustained assaults against hardened military facilities like these are uncommon.
The seizure of eight IEDs during the raid is of particular concern to Mexican authorities. STRATFOR anticipated, and has later tracked, the increased presence and use of IEDs in Mexico. Cartel members from several different organizations have been arrested in possession of explosives as far back as 2008, but we have not seen these explosives used until recently. Two IEDs have been deployed in as many months in Mexico, one in Oaxaca on Feb. 26 that the Mexican military disarmed and another IED was detonated in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state, on March 9.
Though we cannot definitively link the two previous incidents, we cannot rule a connection out either given that the devices showed a similar design (both used C4 as the main charge and cell phone-triggered detonators). Both devices were crude and relatively weak, but bombmaking involves a learning curve, meaning the designer or designers involved may well improve. IEDs carry a much higher risk of collateral damage than more precise cartel weapons like 7.62 mm or 5.56 mm rounds, hand grenades, and even RPGs. The urban environments in which many of these cartel conflicts take place amplify the risk of collateral damage as the bombmaker continues to learn and perfect the craft of IED construction.
Ultimately, the attacks undoubtedly were meant as a message to the Mexican military and security forces that the New Federation controls the northeastern Mexican border region. The outcome of these attacks, however, might have blunted the message.
A Rift in Morelos
The bodies of four decapitated men were found near the entrance of the Cuernavaca-Acapulco highway in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, on March 30. These are just four of the 26 murders in the past two weeks related to a feud between former Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) partners Hector Beltran Leyva and Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal. After the death of BLO leader Arturo Beltran Leyva on Dec. 16, 2009, the organization fell into a bitter succession dispute. Though Valdez Villarreal was Arturo's closest confidant and the top BLO enforcer, it was decided to keep the top BLO spot within the family. Accordingly, power was handed over to Hector, the last remaining living, non-incarcerated Beltran Leyva brother. Though rumors circulated that Valdez Villarreal and Hector had reconciled their differences, events of the past two weeks have demonstrated a clear rift. The once-powerful organization is now split in two, with the BLO's enforcers united under Valdez Villareal and with Beltran Leyva family loyalists united under Hector.
Media reports and rumors have emerged that Valdez Villarreal has rekindled old ties to Sinaloa leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman. Valdez Villareal was Sinaloa's point man in the cartel's offensive to take over the Nuevo Laredo plaza from the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas between 2004-2007. Valdez Villarreal, a U.S. citizen, is known for his exceedingly brutal tactics. Along with Guzman's backing, Valdez Villarreal looks poised to retake regions previously held by the BLO. Hector Beltran Leyva still commands a fairly large contingent of followers with a demonstrated willingness to fight for control of their territory, however. Violence will likely continue in the Morelos region for some time to come, as both groups have extensive networks throughout the region - and neither side appears likely to back down in the near future.
March 29
- A group of men with hand grenades attacked a truck carrying 10 people, seven of whom were under the age of 18, in Durango, Durango state.
- Members of the Mexican military were ambushed by members of the San Pedro Garza Garcia police department as they were transporting a detainee with several grams of cocaine to Escobedo, Nuevo Leon state.
- Erick Alejandro "El Motokles" Martinez Lopez, leader of Los Zetas in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, was arrested at the Mexico City International Airport by Mexican military intelligence.
March 30
- The bodies of six men were discovered in different parts of Morelos state, with signs warning of collaboration with former BLO enforcer Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal.
- Members of the New Federation hijacked and disabled several SUVs and tractor trailers along highways surrounding military installations in Reynosa and Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, forming a blockade.
- A total of 18 New Federation gunmen were killed in several attacks against the Mexican military in Reynosa and Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, as well as China, Nuevo Leon state.
March 31
- Members of the Mexican military detained the former head of public security in Ciudad Hidalgo, Michoacan state, for association with elements of organized crime groups in the region.
- The Nuevo Laredo police department reinforced its headquarters with barbed wire, high fences and concrete barriers in anticipation of violence spreading north from Reynosa.
- After a brief firefight with members of the Mexican military, 19 people were arrested in Acuitzio, Michoacan, four of whom were local police officers.
April 2
- An unknown man was shot to death a few yards away from agents of the Nuevo Leon State Investigative Agency who were investigating a murder that had occurred only hours earlier in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon.
April 3
- A woman washing cars was shot and killed by a group of armed men traveling in a compact car in Torreon, Coahuila state.
April 4
- A report released by the Federal Police suggested there has been a power shift between cartels in the Tamaulipas region. The report states that Los Zetas are no longer the strongest criminal element operating in the region, and that the alliance of the Gulf, Sinaloa and La Familia cartels are now the dominant force.
- Lawyer Rafael Dominguez Puente's body was found along a bridge in Durango, Durango state with 10 gunshot wounds to his chest and abdomen.
Mexico: Police Chief, Cartel Suspect Detained
Federal police detained Roberto Rivero Arana, who identified himself as the nephew of reputed Zetas gang leader Heriberto Lazcano, in the Gulf coast state of Tabasco, according to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, AP reported April 1. Arana was detained along with Daniel Perez, the acting police chief of Ciudad del Carmen. The statement alleged Perez received 200,000 pesos ($16,000) a month for protecting the Zetas. The two men were found with 10 assault rifles, a grenade, ammunition, drugs, police uniforms and work uniforms with the logo of Mexico’s state oil company, Pemex, the Attorney General’s Office said.
Mexico: 18 Killed In Army Base Attacks
Mexican Gen. Edgar Luis Villegas said gunmen staged seven separate attacks on the army, including three blockades, AP reported April 1. Gunmen parked trucks and SUVs outside a military base in the border city of Reynosa trying to block troops from leaving and sparking a gunbattle with soldiers. Gunmen also blocked several streets leading to a garrison in the nearby border city of Matamoros. Another gang of armed men opened fire from several vehicles, shooting at soldiers guarding a federal highway in General Bravo, in Nuevo Leon state. Troops fought back, killing 18 gunmen, wounding two and detaining seven more suspects.
Mexico Security Memo: March 29, 2010
U.S. Security Delegation Visits Mexico
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led a delegation of Cabinet-level national security officials to Mexico City on March 23 for a meeting with Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa Cantellano on security concerns facing the two countries. The visit comes on the heels of the March 13 targeted killings of three individuals tied to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez, Chihuahua state. Clinton's visit to Mexico had been scheduled for some time, but the attendance of U.S. Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen and U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair is rumored to be a result of the Juarez assassinations.
These Cabinet-level officials have no role in investigations into the deaths of State Department employees, so their presence on this trip would indicate a much broader national security concern on the part of the United States. The meeting concluded with U.S. and Mexican officials promising to strengthen bilateral security programs already in place, and no revelatory policy changes were announced, but the visit does highlight the recently growing U.S.-Mexico security relationship.
Over the course of the past few months there have been several instances where U.S. facilities and U.S. personnel have been targeted by organized crime elements in Mexico. Most notable, of course, were the three assassinations in Juarez, but another incident that has not garnered much press attention occurred at the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, on March 3. Several masked gunmen in two SUVs posing as Nuevo Leon state police attempted to enter the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, in what appears to have been an attempted probe of U.S. Consulate security. The masked gunmen were stopped by a "fellow" Nuevo Leon state police agent guarding the consulate. After a 15-minute standoff, the masked gunmen left. This incident came a day after a phoned-in bomb threat caused the U.S. Consulate in Juarez to close for several hours. These are two incidents in a series of events involving U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel since United States' the late-February announcement that it will embed intelligence analysts and agents in the Juarez Intelligence and Operations Fusion center.
The growing trend of U.S. government assets in Mexico being directly targeted by organized crime has led to more pressure from Washington on the Mexican government to produce results in its war against the cartels. But while the Mexican government has been successful in taking out several major cartel leaders, overall violence continues to spiral out of control. Both Clinton and Espinosa were reported to have privately acknowledged during the meeting that the Mexican cartels are a threat to both countries' national security. Until recently, the Mexicans have scoffed at the idea of the United States taking a more active role in countercartel operations in Mexico, but the decision to allow U.S. intelligence analysts and agents to operate in Juarez indicates Mexico City has begun to re-evaluate its ability to tackle the cartel conflict on Mexican soil without assistance. Also, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has staked his presidency on the success of the cartel war, and with the 2012 presidential elections fast approaching the National Action Party (PAN) is looking for, but not finding, a quick solution to turn the tide of the fight. With the increase in pressure from Washington, the Mexican government may have no choice but to look northward for help.
Monterrey Protests
Mexican citizens took to the streets of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, on March 28 to protest the increasing levels of violence in the country's third-largest city and manufacturing hub. The conflict between the newly formed cartel alliance known as the New Federation (the Gulf cartel, the Sinaloa cartel and La Familia Michoacana) and Los Zetas has spread westward from its origins along the southern banks of the Rio Grande to Nuevo Leon and the Monterrey metropolitan area, and violence there has skyrocketed. An estimated 10,000 protesters were dressed in white and released white balloons and white doves to symbolize their desire for peace in the region.
Monterrey is no stranger to its citizens protesting the security environment, but their motives for protesting have been less than clear. Los Zetas were allegedly behind the February 2009 protests that involved "citizens" blocking major thoroughfares in and around the Monterrey metro area to protest the presence of the Mexican military in the region, saying that it was leading to a degradation of the security environment. The New Federation claimed to have instigated the March 28 protest in a video posted to YouTube, saying the protest was "Por la Pas sin Z" (for peace without Zetas). However, the demonstration noticeably lacked the hallmarks of cartel involvement, and the New Federation's claim of sparking the protest appears to be a public relations stunt.
March 22
- Twelve suspected kidnappers were captured in the municipality of Mineral de La Reforma, Pachuca, Hidalgo state.
- Four dismembered bodies were found in bags left in Chilpancingo and Acapulco, Guerrero state. The victims were identified as two ministerial policemen and two family members of a former regional Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) commissioner. Messages attributing the crime to drug cartels were found on the bags.
March 23
- Soldiers seized 1,400 kilograms of marijuana from an abandoned truck during patrols China, Nuevo Leon state. No arrests were made in connection with the incident.
- One soldier and one suspected criminal were killed in a firefight in the El Coyol neighborhood of Veracruz, Veracruz state. One person was arrested after the incident.
- The bodies of three men were found in General Trevino, Nuevo Leon state, after their kidnapping the previous day.
March 24
- The bodies of two men, reportedly executed by gunmen from Los Zetas, were found near Cancun, Quintana Roo state.
- Soldiers in Cosala, Sinaloa state, destroyed a marijuana plantation covering 2.14 hectares.
- Unidentified gunmen burned four houses in Valle de Juarez, Chihuahua state. One person was killed and four were reported missing after the incident.
March 25
- Officials from the State Investigative Agency arrested two federal policemen in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, for allegedly participating in a kidnapping.
- Soldiers reportedly killed six suspected drug trafficking cartel gunmen in a firefight in Cerralvo, Nuevo Leon state. Authorities seized firearms, vehicles and communications equipment after the incident.
- At least 40 prisoners escaped from Matamoros municipal prison in Tamaulipas state. The municipal and state prison directors were removed from their posts as a result of the escapes.
March 26
- The decapitated body of the police chief of Agualeguas, Nuevo Leon state, was found in an abandoned vehicle. The police chief's brother was also killed in the same incident. Three letters were reportedly written on the side of the vehicle with the victims' blood.
- Four suspected La Familia Michoacana members were arrested in Leon, Guanajuato state. The suspects are wanted for alleged kidnapping and murder.
- Three suspected La Familia Michoacana members were taken into custody in Apatzingan, Michoacan state. The men were arrested after police received reports of armed men in the municipality.
- The deputy police chief of Nogales, Sonora state, identified as Adalberto Padilla Molina, was killed along with a bodyguard after an attack by unidentified gunmen in Nogales.
March 27
- Naval troops arrested six suspected kidnappers and freed one kidnap victim in Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche state.
- Police arrested seven suspected kidnappers in the municipality of Teoloyucan, Mexico state. Five of the men were arrested in a rented taxi while wearing police and army uniforms.
- The head of internal affairs at the district attorney's office in Chihuahua state was found dead "near the border," according to a press release. The victim, identified as Mario Rodriguez Ferreiro, was reportedly shot in the Jardines de San Jose neighborhood in Ciudad Juarez.
March 28
- Four policemen were arrested after reportedly participating in an ambush on a military convoy transporting a detained suspect in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. Two soldiers and one civilian were injured in the firefight.
- The bodies of four executed men were found near a sewage canal in Tepozotlan, Mexico state. The bodies bore gunshot wounds to the head, and their hands were tied.
Mexico: U.S. Consulate Murder Suspect Arrested
Mexican soldiers have arrested a suspect in conjunction with the murder of three people linked to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez, AP reported March 29, citing a Chihuahua state police spokesman. The suspect, who was arrested March 26, is a leader of the Barrio Azteca gang. No additional details were provided.
Colombia: 10 Suspected Of Money Laundering
Mexico: Heroin Kingpin Arrested
Mexico: 41 Inmates Escape
U.S., Mexico: Clinton In Mexico City To Pledge Support Against Cartels
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico City, said the United States and Mexico will establish further bilateral cooperation against organized crime to dismantle drug trafficking cartels and strengthen Mexican security forces and government institutions, Milenio reported March 23. Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa said arms trafficking and money laundering would also be targeted under new bilateral accords.
U.S., Mexico: Clinton Pledges To Fight Drug Trafficking
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led a U.S. delegation in Mexico City where she pledged to reduce U.S. demand for drugs as well as guns and drug profits going to Mexico, AP reported March 23. Clinton said the drug cartels "are fighting against both of our governments."
Mexico: Tabasco Governor To Request More Troops
Andres Granier Melo, governor of the Mexican state of Tabasco, said he would present a request for more soldiers to be deployed to his state's border with Guatemala due to heavy drug trafficking in the region, El Heraldo de Tabasco reported March 23. Granier Melo said the proposal would be presented at a governors' conference in Morelia, Michoacan state on March 23.
Video Dispatch: A U.S. Engagement in Mexico
Several U.S. cabinet officials are planning talks on Tuesday with Mexican President Felipe Calderon, in response to escalating border violence. A multi-pronged policy initiative could be in the offing - along with some blowback from drug traffickers, security expert Fred Burton says.
Mexico Security Memo: March 22, 2010
Cartel Road Blocks in Northeastern Mexico
A total of five gunmen and one soldier from the Mexican military were killed March 18 in a firefight along Highway 40 from Monterrey, Nuevo Leon to Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. These media reports were also accompanied by other reports that several highways in the region were blocked by seemingly random vehicles. It was later revealed that these roadblocks were coordinated by members of Los Zetas to prevent Mexican military units from responding to these firefights in a timely manner.
The following day saw a total of 31 street intersections and sections of highway in and around the Monterrey metro area blocked by some 42 abandoned vehicles. Cartel members had carjacked these vehicles, which included everything from sedans to tractor-trailers to city buses, drove them into blocking positions and immobilized them by slashing or shooting out the tires or even setting them on fire. The blockades began to appear around 3:00 a.m. and were finally cleared by 7:00 a.m. before the morning rush hour. While there were no media reports of corresponding confrontations between cartel gunmen and Mexican security forces, sensitive cartel operations likely were carried out at this time.
Using civilian vehicles to block roadways to impede responding Mexican security forces is not new, but Los Zetas had never before used this tactic on such a large scale. During the November 2008 arrest of Los Zetas leader Jaime "El Hummer" Gonzalez Duran in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, Los Zetas hijacked several tractor trailers and crashed them along the highways leading to the Reynosa airports in attempts to impede the Federal Police efforts to transport Gonzalez Duran to Mexico City (standard operating procedure for the capture of high-value cartel targets).
While this tactic is effective in slowing the response of Mexican security forces, it also paralyzes traffic in and around these areas, affecting local businesses. In addition, those individuals stuck in traffic jams along the highways are relatively immobilized, making them easy targets for robberies or carjackings. While it does not currently appear that robbery and carjacking were the primary intentions of these cartel operations, the tactic has been used for such purposes in other regions of Mexico, and the risk is still present.
Nuevo Leon Gov. Rodrigo Medina de la Cruz announced March 20 local and state police will step up both ground and air patrols to prevent future similar incidents. This increase will help with authorities' response time to these types of events and shorten the duration of delays these blockades cause but will not prevent their occurrence outright. Individuals should plan in advance alternate routes around major thoroughfares and maintain a high degree of situational awareness when traveling in this particular area to avoid becoming trapped in one of these scenarios.
Operation Knockdown
Operation Knockdown, a U.S. multi-agency local, state and federal law enforcement operation, was launched as part of the investigation into the murder of three people linked to the U.S. consulate in Juarez, Chihuahua state on March 13. U.S. authorities revealed they believe members of the local gang Los Aztecas carried out the killings of the three individuals, two of which were U.S. citizens. Los Aztecas is the Juarez franchise of the larger Barrio Azteca prison gang based in El Paso, Texas, and has been behind a large number of the murders that have taken place in Juarez over the past three years.
As part of Operation Knockdown, authorities have interviewed more than 100 known members of the Barrio Azteca gang in El Paso and southern New Mexico and have reportedly arrested a number of those interviewed as well on outstanding warrants. Additionally, authorities sought information on the whereabouts of Barrio Azteca leader Eduardo Ravelo, who is one of the FBI's 10 most wanted fugitives.
This operation has undoubtedly gathered an enormous amount of intelligence, especially as there are reports of a number of Barrio Azteca members fully cooperating with authorities. The statements thus far from U.S. and Mexican government entities point toward a case of mistaken identity, but analytically, that assertion is difficult to support. The targeting of two vehicles that were leaving the same birthday party attended by several members of the U.S. diplomatic community, in two very different parts of Juarez, is likely more than a coincidence or case of mistaken identities. The death of Arthur Redelf, a detention officer at the El Paso County Jail, is the most suspicious and an investigative avenue that should be pursued. Redelf would have been in constant contact with members of Barrio Azteca in his work at the El Paso County Jail and would have been the most likely target of these attacks.
Additionally, the U.S. State Department recently announced plans to embed U.S. intelligence agents in Juarez. Such cooperation would pose a serious threat to the cartel's and gang's operations in the region. This provides ample motive for a criminal group in Juarez, such as Los Aztecas/Barrio Azteca and their cartel patrons, to make a statement to the U.S. government and its citizens that they are not immune from the cartels, either.
It is not in the interests of the U.S. or Mexican governments to convey the message that U.S. citizens, specifically U.S. government employees, were targeted for assassination in Juarez. More explicitly, neither government wants to say there is a possibility of U.S. citizens being specifically targeted. The targeting of U.S. citizens in Juarez would have a profound and negative impact on diplomatic relations between the countries as well as the business environment in Juarez, which could subsequently affect the region's already struggling economy. In many ways, the conclusions drawn by the U.S. and Mexican governments take the path of least resistance, hedging against a potential political and economic blowback. But a closer look into the details shows the very real possibility that American targets were intentionally sought out.
March 15
- Unidentified gunmen traveling in 15 vehicles killed seven men in the towns of Creel and Guachohi, Chihuahua state. The victims were reportedly killed after a lengthy highway chase.
March 16
- Unidentified attackers shot at the municipal headquarters in Pueblo Nuevo, Durango state. No injuries were reported.
- The bodies of two unidentified people were discovered in plastic bags in Tultitlan, Mexico state. A message found near the bodies read, "You're next, Victor Maganez, for working with The Barbie," an apparent reference to suspected BLO trafficker Edgar Valdez Villarreal.
- Tijuana, Baja California state police arrested a former municipal policeman, identified as David Garcia Quintana, after responding to an anonymous call warning of an armed person. Police confiscated 311 diamonds from the suspect.
March 17
- The bodies of three unidentified people were found inside an abandoned car in the Lomas de San Miguel neighborhood of Atizapan de Zaragoza, Mexico state.
- Four people were killed and one was injured during an attack by unidentified armed men at a used car lot in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. The attackers reportedly used firearms and grenades against their victims.
- Police captured four suspected extortionists in Chimalhuacan municipality, Mexico state.
- Unidentified gunmen attacked the municipal headquarters of Hidalgo, Tamaulipas state. One policeman was killed and another was injured in the attack.
March 18
- Police discovered the body of the ministerial police chief of the municipality of Choix, Sinaloa state. The victim, identified as Filemon Cecena Arredondo, had been shot in the head.
- The bodies of three people were discovered wrapped in blankets in Santa Ana del Conde, Guanajuato state.
March 19
- Six businesses in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state were destroyed by unidentified persons using grenades. No injuries were reported.
- Suspected members of drug trafficking cartels set up approximately 31 roadblocks along highways in Nuevo Leon state. The roadblocks were set up in Monterrey, Guadalupe, Apodaca, Cadereyta, San Nicolas and Juarez, using vehicles to block the roads.
- Four policemen were executed by unknown gunmen in Lagunas de Zempoala, Morelos state. Soldiers found the bodies in an abandoned car while patrolling for illegal logging.
- Soldiers killed four suspected drug trafficking cartel gunmen during a highway chase and firefight in Los Herreras, Nuevo Leon state.
March 20
- Unknown persons fired more than 100 rounds at the house of Morelos Institutional Revolutionary Party legislator Francisco Moreno Merino. A message warning suspected BLO trafficker Edgar Valdez Villarreal was found at the scene.
- Police arrested two people in Motozintla municipality, Chiapas state, after discovering 278 sticks of dynamite and 200,000 pesos in their car.
March 21
- Unidentified gunmen killed a bodyguard protecting the police chief of Santa Catarina municipality, Nuevo Leon state. One of the attackers was reportedly killed.
- Four policemen were arrested in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, under suspicion of kidnapping local resident Humberto Horacio Lara Martinez.
Mexico: U.S. Delegation To Discuss Drug Fight
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will lead a top-level delegation to Mexico on March 23 to discuss efforts to fight drug cartels, Reuters reported March 18. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair as well as other senior national security officials will accompany Clinton. They will be meeting to discuss the U.S. Merida Initiative, a 2007 plan to give Mexico $1.4 billion to help fight the country's powerful drug cartels. Crowley said the meeting had been in preparation for several months.
Mexico Security Memo: March 15, 2010
U.S. Consulate Employee Targeted in Juarez
Three individuals with connections to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, were gunned down in their cars on their way back from a child's birthday party at about 2:30 p.m. local time March 13. Two of the individuals were U.S. citizens: Lesley A. Enriquez, a consulate employee, and her husband, Arthur H. Redelfs, a detention officer at the El Paso County Jail. According to a Mexican work permit, Enriquez worked as an assistant in the consulate's visa section. Family members said she recently returned to work from maternity leave. The third individual, Jorge Alberto Salcido Ceniceros, a spouse of a Mexican citizen employee at the consulate, was fatally shot and his two children were injured. Both Mexican and U.S. officials are saying that these killings were linked and specifically targeted. The shootings prompted the U.S. Department of State to issue a travel warning March 14 and authorize the departure of U.S. government personnel dependents from missions at six border consulates until April 12.
Enriquez and Redelfs were shot and killed after being pursued for several blocks by gunmen believed to be linked to drug traffickers in Juarez. According to reports and pictures from the scene, it appears that Enriquez and Redelfs were traveling westbound on Fronterizo Street, which runs along the U.S.-Mexico border and underneath the Paso del Norte Bridge, in a white Toyota Rav 4 with Texas license plates. It appears that the fatal shots (which struck Enriquez in the head and Redelfs in the neck and arm) were fired as the couple was turning off of Fronterizo Street onto Lerdo Avenue in order to get on the bridge to return to the United States. A baby in the backseat belonging to Enriquez was unharmed during the incident. The gunmen likely considered this their last good opportunity to strike before the couple approached the border checkpoint, where military personnel and congested traffic would make for a more difficult getaway.
Salcido was gunned down a only a few minutes before Enriquez and Redelfs but in a different part of the city. He was in his white Honda Pilot and had left the same birthday party Enriquez and Redelfs had attended. A different team of gunmen most likely shot Salcido. The fact that both vehicles were targeted nearly simultaneously makes mistaken identity an unlikely explanation for the attacks. No arrests have yet been made in connection with the killings.
U.S. diplomatic missions in Mexico have received increased security threats in the past few weeks. On March 3, STRATFOR sources reported that a group of masked gunmen claiming to be local police sought to gain entry into the U.S. consulate in Monterrey (which was included in the authorized departure of dependents). While there was no violence and the group eventually left peacefully, it was yet another security incident at a consulate that had been targeted many times before. On March 2, a bomb threat was called into the U.S. consulate in Juarez, prompting the evacuation of employees. While the evacuation and search passed without incident, it did force employees to leave the fortified confines of the consulate, making them easier targets.
It is highly unlikely that these incidents are coincidental. The increase in threats to U.S. missions comes after U.S. and Mexican government leaks that U.S. intelligence agents will be embedded with Mexican law enforcement units in Juarez to crack down further on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) involved in violence in the city. Although the announcement later was denied, it appears the DTOs have not dismissed it. Since any increased U.S. effort would be based in U.S. diplomatic missions along the border, it appears the DTOs see these missions as threats and are sending them warnings.
Banners Appeal to President Calderon
Several banners containing messages to Mexican President Felipe Calderon were hung in Jalisco, Chihuahua and Durango states on March 8, with 27 hung in the Guadalajara metropolitan area alone. The messages appealed to Calderon to withdraw the army and navy and to let those who hung the banners rid the area of Los Zetas, the violent DTO that has largely taken over operations in eastern Mexico. Similar banners appeared at a university in Monterrey on March 3 appealing to Calderon to "let them do their work," signed by "cartels united against Los z"
The appeals come as the Gulf, Sinaloa and La Familia Michoacana cartels have allied to target Los Zetas assets, resulting in increased violence along the eastern Mexico-U.S. border. These organizations are appealing to Calderon for support in return for eliminating a major rival organization and government enemy. Allying with and sponsoring certain DTOs to eliminate another is a possible strategy that Calderon could use to bring Mexico's cartel war to a close. But such a policy could have long-ranging consequences. It will take far more than banners to negotiate such a deal, but the strategy itself is not impossible.
March 8
- Naval special forces seized approximately 3.5 tons of marijuana from a vessel near San Lorenzo Island, Baja California state. Three people were arrested in connection with the incident.
March 9
- Four bodies were found in a car in Xochimilco, Mexico state. The victims had been shot, and their hands and feet were bound. A message attributing the crime to Beltran Leyva Organization member Edgar Valdez Villareal was found nearby.
- An improvised explosive device reportedly activated by cell phone was detonated near a gas station in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported.
- Police arrested the suspected leader of a group of kidnappers in Santa Ana, Sonora state. The suspect, identified as Jorge Alberto Martinez Villagran, was arrested along with two other individuals.
March 10
- Unknown attackers launched grenades at the municipal government headquarters of Santiago Papasquiaro, Durango state. No injuries were reported.
- Two policemen were killed during a kidnapping attempt in Iztacalco, Mexico state. The policemen had been escorting the person targeted by the kidnappers.
- Police in Naucalpan, Mexico state, discovered the lower half of an unknown man's body in a river near the neighborhood of San Antonio Zomeyucan.
- Soldiers killed one suspected member of a drug trafficking cartel and injured two others during a firefight in China, Nuevo Leon state.
March 11
- Soldiers in Apodaca, Nuevo Leon state, killed a man identified as Rogelio Sanchez Aldaba and arrested three others after a chase and firefight on a highway near the town. An army communique claimed that Sanchez Aldaba was a municipal government official.
- The body of a man bearing signs of torture was discovered in the Benito Juarez neighborhood of Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state.
- Police arrested the suspected leader of Los Zetas kidnapping gang, identified as Reynaldo Padilla Quintero or Naim Diaz Villasana. The suspect was arrested in an unidentified location of Quintana Roo state.
March 12
- Police discovered a 76-meter long smuggling tunnel in Tijuana, Baja California state. The tunnel entrance was located near the Otay police precinct.
- The body of a businessman identified as Victor Hugo Pacheco Amador was discovered in Garcia, Nuevo Leon state. Pacheco Amador had been kidnapped in San Nicolas de los Garza, according to two policemen arrested in connection with the incident.
- A suspected Beltran Leyva Organization hit man was arrested by police in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Police confiscated a pistol, a grenade and a small amount of marijuana from the suspect.
March 13
- Police discovered 15 bodies at different locations throughout Acapulco, Guerrero state. Two of the victims had been decapitated.
- Unknown gunmen shot and killed a man identified as reporter Evaristo Pacheco Solis near Aserradero Forestal, Guerrero state.
- One soldier and 10 suspected drug trafficking cartel members were killed during a firefight in Ajuchitlan del Progreso, Guerrero state.
- Two suspected members of Los Zetas were killed in a failed attempt to destroy the district attorney's office in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas state. A C-4 explosive charge the two men reportedly intended to place near the building detonated in their vehicle before they managed to install it.
March 14
- Police arrested two men, identified as Felipe Cisneros Zepeda and Luis Alberto Barrera Sanabria, during a routine traffic stop in Sonoyta, Sonora state. The men had $27,000 hidden in a jacket.
- The police chief of Pedro Escobedo, Queretaro state, was arrested on suspicion of firing weapons in public and disturbing the peace.
- The decapitated body of a woman was discovered in Axapusco, Mexico state. The body had stab wounds on its neck, thighs, back and abdomen.
Video Dispatch: A New Phase in the Cartel Wars?
Mexican drug cartels are suspected in the March 14 killings of three people - including two American citizens - with ties to the U.S. consulate in Juarez. The targeted killings may signal a fresh escalation in the border wars, analyst Scott Stewart says.
Video Dispatch: Los Zetas in the Crosshairs
Security expert Fred Burton examines the surge of violence around Monterrey, Mexico, which has pitted the Gulf drug cartel against its former protection unit, Los Zetas.
Mexico: 13 Killed In Acapulco Crime Wave
Thirteen people were killed in and around the Mexican beach resort of Acapulco early March 13 in apparent drug-related violence, Reuters reported. Five of those killed were police officers on night patrol who had been attacked by gunmen on the outskirts of the city. The bullet-riddled bodies of eight other men were discovered in different areas around Acapulco. Four of those eight were found beheaded.
Guatemala: Officials Arrested In Connection With Drug Case
Guatemala's national police chief, Baltazar Gonzalez, anti-drug czar Nelly Bonilla and a third official who was not identified are being held in connection with a case involving cocaine allegedly stolen in March 2009, AP reported March 2. Attorney General Amilcar Velasquez told AP the arrests followed an investigation by Guatemalan authorities and the U.N.-backed International Commission Against Impunity.
Mexico Security Memo: March 1, 2010
A Shift in the Cartel Landscape
Chaos erupted the past week in the northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas, with gunbattles between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel raging in cities all along the Rio Grande from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros. The violence led to the temporary closure of the No. 2 International Bridge in Nuevo Laredo, and the indefinite closure of the U.S. Consulate in Reynosa. STRATFOR had noted early in the week that several anomalies had begun to surface along the South Texas-Mexico border. Now, the pieces of the puzzle are starting to fall in place.
Reports of a break in relations between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel began circulating through chain e-mails and blog posts early in the week in Mexico. Mexican and U.S. law enforcement sources later verified these reports. Some degree of tension between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel has existed ever since the Zetas formally split from the control of the Gulf cartel in the Spring 2008, though the groups continued to work together when their interests aligned. Questions about the nature of their relationship remained, which the events of the past few weeks have now shed light on. The rupture in this relationship and the new alliances precipitated from the break will have a profound impact on the cartel and drug trafficking landscape of all Mexico.
The reports indicate that the rift between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas started over the murder of Los Zetas No. 2 Miguel "Z 40" Trevino Morales' right-hand man and fellow Los Zetas leader, Sergio "El Concord 3" Mendoza Pena, on Jan. 18. Allegedly, an altercation between Mendoza and Gulf cartel No. 2 Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez's men resulted in Mendoza's murder. After learning of Mendoza's death, Trevino gave Costilla an ultimatum to hand over those responsible for Mendoza's death by Jan. 25. The deadline came and went, and Trevino ordered the kidnapping of 16 known Gulf cartel members in the Ciudad Miguel Aleman area as retaliation.
From that point on, tit-for-tat operations between the two organizations have led to Gulf-Zeta conflict throughout the Tamaulipas border region. STRATFOR sources have reported that both Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel have recalled more than 500 forces from all over Mexico as reinforcements in anticipation of a further escalation.
Costilla and Gulf cartel head Antonio "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen have reportedly forged alliances with La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and the Sinaloa cartel to aid in the fight with Los Zetas. Several reports have emerged of members of both the Sinaloa cartel and LFM already participating in the seemingly daily firefights that break out on the Mexican side of the Lower Rio Grande Valley. Both the Sinaloa cartel and LFM have a deep personal hatred of Los Zetas and have a strategic business interest in gaining leverage over drug trafficking in the valley, as this is the largest point of entry to the United States for both legitimate and illicit goods. Los Zetas reportedly have reinforced their alliance with the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) and the Juarez cartel. It appears, however, that neither of these two organizations has been able to provide too much in the way of help. The BLO is in the process of rebuilding after the death of its leader Arturo Beltran Leyva, and the Juarez cartel is bogged down trying to defend its territory from the Sinaloa cartel.
The escalating violence has seen numerous businesses and schools close down; and workers, students and patrons have been told to stay home until the security situation improves. Both Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel are said to have established checkpoints in many of these border cities in the face of Mexican military and local Mexican law enforcement. According to reports, Gulf cartel personnel have been seen traveling in convoys of up to 20 vehicles marked C.D.G., the Spanish acronym Gulf cartel. The two groups reportedly check civilians' identification and confiscate cell phones in the evening to cut down on the reports of the cartels' operations and to prevent cell phone video footage of those operations.
Federal police already have been deployed in Matamoros, but the federal police have not done much in the way of cracking down on the current cartel conflict. Additionally, requests for a Mexican military deployment by local and regional politicians have gone unanswered. There are a limited number of Mexican military elements stationed in the region, but STRATFOR sources report that the military has played a limited role in operations against both Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel. The Mexican government appears to have imposed a media blackout on coverage of cartel-on-cartel violence and operations in the Tamaulipas border region.
Instead, the press has reported many of the fights between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas as "criminal groups" clashing with Mexican military; but, in reality, the Mexican military was not involved in some of these conflicts. This is not to say that the military has not been involved at all, but the bits of coverage in the traditional Mexican media have misrepresented the degree of military involvement. The majority of reporting of these events has come from social media such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs, while the rest of the information has come from local South Texas media and human sources on the ground on the border.
The fluid and violent conditions in the Tamaulipas border region look to be just getting started, as the realignment of cartel alliances and the fight for supremacy in the region will likely take months - possibly even years - to play out. In the meantime, the rapidly deteriorating security situation already has had a profound impact on local businesses, schools and tourism. Additionally, the primary focus for both the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas has shifted back to their home turf, with both groups diverting valuable resources from other operations to deal with the conflict at home. Tense times lie ahead, and STRATFOR will continue to monitor the situation as the battle for the South Texas-Mexico border continues to heat up.
Feb. 22
- An unidentified person died and two were injured during a high-speed pursuit of a suspected criminal's vehicle by police in Matamoros, Coahuila state. The pursuit began in Torreon after a routine traffic stop.
- Unknown persons placed a banner apparently supporting drug-trafficking cartels near the Nuevo Leon state government headquarters in Monterrey.
Feb. 23
- Sixty-two policemen were slightly injured during violent clashes with residents of San Pedro Actopan, Mexico state. The incidents occurred during the rescue of three policemen held by residents.
- Mexican police freed five kidnap victims in Los Reyes de la Paz, Mexico state. Two persons were arrested in connection with the incident.
- Officials from the Jalisco state attorney general's office seized 114 kilograms of marijuana in the municipality of Tamazula de Gordiano. No arrests were made.
- Soldiers seized 15 tons of marijuana from a truck during a traffic stop at El Chinerito, Baja California state. The driver, identified as Mario Flores Castro, was captured.
Feb. 24
- Suspected drug-trafficking cartel members kidnapped 12 members of a single family in China, Nuevo Leon state.
- Unknown gunmen kidnapped a local government official, identified as Javier Martinez Robles from Santa Maria Ostula, Michoacan. An unknown number of attackers in two vehicles kidnapped Martinez Robles from a local restaurant.
- Washington revealed plans to place U.S. intelligence agents in a fusion center in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, to better coordinate cross-border counternarcotics cooperation and initiatives.
- The bodies of three unidentified persons were discovered by police in a sewage canal in the municipalities of Teoloyucan and Tultepec, Mexico state. One of the victims was dismembered.
Feb. 25
- Soldiers arrested two suspected drug-trafficking route operators linked to suspected BLO associate Edgar Valdez Villareal in Ciudad Ayala, Morelos state. A small amount of marijuana was seized from the suspects.
- Oscar Luebbert, the mayor of Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, revealed the existence of a conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas. Luebbert claimed inaccurate reports in social networking Web sites have caused general panic in Reynosa.
- Four unidentified persons were killed in a firefight between suspected drug-trafficking cartel members at an unidentified location on Highway 99 near Matamoros, Tamaulipas state. A vehicle reportedly was seized from the suspects.
Feb. 26
- State investigative agents seized three suspected kidnapping safe houses in the municipality of Santiago, Nuevo Leon state. No arrests were made.
- Police seized 490 kilograms of marijuana from a vehicle in Tijuana, Baja California state. One person was arrested in connection with the incident.
- Soldiers deactivated a bomb in the neighborhood of Rio Salado, Oaxaca, Oaxaca state. Security forces evacuated a nearby private school during the process.
Feb. 27
- Soldiers and suspected cartel gunmen clashed in Las Herreras, Nuevo Leon. No injuries were reported, but two vehicles were seized.
- Unknown persons attacked police stations in Nuevo Leon state's municipalities of San Nicolas de los Garza, Guadalupe, Cadereyta and Apodaca. No injuries were reported.
Feb. 28
- Unknown gunmen shot three men in the municipality of La Union, Guerrero state. Two were killed, but one survived the ambush. No arrests were made.
Mexico: Tamaulipas Governor Requests Army Presence
Tamaulipas Gov. Eugenio Hernandez has requested the return of federal security forces and the Mexican army to his state, Milenio reported Feb. 25. Hernandez said federal police reinforcements were arriving and that joint operations and roadblocks would be carried out at cities in the northern and southern regions of the state. The army left Tamaulipas in December 2009.
U.S.: Mexico Travel Alert Updated
The U.S. State Department issued an updated travel alert for Mexico, adding Durango and Coahuila to a list of states with areas it urged U.S. citizens to avoid visiting due to violence, Reuters reported Feb. 23. The decision followed the killing of four U.S. citizens in late 2009 and early 2010 in the city of Gomez Palacio in Durango state. The alert stated that the cities of Durango, Gomez Palacio and the area known as "La Laguna" that includes the city of Torreon, experienced sharp increases in violence. U.S. citizens are also urged to delay visits to Chihuahua and Michoacan.
Mexico Security Memo: Feb. 22, 2010
Drug Cartels Taking over Mexican Agriculture
A number of reports surfaced in the Mexican media this past week regarding intense cartel penetration into Mexico's agricultural sector and Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA). Mexican Agricultural Minister Francisco Javier Mayorga Castaneda is reported to have formed partnerships with three brothers of Sinaloa cartel head Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, the recently incarcerated Carlos Beltran Leyva and several other unnamed, high-ranking Mexican officials in the Industrias Melder agricultural company. The company allegedly benefited from the Mexican agricultural subsidy program known as PROCAMPO to the tune of more than $800,000 over past year.
The reports come amid growing concerns at the Agricultural High Court of Mexico, whose president, Ricardo Villalobos Garcia Galvez, recently told the Mexican Bar Association that drug traffickers are slowly taking over Mexico's agricultural sector. He said that around 30 percent of Mexico's known croplands have marijuana and opium poppies amid legal crops, primarily in the west-central Mexican agricultural region centered around Michoacan state, in addition to the traditional marijuana and poppy region of the so-called "golden triangle" (comprised of the region where Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua states meet). Growing drug crops amid legal crops conceals the contraband from casual and aerial surveillance. The drug cartels are reportedly supplying the seeds for these illicit crops, as well as competitive compensation for their cultivation.
Concerns run high in the agricultural community that Mexican President Felipe Calderon and other leaders will not view the issue of cartel infiltration of the Agricultural Ministry and the agricultural sector in general as a direct threat to national security relative to the high-profile cartel corruption in the state security apparatus.
A Missed Opportunity to Capture a Zeta
STRATFOR sources reported that a covert Mexican military operation near the border town of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, (a Zeta stronghold) aimed at capturing one of Mexico's most wanted drug traffickers, Los Zetas No. 2 Miguel "Z 40" Trevino Morales was being planned early in the week of Feb. 15. Trevino Morales had reportedly been surrounded, but authorities waited for the proper security assets to arrive given that previous operations to capture high-value cartel targets have resulted in massive firefights and high-speed chases with a high risk of collateral damage. As the week progressed, sources reported that Mexican military assets were continuing to stage themselves outside the city in preparation for the impending takedown, which was reportedly scheduled for the weekend. The weekend came and went, and the police did not move. Reports later surfaced that Trevino Morales had been tipped off to the increase in military assets in the region and fled.
Tamaulipas state does not have an active military operation such as Coordinated Operation Chihuahua or Joint Operation Michoacan. Still, the northeastern Mexican state does have a significant military presence, typically seen in the form of the occasional patrol, checkpoint or quick-reaction force participating in frequent firefights along the border. Local Zeta informants and surveillance operatives known as "halcones" likely would have picked up on any increase in military assets around an important stronghold like Reynosa. Moreover, an operation to capture Trevino Morales may not have been possible without collateral damage. The November 2008 Mexican military operation to capture Los Zetas No. 3 Jaime "El Hummer" Gonzalez Duran, resulted in a high-speed chase and firefight through the streets of Reynosa, for example.
Feb. 15
- Mexican soldiers destroyed a drug-manufacturing lab in Tierra Caliente, Michoacan state. Several containers and two bottles of acetic anhydride were seized.
- An unidentified bus driver was stabbed in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, during a robbery. Two unidentified young men boarded the bus, injured the driver and fled with 2,500 pesos (about $195) in cash.
- Personnel from the Jalisco Attorney General's office seized 1,100 kilograms of marijuana in the municipality of Tlaquepaque in an empty field after a series of investigations. The raid did not result in arrests.
Feb. 16
- Eleven soldiers were arrested in Chilpancingo, Guerrero state, in connection with the death of a man identified as Juan Alberto Rodriguez Villa. Soldiers allegedly beat Rodriguez Villa to death in Tlacotepec for refusing to pay a bribe.
- Six armed men reportedly abducted a businessman identified as Rodolfo Villareal in Apodaca, Nuevo Leon state.
- A group of armed men stole a front-end loader from a construction site in the Veronica Anzures neighborhood of Mexico City. The attackers reportedly beat and tied up four watchmen at the site.
Feb. 17
- Two policemen and two suspected drug cartel members were injured during a firefight in Torreon, Coahuila state. The incident reportedly occurred after a routine traffic stop.
- Federal agents and naval personnel arrested 11 persons on charges of drug and weapons possession in Chiapas state. Raids took place in the towns of Tuxtla Gutierrez, Tapachula, Villa Corzo, Puerto Madero, Huixtla, San Cristobal de las Casas, Venustiano Carranza, Comitan and Ocosingo.
- One policeman was killed and two others were injured during an attack on the police station in Vicente Guerrero, Durango state. Unknown assailants fired at the building for approximately 10 minutes.
- Three men identified as Juan Abad, Jose Raul Abad and Omar Abad were arrested on suspicion of kidnapping a minor in Durango, Durango state. The three suspects were arrested as they attempted to collect a 250,000-peso ransom.
Feb. 18
- Police discovered the decapitated bodies of six persons wrapped in blankets inside an abandoned vehicle in the Villas del Pedregal neighborhood of Morelia, Michoacan state.
- Unknown gunmen attacked soldiers destroying marijuana plantations near Las Humedades, Sinaloa state. A man identified as Jesus Torres Rosas was killed in the ensuing firefight and two suspects, identified as Anselmo Torres Quiroz and Huber Vega Correa, were arrested. Eight firearms were seized at the location.
- Customs agents seized 57 kilograms of cocaine from a vehicle in Diaz Ordaz, Tamaulipas state. One unidentified person was arrested.
Feb. 19
- Nine suspected kidnappers were arrested in the municipality of Chiconcuac, Mexico state. The suspects had reportedly kidnapped a woman on Jan. 21 in the same municipality.
- Four plastic bags containing human remains were found in Morelia, Michoacan state.
Feb. 20
- The bodies of three unidentified men were discovered in Acapulco, Guerrero state, with a message attributing the deaths to Edgar Valdez Villareal.
- Soldiers arrested Roberto Sanchez Arras, identified as the brother of Juarez cartel drug trafficking route operator Pedro Sanchez Arras, in Villa Ahumada, Chihuahua state.
Feb. 21
- Authorities seized 120 kilograms of pseudoephedrine at the Mexico City International Airport. The drugs reportedly arrived from Bangladesh.
U.S.: Homeland Security Secretary In Mexico
U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano met with Mexican President Felipe Calderon in Mexico City on Feb. 17, El Universal reported. Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa and Mexican Governance Secretary Fernando Gomez Mont attended.
Mexico Security Memo: Feb. 15, 2010
Calderon's Trip to Juarez
On Feb. 11, Mexican President Felipe Calderon traveled to Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, to give a speech on the government's countercartel strategy in Juarez and to meet with local and state officials as well as family members of 18 young people killed Jan. 31 when gunmen attacked a high school house party. Calderon was very firm in his comments, saying that the military's role in operations in Juarez and Chihuahua state was absolutely vital to the mission and that the armed forces would not be leaving the area any time soon.
Calderon also highlighted a new initiative called the Juarez Intervention Plan, which will target the socio-economic conditions that have contributed to the lack of security in the city. With a price tag of more than $230 million, the program is intended to provide education and treatment for addiction, poverty and unemployment as well as musical and recreational activities to deter youths from joining gangs and cartels.
The Juarez Intervention Plan will no doubt help the people of Juarez, but it may not be enough. Cartels have long been exploiting the Mexican government's lack of ability to provide a decent wage and standard of living for its employees. Los Zetas have even gone so far as to hang signs urging Mexican soldiers and police officers to desert their posts and go to work for Los Zetas, who promise to double their monthly salaries. Due to the lucrative nature of the drug trafficking and the vast resources of the cartels, they are simply able to offer more pay for less work. The Mexican government also must work to reverse the growing admiration of the narco lifestyle that has captivated a large portion of Mexico's youth. The lure of easy money, women and power associated with the lifestyle often wins out over the struggle of finding a legitimate job in the straining Mexican economy.
Calderon's use of the military - still the best-equipped and most-reliable security force in the country - to fight the cartels has long been criticized by his political opposition as well as human rights groups; and after Calderon's visit to Juarez, an estimated 1,300 people gathered to protest the city's high level of violence, which they believe is due to the presence of the military.
Clearly, Calderon continues to face an uphill battle regarding the social and tactical ramifications of his war against the cartels, which is starting to become a war for the hearts and minds of the Mexican people.
The Loss of Sinaloa's Foothold in Tijuana
In two separate operations Feb. 8, federal police agents and troops detained the two successors of cartel kingpin Eduardo Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental, who was arrested Jan. 12 in La Paz, Baja California Sur state. Raydel "El Muletas" Lopez Uriarte, reportedly El Teo's right-hand man, was detained at a residence in La Paz, Baja California Sur state, in an operation that began promptly at 7 a.m. and involved more than 100 federal police agents, soldiers and marines as well as two helicopters. In an almost simultaneous operation, Manuel "El Chiquilin" Garcia Simental, El Teo's brother, was arrested in Tijuana, Baja California, although details of that operation have not been made available.
The El Teo organization had been the Sinaloa cartel's proxy in the Tijuana region since El Teo split from the leadership of the Arellano Felix organization in early 2008. The Sinaloa cartel has sought control of the Tijuana smuggling corridor for several years now; and after the defection of El Teo and his organization, it finally seemed within reach. With the arrest of Lopez Uriarte and Manuel Garcia Simental, all of the known leaders of the El Teo organization have been removed from the scene - and along with them the Sinaloa cartel's foothold in Tijuana. It is unclear whether the cartel will try once more to wrest control of the Tijuana region from the remaining members of the Arellano Felix organization, since Sinaloa is currently engaged in a costly battle against the Juarez cartel for control of the Juarez smuggling corridor.
Feb. 8
- A group of armed men ambushed and killed two government officials from Salvatierra, Guanajuato state, as they were traveling along a highway outside of town.
- Colombian authorities arrested 21 people connected to drug trafficking in the country's largest counternarcotics operation in 11 years. Among those detained were 12 individuals who were reportedly linked to Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera and the Sinaloa cartel.
- The two remaining leaders of the El Teo faction of the Arellano Felix organization, Raydel "El Muletas" Lopez Uriarte and Manuel "El Chiquilin" García Simental were arrested in two separate operations in La Paz, Baja California Sur, and Tijuana, Baja California.
Feb. 9
- The bodies of two individuals were discovered buried in a shallow grave outside La Union de Ocampo, Guerrero state.
- A group of armed men assassinated two unknown individuals in a cafeteria during the early morning hours in Purepero, Michoacan state.
- The severed heads of three unknown men were thrown at the facade of a restaurant in Escamillas, Sinaloa state. A note accompanying the heads read, "This is what happens to traitors!"
- Members of the Mexican navy seized five boats from the Acapulco harbor that were allegedly involved in drug trafficking.
Feb. 10
- A firefight between a group of armed men and local police left two gunmen dead and three wounded in Tlaquepaque, Jalisco state.
- The Mexico City attorney general's office launched an investigation into death threats against Silvia Irabien, the model who identified Jose Jorge "El JJ" Balderas Garza as the shooter of soccer player Salvador Cabanas.
- Federal police agents arrested a man at the Guadalajara International Airport who had over $100,000 in undeclared gold in his possession.
Feb. 11
- A group of armed men opened fire on the offices of the attorney general in Durango, the capital of Durango state.
- The body of an unknown man was found with eight gunshot wounds and signs of torture outside the city of Zamora, Michoacan state.
- Members of the Mexican attorney general's office arrested Guido Guevara Eduardo Guerra, the former head of Peruvian military intelligence under Alberto Fujimori, in Cuernavaca, Morelos state.
- Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna announced that more federal police agents will be sent to Juarez to aid in ongoing law enforcement operations and to help "rebuild the city." The deployments will supplement intelligence gathering and analysis as well as day-to-day law enforcement operations.
Feb. 12
- Members of the Mexican army were involved in a firefight with suspected gunmen that left two of the gunmen dead in Tequila, Jalisco state.
- Gunmen from two different drug-trafficking gangs were involved in a firefight near Tanhuato, Michoacan state. Three of the gunmen were killed and two were wounded.
- Members of the Mexican military discovered a tunnel used to smuggle illegal aliens and narcotics from Tijuana, Baja California, to San Diego, California.
Feb. 13
- The naked and decapitated body of an unknown man was found along a highway on the outskirts of Acapulco, Guerrero state.
- Gunmen entered a cafe in the town of El Rosario, Sinaloa state, and executed two individuals inside the establishment.
- The United States seized some $26 million belonging to former Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen, who is imprisoned in Houston, Texas.
- A firefight between two groups of armed men resulted in the deaths of two individuals in Morelia, Michoacan state.
Feb. 14
- The bodies of five men were discovered near the cities of Guadalupe and Calvo, in Chihuahua state, close to the border between Chihuahua and Sonora.
- A Public Security Ministry official in Ciudad Lerdo, Durango state, was gunned down inside his car by a group of armed men.
- Federal police agents arrested four members of the kidnapping group Los Jaguars in Zitacuaro, Michoacan state. The group reportedly is linked to the La Familia Michoacana organization.
Mexico: Calderon Won't Pull Troops From Ciudad Juarez
Mexican President Felipe Calderon said he would not withdraw troops from Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, El Universal reported Feb. 12. Calderon said Mexican soldiers would continue to provide support in Ciudad Juarez and the surrounding municipalities of Pradexis, Gadalupe and Palomas, saying that a withdrawal would be "a terrible blow."
Mexico Security Memo: Feb. 8, 2010
Chihuahua State Governor Proposes Move to Ciudad Juarez
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Chihuahua state governor, Jose Reyes Baeza, formally asked the state legislature Feb. 6 that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state government move their operations from the state capital of Chihuahua to the northern border city of Ciudad Juarez in order to focus on security and social issues that continue to plague the region. Reyes Baeza's proposal would require members of these branches to operate part-time out of Juarez three to four days per week so they would be readily available to address issues as they come up, though the capital of Chihuahua state will remain the city of Chihuahua.
Should this proposal be approved by the state legislature it would be a significant development in the Chihuahua state government's response to violence in Juarez; however, in all likelihood, this is nothing more than a political stunt by the PRI governor leading up to the July 4 state elections designed to project the impression that PRI politicians are fiercely committed to facing the problems caused by the drug war. The proposal already has drawn criticism from leaders of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), the latter even calling for the impeachment and removal from office of Reyes Baeza and holding elections for an interim governor.
Additionally, it is not clear that the move will actually contribute anything to the counternarcotics effort. The state government's role in counternarcotics and law enforcement operations in Juarez has been limited at best. Chihuahua state and local Juarez police have a particularly notorious history of corruption, and a majority of their responsibilities have been delegated to the Mexican military and now the federal police. While the state and local law enforcement entities are undergoing a massive "housecleaning," the state and local officers and agents that have been thoroughly vetted and remain on duty have been deployed to low-risk areas of Juarez and the surrounding region.
The ultimate goal of the federal operations in Juarez is to reduce the violence to acceptable levels and turn over control of the region to state and local law enforcement, and some progress can be seen in the transition from military to federal law enforcement control of the operations. However, this is still very much a federal operation with little or no involvement of the state of Chihuahua or local entities, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
United Mexico Against Los Zetas
Reportedly, a new vigilante group has emerged under the name United Mexico Against Los Zetas (MUCLZ) in the Comarca Lagunera metro region on the border of Durango and Coahuila states, including the cities of Torreon, Coahuila state, and Gomez Palacio, Durango state. The group also posted a communique on the Internet saying that citizens are fed up with Los Zetas terrorist tactics, urging citizens to not support businesses owned by Los Zetas. The communique goes on to claim credit for a Jan. 30 shooting at a bar called El Ferrie in Torreon in which10 suspected Zetas were killed. MUCLZ claimed the bar has been a hangout for members of Los Zetas and is owned by a member of Los Zetas. The communique ended by saying MUCLZ will not rest until all Los Zetas members have been killed or have left the region.
This is the second such vigilante-style paramilitary group targeting Los Zetas to appear in less than a year. The other group called themselves "Mata Zetas" (or "Kill Zetas") and claimed responsibility for killing several members of Los Zetas in the Yucatan region as well as posting homemade signs throughout the rest of the country warning Los Zetas to leave the town. However, the Mata Zetas group was discovered to be connected to the Sinaloa cartel, and was merely a ploy to get the general public to rise up against Los Zetas.
Comarca Lagunera is a disputed territory that is a strategic transshipment point for the overland narcotics route to either Nuevo Laredo or Juarez. It also lies on the edge of territory traditionally controlled by Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel, so naturally this strategic location is a point of frictions between the two organizations. While this may very well be a group of proactive citizens taking their safety into their own hands, the emergence of MUCLZ must be considered in context of the region.
Feb. 1
- Three people were killed and five more were injured in an attack on the central police station in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan state.
- La Familia Michoacana launched a large-scale publicity campaign against Los Zetas by hanging homemade signs against Los Zetas throughout Guanjuato, Michoacan and Guerrero states.
- A firefight between two groups of unknown gunmen left five dead and three injured in Tepic, Nayarit state.
- A group of armed men killed five municipal police in a firefight that involved hand grenades in Salamanca, Guanajuato state.
Feb. 2
- Authorities discovered the bodies of four individuals in different locations around Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. Two of the bodies showed signs of torture, while the other two had several gunshot wounds.
- Oscar Dolores Arroyo Chavarria was arrested by members of the Mexican military after a brief firefight. Arroyo Chavarria is believed to be one of the gunmen behind the murders of 18 people at a high school party on Jan. 31 in Juarez.
Feb. 3
- Members of the Mexican army located and destroyed a secret narcotics laboratory where methamphetamine was manufactured in Paracuaro, Michoacan state.
- Mexican authorities asked the U.S. government for assistance locating Jose Jorge Balderas Garza, (aka El JJ), in the United States. Balderas Garza is accused of shooting soccer player Salvador Cabanas in Mexico City.
Feb. 4
- Armed gunmen traveling in several sport utility vehicles kidnapped four people in Juarez, Chihuahua state.
- Gunmen killed two people, including the secretary-general of Coyuca de Catalan municipality in Guerrero state.
Feb. 5
- The decapitated bodies of six men were discovered on the outskirts of Apatzingan, Michoacan state, with a handwritten sign accompanying the bodies.
- A covert military operation was conducted in support of a continuing investigation of an alleged link between the attorney general in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, and organized crime. The operation resulted in the arrest of the head of Los Zetas operations for southeast Mexico.
- The body of a man was found with two fingers missing, its hands and feet bound and wrapped in blanket in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
Feb. 6
- Edgar Ulises Carrillo Tenorio was arrested in Mexico City for his alleged involvement in the kidnapping and murder of 14-year-old Fernanado Marti in June 2008.
- The commander for the anti-kidnapping unit of the municipal police in Juarez, Chihuahua state, was gunned down on his way to his office in Juarez.
- Unknown gunmen killed six people outside the Las Herraduras bar in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
- Members of the Mexican Marines engaged in a firefight with unknown gunmen that left two of the gunmen dead in Montemorelos, Nuevo Leon.
- A Baja California state police agent was killed after he was attacked by a group of armed men in Tijuana.
Feb. 7
- The leader of a La Familia Michoacana cell in Mexico state was arrested by state police in Toluca, Mexico state.
- Ramon Ricardo Martinelli Corro, cousin of the president of Panama and reported money launderer for the Beltran Leyva Organization, was arrested along with 10 other Mexican citizens who were part of a money-laundering network for the BLO in Mexico.
- Members of the Mexican army seized a total of 12 tons of marijuana from tractor trailer outside of Tijuana, Baja California state.
- Members of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) and the paramilitary group Organization for the Defense of Campesino and Indigenous Rights (OPDIC) clashed over a property dispute in the small town of Tumbala, Chiapas state, leaving seven wounded.
Colombia: 21 Alleged Drug Traffickers Arrested
Twenty-one drug traffickers in Colombia wanted for extradition to the U.S. were arrested in a joint operation between Colombia's National Police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Reuters reported Feb 8. The National Police said alleged cocaine transporters for four different Colombian organizations were arrested, including one woman accused of being the link between Colombian cartels and the head of Mexico's Sinaloa cartel, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán. The drug trafficking networks involved operations in at least 10 countries.
Mexico: Gunmen Kill 6 In Sinaloa
Gunmen killed six people at a bar in the northern state of Sinaloa, AP reported Feb. 6. The spokesman for the Sinaloa state prosecutor's office said at least three gunmen walked into the Las Herraduras bar in Mazatlan and opened fire. They killed four people inside the bar, including a hostage who led them to Las Herraduras, and a taxi driver and night watchman outside the bar.
Mexico Security Memo: Feb. 1, 2010
Cabanas Attack: Cartel Connection?
Paraguayan soccer player Salvador Cabanas was attacked Jan. 24 at a Mexico City nightclub called Bar Bar. He reportedly was in the restroom when he was confronted by a man known as "El JJ," who told Cabanas that he was disappointed with Cabanas' lack of scoring for the Mexican soccer team, Club America. Cabanas said he did not appreciate El JJ's attitude, whereupon El JJ produced a handgun and shot Cabanas once in the head. Cabanas survived the attack and is recovering in a Mexico City hospital, but he has no recollection of the event.
What really happened on the night of Jan. 24 remains unclear. The only witness, the bar's janitor, has given investigators two different accounts. While the motive remains equally unclear, a deeper look into the true identity of El JJ presents a possible cartel connection to the attack.
Authorities have identified El JJ as one Jose Jorge Balderas Garza, although he is thought to use as many as seven aliases. A nationwide manhunt for Balderas Garza is still under way, despite two incorrect reports earlier in the week of his arrest in Quintana Roo and Sonora states.
Balderas Garza is known to have resided in neighboring Mexico state and to have frequently conducted business in the affluent southern neighborhoods of Mexico City. And this business, according to authorities, was conducted on behalf of Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) strong man Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal. Balderas Garza reportedly was in charge of trafficking and selling cocaine in Mexico state and southern Mexico City for La Barbie and to have often operated out of high-end clubs like Bar Bar.
Was Balderas Garza simply a hot-headed soccer fan, or did La Barbie want Cabanas dead? If the latter, why? The possible cartel connection warrants a watchful eye, and STRATFOR will continue to monitor the investigation.
January 2010: The Most Violent Month
The first month of the new year ended with 904 drug-related murders in Mexico, which makes January 2010 the deadliest month since Mexican President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006. The last week of the month was characterized by an abnormally high number of beheadings, 12, which took place throughout the country. The second and third most violent days during Calderon's term in office also occurred in January 2010, with 52 drug-related deaths on the first day of the month and 46 drug-related deaths on Jan. 29.
Chihuahua has been the most violent state in Mexico for more than two years, and in January 2010 it accounted for more than one-third of all the drug-related deaths during the month with 327, including the deaths of 16 individuals (many of them teenagers) at a high school house party in Ciudad Juarez that was a case of mistaken identity and location. The violence in Juarez stems from the ongoing conflict between the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels over control of the Juarez Valley trafficking route into the United States. The federal government shifted strategies Jan. 13 when it deployed the federal police as the primary force against the cartels in the urban areas of northern Chihuahua state. While the effects of this change will not likely be felt in the short term, authorities hope the federal police, with their higher level of investigative skill, will eventually be able to root out the causes of the violence in that part of Mexico.
Throughout 2009, Sinaloa state reportedly did not have more than 100 drug-related deaths in any given month, but that changed in January 2010, with 169 drug-related murders in the state. Previously, the deadliest month in Sinaloa was July 2008, with 139 deaths as a result of the conflict between the newly separated BLO and Sinaloa cartels, which began battling each other for control of marijuana fields and trafficking routes in the state.
The violence taking place there now can be largely attributed to local gangs backed by BLO and Sinaloa, which are still battling each other for control of domestic drug markets, mostly in the Culiacan-Navolato metropolitan area. Additionally, Sinaloa is home to several rival Mexican drug-trafficking leaders, such as Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Hector Beltran Leyva and the Arellano Felix family. This is, in part, why Sinaloa has been traditionally one of the most violent states in Mexico; many cartel leaders lay claim to at least some portion of the state, regardless of their organizations' primary areas of operation.
With violence continuing to soar, Calderon and Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna have come under increasing political pressure to reduce the violence to a politically acceptable level. Despite the mounting pressure, however, Calderon and Garcia Luna have yet to deviate from their overall plan, though STRATFOR sources in the Mexican government indicate that the change in strategy in Juarez is a test for a possible shift in strategy nationwide. Still, the accelerating levels of violence in Mexico show no signs of slowing in the foreseeable future.
Jan. 25
- A firefight erupted between gunmen and soldiers on the border of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila states, leaving four gunmen and two soldiers dead.
- Four days after the disappearance of Veracruz city official Nayeli Reyes Santos, his body was found dismembered in Veracruz, Veracruz state. Los Zetas were implicated in the murder.
- Members of the Mexican military seized 80 centimeters of detonation cord, seven satchels of explosives, 160 kilograms of marijuana and several rounds of ammunition.
Jan. 26
- Federal police detained four suspected hit men associated with Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera. The four were detained in a safe house not far from the Ojinaga-Bahia de Kino highway near Gran Molino, Chihuahua state.
- Mexican soldiers surrounded the University Hospital in Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon state, after the target of a suspected Los Zetas assassination attempt was transported there.
Jan. 27
- The head of a decapitated body was discovered by authorities in Quiroga, Michoacan state, near the town's main square. Authorities located the decapitated body sitting upright at a nearby bus station.
- Members of the Mexican military raided two suspected safe houses in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, and arrested 10 suspected members of a kidnapping gang.
- Soldiers located and destroyed a synthetic drug laboratory near the Michoacan-Jalisco state border and arrested six suspects.
Jan. 28
- Two female officers of the Uruapan police department were abducted by unknown assailants.
- The Quiroga police chief and two officers were executed in front of a local high school in Quiroga, Michoacan state.
- The quartered remains of an unknown individual were discovered in two black plastic bags near Morelia, Michoacan state.
- Local authorities discovered four bodies at various locations around Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. The victims had been shot several times.
Jan. 29
- Authorities found six human heads near the city of Apatzingan, Michoacan state. The decapitated bodies were found later in the day on the other side of the city with the letter "Z" carved into their chests.
- The body of a commander of the Teloloapan municipal police department who had been kidnapped a day earlier was found mutilated, showing signs of torture and several gunshot wounds.
- Federal police engaged in a firefight with gunmen near Maravatio, Michoacan state, near the border with Mexico state. Six federal police agents were injured in the confrontation.
- A Sinaloa state police commander was assassinated in his car near the El Rosario neighborhood in Mazatlan, Sinaloa state.
Jan. 30
- The bodies of seven individuals were found in different parts of Guerrero state with their hands tied behind their backs and showing signs of torture.
- Jorge Ochoa Martinez, the editor of El Oportuno and Despertar de la Costa Chica, was assassinated near Chilpancingo, Guerrero state.
- The decapitated bodies of two individuals were discovered by members of the Mexican military in Juarez, Chihuahua state. Their heads were discovered nearby wrapped in notes left by the attackers.
- Elements of the Mexico state investigative police arrested seven suspected members of La Familia Michoacana in the cities of Tejupilco and Luvianos, Mexico state.
Jan. 31
- An unknown number of gunmen broke into a high school house during a party in Juarez, Chihuahua state, opened fire and killed 16 people while wounding 14. Reportedly, the gunmen attacked the wrong party.
- The bodies of two blindfolded individuals were discovered outside of Acapulco, Guerrero state, along with two notes left on top of the bodies.
- A group of armed men attacked and killed five individuals near the El Limoncito neighborhood in Navolato, Sinaloa state.
Drug Violence in Mexico 2001-2009
Justice In Mexico
Mexico: 11 Students, 2 Adults Killed In Ciudad Juarez
Eleven high school students and two adults were shot to death at a party in Ciudad Juarez by suspected drug hitmen, Reuters and the BBC reported Jan. 31. The attackers drove up in four sport utility vehicles to the house where the party was taking place early the morning of Jan. 31, and began firing. Police did not say what specifically sparked the killing, but said that drug hitmen had attacked parties in the past searching for rivals. Police also said that some teenagers had been involved in kidnapping others.
Latin America
Situation Reports
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 25, 2010
Garcia Luna Goes Before Congress
Federal Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna went before the Mexican congress Jan. 21 to discuss the federal counternarcotics strategy and other topics related to national security. Garcia Luna stated that the federal government would continue to utilize the Mexican armed forces as the primary tool in the fight against the cartels and drug trafficking, saying that this strategy has produced positive results across the country, with nearly 100,000 arrests on charges related to drug trafficking since the beginning of President Felipe Calderon's term in December 2006. Garcia Luna also said the unprecedented growth of the domestic drug market (1.7 million cocaine users and more than 3 million marijuana users) is contributing to the escalating levels of violence, with cartels and other criminal elements battling over their share of the lucrative $811 million market.
Garcia Luna's statements come a week after the country's largest counternarcotics operation, Joint Operation Chihuahua, underwent a major strategy shift by transferring command of the operation from the Mexican army to the federal police and renaming the operation "Coordinated Operation Chihuahua." The military is still involved, but has changed its theater of operations from the urban environment of Juarez, Villa Ahumada and Nuevo Casas Grandes to the more rural areas surrounding these cities in an effort to catch drug traffickers attempting to enter or fleeing from the new federal police operations. While the change of command for Coordinated Operation Chihuahua is the first of its kind, the Mexican military remains in command of the country's other major counternarcotics missions: Joint Operation Culiacan-Navolato, Joint Operation Michoacan and Joint Operation Baja California. The Mexican armed forces have proven to be capable of disrupting the structure and operations of major cartels in the regions where they have been deployed, but they have proven less capable of handling everyday law enforcement tasks effectively.
Additionally, interdiction efforts by the Mexican military and the U.S. military and law enforcement have stifled the flow of narcotics to the United States to some degree - although a large amount of narcotics still enters the United States via Mexico - and have made it more lucrative, in some cases, for drug traffickers to sell their dope in Mexico rather than risking interdiction while crossing the border or after entering the United States. This has led to the record numbers of narcotics consumers in Mexico that Garcia Luna cited in his testimony and the development of a lucrative domestic narcotics market in Mexico. Cartels have traditionally been the wholesale suppliers of narcotics and generally do not engage in the retail sale of their product. The retail sale of narcotics is best suited for local gangs that are more familiar with the local market. With the development of the domestic narcotics market, we have seen a corresponding increase in local gangs violently battling each other for turf to sell their product throughout the country - most notably in Juarez.
Coordinated Operation Chihuahua will continue to be an exception to the strategy of using the military as the primary force in the country's counternarcotics mission for the foreseeable future. However, as STRATFOR has noted, Coordinated Operation Chihuahua is a test for the use of the federal police versus the military in urban environments. Any indication of success could prompt the Calderon administration to review its policy of using the military as its primary counternarcotics tool.
FARC-Mexican Cartel Connection
Bloomberg obtained a letter from former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Raul Reyes to other FARC commanders dating from mid-2007 that established an exclusive deal to ship cocaine directly to an unnamed Mexican cartel. The letter, leaked to the news agency by a Colombian government official, was reportedly taken from computers seized in a controversial cross-border raid by Colombian forces on a FARC camp in Ecuador, in which Reyes was killed. The document describes a meeting in mid-2007 between a Mexican cartel agent known as "Camilo" and Reyes during which the two agreed that the FARC would ship cocaine directly to the Mexican cartel, eliminating Central American middlemen. This would then effectively double the FARC's projected profits for its cocaine business.
This revelation of a direct relationship between a Mexican cartel and the FARC comes as no surprise. Mexican cartels have had working relationships and agreements with Colombian drug-trafficking organizations for some time. Ever Villafane Martinez was the Colombian Norte Valle drug cartel's representative in Mexico, before being arrested in August 2008, and was responsible for negotiating cocaine prices with the Beltran Leyva Organization. As the FARC has gained a greater market share in Andean-region cocaine production in recent years, it was all but inevitable that a direct relationship would be forged.
Mexican cartels have been seeking to gain greater control over the cocaine supply since the fall of the major Colombian cartels in the mid-1990s, when Mexico became the primary transshipment point for cocaine entering the United States. The late Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the former leader of the Juarez cartel, set up operations in Chile and Peru as early as the mid-1990s in attempts to secure cocaine shipments as close to the source as possible. This has continued to the present, as current Mexican cartel powerhouses Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel expand their operations and presence deeper into Central and South America in an attempt to gain greater control over the cocaine supply chain.
Jan.18
- Police discovered the bodies of two unidentified men in Naucalpan, Mexico state. The bodies were discovered almost a mile apart, but authorities believe the crimes were related.
- Federal agents arrested seven suspected members of the La Familia Michoacana cartel in Ixtapan, Mexico state, after a firefight.
Jan. 19
- The body of an unidentified man bearing signs of torture was discovered in Zapopan, Jalisco state. The victim's lips were stapled together and his throat was slit.
- A firefight occurred near the tourist zone in the municipality of Boca del Rio, Veracruz state, between soldiers and suspected cartel gunmen. One civilian was injured.
- Two suspected criminals, identified as Heriberto Diaz Rivera and "El Cholo Pepe," were killed by unknown gunmen in the municipality of Coahuayana, Michoacan state.
Jan. 20
- Suspected cartel gunmen killed a policeman and injured another in Uruapan, Michoacan state.
- The bodies of four men bearing signs of torture were discovered in an abandoned car in Chilpancingo, Guerrero state. A message attributing the crime to an unidentified drug-trafficking cartel was found near the bodies.
- Twenty-three prisoners died during a prison riot between members of Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel at the CERESO Numero Uno prison in Durango, Durango state.
- Unknown gunmen killed two policemen and injured another in Huixquilucan, Mexico state.
Jan. 21
- State policemen captured three suspected kidnappers and freed two hostages held since Nov. 9, 2009, during a raid on a house in Malinalco, Mexico state.
- Unknown gunmen attacked the police headquarters and a labor union office in Mochicahui, Sinaloa state. No injuries were reported.
- Police arrested a suspected kidnapper identified as Monge Urias in Los Cabos, Baja California. Urias allegedly led a criminal group suspected of kidnappings in Sinaloa, Nayarit and Durango states.
Jan. 22
- Soldiers seized 118 grenades, 15 firearms and three drug labs during operations in the municipalities of Purepero, Tangancicuaro and Cheran in Michoacan state.
- Unknown gunmen seriously injured Maria Santos Gorrostieta, the mayor of Tiquicheo, Michoacan state, and two other people during an ambush. Santos Gorrostieta was previously injured and her husband was killed in an October 2009 attack.
Jan. 23
- Police arrested an American citizen identified as James Walter Masson in Acapulco, Guerrero state. Masson is suspected of killing Russian citizen Natalia Sidolova.
- Soldiers seized 19 tons of marijuana during a search in El Zapote de los Cazarez, Sinaloa state. One person was arrested and several firearms and vehicles were confiscated.
- Soldiers discovered a drug lab believed to be used for the production of methamphetamine in the municipality of Yahualica de Gonzalez Gallo in Jalisco state. No arrests were made.
Jan. 24
- Police discovered the dismembered body of a judicial secretary identified as Nayeli Reyes Santos in the municipality of Boca del Rio, Veracruz state.
- Two soldiers and four suspected Gulf Cartel gunmen died in a firefight in San Cayetano de Vacas, Nuevo Leon state. The incident began when soldiers raided a house where cartel gunmen allegedly held hostages. No hostages were found at the location.
Colombia: Mexican Cartels And FARC Made Deal In 2007
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreed to a deal in mid-2007 to bypass gangs that had previously shipped the drugs to the Mexican cartels in order to increase their profits, according to a letter written by deceased FARC leader Raul Reyes to other guerrilla commanders and obtained by Bloomberg. The letter was found on a computer captured in the 2008 raid in which Reyes was killed. An unnamed Colombian official told Bloomberg that FARC doubled their profits through the deal and earned at least $1 billion in 2009, though it may have earned several times that amount.
Chile: Investigation Under Way On Possible Sinaloa Cartel Drug-Trafficking Route
The Chilean Attorney General's office is investigating the possibility that Mexico's Sinaloa cartel may be involved in ephedrine trafficking through Chile, El Universal reported Jan. 19. A Chilean government official said evidence indicated a "high possibility" that the cartel controlled routes in Chile. Ephedrine-trafficking routes through Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil toward Mexico reportedly are used by the Mexican cartels.
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 18, 2010January 18, 2010 | 2236 GMT
Related Special Topic Page
Federal Police Take Over Chihuahua OperationThe Mexican military was relieved of command of Joint Operation Chihuahua on Jan. 13, with operational control shifting to the federal police. The operation's name has been changed from Joint Operation Chihuahua to Coordinated Operation Chihuahua. The federal government also sent 2,000 federal police personnel to Ciudad Juarez earlier in the week as reinforcements for the new operation. The head of the federal police, Facundo Rosas Rosas, said the decision to hand over control of the Mexican government's counternarcotics operations in Chihuahua state was reached after a thorough systematic review of the situation in Chihuahua by all three branches of government. This transition represents a major step in the progression of Mexican President Felipe Calderon's federal police reforms that were passed in late 2008 and his strategy to relieve the military of law enforcement duties. As of Jan. 18, the federal police reportedly have already assumed all law enforcement roles in the northern Chihuahua urban regions of Juarez, Villa Ahumada and Nuevo Casas Grandes, including patrols, investigations, surveillance operations and operation of the emergency 066 call center for Juarez (equivalent to a 911 center in the United States). The federal police will operate largely in designated high-risk areas in these urban regions in an attempt to locate and dismantle existing cartel infrastructure from a law enforcement perspective instead of the previous military approach. The military primarily will be charged with patrolling and monitoring the vast expanses of the state's rural desert and manning strategic perimeter checkpoints as part of operations designed to stem the flow of narcotics through remote border crossings. These changes in duties and environment better reflect both security entities' training and capabilities. The federal police are better suited to operate in an urban environment and have specific training in how to interact with the Mexican civilian population, and the Mexican military's training and equipment better prepare the military for any security operation in a rural desert environment. As recently as November 2009, Calderon said he would continue to use the Mexican military as the primary tool to fight the ongoing war against the cartels. However, there has been mounting pressure and criticism over Calderon's use of the military in a law enforcement capacity due to how close it brings Mexico's armed forces to its civilian population. The military was not Calderon's first choice to fight the cartels, but a notoriously corrupt federal police left him no better options at the time. Calderon had been waiting for reforms in the federal police to take effect before allowing the newly vetted and trained force to take over as the primary agency used in the cartel war. As this long-awaited change in strategy plays out in the next couple months in Chihuahua, it likely will be used as a test to see whether it can be utilized viably on other joint counternarcotics operations throughout the country. Any hint of success in Juarez likely would mean a nationwide shift in strategy.
Another Kingpin ArrestEduardo Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental was arrested at a residence in La Paz, Baja California Sur state, on Jan. 12. Federal police launched a raid on the residence at approximately 6:00 a.m. local time that involved the use of 50 agents, two helicopters and four buses. Garcia Simental was the leader of a faction of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), also known as the Tijuana cartel, that had split from the core of the AFO in April 2008 after Fernando "El Ingeniero" Sanchez Arellano was chosen to head the cartel after the arrest of AFO leader Benjamin Arellano Felix. Garcia Simental reportedly joined forces with longtime AFO rival Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera's Sinaloa cartel in an attempt to take control of the Tijuana drug-trafficking corridor. The operation was reportedly the culmination of a three-month-long federal police intelligence operation that tracked the movements of the cartel leader. Several of Garcia Simental's top lieutenants were arrested in the previous weeks leading up to the arrest of Garcia Simental, and intelligence gathered from the previous raids and the debriefing of the detainees likely led authorities to the location of Garcia Simental. It is also possible that Garcia Simental's rival, Sanchez Arellano, could have tipped off authorities to his organization's activities and locations - a common practice in the Mexican cartel landscape. Garcia Simental has been an instigator for much of the violence seen in the Tijuana region over the past two years. At least 600 murders and executions can be directly traced back to Garcia Simental himself or from orders given by the kingpin. Most notable is Garcia Simental's tactic of dissolving bodies of rivals in caustic substances. Garcia Simental also was the leader for the majority of kidnapping and extortion operations that took place throughout the Tijuana metro area. Garcia Simental's arrest - and the arrests of his top lieutenants - is most significant for the security situation in the Baja region of Mexico; however, Gracia Simental's influence outside the region is minimal, and his arrest is unlikely to be felt outside of it. Additionally, the flow of narcotics through the Tijuana corridor has been significantly reduced in recent years due to heavy interdiction efforts by U.S. and Mexican authorities; and Garcia Simental's arrest likely will have little effect on what little narcotics do flow through the region. (click here to view interactive map)
Jan. 11
Jan. 12
Jan. 13
Jan. 14
Jan. 15
Jan. 16
Jan. 17
|
|
Mexico: Drug Kingpin Arrested
Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental, listed among Mexico's most wanted drug kingpins, was arrested Jan. 12 in La Paz in Mexico's Baja California Sur, Mexican and U.S. officials said, AP reported. The Mexican government had offered $2.1 million for information leading to Garcia's arrest. Garcia is suspected of being allied with the Sinaloa drug-trafficking cartel.
Honduras: 5 Suspected Zetas Arrested
Honduran police arrested four Hondurans and one Mexican citizen suspected of being members of Los Zetas in Casa Quemada, Cortes department, Tiempo reported Jan. 11. The suspects reportedly entered Honduras on Dec.24, allegedly to carry out kidnappings and vehicle thefts. A person believed to be the leader of the group, identified as Vladimir Serrano Cabrera, has not been arrested.
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 11, 2010
Suspected BLO Security Chief Captured
On Jan. 4, the Federal Police apprehended suspected Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) security chief Manuel "El Chunda" Alejandro Briones Rodriguez and three other BLO members in Mexico City. The men gave up without resistance. Briones Rodriguez reportedly was the head of personal security for BLO leader Arturo "El Jefe de Jefes" Beltran Leyva, who was killed Dec. 16 in a raid by Mexican naval special operations forces in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Briones Rodriguez was responsible for organizing and deploying security teams to provide protection for Beltran Leyva, although it is currently unclear why he was not present during the Dec. 16 raid.
His duties likely were shifted to provide protection for the new BLO leader, Hector Beltran Leyva, following Arturo's death, and it is now unclear who is coordinating the security arrangements of Hector Beltran Leyva and other high ranking BLO members. Given the recent law enforcement blows against the organization, the remaining members at large likely are trying to keep a low profile and are exercising extreme caution in their movements and activities.
The Attorney General's office said Jan. 7 that the information that led to the arrest of Briones Rodriguez and his three associates came from intelligence gathered following the Dec. 16 raid in Cuernavaca. The arrest of Carlos Beltran Leyva in Sinaloa state also was due to intelligence gathered after the Dec. 16 raid, which produced a trove of information about the BLO that could lead to even more arrests of high-ranking members.
More Ex-Military Take Over City Police
Former Mexican army Lt. Col. Ricardo Andres Gomez Herrera assumed the role of public security director for the city of Apatzingan, Michoacan, on Jan. 6. Apatzingan, which has seen high levels of violence over the past couple months, is one of five cities in which former military officers have taken over law enforcement responsibilities. Another is Garza Garcia, in Nuevo Leon state, where former Mexican army Brig. Gen. Manuel Martinez Olivares was named secretary of security two months after the city's previous Secretary of Security and former Brig. Gen. Juan Antonio Esparza Garcia was gunned down.
These two appointments, which are essentially that of police chief, are part of a continuing trend of recently retired military officers replacing allegedly corrupt local police chiefs and the militarization of law enforcement across Mexico. As the federal government tries to rebuild and professionalize local law enforcement it is turning to former high-ranking Mexican military officers to oversee the reconstruction. This is because the military, while not completely free of corruption, remains the least corrupt security institution in the country.
But that is likely to change. By serving as police chiefs, these former military officers are forced to come in closer contact with the civilian population, something military personnel are not ordinarily trained to do, as well as the drug cartels and their corrupting influences.
Jan. 4
- One person was killed and another was injured during a firefight between rival criminal groups in Zitacuaro, Michoacan state.
Jan. 5
- Unknown gunmen killed a soldier in the municipality of Choix, Sinaloa state, while authorities were eradicating illegal crops. Soldiers opened fire on the house where the suspects were hiding, killing an unidentified civilian.
- Unknown persons phoned in a bomb against the Atlacholoaya Social Rehabilitation Center in Atlacholoaya, Morelos state. Two BLO suspects are being held in the facility. After a thorough search, authorities determined there were no explosives on the premises.
- Suspected kidnappers killed a man identified as Juan Carlos Rangel Melgar after he resisted a kidnapping attempt in the Benito Juarez neighborhood of Culiacan, Sinaloa state.
Jan. 6
- A group of unknown persons beat the deputy director of municipal police in Salto, Jalisco state. Three policemen were arrested in connection with the incident.
- The body of a man identified as Pedro Damian Marquez Valenzuela was discovered in a drainage ditch in Los Mochis, Sinaloa state. Twelve shell casings from a firearm were discovered near the body, along with a sign that read: "I will not steal again, ha, ha, ha."
- Several residents of the Loma Linda neighborhood in Naucalpan, Mexico state, discovered the body of an unidentified man that showed signs of torture.
Jan. 7
- Unknown gunmen killed a truck driver and injured his assistant in Yurecuaro, Michoacan state, after they resisted a robbery attempt. The truck had been intercepted by at least seven armed men in two vehicles with weapons turrets.
- Three persons were shot and killed from a vehicle by unknown men in Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state.
- Police in Los Mochis, Sinaloa state, discovered a soccer ball with the skin from an unidentified person's face sewn onto it. A plastic cooler found nearby contained parts of a body. The items were reportedly thrown into a street near the municipal headquarters by several men in a vehicle.
Jan. 8
- One policeman was injured by a grenade during an ambush by 15 unidentified persons.
- Police discovered the body of kidnapped journalist Valentin Valdes in Saltillo, Cohauila state. Valdes was abducted the previous night by unknown men in two vehicles. A note was found near the body that read: "This happens to those who don't understand the message."
- The body of an unidentified man shot 11 times was discovered on the highway between Huexoculco and San Martin, Mexico state. A message linking him to the death of a taxi driver was found nearby.
Jan. 9
- Unknown gunmen killed three persons and injured two after a high-speed chase in the Colonia Seminario neighborhood in Toluca, Mexico state.
- Police discovered an unexploded fragmentation grenade near a seafood store in the Gustavo Madero district of Mexico City.
- Unknown gunmen killed the former mayor of Angostura, Sinaloa state, who was identified as Mauro Antonio Acosta Bojorquez, near El Diez. A former forestry department official travelling with Acosta Bojorquez was also killed.
- Police discovered five unidentified bodies in an area known as Las Ventanas, in Durango state. The mutilated bodies were tied with ropes at the wrists.
Jan. 10
- An unidentified man's body bearing signs of torture was discovered in the municipality of San Mateo Atenco, in Mexico state.
- Police seized and destroyed 123 marijuana plants in the municipality of Etzatlan, Jalisco state.
Mexico: Police Arrest Suspected Drug Cartel Security Chief
Mexican police arrested suspected Beltran Leyva drug-trafficking cartel security chief Manuel Alejandro Briones Rodriguez in Mexico City on Jan. 4, according to a Public Security Secretariat report released Jan. 7. Briones Rodriguez allegedly planned the secure travel routes for cartel head Arturo Beltran Leyva, and he reportedly coordinated the activities of the organization's lookouts and collaborators. Five people, including three unidentified minors, were arrested with Briones Rodriguez.
Mexico: Remittances From U.S. Down 14 Percent
Remittances sent from the United States to Mexico by Mexican emigrants fell 14 percent year-on-year in November 2009, to $1.5 billion, The Financial Times reported Jan. 4, citing a report from the Bank of Mexico. Remittances for the first 11 months of 2009 were $19.6 billion, down 16 percent from the same period in 2008, the bank said.
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 4, 2010
New Year's Eve Warnings
The Mexican government received a warning from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration that Los Zetas was planning attacks on New Year's Eve, El Universal reported Dec. 30. The warning reportedly said attacks were planned in Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Zacatecas, Mexico state, and the Federal District against civilian targets such as commercial buildings, bridges, public transportation and New Year's Eve celebrations. Additionally, STRATFOR sources reported Dec. 31 that Mexican soldiers were called back from vacation and put on high alert in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, after receiving information that Los Zetas was planning attacks.
However, not much materialized from this threat. The most notable violence that took place Dec. 31 was a string of early-morning explosions and thwarted attempts targeting automated teller machines around the country. No injuries were reported from the incidents. Such tactics have become common over the past year, and anarchist and anti-capitalist groups such as the "Subversive Alliance for the Liberation of the Earth, Animals and Humans" have claimed responsibility for these types of attacks in the past.
It would be highly unexpected for a group like Los Zetas to conduct attacks against civilian targets such as those mentioned above. Violence is known to spill over into civilian areas, and gunmen exercise little caution when carrying out an operation in a public place, but explicitly targeting civilians unaffiliated with the drug trade would not fit in with past drug-trafficking organization (DTO) activity or long-term strategy. After all, these groups are in the business of making money (using the tactic of physical intimidation and extermination as a means to protect their assets), which requires a degree of complicity from the civilian population. Carrying out terrorist-like attacks against civilians would threaten that support and increase support for the government's war against the cartels. The one exception we have seen to this strategy was the 2008 Independence Day attacks in Morelia, Michoacan state, which met with harsh criticism from nearly all other DTOs - an indication that the cartels know full well the dangers of antagonizing civilians.
We have been expecting Los Zetas to conduct attacks on behalf of their allies in the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) to avenge the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva, but such attacks will in all likelihood be directed against the Mexican government and other cartels if the BLO believes another cartel provided the information that allowed the Mexican government to find and kill Arturo. There is no indication that Los Zetas or the BLO will shift their targeting philosophy due to the death of Arturo.
A BLO Arrest and New Leadership
One of the five Beltran Leyva brothers and a high-ranking member of the BLO, Carlos Beltran Leyva, was arrested Dec. 30 in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, according to a statement issued Jan. 2 by Mexico's Public Safety Department. Police conducted a routine traffic stop on him while he was driving through Culiacan, and he was found to have a fake driver's license. A subsequent search found weapons, ammunition and cocaine in his vehicle.
The arrest came just two weeks after his brother and leader of the BLO, Arturo Beltran Leyva, was killed in a Mexican military operation in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. The operation yielded a great deal of intelligence on the BLO organization - some of which may have led to the arrest of Carlos Beltran Leyva.
Following Arturo's death, speculation emerged that Carlos may replace him as leader of the BLO. However, a Federal Police intelligence report released Jan. 4 stated that Hector Beltran Leyva (another brother of Arturo's) has assumed the leadership of the BLO. The report also stated that Hector currently retains the loyalty of Edgar Valdez Villereal (aka La Barbie), the head of the BLO's enforcement arm, contradicting earlier reports that Valdez had defected. It also stated that Hector had passed off his duties of money laundering and other financial responsibilities to Carlos after Arturo's death. Carlos maintained a low-key lifestyle - an essential characteristic for a money launderer, and one found among other cartel figures with similar positions. As the money launderer, he would not necessarily travel with heavy protection that would attract attention.
This is a vital responsibility within a DTO, but it does not appear that Carlos had much time to involve himself in this role. Given this, it is unlikely that his arrest will impact the cartel's activities very much. The fallout from the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva will continue to be the dominant dynamic within the BLO and Mexico's security forces.
Dec. 28
- Police arrested five men in the municipalities of Tula de Allende and Tepeji del Rio, Hidalgo state. The men are suspected of killing three policemen and injuring two others during an ambush Dec. 27.
Dec. 29
- Municipal police in Tijuana, Baja California state, during a traffic stop arrested five gunmen suspected of working for Teodoro Garcia Simental. Police confiscated five firearms, about 700 rounds of ammunition and several military uniforms.
- Federal agents discovered an abandoned suitcase containing 11 kilograms of cocaine at the Mexico City International Airport. No arrests were made.
- Soldiers arrested former municipal policeman Luis Gilberto Sanchez Guerrero in Ensenada, Baja California state, for allegedly conspiring with Teodoro Garcia Simental to murder local security chief Julian Leyzaola Perez.
- Police discovered the decapitated body of a man in the municipality of Delicias, Chihuahua state. Authorities have not yet identified the body.
Dec. 30
- The bodies of two men were discovered hanging from an overpass in Los Mochis, Sinaloa state. One was subsequently identified as local musician Elio Alan Hurtado Quinonez. A message attributing the crime to "La Mochomera" was discovered near the bodies.
- Unknown gunmen traveling in two vehicles killed four people and injured three others in separate locations within the Refugio neighborhood in Gomez Palacio, Durango state.
- The body of an unknown man was discovered in a truck in the Ampliacion La Libertad neighborhood of Acapulco, Guerrero state.
Dec. 31
- Suspected thieves killed a state security officer traveling on a bus in the Gustavo A. Madero neighborhood of Mexico City.
- Unknown gunmen kidnapped journalist Jose Luis Romero in Los Mochis, Sinaloa state.
- Police arrested an unknown man in Mexico City after he threatened to detonate an explosive device in the Zocalo plaza. After taking him into custody, police determined he did not have any explosives.
- Unknown gunmen attacked the state government offices in Saltillo, Coahuila state.
Jan. 1
- A man claiming to be a policeman was injured by police after he tried to prevent the arrest of three suspected gang members in the Los Altos neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The man, identified as Javier Estrada Garcia, allegedly threatened police with a firearm and was subsequently shot.
- Police in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco state, arrested six people suspected of shooting at a police patrol on Dec. 31.
Jan. 2
- The attorney general's office disclosed the arrest of a man identified as Gudiel Ivan Sanchez Valdez in the Pichucalco municipality of Chiapas state. Sanchez is suspected of participating in the murder of several family members of Melquisedec Angulo Cordova. Angulo was the Marine killed during the Dec. 16 raid on Arturo Beltran Leyva's apartment.
Jan. 3
- Six people reportedly were injured during a confrontation between former Mexican Electricians' Union workers and employees of the Federal Electric Commission in Teotihuacan, Mexico state.
Mexico: Hector Beltran Leyva Takes Over Cartel - Police
Mexican police have identified Hector Beltran Leyva as the new head of the Beltran Leyva drug-trafficking cartel, El Universal reported Jan. 4. The new leader reportedly has the support of the cartel's main drug-trafficking route operators.
Mexico: Remittances From U.S. Down 14 Percent
Remittances sent from the United States to Mexico by Mexican emigrants fell 14 percent year-on-year in November 2009, to $1.5 billion, The Financial Times reported Jan. 4, citing a report from the Bank of Mexico. Remittances for the first 11 months of 2009 were $19.6 billion, down 16 percent from the same period in 2008, the bank said.
Mexico: High-Ranking BLO Leader Captured
Mexican police captured Carlos Beltran Leyva, one of the top leaders of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) drug cartel, on Jan. 2 in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, The AP reported Jan. 3 citing a statement from the Mexican Department of Public Safety.
Latin America
Situation Reports
Mexico: Los Zetas Planning Attacks - STRATFOR Sources
The Mexican armed forces in Juarez are on high alert on New Year's Eve after receiving information that Los Zetas are planning attacks, sources told STRATFOR on Dec. 31. Soldiers have been called back from vacation and people are being advised not to go out.
Forget 2012. As far as many Mexicans are concerned, the ancient Mayas were being generous: the sky's actually going to fall next year. Why? Because it's 2010, Mexico's bicentennial, and Mexican history has an eerie way of repeating itself. Mexico's 1910 centennial, after all, saw the start of the bloody, decade-long Mexican Revolution, which killed more than a million people. And that cataclysm was precisely a century after the start of Mexico's bloody, decade-long War of Independence in 1810.
You get the picture. As a result, there's been no shortage of talk lately about possible unrest, especially in the form of armed rebel groups, erupting south of the border in 2010. But is there really a basis for concern? None as apparent as the popular grievances that existed in 1809 or 1909. But this is still Mexico; and while Spanish colonizers no longer oppress the country, and dictators like Porfirio Diaz aren't brutalizing campesinos, the country nonetheless is reeling from the worst criminal violence in its history and one of its hardest economic slumps. "We are very near a social crisis," JosÉ Narro, the director of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City, said recently. "The conditions are there." (Will the world end in 2012? What the Mayan prophecy is and how the movies see it.)
Mexican insurrections often do coincide with important dates. Most recently, Zapatista guerrillas in the poor southern state of Chiapas started a revolt on Jan. 1, 1994, the day the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect. A big fear now is that Mexico's drug cartels, responsible for almost 15,000 killings in the past decade, are lending their resources and firepower to emerging guerrilla groups. If so, their plan may be to sow bicentennial terror and turn Mexicans against President Felipe CalderÓn's drug-war offensive. This past fall authorities say they seized an arsenal of large guns and grenades allegedly being sent from the Zetas, a vicious drug gang, to JosÉ Manuel Hernandez, a purported leader of the rebel group called the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). The EPR in recent years has claimed responsibility for attacks on Mexican oil infrastructure, including the bombing of six pipelines in 2007. (Hernandez denies the charges.) (See how Mexico took down a major drug lord and why it may not make much of a difference.)
At the same time, political observers like Denise Maerker, a prominent columnist for the Mexico City daily El Universal, fear that provincial governments in places like Chiapas, where the weapons were found, are using 2010 fears as a pretext for cracking down on social activists. "They're drawing questionable links between advocates for the poor and armed groups," says Maerker, who adds there's little evidence that Hernandez is an EPR boss. (See pictures from Ciudad Juarez, the most dangerous city in the Americas.)
Either way, the drug cartels have already shown they're willing to use high-profile national celebrations as a stage for narco-terror. Last year, during Independence Day festivities in drug-infested Michoacan state, narcos killed seven people with fragmentation-grenade blasts. Mexicans were rattled again in September when bombs went off at three Mexico City banks and another at a car dealership. No one was injured, but to many chilangos, or capital residents, the explosions seemed a warning of things to come.
Aside from inflated drug and guerrilla violence, another specter is unrest resulting from Mexico's deflated economy. Given its enormous reliance on the U.S. market - and on remittances from Mexican workers there, which have declined sharply this year - the global recession has hit Mexico especially hard. Its GDP, in fact, will contract more than 5% in 2009, exacerbating unemployment as well as Mexico's chronic poverty. A report this year by the Colegio de Mexico, one of the country's top universities, warned, "A national social explosion is knocking at the door." Said top Roman Catholic Bishop Gustavo Rodriguez, "We cannot separate the economic crisis from the violence and criminal crisis that we live day by day."
But while many fear the bicentennial year could galvanize that discontent, especially with the symbolic hype surrounding 1810 and 1910, CalderÓn insists the country will break the ominous century-cycle next year and make 2010 "a moment of peaceful transformation." Last month, he predicted next year will see "Mexico on a different trajectory toward development and progress." CalderÓn tried to get the ball rolling this month with a major political reform proposal that would allow re-election for Mexican office holders like mayors and legislators, a change he insists will give voters more power. It would still limit Presidents to one six-year term; but the move is significant, especially on the eve of 2010, because the ban on re-election was a pillar of the 1910 revolution.
Before CalderÓn can turn the bicentennial into a transformative engine, however, he has to get it jump-started. The economic crisis has forced chronic delays for a quarter of the more than 600 bicentennial projects Mexico had on the drawing board. Rather than being afraid of 2010, says Maerker, Mexicans are instead "just weary, especially of the economic situation." The year 2010 might not offer the fireworks of a revolution, but, unless Mexico can escape its general malaise, the bicentennial might see a quiet but dispiriting national devolution.
Colombia: Soldiers Confiscate 1.78 Tons Of Cocaine
Colombian soldiers confiscated 1.78 tons of cocaine buried on a beach in the municipality of Puerto Escondido in Cordoba department, El Espectador reported Dec.29. A tip by local residents allowed the army to seize the drugs before being sent to the United States via a Central American maritime smuggling route. The cocaine allegedly belonged to a drug-trafficking organization composed of former paramilitary members.
The Recession in Mexico: Boost From a Surprising Sector
Standard & Poor's on Dec. 14 cut Mexico's credit rating to BBB, the second-lowest investment grade. Faced with declining oil profits and an increased budget deficit, Mexico will be at risk of underinvestment in the years to come, which may force the government to ramp up borrowing. This is not an unfamiliar situation for Mexico: Capital shortages are built into its geography. However, there are two possible silver linings for the Mexican economy: the weakening peso and the drug trade.
Rating agency Standard & Poor's (S&P) cut Mexico's credit rating by one level on Dec. 14 to BBB - the second-lowest investment grade - from BBB+. The agency cited "the government's inability to broaden the tax base meaningfully" as the key reason for the downgrade. Despite warnings that it would face downgrade if it did not increase its governmental revenue, Mexico's lower house rejected President Felipe Calderon's proposal to create a new 2 percent consumption tax. Instead, the standing value-added tax was raised by 1 percent to 16 percent, which was not sufficient to reassure investors that Mexico City will be able to rein in its budget.
For centuries, Mexico has faced a serious problem of underinvestment. Capital shortages are built into its geography. With no navigable river network that would allow it to interconnect its agricultural heartlands in an effective way, Mexico has played catch-up for centuries, requiring huge investment programs to develop a transportation infrastructure. This has exposed it to boom and bust cycles throughout its history by forcing the country to binge on credit when available and crash when credit is scarce.
Mexico's economy faces risks in the form of rising loan defaults and declining oil profits. The downturn in oil profits, making up around 38 percent of government revenue in 2008, is a product of underinvestment in infrastructure and will further reinforce that underinvestment due to a lack of a reliable income stream for the government. This will force the government to seriously ramp up international borrowing in coming years, which is not an unfamiliar situation for Mexico.
The current crisis, therefore, is part of the usual economic cycle of Mexico, but with two possible silver linings. First, the weakening peso may have a positive effect on trade and may dampen negative effects of declining remittances. Also, an influx of money from Mexico's lucrative drug trade into local banks may have helped them weather the worst of the recession.
Mexico's Recession Revisited
Mexico's crisis today largely is a product of the country's geography. Its proximity to the world's largest economy means Mexico is tied to what happens in the United States. The United States accounts for more than 80 percent of Mexico's total exports, which make up 24.6 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP). The two countries are further linked by the fact that more than half of foreign direct investments in Mexico come from the United States. Whole manufacturing sectors in the United States are dependent on a supply chain that extends to Mexico, particularly in the auto manufacturing industry, which employs roughly 1 million workers in Mexico.
It was therefore inevitable that Mexico would suffer as the U.S. economy ground to a halt at the end of 2008, proving yet again the adage that "when the U.S. sneezes, Mexico gets pneumonia." That axiom played out in reverse when Mexico was seized by an outbreak of H1N1 influenza in the spring that ultimately crossed the border into the United States. Mexican government officials estimate the flu outbreak cost Mexico $2.3 billion - mainly in lost tourism revenue - or close to 0.3 percent of GDP. These problems were compounded by the increasing violence in the ongoing war on drugs and Americans' cutback on travel amidst the recession.
Mexico's corporate sector also was hit by huge losses caused by currency speculation. Large Mexican corporations - such as Alfa, which makes petrochemicals and processed food; Cemex, one of the largest cement producers in the world; Comerci, a grocery chain; Gruma, in food production; and Vitro, the No. 4 glass-maker in the world - essentially bet that the peso would continue to appreciate against the dollar.
However, the financial crisis caused a rush to the safety of the dollar and a flight from emerging markets. Mexico was no exception: The peso lost more than 20 percent of its value against the dollar in just over a month in September 2008. As Mexico's largest corporations rushed to change pesos to dollars to pay out what they owed, thus placing further depreciation pressures on the peso, the Bank of Mexico was forced to intervene on the foreign currency market by buying pesos with its U.S. dollar reserves, spending 10 percent of its reserves in the process. Mexico ultimately opened a $47 billion line of credit with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2009 to shore up its reserves.
Overall, the damage to the Mexican economy has been severe. The IMF expects the Mexican GDP to shrink by 7.3 percent in 2009, making it the biggest decline in GDP for the country since the Great Depression. It also is one of the direst GDP declines among major emerging economies, on par with the 7.5 percent GDP decline expected in Russia.
The Negatives
Loan defaults normally lag economic downturns because they are correlated with unemployment. For Mexico, that's a short-term risk. Even though GDP in the third quarter rose 2.9 percent quarter-to-quarter, defaults still can be expected to rise as unemployment rises in 2010, thus putting the banking system at risk. Unemployment has indeed risen, reaching a 14-year high of 6.4 percent in August before dipping back to 5.9 percent in October, although that still was a significant increase over the October 2008 rate of 4.1 percent.
Nonperforming loans stand at 3 percent, but that figure is expected to rise in the short term, particularly in mortgages made out to low-income individuals. Sofoles, or financial companies specializing in $20,000-$40,000 loans to low-income individuals, already have defaulted on some of their debt, forcing Mexico's federal housing development bank, Sociedad Hipotecaria Federale, to offer 40 billion pesos ($3.2 billion) in loan guarantees and liquidity to preempt a wider crisis.
However, the danger of rising defaults is no different from what the rest of the world faces. Ultimately, if third-quarter growth in the U.S. is sustained, Mexico will escape danger of defaults as economic activity picks up.
It is Mexico's structural problems, declining oil revenue and paltry non-energy revenue stream to the government that are the main, long-term risks for Mexico. Oil production declined from 3.08 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2007 to about 2.8 million bpd in 2008, a decline that is estimated to have cost Mexican state-owned energy firm Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) around $20 billion. The key problem for Mexico's energy production is the constitutional prohibition of foreign investment in Mexico's natural resources, which has led to underinvestment in extractive industries. Reforms were passed in October 2008 to increase Pemex's efficiency and allow it to hire international oil companies, increasing access to technological expertise, but their implementation has thus far been slow.
The Paradox of a Weak Peso
Despite the decline in the value of the peso - 17 percent since January 2008 - the depreciation is not really a problem for Mexico compared to past bouts of peso devaluation. This time around, Mexico's government debt is a relatively manageable 39.3 percent of GDP. Private sector debt is at 30.9 percent of GDP, but it is mostly peso-denominated, with only around 30 percent of all private sector debt denominated in foreign currency. That compares to nearly 50 percent during the 1994 crisis.
The peso's loss in value, therefore, will not have a devastating effect on the economy due to sudden appreciation of foreign currency loans that were denominated in U.S. dollars. This would have increased the value of debt proportionally to the devaluation, creating problems for repayment for the indebted, a phenomenon that had destabilized emerging markets from Central Europe to Russia and Kazakhstan. Despite Mexico's banking system being more than 80 percent foreign-owned, restrictions on foreign currency lending instituted after the 1994 crisis largely have curbed the severity of the recession.
Furthermore, peso depreciation helps with two other key economic factors for Mexico: remittances and exports.
As the U.S. economy slows down, particularly in the construction sector in states with high Mexican migrant populations, such as California and Texas, remittances are reduced. Mexico's remittances were down from $26 billion in 2007 to $25.1 billion in 2008, with remittances in 2009 from January to October down by $860 million compared to the same period in 2008. That accounted for a 16.2 percent decline over the period. Since remittances are roughly 3 percent of Mexico's GDP, a decline has a measurable effect on Mexican growth. However, the depreciation of the peso means that a slowdown in remittances is not as tragic: Even though fewer U.S. dollars are going back to Mexico in absolute terms, they have a greater purchasing power.
A weak peso to the U.S. dollar also will help exports to the United States bounce back. Those exports have increased month-to-month from June to October, with August, September and October averaging a robust 7.1 percent month-to-month growth. And because the Chinese yuan is essentially pegged to the U.S. dollar, a weak peso also increases Mexico's competitiveness against China on the U.S. market.
An Unlikely Silver Lining
Slumping government revenue is particularly worrisome because Mexico is engaged in a war against drug cartels, with a death toll for 2009 set for around 7,500, an increase from 5,700 in 2008. Security operations cost money, particularly those as expansive as what Mexico City has initiated, and the last thing Mexican government needs are budget cuts that would only further entice government and law enforcement officials to take bribes or cross en masse to the organized crime sphere.
Ironically, the solution to Mexico's revenue problem may be the drug trade. Trafficking in drugs brings Mexico's drug cartels more than $40 billion of estimated annual revenue. That is equivalent to around 5 percent of Mexico's GDP and is double what Mexican migrants send back as remittances. Most importantly, it constitutes an indigenously produced source of foreign capital, a boon that every emerging/developing economy would want access to. This capital has to go somewhere: the mattress of a local sicario (essentially cartel enforcers), investments in the entertainment and tourism industry or offshore bank accounts. Back in the U.S., capital goes to local banks, which then reinvest it in the local economy via consumer and corporate loans.
Tellingly, liquidity has not been a problem for Mexico's banks. Bank deposits have steadily increased since 2004. Assets of Mexico's top five banks grew on average by 50 percent in 2008 - they profited that year despite a global financial crisis that saw banking systems in developed countries suffer crippling losses.
Without further data into exactly how money flows from organized crime to the banking sector and then to the economy, it is impossible to say with certainty how Mexico utilizes or will utilize the enormous influx of capital. Mexico's traditional economic challenge is capital deficiency and yet it faces a novel situation in which a large pool of foreign capital continues to stream across the border.
While Mexico's increased importance as a transit point for South American-grown drugs certainly has brought a number of existential problems, it is possible that the flow of money is the reason for which Mexico's banking system escaped a crisis despite global turmoil. This addition of stability will be a boon for Mexico in the coming year as it recovers from the downturn.
Colombia: Suspected Drug Trafficking Leader Arrested
Colombian authorities announced Dec.28 the arrest of suspected drug trafficker Victor Hugo Ramirez in Barranquilla, El Espectador reported. The Colombian attorney general's office and U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement cooperated during the investigation and arrest. Ramirez is believed to be the head of the "Los Culimochos" drug trafficking organization, responsible for cocaine shipments to Central America, Mexico and the United States. Ramirez could be extradited to the United States.
Spain: Police Confiscate 2 Tons Of Cocaine At Basque Airport
Spanish police Dec. 28 confiscated two tons of cocaine from an airplane at a regional airport in the Basque regional capital of Vitoria in northern Spain, DPA reported. Police arrested 13 people suspected of being involved in an international drug-smuggling ring. The two-ton shipment of cocaine, reportedly from Colombia, marks the largest air shipment of illegal drugs ever confiscated by Spanish police. Police did not identify the nationality of the suspects.
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 21, 2009
Death of a Capo
Family members buried Arturo Beltran Leyva, self-proclaimed "Boss of Bosses" and leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), on Dec. 20 at a cemetery in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. Beltran Leyva was killed Dec. 16 in a Mexican Navy Special Forces raid on the luxury Altitude apartments in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, aimed at apprehending the cartel leader. As the highest-ranking cartel leader toppled during Mexican President Felipe Calderon's term thus far, Beltran Leyva's death represents a significant victory for Mexican government. As an added bonus, investigators managed to glean information about the BLO protection network in Morelos state following the raid.
Mexican investigators have uncovered and released details of the BLO security apparatus, particularly with regard to the state of Morelos. Press reports have revealed that members of Morelos state and local law enforcement, as well as members of the Mexican military operating in the state, served as paid informants for the BLO. The BLO also reportedly had an agreement with the state and local law enforcement allowing BLO enforcers to rid Morelos state of common criminals. Perpetrators of theft and robbery, for example, reportedly were warned to stop their activities and were executed if they continued. In return, elements of state and local law enforcement permitted the BLO to traffic narcotics through the state relatively uninhibited and allowed BLO leaders to move about the state relatively freely, essentially transforming Morelos into a cartel safe-haven. The BLO's penetration into the federal security apparatus was well-documented in 2008, so it comes as no surprise that federal, state and local security forces were co-opted in the cartel's base of operations. Politicians and federal security officials in Mexico City have announced that further investigations will be launched to these corruption allegations.
Concerns over retaliatory attacks by the BLO against high-ranking government security officials are dimming the afterglow of the gains made in the Dec. 16 raid, however. The BLO has carried out successful hits against government officials in Mexico City, and has also constructed improvised explosive devices.
The BLO has become notorious for its retaliatory attacks against the Mexican government and rival cartels when its leaders have been captured or even just threatened, meaning there is increasing concern over the potential for blowback from the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva. Heightening these fears, photos emerged after the raid of Arturo Beltran Leyva's corpse with his pants pulled down, a common tactic used by drug traffickers to degrade the dead bodies of rival drug traffickers, and covered in blood-soaked $100 bills and peso notes. The leaked photos caused an uproar in the Mexican government, with Mexican Interior Minister Fernando Gomez Mont already having ordered an investigation into the photos, which he called insulting to the family of the deceased. The desecration of the cartel leader's body will certainly goad the BLO into a stronger retaliation. Indeed, STRATFOR sources already have reported that Cabinet ministers have adopted stricter security operations out of fears of BLO retribution.
La Familia Payback
Over the course of the past week, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) has been blamed for eight attacks against security forces across Michoacan state from the capital of Morelia in the north to the port city of Lazaro Cardenas on the Pacific coast, leaving one federal agent dead and nine injured. These attacks have ranged from ambushes of police patrols to attacks on hotels housing police to attacks on police stations. All of these attacks have involved tactics typical of LFM. STRATFOR sources have reported that federal police forces came extremely close to capturing LFM No. 3 Servando "La Tuta" Gomez Martinez in an operation in Michoacan the week of Dec. 7. The recent string of attacks reportedly comes in response to La Tuta's close brush with the law - thus signaling law enforcement to back off.
Overall in 2009, LFM experienced some significant setbacks in the form of arrests of high-ranking personnel and seizures. One such arrest, the apprehension of Luis "El 19" Ricardo Magana Mendoza, brought about a similar string of attacks against federal law enforcement throughout Michoacan state involving ambushes and direct attacks on police facilities. LFM has shown before, and continues to demonstrate, that when backed into a corner and threatened, it will lash out.
Dec. 14
- Agents from the state attorney general's office freed a kidnapped labor union leader identified as Iran Cota Cota in Tijuana, Baja California, state. Authorities arrested two suspects in connection with the incident.
- Police in Durango, Durango state, were involved in a firefight with the occupants of a vehicle who attempted to evade a security checkpoint. The suspects abandoned the vehicle near the Las Mangas neighborhood. No arrests were made.
- Police discovered the bodies of two unidentified men in the Naucalpan neighborhood of Mexico City. Both bodies bore signs of torture.
Dec.15
- Two federal policemen were injured in clashes with former electric workers during a protest in Toluca, Mexico state.
- Two severed heads were discovered hanging from a footbridge in Pueblo Nuevo, Durango state. Police identified the deceased persons as local residents Jose Cruz Delgado and Mario Favela Avila. Their bodies were not found.
- Unknown attackers detonated two grenades near the governor's mansion and a police station in Morelia, Michoacan state. No injuries were reported.
- Police located two drug labs in the municipalities of Santa Maria del Oro and Zapotlanejo, Jalisco state, seizing approximately 140 kilograms (308 pounds) of suspected methamphetamine at both locations.
Dec.16
- Police discovered the dismembered bodies of two unidentified men in Chilpancingo, Guerrero state. A message was found near the bodies attributing the crime to "El Jefe de Jefes."
- Unknown persons threw two headless bodies from an aircraft that landed in a field in the municipality of Huatabampo, Sonora state.
- Suspected members of the Total Liberation Front anarchist group allegedly set fire to seven vehicles in the Tlalpan neighborhood of Mexico City. Two persons were arrested near the scene of the attack.
- Police arrested suspected LFM drug-trafficking route operator Antonio Chavez Andrade in La Mira, Michoacan state.
Dec.17
- Police reported a firefight between unknown groups near the Monterrey Technical Institute in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. No injuries were reported.
- State police and Pemex security guards recovered 150 stolen petrochemical pipes belonging to Pemex from a truck near La Venta, Tabasco state. Two men were arrested for allegedly transporting the stolen pipes.
- Unknown persons tortured and killed an unidentified man in El Salitre, Michoacan state. A message allegedly linking the murder to drug-trafficking organizations was found near the body.
- Soldiers killed a suspected Los Zetas drug-trafficking route operator identified only as "El Coreano," Spanish for "the Korean," after a chase and firefight in the municipality of Zuazua, Nuevo Leon state. Two policemen believed to be protecting El Coreano and three suspected drug traffickers also died in the incident. 300 kilograms (661 pounds) of marijuana were seized from the alleged traffickers' vehicles.
- Unknown gunmen killed Javier Gonzalez Iruso, federal anti-narcotics chief for Nogales, Sonora state.
Dec. 18
- Three persons with alleged links to the BLO were arrested in Villa de las Fuentes, Morelos state.
- Police in Jiutepec, Morelos state captured suspected BLO drug-trafficking route operator Jesus Basilio Araujo. Araujo is suspected of links to 109 murders.
- Police in Huichapan, Queretaro state, discovered eight bodies believed to be those of federal agents in a burning cargo truck.
Dec.19
- Authorities arrested a policeman identified as Emilio Guzman Marmolejo under suspicion of cooperating with the BLO in Cuernavaca, Mexico state. More than 40 firearms were seized at Marmolejo's residence.
- One unidentified person was killed and three were injured during a shootout in Torreon, Coahuila state.
Dec.20
- Soldiers arrested two men in possession of approximately 20,000 psychotropic pills and a small amount of cocaine during a routine traffic stop in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon.
Video Dispatch: The Death of a Kingpin
The killing of drug cartel chief Arturo Beltran Leyvan will set off a wave of violence throughout Mexico, as survivors strike back at the government and rival cartels seek to expand their territory, STRATFOR's Fred Burton says.
Mexico: A Cartel Leader's Death and Violence Ahead
Beltran Leyva Organization leader Arturo Beltran Levya was killed in a government raid Dec. 16. His death represents a major victory for the government of Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Even so, Beltran Leyva's death will spark violence as his group retaliates and as Mexico's cartels jockey to fill the vacuum left by his death.
Arturo Beltran Leyva, the leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), died during a Mexican Navy Special Forces raid on an apartment complex in Cuernavaca, Morelos state, late Dec. 16. Three of his bodyguards also were killed and one committed suicide during the two hour-long firefight, along with one member of the Mexican navy. The firefight involved automatic rifles and fragmentation grenades, and according to unconfirmed press reports, Arturo's brother, Hector Beltran Leyva - another high-ranking BLO leader - also was killed.
The operation represents a considerable victory for the Mexican government and Mexican President Felipe Calderon, especially given recent criticism of Mexico's current counternarcotics strategy. Still, the death of the BLO leader will create turbulence in the Mexican security landscape as other drug trafficking players seek to fill the ensuing power vacuum, especially given the BLO's extensive history of retaliatory attacks.?
The Dec. 16 raid followed a week of signals and electronic intelligence-gathering by the Mexican navy. Arturo was nearly caught the week of Dec. 6 when the Navy Special Forces raided a Christmas party hosted by the BLO leader at an estate in Tepoztlan, Morelos state, just outside Cuernavaca. Both operations were likely highly compartmentalized, i.e., known to only a few within the Mexican government. This is due to the sensitive nature of the operations and the level of penetration of the federal security apparatus by the BLO.
In the Dec. 16 raid, more than 200 Mexican Navy Special Forces troops descended on the Altitude luxury apartment complex after pinpointing the BLO's leader's exact location. Two naval helicopters were used to insert troops on the roof as well as to provide aerial surveillance. Arturo's security reportedly was deployed in concentric rings around the leader on the 12th floor of one of the six apartment buildings in the complex, a common tactic for barricaded subjects. As the special forces closed in on Arturo's location, his bodyguards reportedly threw as many as 10 fragmentation grenades. More than 500 members of the Mexican army and navy remained to secure the scene and the cadavers.
As the highest-ranking cartel leader to be toppled during Calderon's administration, the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva represents a major victory for the government. The raid highlights how the Calderon government has chosen to proceed with its strategy of deploying the military in the fight against the cartels despite mounting criticism from the political opposition and international human rights groups.
Even so, the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva will mean expanded violence, at least in the short term. The BLO has a history of extremely violent retaliation against the Mexican government and rival cartels when its leaders have been captured or even threatened.
For example, former head of the Federal Police, Edgar Millan, was assassinated just hours after he launched an operation that nearly captured Arturo Beltran Leyva in May 2008. Similarly, the son of rival Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera was shot more than 100 times and killed in May 2008 after Guzman Loera reportedly tipped off federal authorities to the location of high-ranking BLO member Alfredo Beltran Leyva. Retaliatory attacks against high-ranking federal security figures are therefore likely, and will be facilitated by BLO penetration of the federal security apparatus.
If the intelligence that resulted in Arturo Beltran-Leyva's death was provided by a rival cartel, retaliatory actions against that cartel can also be anticipated. Los Zetas, which the BLO reportedly hired to carry out the attack on El Chapo's son, could be hired to conduct some of these retaliatory attacks.
Arturo Beltran Leyva's absence from the Mexican drug-trafficking scene creates a large power vacuum as well, which will also lead to increased violence. Who will fill his role within his organization remains unclear at this time. Assuming Hector Beltran Leyva was not killed or captured in the Dec. 16 operation, he will likely take the reins of the BLO. Meanwhile, other drug-trafficking groups will likely seek to capitalize on the weakened state of the BLO. Los Zetas, which partners with the BLO, has long sought to increase their power and control in the BLO, and could seize the opportunity presented by Arturo's death to further that goal. Additionally, Guzman Loera could seek to consolidate the BLO back under his control. Either way, Arturo's death will almost certainly spark violence as these groups vie for the BLO's turf.
Mexico: Top Drug Trafficker Beltran Leyva Dead
The Mexican navy stated that Arturo Beltran Leyva, one of Mexico's most wanted drug traffickers, was killed in a shootout with state security forces, Reuters reported Dec. 17. An anonymous navy captain in Mexico City confirmed the death, adding that Beltran Leyva was killed in a navy operation in Cuernavaca.
Ecuador: 5.2 Tons Of Europe-Bound Cocaine Seized
Ecuadorean authorities at the port of Guayaquil seized 5.21 tons of cocaine from a container bound for Portugal, El Universo reported Dec. 16. Police said the cocaine was found in 27 different tanks on board. A Colombian citizen, a French national and an Ecuadorean citizen were arrested in connection with the incident.
Colombia: Security Agents, Police Arrested For Drug Trafficking
Colombian authorities arrested 15 people in the departments of Magdalena, Antioquia and Bolivar for suspected links to a criminal network trafficking narcotics to the United States and Europe, El Espectador reported Dec. 16. Five of the people in custody are agents from the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), three are policemen and one is a soldier, with the civilians. A government official said more arrests could occur in connection with this investigation, as the drug trafficking network is allegedly composed of 23 persons.
Mexico: U.S. Homeland Security Head Delivers Helicopters
John Brennan, U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, gave Mexico five Bell 412 helicopters to be used for counternarcotics operations in a ceremony in Mexico City, El Universal reported Dec. 15. According to a Mexican government official, the air force will crew the aircraft during reconnaissance and transport missions.
Mexican Drug Cartels: Two Wars and a Look Southward
In this report on Mexico's drug cartels, we assess the most significant developments of 2009 and provide an updated description of the country's powerful drug-trafficking organizations, as well as a forecast for 2010. This annual report is a product of the coverage we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo as well as the other analyses we produce throughout the year.
Two cartel wars in Mexico combined to produce record levels of violence in 2009. The first war is the struggle between the government of Mexico and the drug cartels. In a parallel war, cartels compete with one another for control of lucrative supply routes. Shortly after his inauguration in 2006, President Felipe Calderon launched a major campaign targeting the cartels, which he viewed as a major threat to Mexico's security and stability. Over the past three years, the government has weakened and fragmented some of the major cartels (namely the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels), but in the progress has upset the balance of cartel power. The result has been an increase in violence as formerly allied cartels have been pitted against each other in battles of attrition, as they fight for control of lucrative smuggling routes.
The turbulence within individual Mexican cartels that was seen in 2008 was absent in 2009, although the changes created by that turbulence have persisted, along with the divisions in previous alliances caused by Calderon's 2008 campaign against the cartels. With these continued divisions came a continuation of Calderon's strategy, and a continuation of high levels of violence.
With the success experienced in 2008, Calderon continued to pursue his strategy of deploying Mexican military personnel and federal police against the cartels. Calderon has vowed to pursue this strategy into 2010 despite mounting public criticism and issues with rising violence.
Violence in 2009 has again reached unprecedented highs. Chihuahua state has accounted for nearly half of the organized crime-related deaths in Mexico so far in 2009, despite having the highest concentration of security forces in the country. And Juarez continues to be the epicenter of the violence in Chihuahua state as the Sinaloa cartel and the Juarez cartel struggle for control of the Juarez plaza. Another large source of violence has been the emergence of La Familia on the national and international drug-trafficking scene, as the organization looks to expand its territory beyond its home of Michoacan.
The geography controlled by the various cartels has remained relatively static within Mexico, with the exception of La Familia's becoming the dominant force in Michoacan. One noticeable trend identified in 2008 was the expansion of Mexican cartel presence in Central America. The year 2009 also revealed an expansion of cartel operations south of Mexico, with a significant increase in seizures and law enforcement operations, targeting the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas in particular. The increase in seizures, along with less obvious indicators, such as the Sinaloa cartel placing a single person in charge of operations in Central America, shows the region is growing in importance to these organizations.
Cartel Membership and Organization
La Familia
La Familia has by far garnered the most media attention of all the cartels during 2009, especially after being dubbed "the most violent criminal organization in Mexico" by former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora in May. La Familia has grabbed headlines mainly because of its brazen public operations and pseudo-ideological roots. La Familia is unique among Mexico's drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in that it seems to be an ideological movement that uses the proceeds from the business side to fund the spread of its unique "religion," while most DTOs are run as strictly profit-driven businesses. In April, during a Mexican government investigation of the group, several documents were discovered, including a booklet that appears to be a moral code of conduct for La Familia members. Much of the booklet is devoted to pseudo-religious quotations from a man called "El Mas Loco" (the craziest one), also known as Nazario Moreno Gonzalez. There is, however, a major disconnect between some of the religious principles described in the documents and some of the violent crimes associated with La Familia, making it likely that the documents are more representative of the group's propaganda and rhetoric than true tenets of its ideology - perhaps to conceal its actual motives.
The increased media coverage of La Familia has resulted in increased scrutiny from the Mexican federal government. La Familia networks were the focus of a statewide corruption scandal in Michoacan in 2009 that led to the arrests and resignations of several local and state government and security officials. In addition to the corruption scandal, several high-ranking La Familia operatives were arrested as part of a joint Mexican military and Federal Police operation, including the possible fourth-in-command Luis "El 19" Ricardo Magana Mendoza, who reportedly oversaw several aspects of La Familia's operations. It remains unclear who has replaced Magana Mendoza, but his responsibilities were likely absorbed by La Familia No. 3 Servando "La Tuta" Gomez Martinez. The group's leadership is shared by Jose "El Chango" Mendez Vargas and the infamous Moreno Gonzalez, who took over control of the organization after the arrests of Carlos Rosales Mendoza and Zeta deserter Omar Lormendez Pitalua in 2004 and 2005, respectively, co-founders of the modern-day La Familia organization.
La Familia's headquarters and main area of operation are in the southwestern state of Michoacan, hence the full name of the principal group: La Familia Michoacana (LFM). The organization also has regional franchises that operate in the neighboring states of Mexico, Guerrero (La Familia Guerrerenese), Guanajuato (La Familia Guanajuatense). The organization also has a limited presence in Jalisco and Queretaro states. It is unclear the degree to which these groups coordinate and how much autonomy each possesses, although they reportedly follow the same ideology. Without direct access to the U.S.-Mexico border, La Familia is somewhat geographically constrained; the group must rely on and/or pay taxes to the organizations that control the border corridors through which La Familia product must pass.
La Familia was also the target of a 44-month U.S. law enforcement operation, dubbed "Project Coronado," in which several La Familia distribution networks across the United States were dismantled and which culminated in October with the arrests of 303 individuals. More than 1,100 people who were directly or loosely associated with LFM were arrested as a result of the operation. However, information gleaned from Project Coronado has indicated that, unlike other Mexican DTOs, La Familia takes more of a direct role in the retail distribution and sale of its narcotics inside the United States. This allows the organization to control the distribution of drugs directly to the consumer, which in turn allows it to retain a greater percentage of the profits. It also gives LFM control over an aspect of the supply chain that most drug cartels do not have, allowing La Familia to compete in terms of revenue rates with the cartels that control the upstream trafficking. LFM could be forced to employ this more direct hands-on approach to distribution in the United States because it is much smaller than Sinaloa, Los Zetas or the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), controls much less territory and gets a smaller share of the narcotics being trafficked through Mexico. By expanding business into the United States, LFM is able to leverage what little control it does have in order to gain access to the highly lucrative retail market.
Despite its high-profile public image in both Mexico and the United States, La Familia remains relatively small and geographically isolated compared to the larger and more established cartels.
Gulf Cartel
At the beginning of Calderon's campaign against the cartels, the Gulf cartel was considered the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in Mexico. At its height, in the first half of the decade, much of the Gulf cartel's true power came from its former enforcement arm, Los Zetas. Today, however, the two are separate entities, with Los Zetas the dominant organization and controlling much of the Gulf's former territory. After nearly three years of bearing the brunt of Mexican military and law enforcement efforts, the Gulf cartel is now a shell of its former self, but the long-standing connections its leaders and operators have forged from careers in the drug-trafficking industry still make the group a relevant entity on the Mexican narcotics scene. The relationship between the two organizations reportedly became strained over the course of 2009 with the Gulf leadership refusing to take orders from Los Zetas leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano in a surprising role reversal. Despite this reported rift, the two organizations continue to work together when their interests align.
The leadership of the Gulf cartel is shared between Antonio Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen, brother of former Gulf leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen, and Jorge "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez. A senior leader of the Gulf cartel and probably the third in command, Gregorio "El Caramuela" Sauceda Gamboa, was arrested by the federal police in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, in May. Reports also surfaced that Gregorio's brother, Hector "El Karis" Sauceda Gamboa, was killed in a shootout with the Mexican military in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, in February. None of these reports have been substantiated, however, and the status of Hector remains unknown. It is also unknown whether either of the brothers' roles have been delegated to a lower-level Gulf member or if Los Zetas have filled the void left in their absence (which is more likely).
Los Zetas
Over the past year, Los Zetas have held firm to their position as one of the most powerful cartels operating in Mexico and have been working to extend their presence and power southward into Central America from their core area of operations along Mexico's eastern coast and the Yucatan Peninsula. The organization remains under the control of leader "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano. There have been rumors that Lazcano Lazcano has been trying to consolidate control over what is left of the Gulf cartel and integrate the remaining personnel into Los Zetas' operations, but these reports have not been confirmed. Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales remains the second in command of the organization and oversees operations throughout Mexico and Guatemala. After a rash of arrests targeting Los Zetas at the end of 2008, which included the arrest of Los Zetas third-in-command Jamie "El Hummer" Gonzalez Duran in November of that year, it appears that Miguel Trevino Morales has taken more of an active role in operations along the Tamaulipas border region. Miguel's brother, Omar "Z-42" Trevino Morales, appears to have stepped in to fill the role of Gonzalez Duran in the wake of his arrest.
Los Zetas have concentrated much of their efforts over the past year in securing overland trafficking routes across the Mexico-Guatemala border and extending their presence and influence deeper into Guatemala and Central America. Los Zetas have fostered a well-documented relationship with Los Kaibiles (Guatemalan special forces deserters turned criminal enforcers) since at least 2006, which has helped facilitate Los Zetas' expansion into Guatemala. A Guatemalan joint military and law enforcement operation in March raided a Los Zetas camp and air strip in the border department of Ixcan that were being utilized for the tactical training of Los Zetas recruits and as a destination for aerial deliveries of cocaine from South America. This push southward has given the organization greater control of their overland cocaine supply line into Mexico and control of much of the human smuggling from Central America into Mexico and the United States. There are also reports that Los Zetas and Kaibiles were training members of the transnational street gang MS-13 from El Salvador in the Guatemalan camps - further underscoring their efforts to make inroads into Central America by co-opting the group, which is also known as the Maras.
Los Zetas continued to maintain a working relationship with the Beltran Leyva Organization throughout 2009. The two groups forged a relationship when BLO initially split from the Sinaloa cartel in late 2007. As with many inter-cartel alliances, this one formed when the two groups realized they had mutual interests, including a new common enemy in Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera and the Sinaloa cartel. It was even reported that BLO ordered the hit on El Chapo's son in Culiacan, Sinaloa, in May 2008 and that it was carried out by members of Los Zetas. Since then, Los Zetas has been working as muscle for the BLO, while the BLO has utilized the Los Zetas trafficking network to smuggle cocaine and heroin from South America into the United States.
The two organizations are trying to wrest control of the Michoacan and Guerrero regions away from La Familia in order to gain access to the lucrative Pacific ports of Lazero Cardenas and Acapulco. Over the past year, there has also been a concerted effort by the Los Zetas leadership to take a more active role in the administration and leadership of the Beltran-Leyva Organization. However, the role of Los Zetas in the BLO remains that of hired enforcers to supplement the BLO's ongoing operations as the organization pursues its own agenda. Los Zetas have also reportedly contracted themselves out to the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes (VCF) organization, also known as the Juarez cartel, to serve in an advisory and training role for the organization as they battle their common rival, the Sinaloa Cartel, for control of the Juarez border region.
Beltran Leyva Organization
After a very active 2008, the BLO maintained a relatively low profile through much of 2009. Once the BLO had secured its territory in mid-2008 after its split with the Sinaloa cartel - the BLO/Sinaloa battle for territory accounted for a significant portion of the violence in Mexico in early 2008 - the cartel focused on consolidating and streamlining its narcotics smuggling operations. After that period of consolidation, the group went on the offensive again in October and November, when it teamed up with Los Zetas to target La Familia in Guerrero and Michoacan states.
The BLO still remains under the command of self-proclaimed "Jefe de Jefes" (boss of bosses) Arturo Beltran Leyva, who is supported by a well-established network that stretches from Mexico's Pacific coast into northeastern Mexico. Arturo Beltran Leyva and Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano have also continued their working relationship throughout the year. The BLO utilizes Los Zetas power and geography to traffic cocaine overland from Guatemala into Mexico. The March arrest of Hector "La Burra" Huerta Rios, who oversaw BLO operations in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon - a Los Zetas stronghold - also indicated that the BLO was (and likely still is) utilizing Los Zetas control of the South Texas-Mexico border region to traffic its narcotics into the United States. The BLO has been in the narcotics business a long time and has perhaps the most sophisticated intelligence capacity of any of the cartels. It maintains a wide array of human intelligence sources, and arrests in recent years have demonstrated that the BLO intelligence network has penetrated every level of the Mexican government.
Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa cartel is not a single cartel group, but a network of smaller cartels headed by the world's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, who appeared on the Forbes list of the richest people in the world in 2009. In spite of the turbulence and infighting caused by the losses of the VCF and BLO from the Sinaloa federation in 2008, the Sinaloa cartel has remained resilient, active and on the offensive throughout 2009 and remains the most formidable and dominant cartel group in Mexico. Guzman's partners - Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia, Ignacio "El Nacho" Coronel Villareal and Juan "El Azul" Esparagoza Moreno - each have their own network, and they continue to work together to traffic narcotics northward from South America. The Zambada Garcia network experienced a setback when Zambada Garcia's son, Vicente Zambada Niebla, was arrested in Mexico City. Zambada Niebla was a key money launderer and financier in the organization and served in an important logistical role when needed. His absence, however, does not appear to have significantly affected the group's operations.
The conflict in Juarez and Chihuahua state between the Sinaloa cartel and the Juarez cartel has undoubtedly been the primary focus of the Sinaloa cartel over the past year. The conflict, which was initiated by the Sinaloa cartel as it attempted to wrest control of Juarez away from the Juarez cartel, has essentially resulted in a stalemate between the two groups. The pitched battle for control of the lucrative Juarez plaza is exhausting large amounts of money and other resources. The Sinaloa cartel has also remained active in Central and South America in 2009 in an attempt to exert greater control over the flow of weapons and narcotics from South America into Mexico.
The Sinaloa cartel maintains a significant presence in the territory along the Pacific coast of Mexico and the Sierra Madre Occidental. While the violence between the Sinaloa cartel and the BLO has declined significantly, the overlap in their geography has resulted in periods of open conflict, particularly in the state of Sinaloa.
There have also been reports and rumors that the Sinaloa cartel could be making another push for control of the Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo smuggling routes. While there is no indication of a push having begun yet, these rumors do not come without precedent. Much of the violence witnessed in 2007 stemmed from the Sinaloa cartel's attempts to wrest control of these same lucrative plazas away from the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas. Should Sinaloa conduct a sustained operation to take over these plazas, we can expect to see similar levels of violence, which will exacerbate already critical levels of violence in Mexico.
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization/Juarez Cartel
Also known as the Juarez cartel, the VCF is based out of the northern city of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The cartel is led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, who took over after the 1997 death of his brother, Amado, the cartel's founder. In 2009, the Juarez cartel has maintained its long-standing alliance with the Beltran Leyva Organization and reportedly has developed a working relationship with Los Zetas.
The VCF is yet another Mexican DTO that has fallen significantly in the past year. The VCF and its enforcement arm, La Linea, have been locked in a nearly two-year battle with their former partner Guzman Lorea and the Sinaloa cartel over control of the Juarez plaza. The prolonged conflict has taken its toll on the VCF and has forced the cartel to resort to other criminal activities to finance its ongoing battle, primarily kidnapping, prostitution, extortion and the retail sale of drugs to the domestic market. With the growth of the domestic market in Juarez, the VCF has begun to engage in turf battles through proxy street gangs, namely the Aztecas (the Mexican syndicate of the U.S. prison/street gang Barrio Azteca), which is a primary reason for the incredible levels of violence currently seen in Juarez. Los Aztecas are fighting against the Sinaloa cartel-affiliated gangs Artistas Asesinos and the Mexicles. The VCF, in its weakened state, has been forced to focus inward on its core geography and has not been able to project its influence any farther than the greater Juarez area.
The VCF was dealt yet another blow when the organization's number two in command, Vicente Carrillo Leyva, was arrested in Mexico City in April. Carrillo Leyva, Amado's son, reportedly was responsible for the group's financing and money-laundering operations.
Arellano Felix Organization/Tijuana Cartel
The Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), also known as the Tijuana cartel, is based in the far northwestern state of Baja California, across the border from San Diego, Calif. With the arrests of all of the Arellano Felix brothers and several other high-ranking members, infighting eventually led to the once-powerful AFO splitting into two factions in 2008 - one led by Arellano Felix's nephew, Fernando "El Ingeniero" Sanchez Arellano, and the other led by Eduardo Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental. Garcia initially sought the support of AFO rival and Sinaloa leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera after the split. As 2009 draws to a close, it is now thought that Garcia is essentially a Sinaloa proxy in the greater Tijuana area. The Sanchez faction has remained relatively dormant throughout 2009, aside from minimal levels of narcotics smuggling as seen by the discoveries of smuggling tunnels under the border.
The organization has been forced to diversify its operations into other criminal activities, such as human smuggling, prostitution, kidnapping and extortion. This was in part due to increased scrutiny by Mexican law enforcement after a spike in violence in 2008, which at its height saw more than 100 executions in one week in the greater Tijuana area. Much of the violence that has occurred in Tijuana in 2009 has been the result of these two factions fighting for control of territory. The overall level of violence in Tijuana has been far lower in 2009 than it was during the height of the conflict between the two factions in 2008.
Continued Divisions
In our 2008 cartel report, STRATFOR noted that Calderon's success in disrupting cartel activities through a military and federal law enforcement campaign, which included the arrests of high-ranking cartel members, created a year of flux for the cartels. This included divisions within the larger cartels, namely Sinaloa and Gulf. As Calderon continued to pursue his counternarcotics strategy, 2009 has seen more competition and conflict among the DTOs as new groups spun off from the parent cartels or as cartel groups sought to take control of weakened competitors' territory.
The relationship between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel, in particular, has grown more distant in 2009. As previously noted, Los Zetas was the enforcement arm of the Gulf cartel during the height of Gulf's power in the current decade. After being weakened by Mexican military and federal law enforcement operations, the Gulf cartel began to lose its grip on Los Zetas and the chain of command became blurred. In early 2008, Los Zetas stopped taking orders from the Gulf cartel and began to operate autonomously, working with whomever they pleased, while conducting business with the Gulf cartel when it happened to be mutually beneficial. Reports surfaced throughout 2009 that Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano was attempting to consolidate control over what was left of the Gulf Cartel, in an ironic role reversal. It is not clear whether Lazcano Lazcano's attempts to consolidate the Gulf Cartel were successful, but it is clear from reports that his attempts were met with some resistance by senior Gulf leaders Jorge "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez and Antonio Eziquiel "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen.
The splits in the Sinaloa cartel in 2008 were perhaps the most significant. While the Sinaloa cartel remains arguably the largest and most capable cartel in Mexico, the split of the VCF (or Juarez cartel) and the BLO from the Sinaloa cartel in 2008 was significant, and the effects of these divisions were still being felt throughout 2009. The conflict between the Juarez cartel and the Sinaloa cartel has been the most prominent issue in the Mexican cartel wars in 2009. With more than 2,100 deaths in Ciudad Juarez alone and approximately 8,500 Mexican military and federal law enforcement personnel deployed in the city as part of joint "Operation Chihuahua," this conflict has demanded the focus of all players involved.
The conflict between the Sinaloa cartel and the BLO has declined significantly in 2009, in comparison with 2008. The BLO waged a very personal battle against Sinaloa leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera and his associates during the first half of 2008, after Guzman reportedly provided information to authorities that led to the arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva. Since then, the groups' confrontations have seemingly come in cycles and in locations where their geographies overlap, namely Sinaloa state. This year, the violence between the two groups peaked during the fall marijuana harvest, since the key marijuana-producing region lies squarely in the mountains of Sinaloa. The death toll for November alone topped 100 for Sinaloa state, which prompted the deployment of 170 additional Federal Police to the state in addition to the more than 4,200 military and federal law enforcement personnel already deployed as part of joint "Operation Culiacan-Navolato."
Debate Over the Military's Mission
One of the most important facets of the Calderon government's campaign against the drug cartels has been the widespread deployment of Mexican military personnel. This has been the core of Calderon's strategy in his counternarcotics fight, and it is largely responsible for the success the government has had in weakening and splitting the cartels. While previous Mexican presidents have utilized the military for isolated counternarcotics operations, the level to which Calderon has used Mexico's armed forces is unprecedented. During Calderon's term in office, he has deployed more than 35,000 military personnel to regions throughout Mexico to carry out counternarcotics operations. However, 2009 saw a growing debate over what role the Mexican military should play in the country's war against the cartels.
Human rights organizations have expressed concern over an increase in alleged civil rights abuses by Mexican military personnel, and U.S.-based Human Rights Watch has gone so far as to call on U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not to certify Mexico's human rights record, which would effectively freeze a portion of the Merida Initiative funds allocated by the United States to aid Mexico in its counternarcotics operations. Even members of Calderon's own National Action Party (PAN) have stated that there needs to be more of a balance between the needs of the cartel war and the civil rights of Mexican citizens. The extensive use of the military in counternarcotics operations has drawn criticism from leaders of both of Mexico's main opposition parties, who claim it has also unnecessarily weakened the armed forces. In addition, the president of Mexico's Supreme Court has said the court plans to review the appropriateness of military jurisdiction in citizen complaints against soldiers.
The unprecedented use of the military to combat what is essentially a domestic law enforcement problem is due in large part to the systemic corruption in local, state and federal law enforcement ranks, which has made it necessary for the government to seek out a reasonably uncorrupted force. This has forced the military to handle tasks that would normally fall to law enforcement agencies, such as conducting security patrols, making traffic stops and manning checkpoints. As the military has taken over these tasks, it has come into almost constant contact with the civilian population, something the Mexican military is not designed, equipped or trained to do.
This increased interaction with civilians been the source of many of the human rights abuse accusations and has resulted in the current controversy. Calderon has defended the strategy, saying that the military's large role in the war against the cartels is only a temporary solution, and he has tried to minimize the criticism by involving the federal police as much as possible. But the armed forces have provided the bulk of the manpower and coordination that local, state and federal law enforcement agencies - hampered by extensive corruption and a chaotic reform process - have not been able to muster. In some cases, entire local law enforcement agencies have been dissolved for being completely corrupt, which then forces the military to absorb their responsibilities. While the primary reason for using the military is the systematic corruption of Mexican law enforcement, the more the military takes on law enforcement roles, the more vulnerable it becomes to the same corrupting influences that have plagued law enforcement.
Circumstances have left Calderon with few options: The military remains the most reliable and versatile security tool available to the Mexican government. While Calderon's goal is to hand over all law enforcement tasks to a professionalized local, state and federal law enforcement apparatus, the military will not fade away completely from Mexico's war against the cartels. In many ways, the Mexican military is the only security force with the capability to carry out essential elements of an effective counternarcotics strategy. Such tasks as technical intelligence gathering, maritime and aerial reconnaissance, and interdiction are best engaged in by the armed forces, which have the appropriate training and equipment to carry out these vital anti-cartel operations. On a more basic level, the military is also the only security force in Mexico that can match the cartels' fire power. Weapon seizures throughout Mexico routinely net fragmentation hand grenades, rocket and grenade launchers and even the occasional .50-caliber sniper rifle, arsenals that Mexican law enforcement cannot counter - especially when such weapons are wielded by ex-special forces soldiers in Los Zetas and the Kaibiles.
Any legislative or judicial effort to withdraw the armed forces from certain law enforcement tasks will leave the government with fewer options in battling the cartels and in a more precarious position. In an effort to ease some of the criticism, Calderon announced an agreement at the closing of the 27th National Public Security Council meeting in November to establish a system for evaluating security policies and force performance. However, Calderon made it clear in his November mid-term speech that the military is the only option at this point. Of course, using the military to fight the drug war also has made it vulnerable to corruption by the cartels, which have started to target military units for recruitment, and the amount of money involved will eventually cause the corruption to spread into the military just as it did into law enforcement agencies.
Trends in Violence
The last three months of 2008 saw an explosion in violence and a dramatic increase in the number of organized crime-related deaths across Mexico. The levels of violence seen at the end of 2008 persisted into 2009 and have gradually worsened. While the violence of 2008 was characterized by dramatic waves of killings as conflicts flared up in geographic areas like Tijuana and Juarez, the violence of 2009 has been far more consistent, with only minor numerical spikes, resulting in an annual trend of steadily increasing bloodshed. Estimates of the annual toll of organized crime-related deaths at the time this report was written ranged from 6,900 to more than 7,300, with only a few weeks left in 2009. Hence, 2009's death toll will easily shatter the previous annual record of approximately 5,700 set at the end of 2008.
The geography of the violence in Mexico has remained relatively static from the end of the 2008 throughout 2009. Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacan and Baja California were the five most violent Mexican states in 2009 - and all happen to be the five most violent states during Calderon's term.
Chihuahua state once again sits at the top of the list, with nearly 3,200 deaths so far in 2009, more than 2,100 of which occurred in Juarez alone. The extraordinary levels of violence seen in Juarez and Chihuahua state can be attributed to the conflict between the Sinaloa cartel and the Juarez cartel. One factor that has likely played some part in the staggering death toll in Juarez is the fact that the conflict is being played out on two levels: among cartels and among street gangs. The two enforcement arms of the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels, La Linea and Nueva Gente, respectively, have been waging war against each other since the beginning of the Juarez conflict in early 2008. However, a new front opened up in 2009 on the street. The enormous concentration of security forces in the greater Juarez area has stifled smuggling operations into the United States, which in turn has led to a flood of drugs in the greater Juarez area, drastically increasing the size of the already expanding domestic drug market. This has made retail sales in the greater Juarez area a much more reliable source of revenue, which is needed to pay for the weapons and enforcers being consumed in the battle for control of Juarez.
And this retail market is dominated by three street gangs: the Aztecas, Artistas Asesinos and Mexicles. The Juarez cartel, embroiled in a war with Sinaloa and with its international smuggling operations hampered by a growing concentration of security forces on both sides of the border, began to back its traditional street ally, the Aztecas, in a turf expansion designed to generate more income from retail sales. The Sinaloa cartel countered by backing the Artistas Asesinos and the Mexicles in their own expansion against the Aztecas. Now, not only are the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels battling over control of the Juarez smuggling corridor, they are also engaged in a proxy war over virtually every street corner in Ciudad Juarez.
Also, high levels of violence have returned to the Michoacan and Guerrero regions after a two-year lull. The violence in these two states in 2009 is due in large part to the increased activities and expansion of La Familia. That organization has conducted high-profile attacks against federal government forces operating in Michoacan as well as against its rivals in the region. Federal Police and military patrols frequently come under fire and are sometimes ambushed, with the attacks often associated with the capture of a high-ranking La Familia member. The June 11 capture of Arnaldo "La Minsa" Rueda Medina by the Federal Police sparked 14 attacks against federal police agents and military personnel, resulting in the deaths of three federal police agents and two soldiers.
From all indications, other criminal entities are treated similarly by La Familia; bodies seemingly litter the sides of rural highways and urban street corners with narcomantas (poster-board messages left next to dead bodies, usually claiming responsibility for the death of the individual or issuing a warning to a rival group or government force). These messages have often been hung on overpasses over busy highways as well throughout Michoacan and Guerrero in 2009. Many of the narcomantas left by La Familia, the BLO and Los Zetas indicate that much of the most recent violence - in October and November - has been due to a joint push by the BLO and Los Zetas for greater control of the Lazaro Cardenas and Acapulco ports, a push that is meeting heavy resistance from La Familia.
Although there have been some indications that 2009 saw an increase in the seemingly indiscriminant killings of civilians - a trend that could have serious implications for the Mexican security situation - a careful look at the situation suggests this has not really been the case. The September 2008 grenade attacks on a Mexican Independence Day celebration in Morelia, Michoacan state, caused an enormous public backlash and represented the first clear case of the intentional killing of innocents. Since then, closer investigation often reveals that so-called innocent victims may not have been so innocent. Most of them appear to have been associated with cartel targets, making them targets as well. No such case better demonstrates this than the string of cartel and gang attacks on drug rehabilitation clinics in Juarez and Chihuahua state in 2009. Gunmen entered these facilities, lined the patients up against a wall and opened fire, killing 18 in one attack and 10 in another. It was later determined that these rehabilitation clinics were being used by Juarez street gangs as venues for retail drug sales. While many victims of these attacks may not have been involved in the cartel conflict, they were essentially seen as customers or associates of the intended target, which made them all legitimate targets in the eyes of the attackers.
The Expanding Role of Central America
The geography of the Mexican cartel landscape has remained relatively unchanged since the end of 2008, with the exception of La Familia becoming the dominant force in Michoacan and Guerrero. A trend that we pointed out in 2008, the expansion of Mexican DTOs into Central America, namely Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel, has continued throughout 2009. This trend was highlighted by the discovery in March of a Los Zetas training camp in Guatemala near the Mexican border that contained a clandestine airstrip and was reportedly being used to give tactical training to local Guatemalan recruits. A Mexican national was also reportedly made head of Sinaloa operations in Central America.
The spread of Mexican DTOs into Central America stems from increased government efforts to interdict long-range aerial and maritime drug smuggling over the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. As those routes became more difficult, the Mexican DTOs increased trafficking through Central America using overland routes, short littoral maritime routes, short aerial routes or a combination of all three. This allows the DTOs to be more flexible in their logistics coordination and to be more dynamic in response to enforcement operations. Using these tactics and routes, however, significantly limits the cargo capacity due to the vehicles involved. Typically, trucks are used for overland trafficking, but the Sinaloa cartel has been known to use horses and backpackers to transport narcotics. Traffickers also typically use small "go-fast" boats that sacrifice capacity for speed. Small twin-engine planes are used to make aerial jumps toward Mexico, but due to advanced radar tracking systems and flight restrictions, these planes fly into Mexico less frequently than before. Several law enforcement operations during 2009 in Honduras discovered numerous airstrips belonging to the Sinaloa cartel. Another 2009 operation by Nicaraguan security forces targeting the Sinaloa cartel in Nicaragua revealed that the group primarily utilized the Pan-American Highway to transport its illicit cargo north.
In 2009, there has been minimal competition between any two DTOs in the Central American theater, but the Central American land-based trafficking superhighway will undoubtedly become more lucrative as interdiction efforts increase, and inter-cartel competition (and violence) is sure to follow. If the cartel dynamics in Mexico are any guide, intensifying DTO competition in Central America could have serious implications for the security of countries across the region. The investment of resources has proved profitable for the Mexican DTOs, and the ongoing allocation of more resources - particularly human resources - shows that Central America is becoming increasingly important to these organizations.
Outlook
Weakened and disrupted in 2008, the Mexican cartels somewhat solidified in their divided state in 2009, a condition that is likely to continue well into the new year. Calderon has decided to continue his current counternarcotics strategy, which has proved effective in denying the cartels uncontested control of vital territory. The lack of complete control of their geography, combined with their seemingly ever-changing organizational hierarchy, could be the recipe for internal infighting and further fractures to current cartel structures - and provide opportunities for cartels to attack rivals weakened by the government's campaign.
While Mexican security forces, mainly the military, have been able to increase the divisions among the cartels, they have not been able to quell the record-breaking violence and reduce it to politically acceptable levels. Indeed, if anything, the disruption of the cartels resulted in increased violence. Adhering to the strategy of deploying primarily military forces to fight the cartels and restore law and order, Calderon has chosen to accept a high casualty count, and due to delays in reforming the law enforcement apparatus, he has had no real alternative. A thoroughly vetted and professionalized federal police force will eventually become a viable option for a change in strategy, but the deadline for reforms to be implemented is 2012, which means at least two more years of heavy military involvement. We expect to see high levels of violence continue in Mexico throughout 2010.
Further complicating matters for Calderon were the July 2009 Mexican legislative elections, which saw a resurgence of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and an end to Calderon and PAN's majority rule. Calderon has already received much criticism over the levels of violence in the country and his strategy in fighting the cartels. The shift of legislative power to the opposition PRI will pressure the president to find an effective means of reducing the violence. Should Calderon opt for a shift in his counternarcotics strategy, it will be quite difficult without political support from the Mexican legislature.
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 14, 2009
The Guatemalan Connection
Mexican soldiers captured a suspected drug trafficking-route operator Dec. 12 in Matamoros, Tamaulipas state. Tomas Ochoa Celis Ochoa, believed to be a member of Los Zetas, was armed with an AR-15 rifle and fragmentation grenade, wore body armor and had 11 cellular phones in his possession. Cartel members often use different cellular phones to communicate with different people in an effort to confuse authorities trying to monitor cell-phone traffic. Authorities suspect that Ochoa is linked to Guatemala's Lorenzana cartel. His capture is further evidence of connections between Los Zetas and Guatemala and sheds light on the method by which narcotics are trafficked from Central America to the United States.
According to media reports, Ochoa was paid $20,000 per month to supervise the trafficking of one-ton shipments of narcotics (it is unclear if it was marijuana or cocaine) through Mexico. Ochoa had previously served a nine-year sentence in Texas for smuggling marijuana and possessing weapons illegally, indicating that he likely has contacts in the United States as well in Guatemala, making him a valuable point-man for moving contraband through Mexico. His affiliation with Los Zetas would ensure him safe passage through the country and give him access to lower-level members who would assist him in his trafficking efforts. Ochoa appears to be a mid-level go-between for the various cartels involved, meaning that his arrest will not likely have a significant impact on drug trafficking through Mexico.
This is only the latest in a series of cases over the past year that have shed light on Los Zetas and their connection to Guatemala. These cases include the discovery of a Los Zetas training camp by Guatemalan police, the arrest of high-level Los Zetas members and the increasing importance of Central America to trafficking drugs from South America to Mexico and the United States.
Garrison Attack in Michoacan
Three Federal Police officers were injured during an attack Dec. 12 on a garrison in Uruapan, Michoacan state. The attack came just days after a prominent La Familia Michoacana (LFM) member, Servando Gomez Martinez ("La Tuta"), was nearly arrested by police. Martinez is ranked number three in the LFM hierarchy and in charge of operations for the cartel. He is best known for asking the Mexican federal government to sign a truce with LFM in July. He also warned President Felipe Calderon in a televised message that Mexico's federal police chief, Genaro Garcia Luna, was colluding with the Beltran Leyva Organization and Los Zetas.
LFM is the most aggressive cartel in Michocan state and has frequently targeted police forces. The Dec. 12 attack in Uruapan was likely a retaliatory strike for security forces targeting Martinez. Such strikes are a common tactic among Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and one frequently associated with LFM.
Bus Attack in Chihuahua
One person was killed, several others injured and eight people are still missing after an attack Dec. 9 on a bus in El Chihuite, Chihuahua state. Attacks on buses are fairly common in Mexico, since that particular mode of public transportation is a popular way to traffic people and drugs into the United States. It is not clear why this particular bus was attacked, but the fact that eight of the occupants are missing means that they were likely the target of an abduction or execution. Both La Linea (an enforcer group linked to the Vicente Carillo Fuentes [VCF] cartel in Juarez) and Nueva Gente (linked to the Sinaloa cartel) are very active in Chihuahua, and their frequent attacks against each other have helped make the state the most deadly in Mexico's war against the cartels.
The fact that this attack occurred in southern Chihuahua state suggests that it was more likely Nueva Gente that carried it out. The VCF's area of influence does not stretch very far outside the city limits of Juarez.
High-value targets don't take buses, so it is likely that the assailants were after individual drug traffickers or low-level cartel employees. El Chihuite also is in a fairly isolated area of Chihuahua, making it an ideal spot for ambushing a bus without alerting police, military units or rival groups.
Dec. 7
- Unknown attackers detonated three grenades in the cities of Hermosilla, Navojoa and Cananea in Sonora state. Three persons were injured and several buildings, including a government office, were damaged.
- Soldiers arrested six suspected kidnappers, including the brother of a former state police chief, in Tulum, Quintana Roo state.
Dec. 8
- At least three unidentified gunmen shot and killed a man, identified as Isidro Vega Garcia, in Cotija, Michoacan state. Garcia was shot at least 20 times with automatic weapons.
- More than 50 gunmen from unidentified groups engaged in a firefight near El Burrion, Sinaloa state. One unidentified person was found dead at the scene and six police patrol vehicles were damaged. No police casualties were reported.
- Soldiers and state investigators killed 10 suspected cartel members in the town of Ramon Corona, in Cuencame municipality, Durango state. State investigative head Ramon Rosales Sida, an aide and a soldier were injured in the shootout. Authorities freed six kidnapped persons and captured 20 rifles.
- Unknown gunmen killed two men at a nightclub in Valle del Carrizo, Sinaloa state.
Dec. 9
- Unknown assassins shot and killed Mazatlan, Sinaloa state ministerial police chief Mario Garzon Hernandez. Despite a police search, no arrests were made.
Dec. 10
- Two federal police officers injured Dec. 9 in a firefight in Apatzingan, Michoacan state, died of their wounds. Four suspected criminals died and three federal agents were injured during the incident.
- A policeman was killed during a car theft in the Jardines del Pedregal neighborhood of Mexico City.
- Soldiers and federal agents captured 18 firearms and more than 1,000 cartridges of varying calibers during a raid on a house in the Esmeralda neighborhood of Colima, Colima state.
- Police discovered the decapitated body of a man on the highway to Chapala near Ixtlahuacan, Jalisco state.
Dec. 11
- Soldiers captured suspected Gulf cartel drug trafficking-route operator Tomas Ochoa Celis in Tamaulipas state. Ochoa is believed to be a member of Los Zetas and authorities suspect he has links to Guatemala's Lorenzana cartel.
- Unknown gunmen killed six members of a family in a house in San Lorenzo Cuauhtenco, Mexico state. Police found five uninjured children who had been locked in a closet by the suspects before the adult family members were killed.
- Soldiers arrested four men in Boca del Rio, Veracruz state, for possession six firearms, several grenades and nearly 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
- Federal police arrested an unknown number of suspected Gulf cartel kidnappers in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. The suspects are believed to have kidnapped, tortured or extorted immigrants headed to the United States.
- Three persons were killed during a shootout between soldiers and suspected drug traffickers in Limoneros, Morelos state.
Dec. 12
- Three policemen were injured during an attack by unknown persons on a police garrison in Uruapan, Michoacan state.
- Naval personnel arrested 11 suspected members of the Beltran Leyva Organization during a raid in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Authorities seized 20 weapons, 1,700 cartridges and six fragmentation grenades.
Dec. 13
- Unknown persons beat an unidentified man and tied him to a train track in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon state. The man was subsequently killed by a passing train.
- Police arrested a woman in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, after discovering 54 kilograms of marijuana in her vehicle during a traffic stop.
Mexico: Suspected Drug Trafficker Captured In Tamaulipas
Mexican authorities arrested suspected Gulf cartel drug-trafficking route operator Tomas Ochoa Celis in Tamaulipas state, El Universal reported Dec. 11. Ochoa, who is believed to also be a member of Los Zetas, allegedly smuggled cocaine from Guatemala to Tamaulipas, where it was stored in warehouses for shipment to the United States. Ochoa is additionally suspected of links to the Lorenzana cartel in Guatemala.
Mexico: Gunmen Kill Chief Police Investigator In Mazatlan
Gunmen killed Mario Garzon Hernandez, investigative chief of Mexico's Mazatlan, Sinaloa state federal ministerial police, as he headed to work Dec. 9, Milenio reported. Police said no arrests were made, despite a search of the area.
Mexico: The War with the Cartels in 2009
By Scott Stewart and Alex Posey
Editor's Note: This week's Global Security & Intelligence Report is an abridged version of STRATFOR's annual report on Mexico's drug cartels. The full report, which includes extensive diagrams depicting the leadership of each cartel, will be available to our members next week.
There are two cartel wars currently raging in Mexico that have combined to produce record levels of violence in 2009. The first war is the struggle between the government of Mexico and the drug cartels. The second, a parallel war, is the fight among the various cartels as they compete for control of lucrative supply routes. Shortly after his inauguration in December 2006, President Felipe Calderon launched an all-out effort to target the cartels, which he viewed as a major threat to Mexico's security and stability. Over the past three years, the government's effort has weakened and fragmented some of the major cartels (namely the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels), but this government progress has upset the balance of power among the cartels, which has resulted in increased violence. Former cartel allies have been pitted against each other in bloody battles of attrition as rival cartels have tried to take advantage of their weakened competitors and seize control of smuggling routes.
In this year's report on Mexico's drug cartels, we assess the most significant developments of the past year and provide an updated description of the country's powerful drug-trafficking organizations as well as a forecast for 2010. This annual report is a product of the coverage we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo as well as other analyses we produce throughout the year.
Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations
La Familia: This cartel has garnered a great deal of media attention during the past year, especially after being labeled in May "the most violent criminal organization in Mexico" by former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora. La Familia has grabbed headlines mainly because of its brazen attacks against government forces and its pseudo-ideological roots. In spite of its public image, the La Familia organization still remains relatively small and geographically isolated compared to the larger and more established cartels. The La Familia organization's headquarters and main area of operation is in the southwestern state of Michoacan, hence the name of the principal group: La Familia Michoacana. The organization also has regional franchises that operate in the neighboring states of Guerrero, Guanajuato and Mexico, as well as a limited presence in Jalisco and Queretaro states. The degree to which these groups coordinate with each other and how much autonomy they possess is unclear, though they all reportedly follow the same cult-like ideology. Without direct access to the U.S.-Mexico border, La Familia is geographically constrained and must pay "taxes" to the organizations that control the border corridors through which La Familia's product is moved.
Gulf cartel: At the beginning of Calderon's campaign against the cartels, the Gulf cartel was considered the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in Mexico. After nearly three years of bearing the brunt of Mexican law enforcement and military efforts, however, the Gulf cartel is today only a shell of its former self. At its height, a great deal of the Gulf cartel's power came from its former enforcement arm, Los Zetas. Today the two are separate entities, with Los Zetas being the dominant organization and controlling much of the Gulf cartel's former territory. The relationship between the two organizations reportedly was somewhat strained over the past year when the Gulf cartel leadership refused to take orders from Los Zetas chief Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano. Despite this rift, the two organizations continue to work together when their interests align.
Los Zetas: Over the past year, the group has held firm its position as one of the most powerful cartels operating in Mexico while trying to extend its presence southward into Central America from its core area of operations along Mexico's eastern coast and the Yucatan Peninsula. The organization remains fully under the control of "El Lazca." There have been rumors that Lazcano Lazcano has tried to consolidate control over what is left of the Gulf cartel over the past year and integrate the remaining personnel into Los Zetas' operations, but these reports have not been confirmed. Los Zetas have a well-documented relationship with Los Kaibiles (Guatemalan special forces deserters turned criminal muscle) since at least 2006, which has helped facilitate Los Zetas' expansion into Guatemala. A Guatemalan joint military and law enforcement operation in March raided a Los Zetas camp and air strip in the border department of Ixcan that were being utilized for the tactical training of Los Zeta recruits as well as a destination for aerial deliveries of cocaine - further indication that Los Zetas have an established presence in Guatemala. This push southward has given the organization greater control of its overland cocaine supply line into Mexico and enabled it to control much of the human smuggling from Central America into Mexico and the United States.
Los Zetas have also worked with the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) throughout 2009. The two organizations are currently trying to wrest control away from La Familia in the Michoacan and Guerrero regions to gain access to the lucrative Pacific ports of Lazaro Cardenas and Acapulco. There has also been a concerted effort by the Los Zetas leadership to become stakeholders in the BLO over the past year, but currently their role remains that of hired muscle to supplement the BLO's ongoing operations as the organization pursues its own agenda. Los Zetas have also contracted themselves out to the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization, also known as the Juarez cartel, to serve as advisers and trainers for the organization as they both battle their common rival, the Sinaloa cartel, for control over the Juarez border region.
Beltran-Leyva Organization: After a very active 2008, the BLO has kept a relatively low profile throughout much of 2009. After the BLO secured control of its territory in mid-2008 following its split with the Sinaloa cartel (the BLO/Sinaloa battle for territory accounted for a significant portion of the violence in Mexico in early 2008), the cartel was able to concentrate on consolidating and streamlining its narcotics smuggling operations. After the consolidation, the group went on the offensive again in October and November when it teamed up with Los Zetas to target La Familia in Guerrero and Michoacan states. The BLO remains under the command of Arturo Beltran Leyva, who is supported by a well-established network along Mexico's Pacific coast and into northeastern Mexico. The BLO has been in the narcotics business a long time and has perhaps the most sophisticated intelligence capability of any of the cartels.
Sinaloa cartel: In spite of losing some of its former allies like the Carrillo Fuentes Organization and the BLO in 2008, the Sinaloa cartel remains the most formidable and dominant cartel in Mexico today. Headed by the world's most wanted drug lord, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, the Sinaloa cartel demonstrated its resiliency in 2009 and remained quite active throughout the year. Guzman's partners, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia, Ignacio "El Nacho" Coronel Villareal and Juan "El Azul" Esparragoza Moreno, each have their own respective networks and continue to work together when necessary to traffic narcotics northward from South America.
The conflict in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua state between the Sinaloa cartel and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (VCF), also known as the Juarez cartel, has undoubtedly been the primary focus of the Sinaloa cartel over the past year. The conflict has essentially resulted in a stalemate between the two organizations as they battle for control over the lucrative Juarez plaza. The Sinaloa cartel still maintains a significant presence in the territory along the Pacific coast of Mexico and the Sierra Madre Occidental. While violence has lessened significantly between the Sinaloa cartel and the BLO, their overlapping geography continues to generate some conflict between the two organizations, particularly in the state of Sinaloa. The Sinaloa cartel has also remained active in Central and South America throughout 2009 as it attempts to exert greater control over the flow of weapons and narcotics from South America to Mexico.
The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization/Juarez cartel: The VCF is based out of the northern city of Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua state. The cartel is led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, who took over after the 1997 death of his brother and cartel founder Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Throughout 2009, the Juarez cartel has maintained its long-standing alliance with the BLO, which is helping the VCF in its vicious battle with the Sinaloa cartel for control of Juarez.
The VCF is yet another Mexican drug trafficking organization (DTO) that has fallen significantly in the past few years. The VCF and its enforcement arm, La Linea, have been locked in a battle for nearly two years with their former partners from the Sinaloa cartel for control over the lucrative Juarez plaza. The prolonged conflict has taken its toll on the VCF and has forced the cartel to resort to other criminal activities to finance its battle for Juarez, primarily kidnapping, human trafficking, prostitution, extortion and the retail sale of drugs to the domestic Mexican market. In its weakened state, the VCF has been forced to focus almost all of its efforts on fighting the Sinaloa cartel and has not been able to effectively project its influence much farther than the greater Juarez area.
Arellano Felix Organization/Tijuana cartel: The Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) - also known as the Tijuana cartel - is based in the far northwestern state of Baja California, across the border from San Diego. With the arrests of all the Arellano Felix brothers and several other high-ranking members, infighting has caused the once-powerful AFO to be split into two competing factions - one led by Arellano Felix nephew Fernando "El Ingeniero" Sanchez Arellano and the other led by Eduardo Teodoro "El Teo" Garcia Simental. Garcia initially sought the support of the rival Sinaloa cartel and it is now thought that the Garcia faction is essentially a Sinaloa proxy in the greater Tijuana area. The Sanchez faction has remained relatively dormant in 2009. The organization has been forced to diversify its operations into other criminal activities, such as kidnapping, human trafficking, prostitution and extortion. This was due in part to increased scrutiny by Mexican law enforcement after an extraordinary spike in violence in 2008 that saw, at its height, more than 100 executions during one week in the greater Tijuana area. Much of the violence that has occurred in Tijuana in 2009 has been a result of clashes between these two rival factions. The overall level of violence in Tijuana has been far lower in 2009 than it was during the height of the conflict in 2008.
Debate Over the Military's Mission
One of the most important facets of the Calderon government's campaign against the drug cartels has been the widespread deployment of Mexican military personnel. While previous presidents have used the military for isolated counternarcotics operations, the level to which Calderon has used Mexico's armed forces in that role is unprecedented. During Calderon's term in office, he has deployed more than 35,000 military personnel to a number of regions throughout Mexico to carry out counternarcotics operations. Because of this, 2009 witnessed a growing debate over the role of the Mexican military in the country's war against the cartels.
Domestic and international human rights organizations have expressed concerns over an increase in alleged civil rights abuses by Mexican military personnel, and U.S.-based Human Rights Watch has even gone so far as to call on U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not to certify Mexico's human rights record, which would effectively freeze a portion of the Merida Initiative funds allocated by the United States to aid Mexico in its counternarcotics campaign. Even members of Calderon's own National Action Party have stated that there needs to be a better balance between the needs of the cartel war and the civil rights of Mexican citizens.
The Calderon administration's unprecedented use of the military is due in large part to the seemingly systemic corruption in the ranks of local, state and even federal law enforcement agencies in Mexico. Less corrupted as an institution, the military has been increasingly called upon to handle tasks that would normally fall under the responsibilities of law enforcement such as conducting security patrols, making traffic stops and manning checkpoints. As the military has taken over these traditional law enforcement tasks, it has come into closer contact with the Mexican civilian population, which has resulted in human rights-abuse accusations and the current controversy.
Calderon has defended this strategy saying that the military's large role in the war against the cartels is only a temporary solution and has tried to minimize the criticism by involving the federal police as much as possible. But it has been the armed forces that have provided the bulk of the manpower and coordination that federal police agencies - hampered by rampant corruption and a tumultuous reform process - have not been able to muster.
Calderon is aware that it is not ideal to use the military in this capacity, but the fact is that the military remains the most reliable and versatile security tool presently available to the Mexican government. While Calderon's ultimate goal is to professionalize and completely hand over all the traditional law enforcement tasks to the federal police, the military will be needed to help in Mexico's war against the cartels for the foreseeable future. The Mexican government has no other option. It will be years before the federal police will have the capability and manpower required to take over the missions currently being performed by the military.
Trends in Violence
As noted in last year's cartel report, the last three months of 2008 saw an explosion in violence and a dramatic increase in the number of cartel-related deaths across Mexico. The levels of violence seen at the end of 2008 have persisted into 2009 and have gradually worsened over the course of the year. Estimates of the current death toll for organized crime-related deaths in Mexico at the time this report was written ranged from 6,900 to more than 7,300. The previous yearly record was 5,700 deaths in 2008.
The geography of the violence in Mexico has remained relatively static from the end of the 2008 through 2009. Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacan and Baja California were the five most violent states in 2009 - and all happen to be the top five in terms of violence throughout Calderon's term. Chihuahua state once again sits atop the list as the most violent state, with more than 3,200 deaths so far in 2009, and more than 2,100 in Juarez alone. The extraordinary levels of violence seen in Juarez and Chihuahua state can be directly attributed to the ongoing conflict between the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez cartel and their street-gang proxies.
High levels of violence returned to Michoacan and Guerrero states in 2009 due in large part to the increased activities and expansion of the La Familia organization. La Familia has launched numerous high-profile attacks against the military and law enforcement personnel operating in Michoacan as well as its rivals in the region. Federal police and military patrols in the region frequently come under fire and are sometimes ambushed by La Familia gunmen. The attacks on security personnel are often associated with the capture of a high-ranking La Familia member.
While Mexican security forces have been able to weaken and divide some of the more powerful cartels, this diminution of cartel power has actually spawned even more violence as the organizations scramble to retain control of their territory or to steal turf from other cartels. Over the past few decades, the only time intercartel violence has diminished has been during periods of stability and equilibrium among the competing cartels, and the Mexican government's anti-drug operations will not allow for such stability and equilibrium. This means we can expect to see the high level of violence continue between the government and the cartels, and among the competing cartels, throughout 2010.
Honduras: Anti-Drug-Trafficking Chief Killed
Honduras' general director in charge of combating drug trafficking, Julian Aristides Gonzalez, was shot dead Dec. 8 on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa, the AP reported, citing a police spokesman. Gonzalez was traveling in his car when two gunmen on motorcycles opened fire at close range on his vehicle.
Honduras: Retired Colonel Shot Dead
Gunmen killed retired Honduran army colonel Osiris O'Connor and his driver near the village of El Eden on Dec. 8, Proceso Digital reported, citing Honduran police. O'Connor, reportedly a cousin of interim President Roberto Micheletti, formerly served as head of the Honduran navy.
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 7, 2009
Zeta Prison Break
Presumed members of Los Zetas staged a brazen prison raid Dec. 4 in Escobedo, Nuevo Leon state, killing two state police officers guarding the prison and freeing 23 inmates. At the same time in nearby Juarez, Zetas engaged a Mexican military unit in a firefight in an apparent attempt to distract the superior security force away from the prison. While details are still coming in, the incident highlights the uphill battle the Mexican government is fighting as it tries to professionalize its law enforcement ranks.
The firefight in Juarez resulted in the deaths of 12 members of Los Zetas, including Ricardo "El Gori" Almanza Morales, the group's regional leader in Monterrey. Nevertheless, the engagement served its purpose. As the firefight was under way, a Chevrolet pickup truck rammed the gates of the prison in Escobedo, whereupon armed men entered the facility and killed the two guards. The men then were able to free the prisoners, who included 16 former Garcia municipal police officers charged with colluding with organized crime after an investigation into the death of the Garcia police. Members of the federal police unit charged with guarding the prison were inexplicably off-site eating, leaving the prison very vulnerable.
Los Zetas have shown before that they will go to great lengths to protect and rescue fellow members and associates. A similar well-planned and coordinated operation took place in May in Zacatecas that freed more than 50 prisoners, although not a single shot was fired. This indicated that several - if not all - of the prison guards were complicit in the operation. The use of diversionary tactics in Juarez suggests a similarly high level of operational planning and coordination in the Escobedo prison break. It is also testament to the extent to which Los Zetas have penetrated local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and further indicates the level of corruption that still exists as Mexican President Felipe Calderon continues his security reforms.
A March Against Violence in Ciudad Juarez
On Dec. 6, in Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua state, some 5,000 citizens took to the streets during noon hour to protest the presence of the Mexican military and federal police and the high levels of violence in the city. The citizens were complaining that the presence of the federal forces has served only to fuel the violence rather than suppress it and that the federal personnel were running protection rackets against businesses and private citizens. The presence and use of the Mexican military on the streets of Mexican cities has come under increased scrutiny as allegations of human rights violations have mounted and its effectiveness has come into question.
Violence has continued to rise in the Juarez metropolitan area despite its having the highest concentration of security forces in the country - some 8,500 personnel. Nevertheless, more than 2,200 organized-crime related deaths have occurred so far this year. Still, the military seems to be the only viable option for the Mexican government, at least at the moment. While the military is not immune to corruption, Mexican law enforcement agencies are notoriously more corrupt, and none more so than the Juarez police (the enforcement arm for the Juarez cartel, La Linea, consists of former and current Juarez police officers).
The cartels have not ignored the public's frustration over the Mexican military operating in its midst. Cartels have gone as far as to pay private citizens to protest the military's presence. While there is no indication that there was any cartel involvement in the Dec. 6 protests in Juarez, the cartels undoubtedly are taking note and will likely leverage the growing public frustration.
Nov. 30
- Two men were reportedly kidnapped by a group of armed men in Ecuandureo, Michoacan state. Their bodies were later found with several gunshot wounds.
- Three Mexican nationals were arrested in the Panama City International Airport for trying to smuggle cocaine inside their stomachs. The group was allegedly coming from Bolivia and bound for Guadalajara, in Jalisco state.
- A kidnapping victim of Los Zetas who was rescued Nov. 25 from a safe house in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, and had agreed to cooperate with authorities, was found decapitated.
Dec. 1
- Six men were kidnapped by a group of armed men in Ecuandureo, Michoacan.
- Four individuals set fire to 28 vehicles that were supposed to be delivered to the Tijuana Municipal Public Security Secretariat in Tijuana, Baja California state.
- An Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) activist was gunned down by a group of several armed men at a restaurant inside the Nuevo Santa Fe Hotel in Oaxaca, Oaxaca state.
- Edgar Enrique Bayardo de Villar, former director of operations for the Federal Preventive Police and an informant for Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, was assassinated by two men in a Starbucks cafe in Mexico City.
Dec. 2
- Three men were found dead with their hands and feet bound in separate locations around the city of Acapulco, Guerrero state. On two of the bodies were messages from Arturo "El Jefe de Jefes" Beltran-Leyva.
- A fragmentation grenade detonated outside the Union de Isidoro Montes de Oca Municipal Investigative Police station in Guerrero state. There were no reported injuries or damage reported.
- The body of a man showing signs of torture and 30 stab wounds was discovered in the Tiamba neighborhood of Uruapan, Michoacan state.
- Roberto Torres Salinas, director of operations for the Public Security Secretariat in Gomez Palacio, Durango state, was assassinated by a group of armed men. Torres Salinas reportedly was shot more than 50 times as he arrived at his home.
Dec. 3
- Federal police arrested 13 men who allegedly worked for the Arellano Felix Organization to construct a smuggling tunnel in Tijuana, Baja California, that ran under the border into the United States.
- Members of the federal police arrested three individuals reportedly associated with a kidnapping cell of the La Familia Michoacana organization in Morelia, Michoacan.
- A municipal police patrol in San Francisco de los Romo, Aguascalientes state, was ambushed by a group of armed men. Two of the officers were killed and three were wounded.
- The U.S. Department of Treasury designated 22 individuals and 10 companies associated with the Beltran-Leyva Organization as "specially designated narcotics traffickers." This effectively freezes any of the designees' financial assets in the United States and forbids any U.S. citizens from conducting financial or commercial transactions with individuals or companies listed.
- The brother of Joel Torres Felix, a PRI leader in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, was gunned down by a group of armed men in the southern outskirts of Culiacan.
- Five people were killed, including a federal police agent and commander, in a firefight between state and federal law enforcement agencies and suspected drug traffickers at a safe house in Coyuca de Catalan, Guerrero.
Dec. 4
- Members of the anti-kidnapping force of the Morelos attorney general's office arrested six members of the kidnapping gang Los Yeseros in Cuernavaca.
- A federal police agent was gunned down in Escuinapa, Sinaloa state, by a group of men travelling in a car armed with AK-47s.
- Los Zetas staged an operation to free 23 of their associates from a prison in Escobedo, Nuevo Leon, killing two guards in the process. A diversionary fire fight with a military unit in Juarez resulted in 12 Zetas being killed, including Monterrey Zeta leader Ricardo "El Gori" Almanza Morales.
Dec. 5
- Members of the Mexican army and navy detained nine suspected kidnappers who had hours earlier kidnapped a truck driver and stole his load of 30,000 liters of diesel.
- Mexico extradited Francisco Javier Mora to the United States to stand trial for the trafficking of cocaine and methamphetamine and Fermin Bucheta Temich to be tried for the sexual abuse of a minor.
Dec. 6
- A group of armed men assassinated a man outside his home in Uruapan, Michoacan.
- The Mexican Navy announced the seizure of 262 kilograms of cocaine and four speed boats and the arrest of nine individuals after a joint U.S. Coast Guard and Mexican navy operation in the Pacific Ocean near the Mexico-Guatemala border.
- Some 5,000 citizens of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state, took to the streets to protest the presence of the Mexican military and federal police and the high levels of violence in the city.
Mexico: Residents Of Drug War City Call On Army To Leave
Thousands of people dressed in white demanded soldiers leave Mexico's most violent city, accusing troops of provoking a surge in drug-war killings and running protection rackets, Reuters reported Dec. 7. Police and local media said around 5,000 people marched through Ciudad Juarez on the U.S. border, many with white balloons and holding signs stating "Leave Juarez, soldiers and federal police."
Latin America
Situation Reports
'La Familia' North of the Border
By Ben West and Fred Burton
In an indictment handed down Nov. 20, the U.S. Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois accused 15 individuals of being involved in the trafficking of cocaine and other narcotics in the Chicago area. The 15 were arrested in a nationwide counter-narcotics operation led by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) dubbed "Project Coronado," which was aimed at dismantling the drug trafficking network of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), a mid-sized and relatively new drug cartel based in Michoacan state in southwestern Mexico.
The U.S. investigation of LFM has revealed many details about the operation of the group in the United States and answered some important questions about the nature of Mexican drug trafficking and distribution north of the border.
LFM stands out among the various drug cartels that operate throughout Mexico for several reasons. Unlike other drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that have always been focused on drug trafficking, LFM first arose in Michoacan several years ago as a vigilante response to kidnappers and drug gangs. Before long, however, LFM members were themselves accused of conducting the very crimes they had opposed, including kidnapping for ransom, cocaine and marijuana trafficking and, eventually, methamphetamine production. The group is now the largest and most powerful criminal organization in Michoacan - a largely rural state located on Mexico's southwestern Pacific coast - and maintains a significant presence in several surrounding states.
Beyond its vigilante origins, LFM has also set itself apart from other criminal groups in Mexico by its almost cult-like ideology. LFM leaders are known to distribute documents to the group's members that include codes of conduct and pseudo-religious quotations from Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, also known as "El Mas Loco" ("the craziest one"), who appears to serve as a sort of inspirational leader of the group.
Unanswered Questions
In April 2009, STRATFOR published a report on the dynamics of narcotics distribution in the United States. It laid out the differences between trafficking (transporting large quantities of drugs from the suppliers to the buyers over the most efficient routes possible) and distribution (the smaller scale, retail sale of small quantities of drugs over a broader geographic area) as well as the various gangs on the U.S. side that are involved in drug trafficking. The report outlined the differences in the resources and skills required to transport tons of narcotics hundreds of miles through Mexico versus picking up those loads at the border and managing the U.S. retail networks that distribute narcotics to the individual buyers on the street.
In our April analysis, we identified several intelligence gaps in the interface between the Mexican-based drug traffickers (such as the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran-Leyva Organization [BLO] and Los Zetas) and the U.S.-based drug distributors (such as MS-13, Barrio Azteca and the Mexican Mafia). One question we were left with was: How deeply involved are the Mexican DTOs in the U.S. distribution network? While it appeared that narcotics changed hands at the border, it wasn't clear how or even whether the relationships between gangs and drug traffickers had an effect on the distribution of narcotics within the United States. Although we suspected it, there was little evidence that showed cartel involvement in the downstream or retail distribution of narcotics in the U.S. market.
Command and Control in Chicago
Now there is evidence. The indictment handed down Nov. 20 in Chicago clearly alleges that a criminal group in Chicago was directly conspiring with the drug trafficking organization LFM to distribute shipments of cocaine. The indictment specifically links the criminal group in Chicago to LFM and labels it a "command and control group" run by someone in Michoacan. While the indictment only referred to this person as "individual A," we suspect that the unidentified person was LFM operational manager Servando Gomez Martinez, the second in command of LFM. The manager of the Chicago command and control group, Jorge Luis Torres-Galvan, and the distribution supervisor, Jose Gonzalez-Zavala, were allegedly in regular contact with their manager in Mexico, updating him on accounting issues and relying on him to authorize which wholesale distributors the group could do business with in the United States.
These wholesale distributors also appear to have had close ties to the command and control group. According to the indictment, they were allowed to sell cocaine on consignment - they could wait to pay Zavala once the entire load was sold - an agreement that indicates a great deal of trust between the supplier and the retail distributor. It was likely a matter of the LFM commander in Mexico authorizing their involvement and probably was based on an existing business or extended-family relationship. Due to LFM's ideological basis, its members should be thought of more as adherents than employees. The group does not operate using the same business objectives as most other major DTOs, so we would expect personal relationships to be more valued than strictly business relationships among LFM members.
Another member of the group, Jorge Guadalupe Ayala-German, allegedly operated stash houses in the Chicago area where deliveries of narcotics would come in and shipments of cash would leave. The indictment says Ezequel Hernandez-Patino was responsible for physically delivering the shipments of cocaine to the wholesale distributors, and Ismail Flores with Oscar Bueno were responsible for transporting money south to Dallas, where they would deliver cash proceeds from the sale of cocaine and pick up more cocaine to sell. The indictment does not indicate that Flores or Bueno supplied any other markets between Dallas and Chicago, which suggests that the Chicago-based LFM members were fairly compartmentalized.
Project Coronado
The larger operation from which the Chicago indictment emerged, the DEA-led Project Coronado, was a joint operation with the FBI, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and numerous other agencies. It followed several similar nationwide sweeps such as Operation Xcellerator, a multi-year effort to dismantle the Sinaloa cartel's connections in the United States, and Project Reckoning, which went after a Gulf cartel network in the United States that was trafficking cocaine to Italy. Under Project Coronado, the DEA, FBI and ATF, along with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, have made a total of almost 1,200 arrests, seized $32.8 million in U.S. currency and seized 11.7 tons of marijuana, methamphetamines, cocaine and heroin since the operation began in 2005. Dozens of other indictments and criminal complaints (in addition to the Chicago indictment) have been unsealed against associates of the group across the country since Oct. 22, the official culmination of Project Coronado.
The other cases revealed more details about LFM's operations in the United States: how it trafficked methamphetamines and cocaine from Mexico to Dallas, how a cell in Nashville was supplied by a distribution hub in Atlanta, and how a group in New York had obtained automatic assault rifles, high-caliber pistols and ammunition with the intent to smuggle those weapons back to Mexico to supply LFM. LFM has been responsible for a substantial level of violence in southwestern Mexico, and former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Morina Mora recently called it the most dangerous cartel in Mexico.
The Northern District of Texas had the most cases as a result of Project Coronado. It appears that Dallas was a major U.S. hub for LFM, where it managed drug shipments from Mexico to other regions (Chicago and Arkansas were specifically mentioned) and the collection of cash from those distributors before shipping the cash back to Mexico. Dallas is a logical hub for such activity because of its proximity to Mexico and its location along Interstate 35 and Interstate 20, which link Dallas to the rest of the United States as well as points to the south. In at least one case, an individual attempting to smuggle four kilograms of methamphetamines to Dallas passed through the McAllen, Texas, border crossing on a passenger bus but was interdicted by police.
Most indictments (including the one in Chicago) pointed out that LFM groups in the United States conducted countersurveillance while moving drug shipments. On one occasion, accused Dallas drug distributor Soto Cervantes changed the location of a meet-up point when he learned that the person he was meeting suspected that he was being followed. The change in location caused the police (who were indeed following the transporter) to call off the surveillance mission in order to not compromise their investigation. As a result, authorities relied primarily on electronic surveillance of the suspects' communications through wiretaps on home and cellular phones - of which the suspects had many and which they changed frequently.
There were other cases when police were unable to follow suspects due to such surveillance detection tactics, when targeted traffickers called off meetings and changed vehicles in an effort to confuse police. While seemingly simple, these tactics indicate a higher degree of tradecraft and professionalism among the suspects linked to LFM, who don't appear to be members of run-of-the-mill street gangs. It is unclear if these tactics have been institutionalized in the LFM network, but judging by the frequency that police encountered them in various U.S. cities during Project Coronado, they appear to be a standard practice for many if not all LFM members.
Implications
The details released in the Nov. 20 indictment provide solid evidence that drug trafficking organizations in Mexico (specifically LFM) have established command and control groups inside the United States that report to and receive orders from commanders in Mexico. And this shows that LFM has had an international presence far beyond what we originally suspected and is not just a small-time trafficking group in southwestern Mexico.
Whereas most drug distribution in the United States is carried out by individual gangs serving their own interests and operating on their own familiar turf, the criminal group in Chicago working for LFM was carrying out orders issued by a drug trafficking organization some 3,000 miles away. And based on the interaction the Chicago group had with its contact in Mexico, the use of such tactics as countersurveillance measures, the coordination among groups in different cities and reports from STRATFOR sources within U.S. counternarcotics agencies, it is likely that the individual in Mexico was managing several groups throughout the United States.
Most criminal enterprises avoid this kind of command and control structure for two reasons. First, distribution in a foreign country is not typically in a Mexican-based drug trafficker's area of expertise. Their interests tend to focus on their own territory, which they can control much more easily due to their familiarity with and proximity to it. Second, as seen in these latest arrests, U.S. law enforcement agencies are much more proficient at thwarting drug distribution operations than Mexican law enforcement agencies are. (LFM has recently proved very proficient indeed at challenging Mexican security forces.) By passing the drugs off to gangs in the United States, major cartels are also able to avoid a great deal of liability at the hands of U.S. law enforcement. In a way, LFM's efforts to move downstream, farther from the source of the cocaine, mirror those of other, larger Mexican DTOs that are expanding their control over the supply of cocaine in South America as they move upstream, closer to the source.
And this raises the question: Why would LFM want to expand its operations so deeply into the United States when other Mexican DTOs maintain a more superficial presence there? One possible answer is that LFM is much smaller than Sinaloa, Los Zetas and BLO, controls much less territory and gets a smaller share of the narcotics being trafficked through Mexico. By expanding business into the United States, LFM is able to leverage what little control it does have in order to gain access to the highly lucrative retail market. And then there is LFM's ideological bent, which makes it behave at times more like a cult than a purely pragmatic business.
Our answer to the above question is only conjecture. What is certain, at this point, is that there is now a precedent for Mexican DTOs to have a greater influence over their lower-level supply-chain operations in the United States. The details released in the Chicago indictment provide a better understanding of how Mexican-based drug traffickers impact the drug distribution network inside the United States and prove that at least one, "La Familia," is taking a very hands-on approach.
Securing the Border: Challenges for the U.S. and Mexico - Part 3
The United States and Mexico face systemic challenges in efforts to secure their shared border from drug cartel violence. In Part 3 of a special report, STRATFOR examines constraints on U.S. efforts to control crime and violence in the border region.
U.S.: Treasury Department Freezes Assets Of Companies Linked To Mexican Drug Cartel
The United States' Treasury Department has frozen the U.S.-based assets of 10 companies and 22 individual believed to be linked to Mexican drug cartel Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO), which is accused of smuggling drugs into the United States and of murdering Mexican counternarcotics agents, Reuters reported Dec. 3. The companies targeted have locations throughout Mexico, and are involved in businesses such as air and vehicle shipping, electronics retailing, hospitality services and health-products trade.
Mexico: Attorney General's Secretary Killed
Unknown gunmen ambushed and killed a secretary attached to the anti-kidnapping division of the Attorney General's office in Tijuana, El Universal reported Dec. 2. A 14-year-old girl was also killed in the attack. One person was arrested at the scene of the attack, but police did not immediately establish a connection between the suspect and the murder.
Securing the Border: Challenges for the U.S. and Mexico - Part 2
The United States and Mexico face systemic challenges in efforts to secure their shared border from drug cartel violence. In Part 2 of a special report, STRATFOR examines tactics used in cross-border smuggling and patrol operations and questions of corruption on both sides of the Rio Grande.
Securing the Border: Challenges for the U.S. and Mexico - Part 1
The United States and Mexico face systemic challenges in efforts to secure their shared border from drug cartel violence. In Part 1 of a special report, STRATFOR examines the geographic and political issues that weaken Mexico's central government and contribute to the strength of the cartels.
Mexico Security Memo: Nov. 30, 2009
Federal Police Intelligence Headquarters Opens
Mexican President Felipe Calderon and Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna inaugurated the Center of Intelligence of the Federal Police Nov. 25 on the campus of the Public Security Secretariat (SSP) headquarters in the Alvaro Obregon delegation of Mexico City. The building is complete with underground facilities and reportedly energy independent from the rest of the SSP campus and houses four departments: security, operations, national alerts and strategic installations. The center is directly connected to over 600 state and municipal offices as well as 169 Federal Police (PF) stations throughout the country. This new intelligence center represents a step forward in the PF's ability to battle organized crime across Mexico, but its true security and effectiveness remain questionable.
STRATFOR sources have indicated that this center has been operating for the last four months, allowing the operators to identify problems and make appropriate changes before the official opening. The center is also designed to be interoperable with Colombian and U.S. systems to allow a free flow of information among the three countries. However, the necessary information-sharing agreements reportedly are still in the works.
The opening of the intelligence center allows the PF to take on an active intelligence and investigative role by filling the vacuum left by the dissolution of the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) in May as part of national security reforms. Additionally, with near real-time data collection, analysis and dissemination, the center will allow agents in the field to make operational adjustments to cartel and other organized crime activities and adopt newer and more effective strategies faster.
The PF Center of Intelligence is said to be completely secure, similar to Special Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) utilized by the United States for briefing, communication and the analyses of information derived from classified sources and methods. Reportedly, the facility is virtually impenetrable to unauthorized visual, acoustical, technical and physical access. However, one element that no facility can be secure from is corruption. The centralization of sensitive information on cartel activity in this facility will undoubtedly make it a high-priority target for cartels to penetrate, if they haven't already. Corruption in endemic throughout Mexico and the federal security forces are far from immune, as the cartels' deep pockets have proved to be irresistible to even top officials in the past.
Increase in Violence and PF Deployment in Sinaloa
The organized crime-related death toll in Sinaloa state for the month of November crept over 100 on Nov. 23, making this month one of the bloodiest in recent months. During the week proceeding Nov. 23 there were more than 40 murders throughout the state, including 14 on Nov. 22. The recent increase in violence has been disproportionately concentrated in the cities of Culican and Navolato, and the increase has prompted deployment of 170 PF agents from Mexico City as reinforcement to the ongoing Joint Operation Culican-Navolato. Sinaloa Governor Jesus Aguilar Padilla also stated that a special operation will be launched in Navolato to increase security and investigate the 10 recent deaths in the city.
Sinaloa is no stranger to these levels of violence as the state has consistently ranked in the top five most violent states. The recent spike in violence can be attributed to the ongoing feud between the Sinaloa cartel, headed by Joaquin "El Cha













